



RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE OLIVE BRANCH.

Extract of a letter from James Madison, Esq. President of the United States.

Washington, January 28, 1815.

"I have not been able as yet to do more than glance at the plan of the work, and run over a few of its pages: The course adopted of assembling authentic and striking facts, and addressing them impartially and independently, but with becoming emphasis, to the attention of the public, was best fitted to render it a valuable and seasonable service: and it appears that the success of your labours will well reward the laudable views with which it was undertaken."

Extract of a letter from Thomas Jefferson, Esq. ex-president of the United States.

Monticello, Feb, 9, 1815.

"I thank you for the copy of the Olive Branch you have been so kind as to send me. Many extracts from it which I had seen in the newspapers, had excited a wish to procure it. A cursory view over the work has confirmed the opinion excited by the extracts, that it will do great good."

Extract of a letter from W. Sampson, Esq.

New York, Feb. 15, 1815.

"I have read your Olive Branch; and I can now express my sincere satisfaction. I must offer you my best compliments upon a production, which breathes the sentiments of pure and manly patriotism."

Extract of a letter from Orchard Cook, Esq.

Wiscasset, Me, April 2, 1815.

"Permit me to offer you my thanks for your incomparable work, the Olive Branch. You can hardly imagine how much it is admired, and how much good it is doing."

Extract of a letter from N. Biddle, Esq. a member of the Senate of Pennsylvania, a decided Federalist.

"Mr. Biddle takes this opportunity of expressing to Mr. Carey the satisfaction which he has derived from reading his manly appeal from the passions to the reason of contending parties."

Dec. 2, 1814.

Extract of a letter from the Hon. Wm. Eustis, Esq. now minister of the United States, in Holland.

Boston, Nov. 16, 1814.

"The Olive Branch is certainly calculated to do great good. It bears, as you observe, the marks of rapidity:—but it is the rapid, rectilineal course of an enlightened mind, directed by strong common sense."

Extract of a letter from a literary Gentleman in Baltimore.

Nov. 20, 1814.

"Accept my sincere and hearty thanks for the Olive Branch. So far as my opinion goes, it is the best timed and most masterly performance I ever saw."

Extract of a letter from Richard Rush, Esq. now Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States at the Court of St. James's.

Washington, April 28, 1815.

"R. R. has been free to declare upon all occasions, and the sentiment is now still further strengthened, that he thinks the country owes Mr. C. a very large debt for the patriotic, the zealous, and the intelligent efforts of his pen during the late struggle; for his energetic, spirited, yet candid defence of public principles and public measures; for his just exposition of our institutions; for his discriminating and indefatigable selection of authentic documents illustrative of our history, and the forcible, perspicuous, and unanswerable commentaries which he has superinduced upon them. R. R. places, at a very high rate, the share which Mr. Carey's publications have had in serving to rescue us from danger, and to secure our triumphs; and he anticipates in the mass of truth which they have diffused throughout the Union, effects from them of further and more lasting benefit."

"There is perhaps no book extant, that in so small a compass contains so great a quantity of momentous political truth. Like the two-edged sword, said to have been wielded by the angel of light against "Satan and his angels," it dispels and puts to flight an army of error and falsehood."—*Weekly Register*, vol. vii. page 371.

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE OLIVE BRANCH.

Extract of a letter from Phillip Freneau, Esq.

Mount Pleasant, October 30, 1815.

"Your Olive Branch has excited much attention, wherever people will at all read. According to an old saying, it is worth its weight in gold; and since the publication of Thomas Paine's Common Sense, I know nothing that has issued from the American press, of equal solid utility."

Extract of a letter from James J. Wilson, Esq. Member of the United States' Senate.

Trenton, June 21, 1815.

"I consider your work not only as a great present acquisition, but as likely to produce good effects for a long time to come."

Extract of a letter from Benjamin Austin, Esq.

Boston, Oct. 24, 1815.

"I consider the Olive Branch as the most lucid publication that has appeared since the violence of party has plunged the public mind into a chaos of political error."

Extract of a letter from the author of the British Spy.

Richmond, Nov. 1, 1815.

"I consider the Olive Branch as valuable in a high degree, and all that I have heard speak of it in this quarter, express themselves in the warmest terms of approbation."

Extract of a letter from Jesse Moore, Esq. Presiding Judge of the D. C. Pennsylvania.

Meadville, September 29, 1815.

"I have no hesitation in saying that by writing and publishing the Olive Branch, you have been a benefactor to the public; and that in this opinion, after the present mists of party spirit shall have evaporated, a very great proportion of the candid, honest, and intelligent men of every party will at length concur."

Extract of a letter from Dr. James Tilton.

Wilmington, Oct. 10, 1815.

"All that I hear of the Olive Branch, indicates that it passes with the same eclat among the people that Common Sense did in the Revolution."

From "Liberty Hall," a Cincinnati Newspaper.

"The Olive Branch, published by M. Carey, of Philadelphia, has perhaps been the most popular and useful publication ever printed in America. It will hereafter be a matter of record of the most important transactions and documents resulting from the war, and the causes that led to it."

Extract from the Western Herald, July 1815.

"The Author of the Olive Branch deserves the thanks and gratitude of the nation. We have no hesitation in saying that every man who can afford to buy a single book more than the Holy Scriptures, ought to buy the Olive Branch."

Extract of a letter from Jonathan Roberts, Esq member of the Senate of the United States.

"Your labours have contributed more than those of any other person, to remove the mists of prejudice and misrepresentation. You have not only laboured successfully to present a clear view of the conduct of both sides—but you have promulgated your writings with such diligence and success as to double your merits."

Letter from Mahlon Dickerson, Esq. late Governor of the state of New Jersey.

"Trenton, Dec. 5, 1817.

"I will thank you to set me down as a subscriber to your eighth edition of the Olive Branch. I have but two editions of that work—but should have had all, could I have procured them immediately on their first coming out.

"Be assured no man thinks more highly of this work than I do. It is so completely and peculiarly yours, that I should have discovered the author on reading four pages. Indeed, while reading it, I think I hear your voice, and see your manner."

THE
OLIVE BRANCH:
OR,
FAULTS ON BOTH SIDES,
FEDERAL AND DEMOCRATIC.
A SERIOUS APPEAL ON THE NECESSITY
OF
MUTUAL FORGIVENESS AND HARMONY.

BY M. CAREY.

TENTH EDITION, IMPROVED.

“Faction is the madness of the many for the benefit of the few.”

“Frenzied be the head—palsied be the hand—that attempts to destroy the union.” *Gen. Eaton*

“Truths would you teach—or save a sinking land :

“All fear—none aid you—and few understand.” *Pope.*

“Every kingdom divided against itself, is brought to DESOLATION.”

Matt xii. 25.

“In dissensione nulla salus conspicitur.” *Cæsar.*

“If we pay a proper regard to truth, we shall find it necessary not only to condemn our friends upon some occasions, and commend our enemies, but also to commend and condemn the same persons, as different circumstances may require ; for as it is not to be imagined, that those who are engaged in great affairs, should always be pursuing false or mistaken measures ; so neither is it probable that their conduct can be at all times exempt from error.” *Polybius.*

PHILADELPHIA :
PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY M. CAREY AND SON.

No. 126, Chesnut Street.

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June 1, 1818.

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Extract from Governor Strong's Speech, 17th January, 1806.

"Changes in the constitution of government are more injurious than in the system of laws: even a small innovation may destroy its principles. The framers of the constitution had before them not only the forms which had been preferred by the several states; but those also, which, before that time, had been devised in other ages and nations. And though the repeated experiments which have since taken place in *Europe*, may suggest matter for warning, they afford nothing for imitation. If, notwithstanding, it is found by experience, that the constitution operates very unequally, or the construction of any part is doubtful, amendments may be necessary to alter or explain it. *But it is in vain to expect that all will be satisfied.*—Free governments admit of an endless variety of modifications; When the constitution was established, perhaps no man that became subject to it was perfectly pleased with every part. *It was the result of mutual concession:* and such, indeed, must always be the case, when a form of government is voluntarily accepted by a community.

"*In the minds of some men, there seems to be a restlessness, which renders them dissatisfied with any uniform course of things, and makes them eager in the pursuit of novelty. They abound in projects, and are ever meditating some fanciful change in the plan of government, which their imaginations represent as useful. But men of great ambition are still more dangerous; they commonly make the fairest pretences to principles, though they are actuated only by self-interest. If the constitution or laws of their country present obstacles to the accomplishment of their wishes, they employ every artifice to alter or abolish them; and if individuals oppose their attempts, they are equally artful and solicitous to destroy their influence and render them odious to their fellow citizens.*

"Few men, even in a prosperous community, are fully satisfied with their condition. A great part are easily induced to believe, that there is something wrong in the government or laws, which might be rectified to their advantage. They therefore readily embrace any specious proposal to effect an alteration. *The crafty and ambitious know how to avail themselves of this disposition to change, and encourage their followers to expect that the amendments they propose will perfectly suit their case, and produce the very blessings they wish:* in this way they not only effect their immediate object, but acquire an influence which enables them afterwards to accomplish the most disastrous innovations. Such persons encourage hopes that can *never be realized*, and excite complaints which the most wise and benevolent administration is unable to remove.

"Our forms of government are, doubtless, like all other human institutions, imperfect; but they will insure the blessings of freedom to the citizens, and preserve their tranquillity, as long as they are virtuous; and no constitution that has been or can be formed will secure those blessings to a depraved and vicious people."

Extract from the Answer of the Massachusetts Senate to the above Speech.

"We shall look with a still more cautious eye upon every innovation attempted to be made upon our national constitution. The integrity, experience, and extensive information discovered by the illustrious characters, who framed that valuable instrument, and the series of public prosperity enjoyed under it, entitle it to our highest veneration; its excellence appears with still greater lustre, when compared with the ephemeral constitutions of many nations which have flitted across the eye in rapid succession, and then sunk into total oblivion. We are not insensible, that our form of government must be imperfect, as was the nature of its authors: but we recollect, at the same time, that *any proposed alteration, under the name of amendment, is liable to the same imperfections.*

"Believing, therefore, that the principles of the constitution are as well adjusted as human infirmity will permit, and that a small innovation may essentially pervert its original tendency, we shall exert ourselves to preserve it in its present form, except in cases where its operation shall be found extremely unequal and oppressive."

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THIS BOOK,

(AS A MARK OF GRATITUDE FOR
INESTIMABLE BLESSINGS ENJOYED, IN
LIBERTY OF PERSON, LIBERTY OF PROPERTY, AND LIBERTY
OF OPINIONS,
TO A DEGREE NEVER EXCEEDED IN THE WORLD,)
IS RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED
TO A BELOVED BUT BLEEDING COUNTRY,
TORN IN PIECES
BY
FACTIOUS, DESPERATE, CONVULSIVE, AND RUINOUS
STRUGGLES FOR POWER.

IT IS LIKEWISE DEDICATED TO THOSE
MILLIONS OF HUMAN BEINGS,
WHO NEITHER HOLD NOR SEEK OFFICE ;
BUT WHO ARE MADE THE INSTRUMENTS OF THOSE
WHO DO SEEK THEM :
AND WHO, WHILE A FOREIGN ENEMY PRESSES
AT THEIR DOORS,
ARE ENFEEBLED AND KEPT FROM UNION,
TO GRATIFY THE AMBITION OF
A FEW MEN,
(NOT ONE IN FIVE THOUSAND OF THE WHOLE COMMUNITY)
WHO HAVE BROUGHT
TO THE VERY VERGE OF DESTRUCTION,
THE FAIREST PROSPECT
EVER VOUCHSAFED BY HEAVEN TO ANY NATION.

BY THE AUTHOR.

Philad. Nov. 8, 1814.

O. B.

GO, OLIVE BRANCH,
INTO A COMMUNITY, WHICH, DRUGGED INTO
A DEATH-LIKE STUPOR,
WITH UNPARALLELED APATHY BEHOLDS
THE
PILLARS OF THE GOVERNMENT TEARING AWAY;
THE NATION
NEARLY PROSTRATE AT THE FEET OF A RUTHLESS FOE;
ANARCHY RAPIDLY APPROACHING;
A NUMBER OF AMBITIOUS LEADERS, REGARDLESS
OF THE
COMMON DANGER,
STRUGGLING TO SEIZE UPON THE GOVERNMENT,
AND
APPARENTLY DETERMINED THE COUNTRY SHALL GO TO
PERDITION,
UNLESS THEY CAN POSSESS THEMSELVES OF POWER.
AND, WITH THIS VIEW, OPPOSING AND DEFEATING
EVERY MEASURE,
CALCULATED TO INSURE SALVATION

APPEAL TO THE PATRIOTISM,
THE HONOUR, THE FEELING, THE SELF-INTEREST OF YOUR
READERS,
TO SAVE A NOBLE NATION FROM RUIN.

Philad. Jan. 4, 1815.

PREFACE

TO THE FIRST EDITION.

*Philadelphia, Nov. 8, 1814.**

THIS work is submitted to the public with an uncommon degree of solicitude and anxiety. The subject it embraces, and the objects it has in view, are of inexpressible magnitude. The former is the present critical situation of the United States, with the causes that have led to that situation ; the latter, the mitigation of party rage and rancour, and the restoration of harmony.

It is no longer doubtful that a conspiracy exists in New England, among a few of the most wealthy and influential citizens, to effect a dissolution of the union, at every hazard, and to form a separate confederacy. This has been believed by some of our citizens for years, and strenuously denied by others, deceived by the mask the conspirators wore, and by their hollow professions. But it requires more than Bæotian stupidity and dullness, to hesitate on the subject, after the late extraordinary proceedings, which cannot possibly have any other object.

Eighteen years have elapsed since this dangerous project was first promulgated.† From that period to the present, it has never been out of view. The end and the means were equally unholy and pernicious. Falsehood, deception, and calumny, in turn, have been employed to aid the design. The passions of the citizens have been kept in a constant state of the most extravagant excitement. Every act of the government has been placed in the most revolting point of view. And to the public functionaries have been unceasingly ascribed the most odious objects, pursued by the most detestable means.

About two-thirds of the papers published in the eastern states, are opposed to the present administration. They are all ex-parte. A single number of the Centinel, Repertory, Boston Gazette, &c. rarely appears free from abuse of the administration. And I am pretty well convinced that attempts at vindication are hardly ever admitted. The object steadily and invariably pur-

* The reader is requested, in reading the different Prefaces, to pay particular attention to their dates.

† In a series of essays, published under the signature of Pelham, in the Connecticut Courant, 1796.

sued, is to run down the incumbents in office at all events. To this object every thing is made subservient, and every means of effecting it is regarded as lawful.

On the injustice, the cruelty of this procedure, it is needless to descant. It is treating the highest public functionaries of the country, chosen by the unbiassed suffrages of a free people, with more cruelty and injustice than we should display towards the veriest rascal in society. Were he accused of any crime whatever, his defence would be patiently heard before sentence would be pronounced. But our first magistrate, and other public officers, are accused, tried, and condemned, without a possibility of defence.

This is a great and deplorable evil—an evil so inveterate, as to render a remedy almost hopeless. It is hardly possible for any government to stand against such an unjust system, which is pregnant with the most awful consequences to society.

It will be said that there are many newspapers devoted to the defence of the administration, as well as to destroy it. This does not remove the difficulty. Such are the folly and madness of the times, that the mass of our citizens confine themselves to those papers calculated to strengthen their prejudices. They rarely read defences, if any appear.

And thus it is not surprising that those prejudices daily become more violent, and more extensive in their operation—and that through the address and industry of artful men, some of our citizens, otherwise highly estimable, are prepared to destroy that constitution, to whose abuse and perversion they ascribe all these sufferings which have really flowed from the rapacity and injustice of the belligerents.

Besides the party in New England, who are determined on a separation of the states for their own aggrandizement—there is one in the middle states equally dangerous. They are daily engaged in preparing the public mind for seizing the reins of government by violence, and expelling the public functionaries.

With these gentlemen, it is a favourite idea, to send “the president to Elba,” and supply his place with one of their own friends, and thus save the people the necessity of another election. Mr. Barent Gardenier, of New York, editor of the *Courier*, and a few violent men in congress, are the most active of this party. All their talents and industry are devoted to this vile purpose.

Blood and murder—lanterns and guillotines apart, this is as revolutionary, as disorganizing, as jacobinical a project as any of those conceived by Danton, Legendre, Marat, Petion, or Robespierre, in the early stages of the French revolution. And, reader, “*lay not the flattering unction to your soul*,” that we shall, in this event, escape *bloodshed*. It is as impossible that such

a flagitious project should be carried into operation, without rivers of blood being shed, as that you could tear away the foundations on which a mighty edifice rests, without the edifice itself crumbling to ruins ; or remove the dykes which oppose the violence of rushing torrents, and not have the circumjacent country overflowed.

A favourite phrase with Mr. Gardenier is, that "*the present administration must come down.*" This is quite explicit. It is impossible to mistake the intention, or the mode of effecting it. The latter is very simple. History furnishes numerous examples. It is the mode by which, after the Rubicon was passed, Julius Cæsar rose to power on the ruins of the commonwealth ; by which Cromwell expelled the Rump parliament, and seized the reins of government ; and, to come to a later period, it is the mode whereby Bonaparte made himself master of the destinies of France.

But, Mr. Gardenier, we are not ripe for this project yet. Can you, or can general Robert Wharton, (Mayor of Philadelphia) who has given the toast—"James Madison, on the island of Elba"—can you, I say, be mad enough to believe, that the hardy yeomanry of New York, New Jersey, or Pennsylvania, will allow any band of desperadoes with impunity to tear the highest public functionaries of the nation from their seats—men chosen in strict conformity with the terms of the social compact ?

If you flatter yourselves with any such pleasing delusions, awake, and shake off the mighty error. Rely upon it, that those who may make the sacrilegious attempt, will, with their deluded followers, suffer condign punishment as traitors.

For a considerable time past, the United States have exhibited a spectacle of the most extraordinary kind, and almost unique in the history of the world.

Our constitution has probably but one material defect. It wants a due degree of energy, particularly pending war. If it were free from this, it might endure as many ages as the Spartan or Roman government.

This defect must be a subject of deep and serious regret to all good men, not merely our cotemporaries or countrymen, but to those in future times and distant countries, who may feel an interest in the happiness of their fellow men. In perusing history, we lament the errors of our ancestors—ours will be a subject of lamentation to posterity.

This serious defect in the frame of our government, renders it the imperious duty of all good citizens to uphold and support it with all their energy. But, all considerations of duty apart, mere selfishness ought to prompt those who have any interest in

the welfare of the country, who may lose, but cannot gain by convulsions, and tumults, and confusion, and anarchy, with all their efforts to uphold the government which protects them in the enjoyment of all the blessings of life.

It is, however, awful to relate, that a large proportion of the wealthiest men in the community have been as sedulously employed in tearing down the pillars of the government—in throwing every obstacle and difficulty and embarrassment in the way of its administrators, as if it were equally oppressive with that of Algiers or Turkey, or as if they could derive advantage from anarchy. Should they be cursed with final success in their endeavours, they and their posterity will long mourn the consequences.

The national vessel is on rocks and quicksands, and in danger of shipwreck. There is, moreover, a larger and more formidable vessel preparing all possible means for her destruction. But, instead of efforts to extricate her, the crew are distracted by a dispute how she came into that situation. The grand and only object with a part of them is to seize the helm—and, rather than not succeed, they are resolved she shall run the risque of going to perdition. This party swears that all our difficulties and dangers are owing to the imbecility, the corruption, the madness, the folly of the pilot, whom they threaten with “a halter,” or to put him ashore “on the island of Elba.” The others swear with equal vehemence, that the refractory, turbulent, and factious spirit of the mutinous part of the crew has run the vessel aground. They are, accordingly, determined to defend the pilot. A few individuals, who see that both parties have contributed to produce this calamitous event, in vain hold out “*the Olive Branch*,” and implore them to suspend all enquiry into the cause of the danger till the ship is extricated. But it is in vain. While the parties are more and more inflamed against each other, the vessel bilges on a sharp rock—down she goes—pilot—and supporters—and mutineers—and peace makers—all in one common destruction!

This, I am fearful, will be our fate. But it may be prevented. All that is necessary is that a few influential men in the different states unite—bury the hatchet—and lay aside all minor considerations while the vessel of state is in danger. This policy is so obviously just, that one hundred individuals throughout the union setting the example, would have sufficient influence to accomplish the blessed object of saving their country.

Will the Clarksons, the Rays, the Ludlows, the Remsens, the Ogdens, the Pearsalls, the Lenoxes, the Harrisons, the Lawrences, the M'Cormicks, of New York—the Willings, the Francises, the Norrises, the Biddles, the Latimers, the Tilghmans, the Walns, the Ralstons, the Lewises, of Philadelphia—the Gilmors, the Olivers, the Sterets, the Howards, the Smiths, the

Bryces, the Grahams, the Cookes, of Baltimore—and other such estimable federalists throughout the union, continue to regard with apathy the dangers of their country, and not make a bold and decisive stand to rescue her? No. It cannot be. Heaven has not, I hope, so far blotted us out of its favourable remembrance, as to abandon us to such a frightful destiny. It will, I hope, at this late hour, interpose for our salvation, and dispel the horrible mists of passion and prejudice—of madness and folly—which intercept from our view the abyss that yawns before us, ready to swallow us up in remediless destruction.

In England, the opposition to the ministry is always violent, and, like the opposition here, is too generally directed against *all the measures of government*, whether meritorious or otherwise. But there is in parliament a substantial *country party*, which occasionally votes with the minister, and occasionally with the opposition—supporting or opposing measures as conscience dictates.

It is a most unfortunate fact, that in congress the number of members of this description is *very small*. That body may be generally classed into federalists and democrats, who too frequently vote in solid columns.* There are, I grant, laudable exceptions. But they are too rare.

This is one of the worst features in the situation of the country. The indiscriminate adherence to party, and uniform support of party arrangements, *encourage the leaders to proceed to extremities*, and to adopt violent and pernicious measures, which the good sense of their followers may reprobate, but from which they have not *fortitude enough to withhold their support*. This has been in all countries the most frightful of the consequences of the unholy and deleterious spirit of faction. Men, originally of the purest hearts and best intentions, are, by this *ignis fatuus*, gradually corrupted, and led step by step to unite in acts, at which they would, at the commencement of their career, have recoiled with horror and affright. I believe it is a sound political maxim, that *a thoroughgoing party-man cannot be a perfectly honest politician*; for there perhaps never yet was a party free from errors and crimes, more or less gross, in exact proportion to the folly or the wickedness of its leaders.

The Jews, besieged by Titus, within the walls of their metropolis, availed themselves of the cessation of the hostile attacks of their external enemies, to glut their vengeance, and malice, and factious spirit, by butchering each other—and thus both parties fell an easy prey to the invaders. To this deplorable pitch of madness, *we have not yet arrived*. But that we have hitherto escaped this calamity, is not for want of industry on the part of those who are unceasingly employed as incendiaries in blowing

* This state of things has materially changed since the war. Party spirit in Congress has very nearly subsided. May, 1818.

up the flames of discord, and preparing us for similar scenes. The cool, and calm, and temperate part of the community, appear torpid and languid, and take no steps to avert the awful catastrophe. Let them awake from their slumbers soon; or, at no distant day, the evil may be remediless, and they will in vain mourn over their folly.

I believe Mr. Madison perfectly upright; that his administration of the government has been conducted with as pure intentions, as ever actuated a first magistrate of any country; and that lord Chatham, or the great Sully, would have found it a very arduous task to manage the helm under the difficulties, external and internal, that he has had to contend with. But were it a question that related wholly to Mr. Madison or his administration, I should never have trespassed on the public.—Were Mr. Madison as patriotic as Curtius, or the Decii, as just as Aristides—and as immaculate as an archangel—nay, were all the heroes and statesmen of the revolution restored to life, and entrusted with the administration—I should consider their honour, their interests, their happiness, or their safety, as dust in the balance, compared with the salvation of eight millions of people.

It is difficult to conceive an object more worthy of the efforts of an ardent mind. A review of history will convince any reasonable or candid person, that there probably never was, and indubitably there is not at present, a more interesting portion of the human species, than the inhabitants of the United States. There never was a nation in which all the solid blessings and comforts of life were more fully enjoyed than they are here, and were secured by such slender sacrifices. I am not so blind an admirer, as to presume that the nation has no defects. There never was a nation or individual free from them. But take all the leading points that give assurance of happiness, and afford the necessary indications of respectability; and at no period can there be found a nation standing on more elevated ground.

The former points of difference between the federalists and democrats have, for the present, lost all their importance. They are merged in objects of incomparably higher moment. Evils of incalculable magnitude menace us. A powerful enemy, flushed with success, and with superabundant means of annoyance, hovers on our coasts; and, through his formidable navy, can inflict on us deep and lasting injury. And what is pregnant with more terror by far, instead of aiding to extricate us from this perilous situation, the opportunity of a season of difficulty and danger is seized on to attempt the dissolution of the union; to raise up hostile and jarring confederacies; and to destroy the hopes mankind have formed of our noble governmental experiment.

To dispute about the minor points that have divided the parties heretofore, is madness. How superlative would be the folly

and absurdity of two men, who were fighting about the interior decorations and arrangements of an edifice, regardless of the operations of two others, one of whom was undermining and preparing to blow it up in the air, and the other providing a torch to set it on fire? A strait jacket would be too slender a restraint for them. Such are the folly and madness of those democrats and federalists who continue their warfare about the mode of administering the government, or the persons by whom it shall be administered, at a time when the government itself is in danger of being destroyed root and branch.

The plan of this work requires some short explanation. I believe the country to be in imminent danger of a convulsion, whereof the human mind cannot calculate the consequences. The nation is divided into two hostile parties, whose animosity towards each other is daily increased by inflammatory publications. Each charges the other with the guilt of having produced the present alarming state of affairs. In private life, when two individuals quarrel, and each believes the other wholly in the wrong, a reconciliation is hardly practicable. But when they can be convinced that the errors are mutual—as is almost universally the case—they open their ears to the voice of reason, and are willing to meet each other half way. A maxim sound in private affairs, is rarely unsound in public life. While a violent federalist believes all the evils of the present state of things have arisen from the guilt of the administration, nothing less will satisfy him than hurling Mr. Madison from the seat of government, and “*sending him to Elba.*” While, on the other hand, a violent democrat persuades himself that all our dangers have arisen from the difficulties and embarrassments constantly and steadily thrown in the way of the administration by the federalists, he is utterly averse to any compromise.—Each looks down upon the other with scorn and hatred, as the Pharisee in the Gospel, upon the publican. I have endeavoured to prove, and I believe I have fully proved, that each party has a heavy debt of error, and folly, and guilt, to answer for to its injured country, and to posterity—and, as I have stated in the body of this work, that mutual forgiveness is no more than an act of justice—and can lay no claim to the character of liberality on either side.

But even supposing for a moment—what probably hardly ever occurred since the world was formed—that the error is all on one side, is it less insane in the other to increase the difficulty of extrication—to refuse its aid—to embarrass those who have the management of affairs? My house is on fire. Instead of calling for aid—or providing fire-engines—or endeavouring to smother the flames—I institute an inquiry how it took fire—whether by accident or design—and if by design, who was the

incendiary ; and further undertake to punish him on the spot for his wickedness ! a most wise and wonderful procedure—and just on a level with the wisdom, and patriotism, and public spirit of those sapient members of congress, who spend days in making long speeches upon the cause of the war, and the errors of its management—every idea whereof has been a hundred, perhaps a thousand times repeated in the newspapers—instead of meeting the pressing and imperious necessity of the emergency.

I claim but one merit in this production, and that is by no means inconsiderable. It is, that with a perfect knowledge of the furious, remorseless, never-dying, and cut-throat hostility, with which Faction has in all ages persecuted those who have dared oppose her—and perfectly satisfied, that with us she is an implacable, as malignant, and as inexorable a monster as she has ever been, I have dared, nevertheless, to state the truth, regardless of the consequences. I was, it is true, reluctant. I should by far have preferred, for the remainder of my life, steering clear of the quicksands of politics. None of the questions that have heretofore divided parties in this country, could have induced me to venture upon the tempestuous ocean. But at a crisis like the present, neutrality would be guilt. The question now is between the friends of social order, and jacobins, who are endeavouring to destroy the whole fabric of government, with the slender chance of building it up again—between peace and harmony on one side, and civil war and anarchy on the other. A lamentable delusion prevails. The community shut their eyes against the truth on the subject. But this is the real state of the case, or I am as grossly deceived as ever was human being. And unless some of our influential men exert themselves to allay the storm, a few short months will change doubt into awful and dreadful certainty.

While I was deliberating about the sacrifice which such a publication as this requires, one serious and affecting consideration removed my doubts, and decided my conduct. Seeing thousands of the flower of our population—to whom the spring of life just opens with all its joys, and pleasures, and enchantments—prepared in the tented field to risk, or, if necessary, sacrifice their lives for their country's welfare ; I thought it would be baseness in me, whose sun has long passed the meridian, and on whom the attractions of life have ceased to operate with their early fascinations, to have declined any risk that might arise from the effort to ward off the patricidal stroke aimed at a country to which I owe such heavy obligations. With this view of the subject, I could not decide otherwise than I have done.

On the execution of the work it behoves me to offer a few remarks. I know it is very considerably imperfect. It is hard-

ly possible to prepare any literary production under greater disadvantages than have attended the Olive Branch. A large portion of it is, therefore, crude, and indigested, and without order. Were it a treatise on morals, religion, history, or science, which could not suffer by the delay necessary to mature and methodize it, I should be unpardonable, and deserve the severest castigation of criticism, for presenting it to the public in this unfinished state. But the exigencies of the times are so pressing, that were it delayed till I could digest it properly, it might be wholly out of season.

It would be unjust were I not to acknowledge the numerous and weighty obligations I owe to "The Weekly Register," edited by H. Niles, the best periodical work ever published in America, from which I have drawn a large portion of the facts and documents I have employed. I venture to assert that no American library can be complete without this work.

I have carefully studied to be correct in point of fact and argument. But the circumstances under which I have written, render it probable that I may have fallen into errors. I shall therefore regard it as a most particular favour, if any gentleman who discovers them, however minute, will frankly point them out, and they shall be most cheerfully corrected. If of sufficient importance, I shall make a public acknowledgment in the newspapers. If the cause I espouse cannot be supported by truth, candour, and fair argument, may it perish, never to find another advocate!

PLAN OF AN UNION SOCIETY.

"Above all things hold dear your national union. Accustom yourselves to estimate its infinite value to your individual and national happiness. Look on it as the palladium of your tranquillity at home; of your peace abroad; of your safety; of your prosperity; and even of that liberty which you so highly prize"

WASHINGTON'S FAREWELL ADDRESS.

WHEREAS many disaffected citizens have long laboured to prepare the public mind for a dissolution of the union, and the formation of separate confederacies; and whereas they have at length publicly and daringly avowed their flagitious designs; and whereas the experience of all history to the present time affords the most complete proof that such dissolutions of existing forms of government, and the formation of new ones, have almost invariably produced bloody civil wars, the greatest curse that ever afflicted mankind; and whereas the present form of the general government, if duly supported by our citizens, is calculated to produce as high a degree of happiness as has ever fallen to the lot of any nation; and whereas the separate confederacies, contemplated as substitutes for the present general

confederacy, even if it were possible to establish them peaceably, would be pregnant with interminable future wars, such as have almost constantly prevailed between neighbouring states, with rival interests, real or supposed ; and would hold out every possible inducement, and every desirable facility, to foreign nations, to array each against the other, and thus subjugate the whole, or at least render them dependent upon, or subservient to those foreign nations ; and whereas, finally, it would be absolute madness to throw away the incalculable blessings we enjoy, for the mere chance of bettering our condition, and still more for the absolute certainty of rendering it much worse :

Therefore *resolved*, that we the subscribers do associate under the title of THE WASHINGTON UNION SOCIETY, of which the following is the

CONSTITUTION.

I. We solemnly pledge ourselves to support by every honourable and legal means in our power, the existing form of the general government.

II. That we will use our utmost endeavours to counteract, as far as in our power, all plots for the dissolution of the union.

III. That we will correspond and cheerfully co-operate with all individuals, and bodies of men, in all parts of the union, who have the same views with us on the object embraced in the second article, however they may differ from us on other political topics.

IV. That the officers of the society shall be a president, vice-president, secretary, treasurer, committee of correspondence, and committee of elections.

V. That it shall be the duty of the committee of correspondence, to invite the good citizens of this state, and of the other states, to form similar societies, and to correspond with them ; to investigate and expose to public abhorrence, the various plans that have been adopted from time to time, to effect the parricidal purpose of dissolving the union ; to place in the strongest point of light the advantages of our blessed form of government, with the tremendous consequences of civil war, and (the inevitable result of a separation) our being instruments in the hands of the great powers of Europe, to annoy, ravage, depopulate, slaughter, and destroy each other.

PREFACE

TO THE SECOND EDITION.

Philadelphia, January 4, 1815.

THE unequivocal and decided approbation with which the former edition of this work has been favoured by respectable men of both the hostile parties that divide this country, I regard as among the most grateful circumstances of my life. Its numerous defects—its want of method—and the great imperfection of its style and manner—were, I presume, regarded as atoned for by its obvious and undeniable object—the object of contributing my feeble efforts towards allaying the effervescence, the turbulence, the animosity that pervade the community, and are pregnant with such alarming consequences.

Of the time that has elapsed since its first appearance, I have availed myself, to amplify—to methodize—and to improve it. And although I am very far indeed from presuming it to be perfect, yet I hope it will be found more entitled to patronage than it was in its original *deshabille*.

It embraces a very convulsed period of our history; and has been written under no common disadvantages. I have laboured under a great deficiency of various materials and documents, which no exertions have enabled me to procure—and it has been begun, carried on, and completed in moments constantly subject to those interruptions inevitable in the pressure of business. To suppose, then, it were perfect, would argue a degree of insanity which the fondest and most doting delirium of paternal vanity could hardly palliate. It would be a case unparalleled in the annals of literature. The world has had numerous instances of men of most splendid talents—of laborious research, with abundant materials and documents—enjoying full leisure to do justice to their subjects—and employing years for the purpose—yet falling into egregious errors. It could not then be expected that a work embracing such a variety of objects, and written under such disadvantages as I have stated, should be free from them. But the reader may rest assured that whatever they may be, they have not resulted from design. They are the offspring of slenderness of talents—deficiency of materials—inadvertence—or that bias to which all men are subject, in a greater or less degree, when treating on subjects wherein

they feel deeply interested : of the latter, however, I have laboured to divest myself.

Had I written with any view to literary reputation, the work would have made a totally different appearance. Instead of presenting the reader with so many documents verbatim, I should, as is usual with other writers, have given abstracts of them in my own words—and thus formed a regular connected narrative of events, far more agreeable to read than the work in its present form, and rather easier to write ; for the reader may rest assured, that I have frequently written three pages in less time than I employed in the search for a document, which does not occupy a single page, and whereof I could have readily given an analysis ; and long laborious researches for a document or newspaper paragraph or essay, have not unfrequently been wholly in vain.

But though a thirst for literary reputation is far from illaudable—and though it inspires to great exertions, it has not had the slightest influence on me in this case. It would have been utterly unavailing to counteract the loathing, the abhorrence I felt at entering into political discussion, or for making myself once more an object of newspaper abuse, of which few men in private life have been honoured with a greater share.

No. I appeal to heaven for the truth of what I now declare. I soared to higher objects, far beyond such narrow views. I believed—I still believe—that a dissolution of the union is contemplated by a few ambitious and wicked men ; that in the state of excitement to which the public mind is raised, and which is hourly increasing by the most profligate disregard of truth and of the welfare of the country—and by the utmost prostitution of talents—a mere trifle would suffice to produce a convulsion—(as, when you have collected together a quantity of highly combustible materials, a single spark suffices to produce a conflagration)—that a dissolution of the union would infallibly produce a civil war ; that in the event of a civil war, there would be a struggle throughout the country for ascendancy, wherein would be perpetrated atrocities similar to those which disgraced the French revolution ; that even if we escaped a civil war, or, (if we did not) after its termination, and the establishment of separate confederacies, the country would be cursed with a constant border war, fomented by the nations of Europe, to whom we should be a sport and a prey ; and that, in one word, a nation most highly favoured by heaven, is on the very verge of perdition.

These views may be erroneous. Would to heaven they were ! They differ from those of most of my friends. The mass of the community do not accord with them. But they are unalterably impressed upon my mind, and I cannot shake them off. They

are all supported by the instructive but neglected voice of history. I possess not the happy faculty with which so many are endowed, to believe an event will not take place, because I hope and pray it may not. I am disposed to envy those who are thus gifted. It diminishes the hours of suffering. In a life so chequered as ours, this is some advantage. But it has, like all other blessings, a counterpoising evil. When we disbelieve in the approach of danger, we make no preparations to repel it.

With these impressions, I preferred risking any consequences, however pernicious to myself, that might arise from the present work, to a state of torpor and inactivity—to perishing without an effort. In a sanguine moment, I indulged the flattering, the fond, (pray heaven it may not be the delusive) hope that my efforts might be so far crowned with success, as to make me the happy, the blessed instrument of arousing even one, two, or three active influential citizens from the morbid, the lethargic slumber, into which the community has been so fatally lulled; that these might arouse others; and that thus the potent spells might be dissolved, which, in a manner unexampled in the history of the world, make us regard with stupid, torpid apathy and indifference, the actual bankruptcy of our government (produced by a most daring conspiracy)—the impending destruction of our glorious constitution, the work of Washington, Franklin, Livingston, Hamilton, &c. the depreciation of every species of property—and the approaching ruin of our country. Should heaven thus bless me, die afterwards when I may, I shall not have lived in vain. Should I fail, on my tombstone shall be engraven, “*magnis excidit ausis.*”

I offer these great and solemn truths to the consideration of all who have an interest in the welfare of this country.

I. *A separation of the states cannot be effected without an immediate CIVIL, and almost continual BORDER WAR; and must inevitably place us at the mercy of England, and make this country the sport of the European powers at all future times.*

II. As well might we expect to re-unite, without a flaw, the fragments of an elegant porcelain vase, shattered to pieces, as to restore the union, if dissolved but for one hour.

III. A period of war, and invasion, and danger, is utterly unfit for repairing or amending a constitution. Nothing but convulsion can arise out of the attempt.

IV. General Washington, in his legacy, one of the noblest efforts of human wisdom, impressively urged his countrymen to frown indignantly upon any attempt to impair or dissolve the union.

V. To hostile European powers a dissolution would be of immense and incalculable advantage.

VI. It would be inexpressible folly and madness to reject the policy dictated by Washington, and follow that which would be dictated by those powers of Europe who regard our prosperity with jealousy; to abandon the maxims of our most devoted friend for those of our most deadly enemies.

PREFACE

TO THE FOURTH EDITION.*

Philadelphia, April 10, 1815.

I COMMENCE this preface, with feelings very different indeed from those by which I was actuated, when I penned the former ones. Prospects, public and private, have wonderfully improved. A revolution, immense, striking, glorious, and delightful, has taken place in the affairs of our blessed country, for which we cannot be sufficiently grateful to heaven. We have not—I say emphatically, we have not—merited the change. I could assign various satisfactory reasons in proof of this opinion, extraordinary as it may seem. I waive them. It is unnecessary to enter into the recapitulation. But whatever may have been our past merits or demerits, I hope our prosperity is now fixed on a basis as firm as the rock of Gibraltar.

In the present tranquillized state of the public mind, when the fears and solitudes excited by the late alarming state of affairs have subsided, it will be difficult for the reader to justify, or even to account for, the warmth which many parts of this work display. It is therefore but justice to myself, to give a rapid sketch of the scenes through which we have passed, in order to account for the excitement of mind so obvious to every reader in the perusal of some of the chapters.

The government had been nearly reduced to bankruptcy, and unable to raise money to discharge the most imperious engagements. There was no general circulating medium in the country. The banks from New-York to New-Orleans, inclusively, had, with perhaps one or two exceptions, suspended the payment of specie. The bank notes of Philadelphia and New-York were depreciated in Boston from 15 to 25 per cent. below par. And every feature in our political affairs wore an equally awful aspect. Whether the causes I have assigned in chapter LII. really produced this state of things or not, is immaterial. Be the cause what it may, the fact existed. Want of money had partially suspended the recruiting service. And

* The third edition, of 1250 copies, was printed in Boston.

the pacification of Europe had quadrupled the disposable force of our enemy, and in the same degree increased our danger, and the necessity for energy and vigilance.

Under these circumstances, congress was convened on the 19th of September, nearly two months earlier than the period fixed by law, in order to make provision for such an extraordinary emergency. The state of the nation was fully detailed in various executive communications, which called, imperiously called, for energy and decision.

Rarely has a legislative body had more important duties to fulfil, or a more glorious opportunity of signalizing itself, and laying claim to the public gratitude. Rarely have stronger motives existed, to arouse every spark of public spirit or patriotism that had lain dormant in the heart. And I venture to assert, there hardly ever was a legislature that more completely disappointed public expectation—that more egregiously failed of its duty.

The imbecility, the folly, the vacillation, the want of system, of energy, and of decision, displayed by the majority—and the unyielding, stubborn, violent, and factious opposition of the minority, to all the measures for which the occasion so loudly called—have affixed an indelible stain on the memory of the thirteenth congress. It will be long remembered with emotions neither of gratitude nor respect. No where, I am persuaded, in the annals of legislation, is there to be found an instance of precious time more astonishingly wasted. It had been in session nearly five months when the news of peace arrived—and had but three weeks to sit. The spring, the season of hostility and depredation, was rapidly approaching. And what had it done to serve or save its country? What provision had it made of men or money? Little or none. Nearly all the measures adapted to the emergency that had been brought forward in congress, had been defeated.*

That this state of public affairs was calculated to excite warmth of feeling, and to call forth a strong expression of that warmth, must be obvious—and will not merely account for, but justify the high-wrought passages to be found in the work, which, under other circumstances, might perhaps be indefensible.

* I have asserted elsewhere, that England presents much to admire and copy. In this point she is transcendently superior to us. Had the British parliament been called in such a crisis as existed last September in this country, all the effective preparations necessary to breast the storm, would have been made in one week. Some of the declamatory speeches, of two or three days long, occupied as much time as that parliament would have required to raise fifty millions of money, and to provide means for embodying an army of 50,000 men.

It will be asked, what good purpose can the re-publication of this work answer at present? Is it not, it will be said, far better to bury the hatchet, and to consign these things to oblivion, than to keep alive animosity and discord?

Were the tendency of the Olive Branch to keep alive discord, I should unhesitatingly consign it to the flames. But I utterly disbelieve this can be the consequence. I cannot admit that a fair detail of the mutual follies and wickedness of the two parties, has a tendency to perpetuate hostility between them. It is contrary to reason, common sense, and the universal experience of mankind.

Peace, or harmony, or conciliation, is not to be hoped for, while both parties clothe themselves in the deceptive mantle of self-righteousness—while they not only believe themselves immaculate, but their opponents “*monsters unredeemed by any virtue.*”^{*} Nothing but a serious, solemn, and deep-rooted conviction on both sides, of egregious misconduct, can lead to that temper of mind which is necessary to produce a mild, conciliating spirit. While each acts the part of the self-approving pharisee, we might with equal chance of success attempt to unite fire and water—light and darkness—virtue and vice, as to reconcile them. But when both regard themselves in their true light, as offenders against their duties to their country, they will be disposed to forgive, that they may be forgiven. This idea, which is the basis whereon this work rests, cannot be too often repeated, and inculcated on the public mind.

I fondly hope the Olive Branch will have other uses—that it may serve as a beacon to other times than ours. When a navigator discovers new shoals, and rocks, and quicksands, he marks them on his chart, to admonish future navigators to be on their guard, and to shun the destruction to which ignorance might lead.

This strongly applies to our case. By an extraordinary mixture of folly and wickedness, we had run the vessel of state on rocks, and quicksands, and breakers, where she was in imminent danger of perishing. We had brought to the verge of perdition the noblest form of government, and the most free and happy people, that the sun ever beheld. But, thanks to heaven—not to our virtue,† our public spirit, or our liberality—we

^{*} *Monstra nulla virtute redempta.*

† The illustrious heroes of the western country—our gallant navy—several of our generals and armies on the lines—the citizens of Baltimore and of Stonington—the garrison at Crany island—and the people of some other places—are obviously exempt from this censure. And never was there greater energy displayed than in New York, in making preparations for the warm reception of an enemy. But when we consider the violence of the eastern states against the rulers chosen by the people, the torpor and indifference of the mighty state of Pennsylvania, and of other portions of the union, we must heave a sigh, and draw a veil over past scenes.

have escaped. We have arrived safe in port. I have endeavoured to delineate a chart of the most formidable of the rocks on which our vessel was striking, to serve as a guide to future state pilots. I trust the chart cannot be examined attentively without benefit. It establishes an important, but most awful political maxim, that during the prevalence of the destructive, and devouring, and execrable spirit of faction, men, otherwise good and respectable, will too frequently sacrifice, without scruple or remorse, the most vital interests of their country, under the dictates, and to promote the views, of violent and ambitious leaders! What a terrific subject for contemplation!

The publication of this book has established one point, of considerable importance to the truth of history, and to the happiness of mankind; that it is not quite so dangerous, as has been supposed, for a writer to draw a portrait of his cotemporaries—provided the features be faithfully and impartially delineated. It has been too generally presumed to be utterly unsafe to write of our own times with truth. With this idea I was impressed when I first engaged in the work. And it required no common stimulus to inspire me with the hardihood the undertaking required.

But the event has falsified the anticipation. Without any of the advantages that office, or rank, or connexions afford, I have dared publicly to stigmatize faction, and jacobinism, and disorganization—as well as factious men, and jacobins, and disorganizers—by their proper names, without distinction of party. And the reliance I placed upon the good sense of the public has not been disappointed. My efforts have been received by a large proportion of the good and great men of the nation with a favour and kindness, which fill my heart with the most exquisite pleasure—and amply repay my trouble and my risk—the sacrifice of my business and of my enjoyments, during the progress of the work—and hold out encouragement to political writers to shun that slavish and dishonourable devotion to party, whereby truth is sacrificed, and history made a mere tissue of fables. If no other effect had been produced by this book, I should not have written in vain.

The advantages of cotemporaneous writing are numerous and weighty. When the passing events are recorded and commented on, while they are, as it were, spread before our eyes, it only requires honesty of intention to make the portrait a tolerable likeness. But when we treat on occurrences of “years that are past and gone,” it is like tracing the features of a deceased friend from memory. The great and leading outlines may be correct—but in filling up the drawing, many of the most important characteristics must escape.

It may not be improper to warn the reader, that I am attached to, and in general approve of the political views and most part (not the whole by any means) of the conduct of that party which was stigmatized as antifederal, before the adoption of the federal constitution, and is now styled democratic or republican. We were called antifederalists, because we were eager to have the federal constitution amended previous to its ratification, doubting the practicability of amendment afterwards. We were wild and extravagant enough to see despotism in many of its features; and were so fatuitous and blind as not to have the slightest idea of danger from the state governments. We have lived to see our miserable infatuation, and to deprecate and deplore its consequences.

My reason for this explicit avowal is, to induce the reader to receive my opinions and inferences with the caution which is necessary, from the probability of my being under the influence of that bias, which, more or less, every man feels towards the party to which he is attached; and which, notwithstanding I have sedulously endeavoured to guard against its influence, may have occasionally led me astray. To no human being has heaven deigned to impart infallibility: and it would be almost a miracle, if, in such a wide scope as I have taken, I were not sometimes warped by passion or prejudice.

But to this it is proper to add, that I believe no man ever wrote a book of this extent, and embracing such a variety of subjects, who made lighter demands on the complaisance or credulity of his readers than I have done. For as the subjects I have discussed are of incalculable moment—as the happiness or misery of unborn millions, as well as of this generation, depends on the course we steer—as that course must be materially affected by the correctness or error of the views we may take of our past system of conduct—and as I have dared to cite before the bar of the public, men of high standing—great talents—great wealth—and powerful influence—I have judged it proper to support, as far as in my power, and to a degree hardly ever exceeded, all the important facts, by documents of undeniable authority. Many of my readers will probably believe that I have gone unnecessary lengths in this respect. But I trust I have not. It is at all events far better to produce too much evidence than too little.

Were every line of my own writing in this work annihilated, the documents, which are its bones, and sinews, and muscles, would be amply adequate to establish the positions I meant to prove.

The strong style I have used in treating of the conduct of the eastern federalists, will be censured. But it may be defended on impregnable ground. In all their lucubrations on the motives of the war—the proceedings of the administration--

and the conduct of their opponents—they uniformly employ the most unqualified terms of reprobation and condemnation. To sheer, downright wickedness, all the errors and misfortunes that have occurred, are ascribed. There is not the slightest shade of allowance made for human imperfection. A deep, wicked, and desperate conspiracy to destroy commerce is assumed as the leading motive of government. And all its measures are charged to, and accounted for by, this absurd, this unfounded, this contemptible, this often-refuted allegation.

Those who shew no mercy, and hardly any justice, have no right to complain, if they are themselves treated with strict and unrelenting justice. “With what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again.”

I have in the appendix, commencing with chapter 60, considerably extended the subjects of this work.

The pacific policy which our local situation affords us reason to hope we may safely pursue, and which our interest dictates, has induced me to review the restrictive system, and to point out its decisive effects on the prosperity of England. It is a most potent weapon—and, had not faction deprived it of its efficacy, would have insured us complete justice, and averted the horrors of warfare. To the defeat of this mild, but powerful instrument, we may justly charge all the carnage and the expense of the war.

An efficient and safe mode of defence, whereby foreign aggressions may be prevented, and internal tranquillity preserved, is the greatest desideratum in our political system. It is the key-stone of the arch of our freedom and happiness. I have therefore gone most copiously into the consideration of the subject.—The authority I have produced is irresistible. Neither Pringle, nor Cullen, nor Sydenham, on medicine—nor Lavoisier, nor Chaptal, nor Davie, on chemistry—nor Luther, nor Calvin, nor Wesley, among their respective followers, on religion—are superior authority to general Washington on militia service. I have therefore availed myself of his testimony, to an extent which nothing but the immense magnitude of the subject could justify.

I have, likewise, in the appendix analyzed a small pamphlet, which I published last November, entitled “A calm address to the people of the eastern states,” wherein I have given a full view of the very erroneous opinions entertained respecting the slave representation; and I think fully proved, that notwithstanding the unceasing outcry and clamour on this subject in the eastern states, from the organization of the government, those states have uniformly had more than their share of influence in the legislature of the union, without having any regard

to the slave population. In the course of this investigation I have made two curious discoveries—one, that New-York and Delaware have each a slave representative—and the other, that Massachusetts, although she has no slaves, has a representative of her black population.

Before I dismiss the work from my hands, feeling the solicitude of a parent for his offspring, I cannot refrain from once more requesting the reader, when he discovers any errors of style or matter—any deficiency or redundancy—or, in a word, any thing to censure, that he will bear in mind the disadvantages under which I have written—in hours stolen from sleep, and during the pressure of a business which in no common degree requires all the energies of body and mind; that I have in my various editions, and in the public papers, solicited the suggestion of errors, which, if pointed out, I promised to correct;—and that I have also in the papers, and privately, in vain solicited communications from those who could and ought to have afforded them.

On subjects that have employed so many thousand pens and tongues, much novelty cannot be expected. It is possible that there is not a new idea in the whole work. All that Dr. Franklin or Patrick Henry could claim in the investigation of topics so long hacknied, is merely the arrangement.

I fondly flatter myself that in this work will be found materials for a complete defence of the American nation in its intercourse with England. I am grossly deceived, if the mild, forbearing, pacific system pursued by this country for so many years, amidst such grievous, such outrageous, such contumelious provocations, will not universally receive, as it deserves, the praise—and the oppressive and injurious conduct of England to us, the censure—of all Christendom.

It would be gross injustice to suppose, that I wish to perpetuate the hatred between the two nations. It is very far from my intention. It is the interest of the United States, and will be their policy, if treated with common decency or justice, to cultivate peace with all the world. And I am much deceived, if a plain and candid exposure of the vexatious, harassing, insulting, and lawless policy pursued by the successive ministers of England, from the year 1793, will not be the best means of preventing a recurrence of such impolitic and unjust conduct. They have deeply injured us. But the injury they inflicted on the vital interests of their own nation, has far exceeded what we have suffered.

PREFACE

TO THE SIXTH EDITION.*

Philadelphia, September 6, 1815.

ONCE more, and probably for the last time, I offer the "Olive Branch," to my fellow citizens; improved and enlarged as far as in my power. I feel grateful for the kindness and indulgence extended to its imperfections.

Of the origin and progress of a work, which has succeeded so far beyond all human expectations, I may, perhaps, be permitted, without incurring the charge of vanity, to give a brief account. Should the detail be really chargeable to that source, (no man can judge correctly of himself) I hope it will be regarded as a venial failing.

Early in September, 1814, I was under as great a depression of mind, about the state of affairs, public and private, as any man ever experienced. A deep and awful gloom pervaded the thinking part of the community! Thick clouds and darkness covered the horizon! The keenest eye could not behold, and could hardly anticipate a single spark of sunshine! Washington had been taken—and its public buildings destroyed with Gothic barbarity! Alexandria had been pillaged and plundered! Hampton had suffered rape and rapine! Baltimore was menaced with signal vengeance, and pointed out for military execution, *in papers published by citizens of the United States!!!!!!* Philadelphia and New York were held in a state of the most alarming suspense, and in daily expectation of a hostile visit—and of perhaps sharing the fate of Washington and Alexandria! And a proclamation by admiral Cockburn had been received by our government, wherein he stated that he had received orders to desolate such parts of our country as were assailable.

At this awful moment, the horrible, the disorganizing, the jacobinical idea was not unfrequently advanced in our coffee-house, in our streets, and in our newspapers, that the war having been begun by the democrats, they must carry it on;† that they had no right to call on the federalists for assistance, which the latter ought not to afford; that if the democrats compromised the honour and the interests of their country, by a dishonourable peace, the federalists should take the power

* The Middlebury Edition, of 1920 copies, is the Fifth.

† See the contents of the 75th chapter, for ample details in full proof of this allegation

out of their hands, and then contend for the violated honour and dignity of the country ; that the British could not, nor, consistently with a regard to their honour, ought they to, treat with Mr. Madison, who should be compelled to resign ; with a vast variety of the same patriotic doctrines, which were publicly promulgated in some of our newspapers. At the same time, a few desperate men were preparing to add to the general distress and difficulty by a dissolution of the union.*

I was appalled at this horrible and factious violence of some of the leaders of the federalists ; and equally so at the odious imbecility and inactivity of the democrats. As the government, chosen by the free voice of a large majority of the nation, did not exercise the energy and decision, that were requisite to controul and coerce the refractory minority, it appeared far better to make a change, than let the country become a prey to a foreign enemy—or be torn in pieces by internal discord, which seemed the only alternative. A frightful and sorrowful alternative ! But the violence of party and faction seemed to force it on the country.

With a mind, harrowed up with these terrific considerations, I sat down to write, on the 6th of September. On a careful examination of “ the whole ground,” the least of the mighty evils before the nation, appeared to be, to submit to swallow the bitter pill presented, and make a radical change in the administration—so as to hold out inducements to the federalists to unite their exertions to rescue the country from impending ruin. This radical change, I thought, ought to be introduced by resignation on the part of the incumbents.

This confession will excite different emotions. Some readers will smile at the arrogance of daring to suggest such a plan. Others will abuse the imbecility of the proposal, to give an inch of ground. “ *He jests at scars who never felt a wound.*” And no man who cannot most distinctly and clearly place before his eyes, the gloomy and frightful prospect, then in view, is capable of forming a correct judgment on the subject. But I feel the most perfect indifference, as to the opinion that may be en-

* It may serve to display the high fever of the public mind, to annex an arrogant, and almost treasonable resolution offered in the house of representatives of Massachusetts, about four weeks after this period, viz. Oct. 5, 1814, by Mr. Law of Lyman, which was, however, withdrawn the next day, as premature at that time.

“ Resolved, that a committee be appointed to confer with all the new “ England States, and see if they will agree to appoint a committee to join “ them, and repair to the city of Washington immediately, then and there personally to make known to the president, the general opinion of all the New “ England States in regard to the present war, and the manner in which it has “ been conducted ; and inform him that he **MUST EITHER RESIGN HIS “ OFFICE AS PRESIDENT, or remove those ministers and their officers, who “ have by their nefarious plans ruined the nation ! ! ! ! !”**

tertained. I merely state the fact, neither caring for, nor expecting praise, and equally remote from the deprecation of censure.

That evening I wrote twelve or fourteen pages, containing a brief review of our past proceedings—reflections on our actual situation—with hints for the proposed new arrangements.

However great my despondence, I felt dissatisfied with what I had committed to paper. I laid it aside—and did not resume it for ten or twelve days. In the interim the glorious news arrived, of the complete defeat of the enemy at Baltimore—of the immortal M'Donough's victory on lake Champlain—of the discomfiture and flight of Gen. Prevost's Wellingtonians, at and from Plattsburg. These wonderful successes made a total change in the face of affairs. By this time my spirits revived. I rejected my embryo work, and flattered myself into the opinion, that a candid appeal to men of integrity of both parties, might produce a beneficial effect; that a few might be aroused, and rouse others; that at all events, it was worth the trial; that in such a noble undertaking as an attempt to rescue the country, from what I regarded as impending anarchy, even a failure would be honourable—and success would be glorious and eminently beneficial.

I therefore destroyed what I had written, and began the work anew, on its present plan, about the 18th of September. I had a large stock of public documents—I borrowed some—and with these, and the Weekly Register, amid all the hurry and bustle of business, in the leisure hours of six weeks, I patched up the first crude and indigested edition. It was published on the ninth of November.

I ought to have observed, that when it was about two-thirds printed, I was struck with astonishment at my Quixotism and folly, in expecting to make an impression on a community, torn in pieces by faction; a prey to the most violent passions; and labouring under the most awful degree of delusion. My heart sunk within me at my presumption: and, the reader may rest assured, I was on the point of converting the sheets into waste paper. This ague fit went off in a day or two; and I determined to give the work a fair experiment.

The edition was small—only 500 copies. Two motives dictated this limited scale. I knew the work must necessarily be very imperfect, from the disadvantages under which it was written: and I determined, if it met with success, to have an opportunity to improve and extend it: moreover, from the almost universal failure of political publications, I was far indeed from being sanguine in the hope of success.

My expectations of sale lay principally at Washington. I sent one hundred copies there, as a sort of breakfast, calculating

upon a speedy sale of them, and an order for more. There were above two hundred legislators there, and twice as many visitors; and I supposed that whatever might be the demerits of the execution, the importance of the topics discussed, would insure the sale of a large part of the edition; more particularly, as I had already received a highly flattering approbation of the work from the late vice-president, and other gentlemen, to whom I had sent copies by mail.

The result disappointed those calculations; and, had I been actuated by the vanity of authorship, would have sufficiently mortified it; for when I had, in Philadelphia, New-York, and Baltimore, disposed of the remaining four hundred, and wrote down to Mr. Weightman, at Washington, to enquire into the success of the work, I learned that four of the hundred had been stolen on the road—that fifty-nine remained unsold—and that *thirty-seven copies had fully satisfied the curiosity of a president, three secretaries, thirty-six senators, one hundred and eighty-two representatives, one or two hundred clerks, the whole of the population of the metropolis of the United States, and all its numerous visitors!* It is probable, that in such circumstances, so great a degree of miserable apathy and indifference, on topics of such magnitude, never before existed. I ordered back the remaining fifty-nine.

A new edition was, however, called for, notwithstanding the discouraging coldness and culpable indifference of the members of the government. I used all possible expedition, and published, on the 11th of January, one thousand copies.

The success of this edition exceeded that of the first. In five weeks there were not twenty copies unsold. And a day or two previous to the blessed, thrice-blessed news of peace, foreseeing the demand would require another edition, I contracted with a printer, to execute a third. When the joyful tidings came, I thought the public would no longer feel any interest in the work, and for a time abandoned the idea of republication. But I was mistaken. The demand increased. I printed a new edition, which was published on the 13th of April, and was sold out in about three months, except a few copies in Georgetown, and elsewhere.

As the eastern states were the scene, where such a work was most necessary, I was very desirous of giving it a circulation there. I saw, that to afford it a fair chance, it ought to be printed in Boston; for otherwise only a few hundred at most, of my editions, would ever reach that quarter: and no person there being interested in the disposal of them, the effects of the book would be greatly circumscribed. I therefore offered the editors of the Chronicle, the Patriot, the Yankee, my friend Mr. Caleb Bingham, and Mr. A. Dunlap, the gratuitous privilege of print-

ing an edition, jointly ; merely on condition of presenting ten per cent. of the copies to persons unable to purchase. The two first, and Mr. B. declined ; they probably doubted the success of the enterprise. The editors of the *Yankee*, and Mr. Dunlap, jointly printed an edition, which, although it did not appear till after the peace, has been some time wholly sold off.

Were the spirit of persecution in possession of as sovereign authority over the axe, or the gibbet, as formerly ; I should most indubitably be destroyed, for the very strong and unpalatable truths in this book, if I had "*as many lives as a cat*," or "*as one Plutarch is said to have had*." But thank heaven, those days are past. The spirit, however, remains. But it can only sate its malice, by slander and abuse of a man's character ; and by attempts to destroy his business, or his prospects in life. But to a man who has passed fifty-five, with a constitution never very good, and now considerably impaired, it is not very important what befalls him, in the short remainder of life. When tender women, some of them pregnant, have freely gone to the stake, or to the gibbet, for dogmas, which they could not understand ; it does not require a very extraordinary degree of heroism, for a man of my age, to run any risques, of person or character, that may attend a bold appeal to the good sense of the nation, with a view to acquire the benediction, pronounced in the declaration, "Blessed are the peace makers."

* * It would be ungenerous not to acknowledge the obligation I am under to sundry gentlemen, for documents of various kinds. Richard Rush, Cesar A. Rodney, Joseph Nourse, Adam Seybert, and Benjamin Homans, Esq's. have been uncommonly kind and attentive. Whatever they have had in their power, they have furnished. To Mr. Duponceau's pamphlets I have had free access. From Mr. Binns I have had various newspapers highly serviceable. And Mr. Andrew Dunlap, late of Boston, now of Cincinnati, furnished me with the chief part of the extracts from the Boston papers. These gentlemen, and others whose names I need not mention, will, I hope, accept this public testimony of my gratitude.

PREFACE TO THE SEVENTH EDITION.

Philadelphia, Dec. 18, 1815.

LITTLE more than thirteen months have elapsed since the first appearance of this work, and, contrary to all my calculations, a seventh edition has been called for. The reader will, I trust, do me the justice to believe that I am fully sensible of the public indulgence.

Regarding myself bound to render the Book as perfect as in my power, I have availed myself of all the information and documents I could collect, and made a number of corrections and alterations, as I have done in the former editions.

To this edition I have added some new chapters, at the close, on subjects whose importance will probably justify me in presenting them to the view of my fellow-citizens.

PREFACE

TO THE EIGHTH EDITION.

Philadelphia, July 1, 1817.

THE very great public favour and indulgence extended to the Olive Branch, enables me to lay it for the eighth time before my fellow citizens, in a little more than two years and a half from its first appearance.

The contemplation of this work affords three sources of as high gratification as can be enjoyed by a rational being, actuated by liberal or public-spirited motives:—the satisfaction, whereof nothing can deprive me, of having employed the slender talents I possess, in the most sincere and ardent efforts to serve this country;—the belief, founded on the concurring opinions of numbers of our best citizens, of both parties, that those efforts have not been wholly unsuccessful; and, finally, the general appreciation of those efforts and their results, to their utmost extent—and probably far beyond it. Greater good fortune cannot attend any intellectual production. It is a truly rich reward, and far exceeds all the calculations, that could have been previously formed by the most extravagantly sanguine temper.

To this Edition various additions have been made.* They are written in the same independent style as the former part of the work. I feel as little disposed as ever to sacrifice the cause of truth at the shrine of party or faction.

A respectable gentleman, of federal politics, has given as his opinion, that though I struck both parties severely, yet I struck the federalists with the right hand, and the democrats with the left—and, as a man can strike harder with the right hand than with the left, that I was more severe upon the former than the latter.

If this be true, as it probably is, a satisfactory reason can be given for it, wholly free from any sinister intention. Recent or passing events, whether pleasurable or distressing, make far more impression than those of remote date, although greater in magnitude. This is a trait in the human character, that cannot have escaped the observation of the most superficial. It is therefore perfectly natural, that as the great sin of federalism—a seditious and dangerous opposition to government, which occupies so much of this Book—was in actual operation while I was writing, it should have been the subject of more severe animadver-

* The last ten chapters.

sion, than the sins of the democrats, which, though very great, were, in general, inferior in magnitude, and more remote in point of time.

Moreover, I was strongly impressed with the opinion, and acted under its influence, that the course pursued by the leaders of the federalists, in which they were blindly and submissively followed by the mass of the party, led directly to anarchy, insurrection, and civil war, with all their horrors. This opinion remains unchanged. It has been the subject of serious and deliberate reflexion. And the more I reflect on it, the more thorough is my conviction. I am far from believing that such was the intention of the party generally, or even of their leaders. But I repeat, what I have frequently stated in this Book, that when popular violence is once loosed from the restraints of law and constitution, Omniscience alone can foretell the event, and Omnipotence alone set bounds to the devastation. Thousands of horrible pages of the dreary and sickening history of mankind, bear the most overwhelming testimony to this all-important truth.

M. CAREY.

PREFACE

TO THE TENTH EDITION.*

Philadelphia, May 25, 1818.

TO this Edition no additions are made. A number of corrections, most of them of no very great importance, appeared requisite, and have accordingly been adopted.

* The ninth Edition, of 1000 copies, was published in Winchester last summer.

CONTENTS.

Chap.	Page.
1. Crisis of affairs of the United States. Dangers of parties and factions. Similarity of our situation to that of France, Italy, and England, previous to their civil wars, - - -	37
2. Errors of the Democratic Party. Federal Constitution. Opposition to a Navy. Alien and Sedition Law. Jay's Treaty, - - -	46
3. Monroe and Pinkney's Treaty with England. Separation of the States. Treasonable Publications. Embargo. Non-intercourse, - - -	53
4. Bank of the United States. Miserable Policy not to renew the Charter, - - -	58
5. Armistice proposed by Admiral Warren, - - -	59
6. Appointment of Mr. Gallatin as Minister to treat with Great Britain. Negotiation at Gottenburg. Recent neglect of due preparations, - - -	63
7. General Wilkinson and General Hampton. Proceedings of Congress. Lamentable torpor, delay, and indecision. Neglect of Public Opinion, - - -	67
8. Capture of Washington. Causes. Mismanagement. Fort Washington. Trial of Captain Dyson. Extraordinary Sentence. Loans. Injury of Public Credit. Retrospection, - - -	73
9. The Federalists. Federal Convention and Constitution. Complaints of want of Energy in the Constitution. Disorganizers and Jacobins. Alien and Sedition Laws, - - -	81
10. British Orders in Council, November, 1793. Enforcement of the Rule of 1756, - - -	84
11. Extracts from the Boston Memorial to Congress, - - -	88
12. Extracts from the New York Memorial, - - -	89
13. Extracts from the Memorial of the Merchants of Philadelphia, - - -	91
14. Extracts from the Baltimore Memorial, - - -	93
15. Extracts from the Memorials of Newhaven and Newburyport, - - -	95
16. Extracts from the Memorial of the Merchants of Salem, Ms. - - -	96
17. Reflections on the Memorials. Uniform call for Redress. Uniform Pledge of Support, - - -	99
18. Character of Merchants, by Edmund Burke. Illiberal and unfounded. Merchants as various in character as other classes of men, - - -	101
19. British Depredations brought on the tapis in the Senate of the United States. Condemnatory Resolutions passed, - - -	106
20. Attack on the Chesapeake. Proclamations interdicting our harbours to the British, - - -	108
21. Blockade of the Coast from the Elbe to Brest. Berlin Decree, - - -	115
22. Orders in Council of November 11, 1807. Milan Decree, - - -	117
23. The Orders in Council of November 11, 1807, defended by Americans. Founded on the untenable plea of American acquiescence in the Berlin Decree. Enquiry into their Causes and Consequences, by A. Baring, Esq., M. P. - - -	122
24. Embargo. Situation of American Commerce. Factious clamour. Embargo a wise, prudent, and necessary measure, - - -	129
25. Enquiry into the Constitutionality of the Act for Enforcing the Embargo. Compared with acts passed during the presidency of General Washington and John Adams, - - -	136
26. Patriotic Proceedings, - - -	141
27. John Henry's Mission to the Eastern States. Instructions from the Governor General of British America, - - -	145
28. Embargo Repealed. British and French vessels interdicted from entering our harbours. Importations from both countries prohibited, - - -	158
29. Embargo recommended to Congress by Merchants of New York, - - -	160

CONTENTS.

Chap.	Page.
30. The Erskine Arrangement. A liberal and magnanimous procedure. Loudly applauded by all Parties. Rejected by England. Wonderful inconsistency,	162
31. Impressment of American seamen. Plea of James Madison. Of John Quincy Adams. Of William Cobbett. Of Weekly Register,	180
32. Impressment during the administration of General Washington. Letter from T. Jefferson to T. Pickering. From Mr. Jay From T. Pickering. From Rufus King,	184
33. Impressment during the administration of Mr. Adams. Letter from Rufus King. From Silas Talbot. From Timothy Pickering. Instructions of Judge Marshall to Rufus King,	185
34. Mr. Liston's Project of a Convention respecting Deserters. Objected to by Mr. Pickering, Mr. Stoddart, Mr. Wolcott, and Mr. McHenry. Rejected,	193
35. Horrors of impressment, as submitted to Congress, by Timothy Pickering, secretary of state,	195
36. Impressment during the administration of Mr. Jefferson. Letter from Rufus King. Arrangement with Lord St. Vincent rejected by Mr. King,	196
37. Documents on Impressment continued,	200
38. Subject of Impressment concluded,	206
39. An apology for an egregious error committed by the writer, on the subject of preparation for war. The whole session one continued series of preparations. Nineteen acts bearing strong notes of martial arrangement,	217
40. Reproaches of the minority against the imbecility of the majority. Pernicious consequences of newspaper misrepresentation. British deceived by their friends,	220
41. War proceedings in Congress. Yeas and Nays. Inexplicable conduct,	224
42. Declaration of War. Violently opposed,	227
43. Peace Party. Composed of warlike materials. Repeated clamour for war,	229
44. Inquiry into the Justice of the War,	236
45. Consideration of the Orders in Council continued. Strong and unequivocal reprobation of them by James Lloyd and James Bayard, Esqrs. and Governor Griswold. Extract of a letter from Harrison Gray Otis, Esq.	242
46. Inquiry into the Justice of the War continued,	250
47. Turbulence of Boston. Boston acts on Massachusetts. Massachusetts acts on the other Eastern States. Jealousies and Discord sedulously excited. Hateful Picture of the Southern States,	253
48. Arrogance of the Claims of the Eastern States. Statistical Tables. Comparison of the exports of the several states,	259
49. Comparison of the exports, foreign and domestic, of the different states, from 1791 to 1813. Glance at tonnage,	268
50. Another source of excitement among the citizens of the Eastern States. Duties on imports. Statistics. Southern States pay very nearly as much as the Eastern. Wonderful Delusion,	275
51. Fallacy of the opinion of any hostility in the Southern against the Eastern States. Commercial and agricultural States mutually dependent on, and beneficial to each other,	279
52. Money the sinews of war. Associations to prevent the success of the Loans. Efforts to bankrupt the government,	285
53. Smuggling carried to excess in Boston. Specie abundant there. Oppressive drafts on New York. Arrangements between persons in Canada and in Boston,	292
54. Subject continued. Brief statement of facts,	300
55. Massachusetts compared with Tennessee. The blind leading the blind. Profits of trade 50 per cent. ! Road to Ruin,	302
56. Pulpit Politics. Prostitution of the Sacred Functions. Massacre on board the Ocean. An Anthology of Sedition,	305
57. Parties change Name and Character. Jacobins. Definition. Unholy Struggle for Power, the cause of all our difficulties,	312

CONTENTS.

Chap.	Page.
58. Illiberality of Prejudices against Foreigners. Ungrateful on the part of America. Irishmen and Frenchmen peculiar objects of dislike,	314
59. Address to the Federalists of the United States,	321

APPENDIX. No. I.

60. Orders in Council. Restrictive System. Impolicy of the British Ministry. Abstract of the Examinations before the House of Commons. Ruinous Effects of the Policy of Great Britain on the vital interests of that Nation,	329
61. England said to be struggling for her Existence. This no palliation of her outrages on neutral Nations. Attack on Copenhagen,	341
62. The clamour raised by the Eastern States on the subject of Representation, unfounded. The result of factious delusion,	346
63. Statistics continued. Slave Representation fairly stated,	348
64. Inquiry into the charge against the Southern States of destroying Commerce to promote Manufactures,	354
65. Militia Defence. System of Classification proposed in Congress. Rejected. Awful outcry,	355
66. Right of Society to coerce, and duty of citizens to afford, Military Service,	358
67. Power of Congress to call out the Militia. The usual mode of drafting oppressive, unequal, and unjust,	363
68. Inefficiency of Militia generally. Extravagantly expensive. General Washington's testimony on the subject full and complete,	367
69. Conscription or Classification of the Militia to fill up the Army, the most impartial and efficacious mode. A measure of the American Revolution. Plan borrowed by France. General Knox's Plan,	377
70. Gerrymanderism. Derivation of this queer name. Political Legerdemain. A grand discovery how to enable a minority to rule the majority. Joint and concurrent votes. General ticket,	383
71. State of Representation in Massachusetts. Wretched System of Representation in Maryland and Virginia. Rotten Boroughs,	387
72. A Wonderful Contrast. "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers."—Rev. Dr. Morse—Rev. Dr. Parish—Rev. Dr. Osgood. Invocation to War. Governor Gilman,	390
73. View of the prosperity of the United States, during the various administrations. Mighty errors prevalent on this topic,	396
74. Miscellaneous Facts and Observations,	411

APPENDIX. No. II.

75. Separation of the States. Civil War. Cromwelism,	421
76. Abuse of the Freedom of the Press. Attacks on Monarchs and Nations of Europe,	430
77. Shall we soon have another war? The vulnerable part of Great Britain. The late war. Defective Legislation. American Seamen,	435
78. Congressional Caucuses for President and Vice-President,	439

APPENDIX. No. III.

79. Western insurrection,	453
80. Blue Lights. Congress,	407
81. Faction. A most tremendous scourge,	463
82. Rejection of Monroe and Pinkney's treaty,	469
83. Hartford Convention,	473
84. Freedom of the seas. Prophets. Sedition,	477
85. Self-created Societies,	480
86. American magnanimity, generosity, and public spirit,	486
87. Miscellaneous articles,	490
88. Conscription. Impressment,	495

THE POLITICAL OLIVE BRANCH.

CHAPTER I.

Crisis of the affairs of the United States. Dangers of parties and factions. Similarity of our situation to that of France, Italy, and England, previous to their civil wars.

IN the year 1814, the situation of the United States was highly critical. Party and faction, the bane and destruction of the ancient republics,* were carried to such an extravagant extent, as to endanger the public tranquillity—and menace us with civil war, the greastest scourge that ever afflicted mankind. Unceasing efforts were used to excite our citizens to open resistance of the government.† The principal scenes of these disorders lay in the eastern states; but in almost every portion of the union, persons were constantly employed in inflaming the public mind, and preparing it for commotions.‡ Thousands and tens of thousands of our citizens, upright, honest, and honourable in private life, were so deluded by the madness of party and faction as to believe, that the defeat, the disgrace, and the disasters of our armies§—the destruction of public credit ||—(as leading to the

* An idea has been propagated by superficial writers, and generally believed by superficial readers, that party and faction are peculiar to republics. Never was there a greater error. There is hardly a body of men, how small or insignificant soever, that is not disturbed more or less by party and faction. Within the last ten years, one half, at least, of the Religious Congregations in Philadelphia, have been distracted by discord and faction, which, in various instances, have been carried to the extreme length of absolute separation. And, to mount higher, who can forget the violent factions at the commencement of the reign of George III, when England was on the very verge of insurrection? and let me add the religious crusade of lord George Gordon, which was the offspring of faction, and terminated in enkindling thirty-six fires at once in London: of which city the mob had undisturbed possession for several days. All the felons, and other tenants of the prisons, had their chains knocked off, and were let loose once more to prey on the public. During the sixteenth century, France was as much harassed and distressed by faction as any republic, ancient or modern, has ever been. The enumeration were endless. Let this slight sketch suffice.

† These topics will be fully discussed in specific chapters at the close of this work.

‡ To some this will seem impossible. It certainly appears incredible. But many things appears incredible, which are nevertheless true. And it is capable of the most complete judicial proof, that gentlemen, highly estimable in

expulsion from their stations of the highest public functionaries duly chosen by the people)—were all “a consummation devoutly to be wished”—and the certain means of procuring a speedy and honourable peace, which we could not fail to obtain from the magnanimity of Great Britain, provided we removed those public officers, whom, according to them, she had so much reason to execrate.

The uniform voice of history in vain proclaimed the generosity of nations towards each other to be a nonentity; that the terms of a treaty are more or less favourable or injurious in proportion to the relative strength, and energy, and means of annoyance or defence, of the parties; that powerful nations have almost always taken advantage of the feebleness of their adversaries; and that the certain road to a speedy and honourable peace has throughout all ages been to wage war with the utmost decision and effect.

Were history wholly silent on this topic, the inherent propensities of human nature, properly explored, would satisfy every rational mind of the soundness of these political maxims. They are fair deductions of reason and common sense, to which the universal experience of mankind bears testimony. Every nation, in its periods of debility, has been obliged occasionally to submit to injustice. Every nation, possessing the power to perpetrate injustice, has more or less availed itself of the opportunity.

The fears of civil war were regarded as visionary—as the wild effusions of a disordered brain. They were felt by a small minority. And, were the correctness of opinions to be tested by the numbers who entertained them, they must have appeared most miserably erroneous. But this conclusion is unwarranted by history. It has been a thousand times asserted, and will be as often repeated, that the people of the United States were too enlightened to commit such a fatal error, knowing too well the value of the blessings they enjoyed, to sacrifice them so absurdly. Such a delusion was pardonable a few years previous to that period. But our then recent, stupendous follies ought to have wholly dispelled it. We had, in many cases, displayed as much insanity as the history of the world exhibits in any of its pages.

private life, have thanked God most fervently for the disgraceful capture of our armies. Others have prayed to God that our soldiers who entered Canada might be slaughtered. This is one of the many strange and unaccountable instances in which our history is utterly unlike those of the other nations of the earth. It is really a *sui generis*. I feel pretty confident that no man of character or worth in England or France, ever rejoices at the disgrace or disasters of his country. But I blush to tell it, the disgrace of our armies has been repeatedly a subject of as much exultation in our coffee-houses and our newspapers, as in the city of London. I could name individuals of the utmost worth in all the social relations, *except that which they bear to their country*, whose satisfaction at the distresses and embarrassments of our government, has at least equalled that of lord Castlereagh.

Danger is not diminished by shutting our eyes against its approach, or by denying its existence. This would be a cheap price to pay for security. But it is not to be purchased thus. And those who seriously weigh the causes that led to the civil wars which desolated France, under the house of Valois; England under Charles I; and Italy for entire centuries, with hardly any intermission; will be convinced that our security was by no means so well founded as was generally supposed. In numberless points of view, our situation and our proceedings bore a very strong analogy to those of the three nations to which I have referred, immediately previous to their respective civil wars. Whoever reads with due attention Davila's history of France, Machiavel's of Florence, or Clarendon's of the rebellion under Charles I. will be astonished at the near resemblance.*

The difference between the state of the country a few years previous, and at the period under review, was indubitably far greater than from where we then stood to insurrection, and separation, and civil war. While there were so many combustible materials scattered abroad, and such unceasing pains taken to inflame the public mind, very trivial accidents might have enkindled a conflagration.—Once unhinge a government—once let loose mankind from the restraints of law and constitution—and the human mind cannot readily calculate the terrible result.

It was said, that those who had for years urged the propriety, and necessity, and advantages to the eastern states, of a dissolution of the union, did not intend to proceed thus far; and that they held out these threats *in terrorem* to awe the administration. There is the strongest possible reason to believe that this was a pernicious, a fatal error—and that the leaders of the malcontents were perfectly serious in their views of a separation. How often had the churches echoed with the insurrectional, the treasonable, the fanatical, the rebellious cry, "**WHERE IS OUR MOSES?** *Where is the rod of his miracles? Where is our Aaron? Have we no Moses to lead us out of the land of Egypt?*"† Fatuity itself could not mistake the meaning of this species of declamation. But even were the leaders merely threatening, it afforded us no security against the ruinous result. Those who

* The divisions, and distractions, and factions, that prevailed among, and the butcheries alternately perpetrated on each other by, the contending factions in the Grecian and Italian republics, are ably and instructively detailed in the defence of the American Constitutions by the ex-president John Adams. This work has not had the fate it merited. It has been laid aside, and is almost forgotten. Yet there is no work extant which contains more useful lessons for an American—none in which the horrors of faction are more forcibly displayed—none that our statesmen and politicians ought to study more carefully. A few exceptionable passages, selected here and there, have been employed for the purpose of decrying it, and with too much success. But there never yet was a human production that might not be condemned to the flames by the same mode of trial.

† See the sermons of the reverend Messrs. Osgood, Parish, and Gardiner.

raise the storm of civil commotions, possess not the power at pleasure to allay its violence—to say with effect, “thus far shalt thou go, and no farther.” This theory was fully exemplified in the civil wars of England between Charles I. and his parliament, and likewise in the French revolution. The latter, of which nearly all the early leaders perished in jails and on scaffolds, is a very strong case. Very few of those distinguished and illustrious men contemplated a recourse to arms. They hoped for a bloodless triumph over tyranny. But they were borne down and destroyed by violent and sanguinary men, or rather monsters, whom their proceedings released from restraint, but whom their utmost efforts could not check or controul.

Never had brighter prospects shone on a nation than those that shone on the United States. Never had a nation been more highly blest. Never had the security of person and property—of liberty, civil and religious—been attained by such easy sacrifices. Never had the weight of government pressed more lightly. It was not felt. Never had the fondest theories of philosophers and lovers of mankind, been more completely realized.

Our situation was very analagous to that of a youth who inherits a large estate, and, unacquainted with the difficulty of its acquisition, cannot form an estimate of its value. This can only be done by a due consideration of the condition of those destitute of the advantages of fortune. He becomes a prodigal. He lavishes away his treasures. He only then begins to appreciate them, when they are irretrievably squandered. This was precisely our case. We had not sufficiently compared our situation with that of the mass of mankind. We had not taken a full view of the glorious, the inestimable advantages we possessed. We had the most noble inheritance that ever fell to the lot of a nation, and had not duly appreciated our happiness. We had jeopardized it most wantonly and fatuitously. We were on the verge of its total loss. A little further progress in folly and madness, and we should have been undone. We had, by rapid strides, approached the banks of the Rubicon. Whether we should plunge in, and ford the stream, or, struck with a due sense of our errors and our danger, make a retrograde movement, and regain the elysium whence we started, was in the womb of time. Heaven directed us to the blessed alternative! Beyond the stream verges a dreary desert, where anarchy and civil war hold their terrific reign, with all their long train of horrors, and where the devious paths lead directly to ruthless despotism.

It was time therefore to make a solemn pause—to retrace our steps—and, since we refused to profit by the sad experience of other ages and nations, to avail ourselves of our own. By honest endeavours—by abating the odious violence of party spirit—by mutual compromise—by rending asunder the odious, the degrading, the pernicious yoke of the violent men whose in-

fluence and prosperity depended on public commotions—we might happily regain the ground we had lost—we might dispel the delusion that was leading us to temporal perdition.

To vindicate myself from the charge of folly, in those gloomy apprehensions and anticipations, I submit to the reader a few specimens of the unceasing efforts which for years had been made to enkindle the flames of civil war. That we were not involved in it, is not justly chargeable to the want of a due degree of labour and industry. Never was more activity displayed—never was a cause more sedulously or ably advocated. And never was there less scruple about the means, provided the end could be accomplished.

“On or before the fourth of July, if James Madison is not out of office, a new form of government will be in operation in the eastern section of the union.—Instantly after, the contest in many of the states will be, whether to adhere to the old, or join the new government. Like every thing else foretold years ago, and which is verified every day, this warning will be also ridiculed as visionary. Be it so. But Mr. Madison cannot complete his term of service, if the war continues.—It is not possible; and if he knew human nature, he would see it.”*

“Is there a federalist, a patriot in America, who conceives it his duty to shed his blood for Bonaparte, for Madison, for Jefferson, and that HOST OF RUFFIANS in Congress, who have set their faces against US for years, and spirited up the BRUTAL PART OF THE POPULACE to destroy us? Not one—Shall we then any longer be held in slavery, and driven to desperate poverty, by such a graceless faction? Heaven forbid.”†

“If at the present moment, no symptoms of civil war appear, THEY CERTAINLY WILL SOON, unless the courage of the war party fail them‡.”

“A CIVIL WAR becomes as certain as the events that happen according to the known laws and established course of nature.”§

“If we would preserve the liberties, by that struggle [the American revolution] so dearly purchased, the call for RESISTANCE against the usurpations of our own government is as urgent as it was formerly against those of our mother country.”||

“If the impending negotiation with Great Britain is defeated by insidious artifice; if the friendly and conciliatory proposals of the enemy should not, from French subserviency, or views of sectional ambition, be met throughout with a spirit of moderation and sincerity, so as to terminate the infamous war which is scattering its horrors around us, and arrest the calamities and distress of a disgraced country, it is necessary to apprise you that such conduct will be no longer borne with. The injured States will be compelled, by every motive of duty, interest and honour; by one manly exertion of their strength to dash into atoms the bonds of tyranny. It will then be too late to retract. The die will be cast.—Freedom preserved.”¶

“A SEPARATION OF THE STATES will be an inevitable result. Motives numerous and urgent will demand that measure. As they originate in oppression, the oppressors must be responsible for the momentous and contingent events, arising from the DISSOLUTION OF THE PRESENT CONFEDERACY, and the erection of SEPARATE GOVERNMENTS. It will be their work. While

* Federal Republican, November 7, 1814.

† Boston Gazette.

‡ Sermon by David Osgood, D. D. Pastor of the church of Medford, delivered June 26, 1812, page 9. § Idem, page 15.

|| Discourse delivered before the lieutenant governor, the council, and the two houses composing the legislature of the commonwealth of Massachusetts, May 31, 1809. By David Osgood, D. D. p. 25.

¶ “Northern grievances, set forth in a letter to James Madison, by a North American.” Published May, 1814, and circulated with great industry, throughout the Eastern states and New York. P. 4.

posterity will admire the independent spirit of the Eastern section of our country, and with sentiments of gratitude, enjoy the fruits of their firmness and wisdom, the descendants of the South and West will have reason to curse the infatuation and folly of your councils”*

“Bold and resolute, when they step forth in the sacred cause of freedom and independence, the northern people will secure their object. No obstacle can impede them. No force can withstand their powerful arm. The most numerous armies will melt before their manly strength.” Does not the page of history instruct you, that the feeble debility of the South never could face the vigorous activity of the North? Do not the events of past ages remind you of the valuable truth, that a single spark of Northern liberty, especially when enlightened by congenial commerce, will explode a whole atmosphere of sultry Southern despotism? You well know the termination of the expedition of Xerxes, with his hundreds of thousands, against the Greeks! The commercial Athenians taught the debilitated tyrant of Asia, on the plains of Marathon, and at the straits of Salamis, of what exertions freedom is capable, when roused by oppression. The hardy Macedonians not only defeated and dispersed countless hordes of Southern effeminacy, but traversed their country at pleasure”†

“When such are the effects of oppression upon men resolved not to submit, as displayed in the North and South of Europe, and in all ages of the world, do you flatter yourself with its producing a different operation in this country? Do you think the energies of Northern freemen are to be tamely smothered? Do you imagine they will allow themselves to be trampled upon with impunity? And by whom? The Southern and Western states! by men whose united efforts are not sufficient to keep in order their own enslaved population, and defend their own frontiers? by warriors whose repeated attempts at invasion of a neighbouring province, have been disgracefully foiled by a handful of disciplined troops! by generals, monuments of arrogance and folly! by councils the essence of corruption, imbecility and madness!

“The aggregate strength of the South and West, if brought against the North, would be driven into the ocean, or back to their own sultry wilds; and they might think themselves fortunate if they escaped other punishment than a defeat, which their temerity would merit.” While the one would strive to enslave, the other would fight for freedom. While the councils of the one would be distracted with discordant interests; the decisions of the other would be directed by one soul. Beware! Pause! before you take the fatal plunge.”‡

“You have carried your oppressions to the utmost stretch. *We will no longer submit.* Restore the Constitution to its purity. Give us security for the future, indemnity for the past. Abolish every tyrannical law. Make an immediate and honourable peace. Revive our commerce. Increase our navy. Protect our seamen. *Unless you comply with these just demands, without delay, we will withdraw from the Union, scatter to the winds the bonds of tyranny, and transmit to posterity that Liberty purchased by the Revolution.*”§

“Americans! **PREPARE YOUR ARMS:** *you will soon be called to use them.* We must use them for the emperor of France, OR FOR OURSELVES. It is but an individual who now points to this ambiguous alternative. But Mr. Madison and his cabal may rest assured, there is in the hearts of many thousands in this abused and almost ruined country, a sentiment and energy to illustrate the distinction when his madness shall call it into action.”||

“Old Massachusetts is as terrible to the American, now, as she was to the British cabinet in 1775; for America, too, has her Butes and her Norths. Let then the commercial states breast themselves to the shock, and know that to themselves they must look for safety. All party bickerings must be sacrificed on the altar of patriotism. Then, and not till then, shall they humble the pride and ambition of Virginia, whose strength lies in their weakness; and chastise the insolence of those madmen of Kentucky and Tennessee, who aspire to the government of these states, and threaten to involve the country in all the horrors of war.”¶

* Idem, page 9.

† Idem, page 12.

‡ Idem, page 12.

§ Idem, page 15.

|| Boston Repertory.

¶ New York Commercial Advertiser.

The language of the writers is plain and unequivocal. It admits of no mistake or misconstruction. That they intended to produce insurrection and dissolution of the union, unless they and their friends were enabled to seize upon the government, regardless of the frightful consequences, it would require consummate impudence to deny ; it would be folly, or insanity to disbelieve. What might ultimately be their success, it was impossible to foresee. Every thing depended on the course pursued by those who had an interest in the public welfare. If they were not wanting to themselves and to their country, we were sure to rise triumphant over our difficulties and embarrassments. But if the then prevailing wonderful apathy continued ; if we sluggishly remained with our arms folded, while our situation became daily more awful and alarming ; ruin was inevitable. We should have afforded one of the most striking instances in history, of premature decay and decrepitude. The Lord in his mercy has averted such an awful fate !

Reliance was placed by those who denied the existence of the danger here described, upon the sober character of the nation. They regarded that character as a guarantee against civil war. I was well aware of this circumstance. I allowed it a due share of influence and importance. But the strong inference drawn from it, was unwarranted by history. And let it be observed, once for all, that in government, or politics, the only unerring guide is history, to the neglect of whose lessons may be ascribed more than two thirds of our errors and follies.

The Athenians were a polished and refined people. No nation, in ancient times, ever excelled them in these respects. Yet **they** were occasionally seduced into the most frightful cruelties by their demagogues, their Cleons and other enragés. They often massacred their prisoners in cold blood, and long after they were taken. And the proscriptions and butcheries the adverse parties perpetrated on each other, when they gained the ascendancy, are frightful subjects of reflection, and to us hold out most invaluable warnings.

No nation of modern Europe excelled France, few equalled her—in courtesy—in mildness—in urbanity. And yet never did mankind exhibit themselves under a more hideous aspect—never did they change nature more completely with wolves, tigers, and hyænas, than the French have done under Marat, Danton, Couthon, and Robespierre. *These are awful lessons, to which those who were lending their aid to tear down the pillars of government, paid no attention.*

Man is the same every where, under the same excitements. We have our Cleons, and our Couthons, and our Dantons, and our Marats, and our Robespierres, and our Cromwells, who only required suitable occasions to have given scope to their ferocity. Mild and gentle as is the American character generally,

the revolution in this country exhibited[¶] in various places, where the parties were rancorously embittered against each other, many terrifying scenes. Prisoners were often hung up without trial by the partizans on both sides. Men and women were treacherously shot down in their houses*. And not unfrequently, private malice, to sate its rage, disguised itself under the cloak of public spirit. Let us ponder well on those circumstances. They are fraught with important admonitions.

To apply a remedy to any evil, moral or physical, it is indispensably necessary to explore its nature—to ascertain its causes—and to trace its consequences. Any other procedure arises from error and folly, and is pregnant with defeat and disappointment.

With this view, and in the state of affairs just described, I respectfully solicited the public attention. I took a rapid retrospective glance at the folly and guilt, which the factious and discordant state of our country had generated. As far as in my power, I divested myself of party bias, and treated the subject as if it belonged to another age or nation. Whatever errors I fell into, arose not from sinister intention: they were chargeable to inadvertence and human imperfection. On my freedom from partiality, I felt the more reliance, from my unalterable conviction, that both the hostile parties that divide this country, and who regard each other with so much hatred and jealousy, had largely contributed towards the misfortunes that had befallen us—the melancholy change that had taken place in our situation—and the dangers that threatened us. It was impossible for a candid mind to review the scenes through which we had passed for some years, without a thorough conviction, that each had been guilty of most egregious errors and follies, and occasionally of worse than error or folly; and that *when-ever the interests of the nation and the interests of the party came in collision, the former had been too frequently sacrificed,† by both federalists and democrats, to the latter.* No man who has any public spirit, can take a review of our history without feeling the deepest regret at the extent of the mischief this miserable system of conduct has produced. It has defeated many of the noblest plans that the wisdom of the country has ever devised, and has prevailed to at least as great an extent here, as in almost any other country, or at any other period of time. When the present generation sits for its picture to the historian, it will form a strong contrast to that which is past and gone. The errors or follies, however, of either party would have produced but little injury comparatively, had not those of the other conspired to give them malignity and effect.

* See Ramsay's History of the Revolution in South Carolina.

† This is one of the most lamentable and humiliating facts in our history.

From this exposition of my views, it was obvious I should steer a course very different from the generality of writers on political topics. With hardly a single exception, their object is, having espoused a party, to justify its supporters, and emblazon their acts, whether right or wrong ; and, if need be,

“To make the worse appear the better cause.”

In pursuit of this object, their own partizans are all angels of light,—whose sublime and magnificent plans of policy are calculated to produce a political millennium ; and their opponents, demons incarnate, intent on the destruction of the best interests of the country. These portraits are equally unjust and incorrect. One is all beauty, with little resemblance to the pretended original—the other a hideous caricature equally foreign from honour, truth, and justice.

Among the frightful consequences resulting from this odious practice, a plain and palpable one presents itself. These horrible portraits engendered a satanical spirit of hatred, malice, and abhorrence in the parties towards each other. Citizens of adverse opinions, whose views were perfectly pure and public spirited, were to each other objects of distrust and jealousy. They attached all possible guilt and wickedness—political at least—to their opponents—and then detested the hobgoblins which they had themselves created.

Society is not thus constituted. The mass of mankind of all parties, and in all ages, have meant well, except in periods of great depravity and corruption. And little more is necessary to produce harmony between them, than to understand each other correctly. But hostility is excited and perpetuated by the intrigues and management of demagogues, whose influence and consequence depend on fomenting discord, and who would sink into insignificance in times of tranquillity. Mankind, as I have hinted, abhor each other, not for real existing differences, but for phantoms, the production of heated imaginations. Experience has frequently evinced, that the very plans of policy which parties out of power have reprobated and denounced as pernicious, they have pursued themselves as soon as they had vanquished their opponents, and seized on their places. And I believe every man of reflection will acknowledge, that if the federalists had retained the administration in their hands, they would have advocated the rights of their country as firmly as their successors have done ; and would probably have adopted measures to resist the arrogant and destructive claims of England, similar to those, for which they have so strenuously, though not very honourably or consistently, opposed the present administration.

This is not mere supposition. It is historical fact. It will be seen in the sequel of this work, that the federalists took as high ground on the subject of impressment, and as firmly and

patriotically resisted the unjust, the daring, the degrading pretensions of England, as Mr. Jefferson or Mr. Madison have done. Yet the resistance of the two latter presidents to this atrocious violence, has been among the strongest accusations alleged against them by their political adversaries. It is impossible to reflect on these topics without sighing over human weakness and folly. Federalism has in these transactions suffered a stain never to be effaced.

CHAPTER II.

Errors of the Democratic Party. Federal Constitution. Opposition to a Navy. Alien and Sedition Law. Jay's Treaty.

IN pursuance of my plan, I proceed to a review of those errors of the democratic party, which contributed to change the prospects of this country, and to darken the political horizon; and I trust it will appear that I have not done them injustice in charging a large portion of the folly and guilt of the late state of affairs to their account.

Federal Constitution.

In the convention that formed the federal constitution, the democratic party sowed the seeds of a premature dissolution of that instrument, and of the American confederacy. Regarding society more as it ought to be, than as it has ever been, or is ever likely to be; seduced by theories more plausible than solid—applying to a free elective government, deriving all its powers and authorities from the voice of the people, maxims, and apprehensions, and precautions, calculated for the meridian of monarchy, they directed all their efforts, and all their views, towards guarding against oppression from the federal government. Whatever of authority or power, they divested it of, to bestow on the state governments, or reserve to the people, was regarded as an important advantage. Against the federal government their fears and terrors were wholly directed. This was the horrible monster, which they laboured to cripple and chain down, to prevent its ravages.—The state governments they regarded with the utmost complacency, as the public protectors against this dreadful enemy of liberty. Had they succeeded in all their views, they would have deprived the general government of nearly all its efficiency. Alas! little did they suppose that our grand danger would arise from the usurpations of the state governments, some of which have since most awfully and treasonably jeopardized the union. Unfortunately, this party was too successful in the convention. Its energy and ardent zeal produced a constitution, which, however admirably calculated for a period of peace, has been found incompetent in war to call forth, at once and decisively, the energies of the nation, and the ad-

ministration of which has been repeatedly bearded, baffled, and thwarted by the state governments. Had the real federalists in the convention succeeded, and made the general government somewhat more energetic—and endowed it with a small degree of power more than it possesses—it might endure for centuries. What fate at present awaits it, is not in human wisdom to foresee. I fervently pray, with the celebrated father Paul, *esto perpetua*.

This error of the *democratic party* arose from want of due regard to the history of republics, and from a profound study of those political writers who had written under monarchical governments, and whose views were wholly directed to guard against the danger of tyranny flowing from the overweening regal power, especially when possessed by men of powerful talents, and great ambition. The theories whence they derived their views of government were splendid and sublime—the productions of men of great public spirit, and regard for the general welfare and happiness—and, had they been duly attuned by maxims drawn from experience, would have been of inestimable value.

Establishment of a small Navy.

The steady and factious opposition made by the democratic party, to the establishment of a small navy, adequate at least to the protection of our own coasts, has by the event been proved most wretched and miserable policy. It arose, as well from a spirit of hostility towards the party in power, as from a sordid and contemptible spirit of economy, which has in many instances disgraced and dishonoured this party, who have frequently proved themselves, to use a very trite but very expressive proverb, “penny wise—pound foolish.” When we analyse the boasted spirit of economy, to which the opposition to a navy may be in part ascribed, we shall find it arises from two sources; the one, men of narrow minds carrying into public, the huckstering habits of private life: the other, a base spirit of courting popularity by husbanding the public treasure, even on occasions when liberality is true economy, which as frequently occur in public affairs as in private life. Both motives are equally contemptible; but the latter is more pernicious, and produces the most ruinous consequences. It starves and smothers public undertakings, and public spirit; and often defrauds illustrious men of their due rewards. It is the characteristic vice of our times, and of our nation; and ought to be hunted down by every man who has a real regard for the honour and interest of his country. To this vile spirit we must ascribe the never enough-to-be-despised debate, whether Eaton, the glorious and immortal hero of Derne*,

* This is among the most illustrious events in American military affairs by land, when all the circumstances of the case are taken into view. Who can reflect without amazement and admiration, on the heroism of the gallant band, that under this intrepid chief, pierced through the frightful desert, and

should be rewarded with a sword or a medal ! a debate which brought down on the congress in which it took place, the contempt of every magnanimous and liberal man in the nation ; a debate which would have disgraced the common council of the most petty borough in the union. To this spirit it is due, that votes of thanks, and swords, and urns, and other cheap modes of displaying our gratitude, have tranquillized our minds, and deceived us into the opinion, that we have paid the boundless debt due to the Hulls, the Bainbridges, the Decatur, the Perrys, the Porters, the Macdonoughs, the Joneses, the Ripleys, the Browns, the Scotts, the Coffees, the Carrolls, the Macombs, the Jacksons, and the other heroes, whose glory will live as long as public spirit, consummate talents, and distinguished bravery command the veneration of mankind.

The modest, the unassuming, the youthful Perry rescued a whole frontier, men, women, and children from the murderous tomahawk. Macdonough rescued another, and prevented the enemy from establishing his winter quarters far within our territory. And Jackson achieved for himself and his country immortal honour, by an exploit certainly never exceeded, perhaps never equalled. He preserved one of the most important keys and emporiums of the country, from the power of the enemy, by the most consummate prudence, talents, and bravery. The interest of the property he saved from depredation, is probably above \$750,000 per annum. Yet it is doubtful whether there is gratitude enough in our public bodies, who hold the purse strings of the nation, or in the individuals whose property has been preserved, to make him any adequate return*. I hope and pray I may be deceived. I deprecate being correct in this calculation. But I have fearful misgivings on the subject.

To enable us to form an estimate of the immense debt we owe our illustrious heroes, it is only necessary to call to recollection, the prostration of the public mind, and the degradation of the national character in the early part of the war, when our operations on land were "one continued stream" of disgraces and disasters ; and when but for the exploits of Hull and a few others on the ocean, the name of an American would have been a passport to shame and disgrace. The national character was supported throughout the war by our little navy, whose exploits may challenge comparison with any of the most signal acts of hero-

shook a powerful usurper's throne to the centre. The inauspicious interference that dashed the glorious prize to the earth, just as Eaton had stretched out his hand, and was ready to seize it without the smallest danger of an unfavourable result, is highly to be regretted. The state of Massachusetts acquired a high degree of honour by its liberality to the warrior of Derne, on whom it bestowed ten thousand acres of land as a mark of its esteem and admiration. This act of generosity, by the contrast, made the miserable conduct of Congress appear worthy of additional contempt.

* The event has realised these anticipations.

ism recorded in history. And on land, towards the close, it was nobly retrieved by the heroes whose names I have given, and others who nobly grace their country's annals. And is it possible that congress will not give some substantial proof of the nation's gratitude for benefits so far beyond all price !

In very few instances, hitherto, have congress or the people of the United States discharged their duty in this respect, or displayed a suitable degree of gratitude. Of votes of thanks they have been abundantly liberal. These cost nothing. A few swords and medals too have been awarded. But of all the benefactors of their country—those men *who have preserved it from the bottomless abysses of disgrace and dishonour into which it was precipitously falling*—who have given it a rank among the nations of the earth, there is hardly one on whom the nation has bestowed a reward worthy of it or him.

The debt due to the illustrious men with whose names I have honoured my page, and others, who have trod the same path of glory, cannot easily be discharged, even on the ground of mere calculation of pecuniary advantage to the nation, exclusive of the elevation of its character.

If England, whom in this respect we ought to aspire to emulate, gave 500,000 sterling to her Wellingtons and Nelsons, let the United States give some solid and substantial proof of their gratitude, to their illustrious heroes. Such extravagant rewards as the British parliament voted "the great lord" as he has been styled, are not here contemplated. But the gift ought to be worthy of the donor and acceptor ; ought to operate as a reward to the meritorious, and a stimulus to excite others to emulation.

This is in some degree a digression. But I hope the feelings of my readers will be sufficiently in unison with these sentiments, not to require an apology. I therefore make none. I return to the navy.

I feel confident, that the nation has lost five hundred times as much through the want of a small navy, as that navy would have cost. Numbers of instances have occurred, of valuable merchantmen having been captured by petty pickaroons, with one or two guns. Our ports have been insulted and outraged, and the ships and cargoes of our merchants plundered by privateers and sloops of war, which a few armed vessels would have forced to keep a respectful distance. There is none of the points on which the two hostile parties have differed, wherein the democrats have been so far below their adversaries in consulting the real, the permanent honour and interest of the country. as the establishment of a naval force. The policy of the federalists in this respect was dignified and honourable ; that of the democrats miserably contracted.

Alien and Sedition Laws, and Eight per cent. Loans.

THE factious clamour excited against the sedition and alien laws, and against the eight per cent. loan,—which clamour was the principal means of changing the administration, and taking it from the hands of the federalists, to place it in those of the democrats—may be justly reckoned among the sins of the latter party. A candid review of the so-styled sedition law, at the present hour, when the public ferment to which it gave rise has wholly subsided, will satisfy any reasonable man, that so far from being an outrageous infringement of liberty, as was asserted, it was a measure not merely defensible, but absolutely necessary and indispensable towards the support of government*. To enable the reader to judge for himself, without the trouble of referring to a volume of the laws, I annex the document itself.

“SEC. 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That if any persons shall unlawfully combine or conspire together, with intent to oppose any measure or measures of the government of the United States, which are or shall be directed by the proper authority, or to impede the operation of any law of the United States, or to intimidate or prevent any person holding a place or office in or under the government of the United States, from undertaking, performing, or executing his trust, or duty; and if any person or persons, with intent as aforesaid, shall counsel, advise, or attempt to procure any insurrection, riot, unlawful assembly, or combination, whether such conspiracy, threatening, counsel, advice, or attempt shall have the proposed effect or not, he or they shall be deemed guilty of a high misdemeanour; and on conviction, before any court of the United States, having jurisdiction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, and by imprisonment during a term not less than six months, nor exceeding five years; and further, at the discretion of the court may be holden to find sureties for his or their good behaviour in such sum, and for such time, as the said court may direct.

“SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That if any person shall write, print, utter or publish, or shall cause or procure to be written, printed, uttered, or published, or shall knowingly and willingly assist or aid in writing, printing, uttering or publishing any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the government of the United States, or either house of the Congress of the United States, or the President of the United States, with intent to defame the said government, or either house of the Congress, or the said President, or to bring them, or either of them, into contempt or disrepute; or to excite against them, or either or any of them, the hatred of the good people of the United States, or to stir up sedition within the United States; or to excite any unlawful combinations therein, for opposing or resisting any law of the United States, or any act of the president of the United States, done in pursuance of any such law, or of the powers in him vested by the constitution of the United States; or to resist, oppose, or defeat any such law or act; or to aid, encourage, or abet any hostile designs of any foreign nation against the United

* It is but justice to avow that the writer of this book was as ardent in his opposition to, and as much alarmed at the probable consequences of, the alien and sedition laws, as any man in the community. As it requires an extraordinary degree of corporeal sanity to resist the effects of a violent epidemical disorder, so it requires great strength of mind to keep out of the vortex of factious contagion, when prevalent with those whose opinions are generally congenial with our own. Of this strength of mind the writer was destitute in common with a large portion of his fellow citizens.

States, their people or government ; then such person, being thereof convicted before any court of the United States having jurisdiction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars, and by imprisonment not exceeding two years.

“SEC. 3. *And be it further enacted and declared*, That if any person shall be prosecuted under this act, for writing or publishing any libel as aforesaid, *it shall be lawful for the defendant, upon the trial of the cause, to give in evidence, in his defence, the truth of the matter contained in the publication charged as a libel.* And the jury who shall try the cause, shall have a right to determine the law and the fact, under the direction of the court, as in other cases.”

The fate of this law holds out an all-important lesson on faction and party spirit. Laudable and necessary as it was, and guarded, as far as a law can be guarded, against abuse, the opposition to it was as violent, and it excited as much horror and indignation, as if it had wholly destroyed the liberty of the press, and “*left not a trace behind.*” And in this senseless and disgraceful clamour, were engaged vast numbers of the best and most intelligent members of the community. The Alien and Sedition Laws were made the subject of an elegant, but violent and inflammatory report, agreed to by the legislature of Virginia, as respectable and enlightened a deliberative body as any in the United States, or perhaps in the world. But they were bitten by the mad dog of faction in common with so large a portion of their fellow-citizens, and were seized with the prevalent disorder. They regarded the two obnoxious laws as inroads upon public liberty, which required to be repelled with the utmost firmness.

It would be uncandid not to state, that the trials under this act, for libels against the president, and, as far as my recollection serves me, against some of the other public functionaries, were managed with very considerable rigour; and, from the abuse of the law, tended to give an appearance of propriety and justice to the clamour against it. The cases of Thomas Cooper and Matthew Lyon, Esqrs. who were both treated with remarkable severity, excited a high degree of sympathy in the public mind. I am convinced, that under all the circumstances, a jury could not be found in London to pronounce a verdict of “guilty” against either of them. Of the two cases, it may be justly said, *summum jus summa injuria*. But the censure did not attach to the law. It lay at the door of the juries.

I have little to offer respecting the alien law. It was undoubtedly liable to strong objections. It invested the president with powers liable to great abuse. But it certainly never warranted the awful outcry that was raised against it. To enable the reader, however, to form his own opinion—and, if mine be erroneous, to reject it altogether, I annex the most obnoxious clause of the act.

“SEC. 1. *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled*, That it shall be lawful for the President of the United States, at any time during the continuance of this act, to order all such aliens as he shall judge dangerous to the peace and safety of

the United States, or shall have reasonable grounds to suspect are concerned in any treasonable or secret machinations against the government thereof, to depart out of the territory of the United States, within such time as shall be expressed in such order; which order shall be served on such alien, by delivering him a copy thereof, or leaving the same at his usual abode, and returned to the office of the secretary of state, by the marshal or other person to whom the same shall be directed. And in case any alien, so ordered to depart, shall be found at large within the United States after the time limited in such order for his departure, and not having obtained a *license* from the president to reside therein; or, having obtained such *license*, shall not have conformed thereto; every such alien shall, on conviction thereof, be imprisoned for a term not exceeding three years, and shall never after be admitted to become a citizen of the United States. *Provided always, and be it further enacted,* That if any alien, so ordered to depart, shall prove to the satisfaction of the president, by evidence to be taken before such person or persons as the president shall direct, who are for that purpose hereby authorised to administer oaths, that no injury or danger to the United States will arise from suffering such alien to reside therein, the president may grant a *license* to such alien to remain within the United States, for such time as he shall judge proper, and at such place as he may designate. And the president may also require of such alien to enter into a bond to the United States, in such penal sum as he may direct, with one or more sufficient sureties to the satisfaction of the person authorised by the president to take the same, conditioned for the good behaviour of such alien during his residence in the United States, and not violating his license; which license the president may *revoke*, whenever he shall think proper." *July 6, 1798.*

The eight per cent. loan remains. It was united with, and increased the clamour against, the alien and sedition laws; and these unpopular measures, as I have already observed, precipitated the federalists from power. Yet we have since found that their successors, the democrats, have themselves given about eight per cent. on some of their loans. This would afford a glorious triumph to federalism over her inveterate rival, democracy, were it not that the annals of the former can furnish many instances of similar inconsistency and departure from professions. And it is a melancholy truth, that the histories of all the parties and factions which, since government was first instituted, have cursed and scourged mankind by their senseless, envenomed, and implacable hostilities, are replete with instances of errors equally disgraceful and dishonourable. A history of the madness, the folly and depravity of party and faction, is a grand desideratum.

Jay's Treaty.

The violent opposition to this instrument, which pervaded the union, and greatly disturbed the administration of general Washington, was a highly factious procedure on the part of the democrats, who were led away by objections, plausible, but unsubstantial—hardly any of which have been realized. This affair evinces the danger of yielding to the sudden impulses of national feeling, which bear down every thing before them, and which wholly overpower the reason and understanding of even the wise and the good, who, on such occasions, are only on a level with the uninformed and uncultivated part of the community. Nearly all the predictions respecting this treaty have been the sooth-say-

ings of false prophets ; of men, some led astray by their prejudices—others by perturbed imaginations, and of some who sought to make this instrument a ladder to mount to the gratification of their ambition. Such of them as have been realized, have been more than counterbalanced by the solid advantages resulting from the adjustment of the differences between the two nations.

CHAPTER III.

Monroe and Pinkney's Treaty with England. Separation of the States. Treasonable publications. Embargo. Non-intercourse.

OF the errors of Mr. Jefferson's administration, I shall confine myself to three, denoting two very opposite extremes of character—the one highly bold and daring—the other displaying an equal degree of feebleness.

Monroe and Pinkney's Treaty with England.

Two ministers, appointed by Mr. Jefferson, had negotiated a treaty with England, the best they could obtain. It had been transmitted to him in due form. Without consulting the Senate, the co-ordinate branch of the treaty-making power, he, on his own responsibility, rejected it, and transmitted to these ministers instructions to begin the negotiation anew. This was a mighty and a fatal error.* It may be doubted whether it were not a violation, at least of the spirit of the constitution. It was, at all events, a case that probably did not enter into the conceptions of the framers of that instrument. If it had, it is likely they would have provided against its occurrence.

A calm reflection on this subject can hardly fail to convince the reader, that to this source may probably be traced nearly all our late difficulties. Had this treaty been submitted to the senate, they would, in all likelihood, have ratified the chief parts of it ; and, as had been the case with Jay's treaty, have referred the obnoxious clauses to a new discussion. Our disputes with England would have been thus compromised—and our party divisions could never have been excited to such a height as to endanger the peace and security of the country.

The rejection of this treaty has been ascribed to Mr. Jefferson's desire of a cause of war with England. This is radically wrong. From the commencement of the French revolution, England afforded this country constant ground for war, in the impressment of our seamen, and the predatory proceedings against our commerce. But a pregnant proof of the utter fallacy of this accusation arises out of the attack of the Leopard on the Chesa-

* It has been attempted to justify this procedure, by the circumstance, that the negociators had violated one explicit item of Mr. Jefferson's instructions; to conclude no treaty without a specific article guarding against impressments. This is no justification. It is barely a palliation.

peake. This circumstance decides the question forever. Had Mr. Jefferson been desirous of war with England, nothing more was necessary than to have convened congress immediately after that event, during the extraordinary fermentation of the public mind which it created. All parties were then clamorous for, and would have heartily united in support of, a war with Great Britain. And war would certainly have been declared by congress almost unanimously. But with a desire of peace, deserving of the highest praise, and of the gratitude of his country, which he has never received, he deferred convening congress about four months, within which period the public ferment had subsided. This important fact has been wholly overlooked in the factious discussions that have taken place respecting his administration; so true it is, that in times of turbulence, reason raises her voice in vain. It is drowned in the obstreperous brawlings of noisy factionists.

The same regard for justice which leads to this vindication, demands an unqualified censure of the very extraordinary and unprecedented measure of rejecting the treaty on his own responsibility.

Besides the want of an explicit clause on the subject of impressment, the friends of Mr. Jefferson assign another plea to justify him for the rejection of this treaty. After it had been agreed upon by the British commissioners, and those of the United States, a rider was annexed to it by the former, intended to give the treaty-sanction to the celebrated orders in council, which, even then, it would appear, were in contemplation.

To enable the reader to decide correctly, I annex the rider.

Note of the British Commissioners, accompanying Monroe and Pinkney's Treaty.

LONDON, Dec. 31, 1806.

"The undersigned, Henry Richard Vassal, lord Holland, and William lord Auckland, plenipotentiaries of his Britannic majesty, have the honour to inform James Monroe, and William Pinkney, commissioners extraordinary and plenipotentiaries of the United States of America, that they are now ready to proceed to the signature of the treaty of amity, commerce and navigation, on the articles of which they have mutually agreed.

"But at the same time they have it in command from his majesty to call the attention of the commissioners of the United States, to some extraordinary proceedings which have lately taken place on the continent of Europe, and to communicate to them officially the sentiments of his majesty's government thereupon.

"The proceedings alluded to are certain declarations and orders of the French government, issued at Berlin, on the twenty-first of November last.

"In those orders, the French government seeks to justify or palliate its own unjust pretensions, by imputing to Great Britain, principles which she never professed, and practices which never existed. His majesty is accused of a systematic and general disregard of the law of nations, recognized by civilised states, and more particularly of an unwarrantable extension of the right of blockade. Whereas his majesty may confidently appeal to the world on his uniform respect to neutral rights, and his general and scrupulous adherence to the law of nations, without condescending to contrast his conduct in these particulars

with that of his enemy ; and with regard to the only specified charge, *it is notorious that he has never declared any ports to be in a state of blockade, without allotting to that object a force sufficient to make the entrance into them manifestly dangerous.*

“ By such allegations, unfounded as they are, the enemy attempts to justify his pretensions of confiscating as lawful prize, all produce of English industry or manufacture, though it be the property of neutrals ; of excluding from his harbours every neutral vessel, which has touched at any port of his majesty’s dominions, though employed in an innocent commerce ; and of declaring Great Britain to be in a state of blockade, though his own naval ports and arsenals are actually blockaded ! and he is unable to station any naval force, whatever, before any port of the united kingdom.

“ Such principles are in themselves extravagant and repugnant to the law of nations ; and the pretensions founded on them, though professedly directed solely against Great Britain, tend to alter the practice of war among civilised nations, and *utterly to subvert the rights and independence of neutral powers.* The undersigned cannot, therefore, believe, that the enemy will ever seriously attempt to enforce such a system. If he should, they are confident that the good sense of the American government will perceive the fatal consequences of such pretensions to neutral commerce ; and that its spirit and regard to national honour will prevent its acquiescence in such palpable violations of its rights, and injurious encroachments on its interests.

“ If, however, the enemy should carry these threats into execution ; and if neutral nations, contrary to all expectations, should acquiesce in such usurpations ; his majesty might probably be compelled, however reluctantly, to retaliate in his just defence ; and to adopt, in regard to the commerce of neutral nations with his enemies, the same measures, which those nations shall have permitted to be enforced against their commerce with his subjects. The commissioners of the United States will therefore feel, that at a moment when *his majesty and all neutral nations are threatened with such an extension of the belligerent pretensions of his enemies,* he cannot enter into the stipulations of the present treaty, without explanation from the United States of their intentions, or a reservation on the part of his majesty in the case above mentioned, if it should ever occur.

“ The undersigned, considering that the distance of the American government, renders any immediate explanation on this subject impossible, and animated by a desire of forwarding the beneficial work in which they are engaged, are authorised by his majesty to conclude the treaty without delay. They proceed to the signature under the full persuasion that before the treaty shall be returned from America, with the ratification of the United States, the enemy will either have formally abandoned, or tacitly relinquished, his unjust pretensions ; or that the government of the United States, by its conduct or assurances, will have given security to his majesty that it will not submit to such innovations in the established system of maritime law : and the undersigned have presented this note from an anxious wish that it should be clearly understood on both sides, that without such an abandonment on the part of the enemy, or such conduct on the part of the United States, **HIS MAJESTY WILL NOT CONSIDER HIMSELF BOUND, BY THE PRESENT SIGNATURE OF HIS COMMISSIONERS, TO RATIFY THIS TREATY, OR PRECLUDE FROM ADOPTING SUCH MEASURES AS MAY SEEM NECESSARY FOR COUNTERACTING THE DESIGNS OF HIS ENEMY.**

“ The undersigned cannot conclude, without expressing their satisfaction on the prospect of accomplishing an object so important to the interests and friendly connection of both nations, and their just sense of the conciliatory disposition, manifested by the commissioners of the United States, during the whole course of the negotiation.”

(Signed)

TO JAMES MONROE, &c. &c. &c.

WILLIAM PINKNEY, &c. &c. &c.

VASSAL HOLLAND.

AUCKLAND.

However exceptionable the terms of this note may be, I cannot persuade myself that it justifies the rejection of the treaty

without consulting the senate. Men of powerful minds defend the procedure. Their arguments appear unsound.—To the reader's judgment the subject is submitted.

Separation of the States.

The next error of Mr. Jefferson's administration involves a very great neglect of duty. During nearly the whole of that period, the insurrectional and treasonable doctrine of a separation of the states, was publicly advocated in some of the gazettes to the eastward, and, wonderful and shameful to tell, preached from the pulpit.* These publications and sermons, having a direct tendency to the destruction of social order, and the introduction of civil war, demanded the severe animadversion of the law officers of the government. It was the incumbent duty of the President to have had the laws put in force, in order to repress the offences, and to punish the offenders. And if there were no law to reach the offence, he ought to have submitted the case to congress, for the purpose of supplying the defect. A re-enactment and enforcement of the sedition law were imperiously required. And the good sense of the nation would have supported a measure which the public welfare rendered so necessary. It may be fairly averred that there is no country in the world but the United States, in which an open attempt to subvert the government, and tear down the pillars of society, would have escaped condign punishment. Every society ought to possess within itself, and rigorously to exercise, whenever occasions call for it, the fundamental principle of self-preservation.

It is impossible to censure too highly the error here adverted to. The jeopardy in which the nation was lately placed, when our nearest and dearest interests were in the most imminent danger, may be fairly ascribed to this most fatal and pernicious misconduct. In every science, there are some great, leading truths which cannot be controverted. And in political economy there is no maxim more indubitable than this, that *treason never was, and probably never will be propitiated by forbearance*. Since the world was formed, never did a conspiracy meet with the same degree of impunity. Our "Palinurus slept at the helm." The mutineers had full scope for their activity. They made their arrangements at leisure, as undisturbedly as if they were engaged in promoting the salvation of the state. To whatever cause this neglect may be ascribed, whether to torpor, inactivity, or reliance on the good sense of the nation, it casts an indelible stain on the administration of Mr. Jefferson.

The last of the errors of that administration which I shall notice, arises from its neglect of enforcing

The Embargo,

Which was a most efficient weapon for procuring redress from England. Its effects upon her colonies by privations of the ne-

* See Chapter 55,

cessaries of life—and upon her trade and naval power, by withholding supplies of raw materials and naval stores, were very considerable. And had it been duly enforced, as the duty of the chief magistrate required, it could hardly have failed to impel the British to relinquish those pretensions, which so highly and perniciously infringed our rights. But it was openly and flagitiously violated: and of course its intended operation on England utterly counteracted. It became almost a mere paper pop gun. Its effects on this country were highly pernicious. While it curtailed the trade and profits of the fair trader, it enabled smugglers, and those who set the laws of their country at defiance—whose god was gain, to make rapid and unhallowed fortunes. In a word it sacrificed the interests of some of the best, to those of the very worst members of the community. In proportion as a citizen held the laws sacred—in proportion as he honestly yielded them obedience—in the same proportion did he sacrifice his interest. And by this political arithmetic, in proportion as he disregarded the law—in proportion as he sacrificed the public interest to his thirst of gain—in the same proportion did he aggrandize himself. The export trade, which was fraudulently carried on to a considerable extent, was wholly in the hands of persons of the latter description. Their vessels, laden with abundant supplies for the British colonies, were very conveniently driven to sea by north west winds, and *forced into the West Indies*.

It has been said, in vindication of Mr. Jefferson, that he had not sufficient power to enforce the execution of the law. This is utterly incorrect. His powers were amply adequate for this purpose. But even if this defence were valid, it does not exonerate him from the high degree of censure attached to this dereliction of duty. He ought, in that case, to have stated the defect to congress, who had power of applying, and undoubtedly at his requisition would have applied a remedy.

Besides the non-enforcement of the embargo act, there was a radical error committed by the government in continuing it so long. Its inadequacy, to effect the purpose its friends had contemplated, was fully established. And, this object being unattained, its effect was to punish ourselves for the lawless proceedings of others. It ought to have been considered principally as a preparation for war.

The measure substituted for the embargo, that is, the non-intercourse with both belligerents, has been generally regarded by the democrats, as a feeble one: and the tenth congress, which made the change, has been on that ground stigmatized by them almost universally, as imbecile and contemptible. This is a most egregious error. It is inconceivable how it could have found such general credence. The non-intercourse law was as bold, as manly, and as energetic a measure as the annals of Christen-

dom can produce for a century. An infant nation, with five or six frigates, and a number of gun-boats, forbids the entrance into her ports, under penalty of confiscation, to the vessels of the two most powerful nations in the world ; the one absolute by land—the other by sea, the latter owning a thousand vessels of war ! and this is, forsooth, a measure dictated by imbecility ! The human mind can hardly conceive a greater instance of folly.

CHAPTER IV.

Bank of the United States. Miserable policy not to renew the Charter.

Among the great sins of the democratic party, during Mr. Madison's administration, must be numbered the non-renewal of the charter of the Bank of the United States. This circumstance injuriously affected the credit and character of this country abroad—produced a great degree of stagnation, distress, and difficulty at home—and was among the causes of the late embarrassments and difficulties of the pecuniary concerns of the country.—Had this bank been in existence, its capital might readily at any time have been increased by congress, ten, twenty, or thirty millions, so as to aid the government most effectually, and support the national credit.

To the renewal of the charter there were various objections offered, on the ground of inexpediency : but these had not much influence—nor were they entertained by many of the members. The grand difficulty arose from the idea so steadily maintained by most of the democratic party, that the constitution imparts no power to grant charters of incorporation. Many of the members who on this ground voted in the negative, most unequivocally admitted the *expediency* of the renewal of the charter.

This constitutional objection had been obviated, it would appear, unanswerably. All the departments of the government, legislative, executive, and judiciary, had recognized the institution, at various times during the twenty years of its existence.

The courts of different states, and of the United States, had sustained various suits brought by the bank in its corporate capacity—by which, so far as depends upon the judiciary, it had had the seal of constitutionality stamped on it. This was a very serious, important, and decisive circumstance.

In addition to this, a democratic legislature of the United States had given it a most solemn sanction. In March, 1804, an act had passed, authorising the institution to establish branches in the territories of the United States, which power was not embraced by the original charter. *This act was passed without a division, when nearly all the members were present, and when the democrats had an overwhelming majority in congress. No*

constitutional objection could have been then suggested ; for had any of the members believed the measure unconstitutional, they would indubitably have called for the yeas and nays, in order to record their dissent.

The act was signed by Nathaniel Macon, speaker of the house of representatives ; Jesse Franklin, president of the senate ; and Thomas Jefferson, president of the United States.

These cases, with others which might be cited, produced this dilemma. They either, as I have stated, afforded a complete recognition of the constitutionality of the charter, or a gross, palpable violation of the constitution, by the three several grand departments of the government.

I presume it cannot be doubted, that if a charter of incorporation be unconstitutional, every extension of the powers of the corporate body must be equally unconstitutional.

It therefore irresistibly follows, that every member of congress who voted for the act of March, 1804, and afterwards voted against a renewal of the charter, merely on the ground of unconstitutionality, was guilty of a manifest, if not a criminal inconsistency.*

A circumstance connected with this transaction, rendered the impropriety of the rejection of the application for a renewal of the charter, still more striking and palpable. The government till the year 1802 held 2200 shares of the stock, which it sold to Sir Francis Baring at 45 per cent. advance, whereby it made a clear profit of \$399,600 beyond their par value. Those who purchased of Mr. Baring, and held the stock till the dissolution of the bank, lost all this sum, exclusive of a considerable difference between the dividends and legal interest on the purchase money. They could never have entertained any doubt of the continuance of the charter. They must have conceived it to be as permanent as that of the bank of England. Had they supposed otherwise, they would not have bought at so great an advance. And it would not be easy to satisfy the candid and impartial, that our government could with propriety or justice, make such profit of their ignorance and their confidence in its integrity and fairness.

CHAPTER V.

Armistice proposed by Admiral Warren.

THE next of the errors of Mr. Madison's administration, that I notice, is the rejection of the armistice offered by admiral Warren, on the 12th of September, 1812, nearly three months after the declaration of war.

* For further details on the subject, the reader is referred to "Seven letters to Dr. Seybert on the renewal of the charter of the Bank of the United States." By M. C.

Never, probably, was war more just. Never had a country more patiently borne the most humiliating accumulation of outrage and injury than the United States had done. Her character had in consequence depreciated in the estimation of mankind. She was universally presumed to be so lost in the sordid pursuit of gain, as to be callous to outrage, to insult, and to contumely. She appeared to have forfeited all regard to national honour and dignity. Her mendicant ambassadors had been, for years, in vain suing for justice and forbearance at the portals of St. James's palace. The pusillanimity of the government had become to the federalists a theme of reproach against their antagonists—to the democrats, of shame and mortification. And it was a bye-word among the opposers of the administration, that it "could not be kicked into war." This reproachful expression was used even in congress by Mr. Josiah Quincey, and was quite common out of doors. It is impossible to forget the torrents of reproaches heaped upon the cabinet at Washington on this ground. The pusillanimity and cowardice of the administration furnished an inexhaustible fund of rhetorical embellishments to flowery speeches innumerable.

The declaration of war was therefore indubitably as just as any similar document from the days of Nimrod. The expediency of it was, however, not equally clear. The risk was immense. It was putting to hazard the vital interests of eight millions of people, on the very uncertain chances of war. Yet I do not pretend to decide the question of expediency in the negative; for let it be observed, that every argument against this war would apply with nearly equal force against resistance to any degree of insult, outrage, and injury from England; as the chief arguments against its expediency were predicated upon the immense naval force of that nation, and her consequent means of inflicting incalculable injury upon the United States: and whatever cogency there might be in these arguments, would equally exist, let the injuries sustained be what they might.

But whatever might be the justice, necessity, or policy of the war, it was a great error, when the orders in council were repealed, and an armistice offered by the British government, not to accept it. Negotiations for the removal of the rest of our grievances might have taken place; and would undoubtedly have been conducted under more favourable auspices, than those that preceded them; for England having discovered that she had calculated too far on our passiveness, would have been far more disposed to do us justice.

Unfortunately, the proposition was rejected.*

* Candour and justice to Mr. Madison require that I should state, that he offered to agree to an armistice with sir John Borlase Warren, on condition that the practice of impressment should be suspended during the negotiation.

When the preceding article was written, I had not sufficiently examined the celebrated repeal, as it is styled, of the orders in From the letter of the Secretary of State to sir John on this subject, I annex an extract—

“The claim of the British government is to take from the merchant vessels of other countries, British subjects. In the practice, the commanders of British ships of war often take from the merchant vessels of the United States, American citizens. *If the United States prohibit the employment of British subjects in their service, and enforce the prohibition by suitable regulations and penalties, the motive to the practice is taken away.* It is in this mode that the president is willing to accommodate this important controversy with the British government: and it cannot be conceived on what ground the arrangement can be refused.

“A suspension of the practice of impressment, pending the armistice, seems to be a necessary consequence. It cannot be presumed, while the parties are engaged in a negotiation to adjust amicably this important difference, that the United States would admit the right, or acquiesce in the practice, of the opposite party; or that Great Britain would be unwilling to restrain her cruisers from a practice which would have the strongest tendency to defeat the negotiation. It is presumable, that both parties would enter into the negotiation with a sincere desire to give it effect. For this purpose, it is necessary, that a clear and distinct understanding be first obtained between them, of the accommodation which each is prepared to make. *If the British government is willing to suspend the practice of impressment from American vessels, on consideration that the United States will exclude British seamen from their service, the regulations by which the compromise should be carried into effect, would be solely the object of negotiation.* The armistice would be of short duration. If the parties agreed, peace would be the result. If the negotiation failed, each would be restored to its former state, and to all its pretensions by recurring to war.

“The president desires that the war which exists between the two countries should be terminated on such conditions as may secure a solid and durable peace. To accomplish this grand object, it is necessary that the great subject of impressment be satisfactorily arranged. *He is willing that Great Britain should be secured against the evils of which she complains.* He seeks on the other hand, that the citizens of the United States should be protected against a practice, which, *while it degrades the nation, deprives them of their rights as freemen, takes them by force from their families and country into a foreign service, to fight the battles of a foreign power, perhaps against their own kindred and country.*”

These proposals were perfectly fair and honourable; and it is to be lamented that sir J. B. Warren’s powers were not extensive enough to allow him to accept them: but as they were not thus extensive, it is equally to be lamented that the suspension of impressment was insisted on.

As this is a most important feature in our public proceedings, it is proper to state further, that so sincerely desirous was Mr. Madison to close the breach, that on the twenty-sixth of June, 1812, only eight days after the declaration of war, he authorised Mr. Russel to make the same proposition to the government of Great Britain. The communication was made to lord Castlereagh by Mr. Russel, in the following words:

London, August 24, 1812.

“As an inducement to Great Britain, to discontinue the practice of impressment from American vessels, I am authorised to give assurance, that a law shall be passed (to be reciprocal) to prohibit the employment of British seamen, in the public or commercial service of the United States.

“It is sincerely believed, that such an arrangement would prove more efficacious in securing to Great Britain her seamen, than the practice of impressment, so derogatory to the sovereign attributes of the United States, and so incompatible with the personal rights of her citizens.”

This proposition was rejected.

* Message of the President to Congress, November 4, 1812.

O. B. 10

council, which is very different indeed, from what I had conceived it. It is liable to strong objections, which I believe have never been fully stated, and of which the public are not probably aware. To enable the reader to form a correct opinion on a point of such great magnitude, independent of any impression to be made by my statement, I annex the paragraph of the instrument to which I allude, and which I am confident never was generally understood or attended to.

"His royal highness is hereby pleased to declare, in the name and on the behalf of his majesty, that nothing in this present order contained, shall be understood to preclude his royal highness the prince regent, IF CIRCUMSTANCES SHALL SO REQUIRE," [mark these words, reader—"if circumstances shall so require,"] "*from restoring, after reasonable notice, the orders of the seventh of January, 1807, and the twenty-sixth of April, 1809, or any part thereof, to their full effect: OR, from taking such other measures of retaliation against the enemy, as may appear to his royal highness to be just and necessary.*"

This is a most extraordinary, unprecedented, and indefensible clause. The prince regent has received an authenticated document, containing the repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees, on which he deems himself bound to repeal the orders in council. But in the instrument which he issues on the subject, he expressly reserves the right of restoring those orders, "*if circumstances shall so require.*" On these "*circumstances*" he, of course, is to decide. These "*circumstances*" are wholly independent of "*retaliation*," provision being made in the subsequent part of the paragraph expressly for "*retaliation*" in a distinct clause. It therefore appears that the orders in council were, in strict technical language, *never repealed*. They were merely *suspended* till "*circumstances should require*" their revival.

No candid reader can, I presume, deny that the above is fair reasoning. This, therefore, cannot be regarded as a "*repeal*," in the sense in which this nation had a right to expect the orders in council to be "*repealed*," according to the British pledge, to proceed *pari passu* with the repeal of the French decrees. The orders in council might have been "*restored*," in one month after the date of this instrument, according to its tenor, "*if circumstances should have so required*," without our government having any just reason to complain of breach of faith on the part of that of Great Britain. There never was a public document more cautiously worded. And had it arrived here previous to the declaration of war, this country would have been perfectly warranted in refusing to regard it as "*a repeal*." To meet and to fulfil the idea held out in the previous pledges of the British government, the repeal ought to have been unconditional, except the reservation of a right to renew the orders in council in the one specific case of the revival of the French decrees.

It is a remarkable fact respecting this repeal, that in the debates upon it in the British parliament, the mighty wrongs in-

flicted by the orders in council upon this country formed hardly any part of the reasons whereon the adoption of the measure was urged. Even Mr. Brougham, the powerful opponent of the orders, and the mover of the address for their "*repeal*," founded his arguments, in his published speech, wholly on the injurious effects experienced in England by the loss of our trade. It is true, he once glances at the injustice of the orders, but it is very slightly and altogether incidentally. He does not boldly and magnanimously expose them to reprobation on the ground of their violation of our rights, as Mr. Baring had done in his celebrated pamphlet.

But as the president admitted the instrument to be a *repeal*, it was, I repeat, to be deeply regretted, that he did not accept the armistice, and trust to subsequent negotiation for redress on the subject of impressment. His admission of it in that point of light, precluded him from employing the solid objection to which it was liable.

CHAPTER VI.

Appointment of Mr. Gallatin as minister to treat with Great Britain. Negotiation at Gottenburg. Recent neglect of due preparations.

THE appointment of Mr. Gallatin as minister to treat with the court of St. James's was a very considerable error. This gentleman has had the reputation, probably with justice, of being one of the ablest financiers in this country. For twelve years, he had presided over the financial concerns of the nation, during which period, moderate talents were adequate to the duties of that station. But a crisis had arrived when the abilities of a Colbert, or a Sully, or a Ximenes, might be necessary; and most injudiciously and indefensibly he was then despatched to another hemisphere; and his duties devolved *ad interim* on another officer, whose proper official duties require all his time and all his talents.

This measure was highly preposterous. It was incorrect in the president to confer, it was equally incorrect in the secretary to receive, the appointment. It was the less defensible, from the circumstance, that nearly all the democrats in the United States had, in 1794, utterly disapproved of, and declaimed against, the appointment, by general Washington, of judge Jay, to negotiate a treaty with Great Britain, pending his continuance as a judge. It is moreover obvious, that the absence of one judge cannot produce any material inconvenience; as there are always others to supply his place. But there are high and responsible duties attached to the office of secretary of the treasury, which can never, without very great impropriety, be devolved on a deputy. I pass over all but the transcendent one of remitting fines and for-

feitures, too high a power probably to be trusted to any individual whatever, not excepting even the secretary himself.*

Negotiation at Gottenburg.

At a period when it was of immense importance to the United States to close the war as speedily as possible, the president had the alternative of London or Gottenburg as the scene of negotiation. We had been unfortunate by land, through treason, incapacity, or some other cause. It was our interest to accelerate—it was that of the British to procrastinate the negotiations. The chances from delay were much in their favour. War is, moreover, a component part of their system. Ours is calculated for peace. These observations acquired treble force from a reflection on the disaffection of the eastern portion of the union, and its aversion to the war. Of course, we ought to have shunned whatever might produce delay. It was therefore most extraordinary and unaccountable, that the president should have chosen Gottenburg in preference to London, under all the obvious delays resulting from the necessity that would probably arise, or be pretended, to consult the court of St. James's, by the ministers of that court. It appears almost as absurd as it would be to choose the Havanna, or Port Royal, were the negotiations to be conducted on this side of the Atlantic. This was the more erroneous, from the consideration that the fate of large portions of our territory, and the lives of hundreds of valuable citizens, might depend upon the delay of a single day.

Shortly after the annunciation of the choice of Gottenburg, there was a paragraph published here, extracted from a London newspaper, stating that twenty mails were then actually due from that place at London, owing to the continued prevalence of adverse winds. This was an unanswerable proof, if any were necessary, of the impropriety of the choice of Gottenburg.

Neglect of due preparations for the defence of the country after the downfall of Bonaparte.

Under this head, the president and the heads of departments were still more culpable than under any of the former ones.

From the period of the downfall of Bonaparte, and the complete triumph of Great Britain and her allies, it was obvious to the meanest capacity, that her powers of annoyance had increased prodigiously. The immense forces raised to aid the coalition against France were liberated from all employment but against us. And of the disposition of England to continue the war, we had the most convincing indications. The British newspapers were replete with denunciations of vengeance against

* See the luminous essays on this subject by W. B. Giles, esq, which are replete with the most convincing and unanswerable arguments.

us, and with statements of immense preparations for our chastisement. And to crown the whole—to remove all possible doubt on the subject—to deprive us and our rulers of all plea in justification of our torpor, apathy, and neglect, the lords of the admiralty published an address to the navy, stating, as a reason for not discharging so many seamen as the return of peace in Europe might have warranted, that the war existing with this country for the maritime rights of the British Empire, rendered such a measure improper. I annex a short extract from the address :

London, April, 30, 1814.

“The lords commissioners of the admiralty regret that the unjust and *unprovoked aggression of the AMERICAN GOVERNMENT*, in declaring war upon this country, *after all the causes of its original complaint had been removed*, does not permit them to reduce the fleet at once to a peace establishment. But as the question now at issue in this war, *is the maintenance of those maritime rights, which are the sure foundation of our national glory*, their lordships look with confidence to that part of the fleet which it may be still necessary to keep in commission, for a continuance of that spirit of discipline and gallantry, which has raised the British navy to its present pre-eminence.”

“J. W. CROKER.”

Notwithstanding these symptoms of an impending hurricane, an extraordinary delusion almost universally prevailed throughout the nation, of which it is hardly possible to produce a parallel. Numbers of our most enlightened citizens, knowing that the restoration of peace in Europe had removed all the ostensible causes of war, and placing full reliance upon the magnanimity of Great Britain, predicated all their arrangements on a speedy and honourable peace. Purchases and sales of property to an incalculable amount, were made under this soothing expectation. And we were lulled into a state of the most perfect security, as if all our dangers had utterly subsided—the temple of Janus were about to be closed—and every man were to convert his sword into a plough-share.

To such a degree was this infatuation carried, that authentic information of the sailing of hostile armaments produced no effect to diminish it. We were gravely told, that it was quite in character for nations to assume an energetic and formidable attitude pending negotiations ; that the expense to England of sending these armaments was inconsiderable ; that they would be recalled as soon as a treaty was signed ; and, in fine, that she was too magnanimous to take advantage of the existing state of things—with *an endless variety of arguments and assertions, equally profound, convincing, and cogent.*

There were infinite pains taken by the friends of England in this country, to foster and extend this delusion. Their efforts were crowned with the most complete success. The nation fell into the snare with a degree of cullibility that afforded a practical commentary on our pretensions to illumination, superior to the rest of the world.

These deceits were varied with an address and industry, worthy of a better cause. They assumed every shape, from an humble six-penny paragraph, extracted from a London paper, to an important public document. Extracts of letters innumerable, from "*eminent merchants*" in London, Liverpool, and Glasgow, to merchants of *equal eminence* in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore, were published with most confident assurances of the immediate appointment of commissioners, to negotiate with ours, on terms comporting with the magnanimity of England, and perfectly honourable to the United States. Letters were said likewise to have been received from Mr. Gallatin, full of assurances of peace, which Great Britain would grant on terms more favourable than when she was pressed by the power of Bonaparte. All these tales, how wild or extravagant soever, were greedily caught at and believed by our citizens, as they flattered and coincided with their ardent desire of peace. So justly sings the poet,

"What we wish to be true, we are fond to believe."

Several times we were deluded with information that Admiral Cochrane had received despatches announcing an approaching armistice, and his consequent recal from the American station. In a word, no pains were spared to lull us into a most profound sleep; and the opiates operated most powerfully.

During all this deceitful calm, through which every man of discernment might readily and unerringly foresee the approaches of a fearful storm—as every indication from England, deserving of credit, portended a long, a desperate, and a vindictive warfare; the government of the United States took no measures to dispel the delusion. In vain the public looked to Washington for information on the prospect of affairs. All was there profoundly silent. Government must have had all the information on the subject that was in this country: and it was their incumbent duty to have disseminated abroad the result of their intelligence, that the public might regulate their proceedings, and predicate their measures on rational and prudential calculations. But this imperious duty was, I venture to assert, utterly neglected. There was not a line of official communication on the subject. And nothing appeared in the National Intelligencer which strongly marked either a probability of peace, or a continuance of the war. As far, however, as conclusions could be drawn from this semi-official paper, they warranted much more the hope of a restoration of peace, than fear of the contrary.

This conduct, on the part of the administration, was to the last degree culpable. It was a dereliction of duty that exposed our citizens to ruinous consequences. The Philadelphians were among the most deluded portion of the people of the United States. There were no preparations made for defence except the embodying a number of volunteer corps, very inefficient in-

deed to protect us. And I shudder to think what might have been the consequences, had the enemy assailed us while we were thus napping in a state of stupid and most irrational security.

The crash of the conflagration at Washington, awaked us out of our slumbers, and dispelled the delusion.—We were then aroused to a full sense of our dangerous situation, and of the folly and supineness that had caused it. We went manfully to work—and in a few weeks made such preparations as renewed public confidence, and promised fair to enable us to repel the enemy, should he make his appearance.

CHAPTER VII.

General Wilkinson and General Hampton. Proceedings of Congress. Lamentable torpor, delay, and indecision. Neglect of public opinion.

In military affairs, when combined operations are undertaken, it is indispensably necessary, in order to insure success, that a good understanding should prevail between the commanders who are to co-operate. A want of due attention to this obvious dictate of prudence and common sense, has caused the failure, among various nations, of expeditions of the utmost importance. It is one of those plain rules, which can hardly escape the discernment of a man of even mediocre capacity.

Nevertheless, the northern campaign of 1813, was intrusted to Gen. Wilkinson, and Gen. Hampton, between whom existed a high degree of hostility, which was sufficiently well known, to have pointed out the absurdity of the procedure. The issue of the campaign was disastrous. And it is not improbable that a large portion, perhaps the whole of the disaster, arose from the neglect of a rule so very rational, that it is astonishing how it could have been overlooked.

Proceedings of Congress.

Among the grievous sins of the ruling party, I know of none much more culpable than the shocking and miserable mode in which the proceedings of Congress were managed during the session of 1814–15. Whatever was the urgency of the public business, how ruinous soever might be delay, it was utterly impossible to inspire that body with a due degree of energy or promptitude. Week after week, and month after month, passed over—and the public anxiously, but in vain, expected remedies to be applied to the disorders of the state. To a most culpable spirit of procrastination, and the miserable itch of speaking, this wretched waste of time and neglect of the public embarrassments may be fairly ascribed.

Two or three powerful *orators* on each side take a comprehensive view of a subject. They exhaust it completely. They are

followed by a crowd of *speakers*, who are unable to throw any new or important light on it—and whose speeches stand in the same relation to those of the early orators, that a hash warmed over a second or third time does to the original noble sirloin, of whose fragments it is formed. And thus is the money of the nation expended, and its hopes frustrated, merely that Mr. A, and Mr. B, and Mr. C, and Mr. D, may have opportunities of making long speeches to prove to their constituents how wisely they have selected representatives!

I have not before me the debates of the British parliament—and therefore cannot with full confidence state what is actually their mode of proceeding. But it is strongly impressed on my mind, that they generally decide on questions at one sitting.—This at least I can aver with the utmost certainty, that many of the most momentous questions, involving the interests of 80,000,000 of people,* have been thus decided, after a debate from three o'clock in the afternoon, till three or four in the morning. And in the debates on these subjects, some of the greatest men in Europe have displayed their talents on both sides—Ers-kine, and Fox, and Grey—Pitt, and Burke, and Wyndham.—Whereas one of our *speechifiers* will sometimes occupy eight, ten, or twelve hours, sometimes two days, with a single speech.

A large portion of the people of this country have taken opposite sides respecting England, her manners, and her customs.—One party admires and copies—the other censures and despises almost every thing British.—They are both in equal error. England presents much to admire and imitate—much to censure and avoid. It is highly desirable we should imitate her in the management of her parliamentary proceedings.

As respects the business of Congress, a decisive remedy ought to be applied. The debates ought to be limited within reasonable bounds. When they have been sufficiently extended, they ought to be terminated by the previous question, notwithstanding the clamour and outcry of the minority. And whenever the emergency of the case requires promptitude, the sitting ought to be continued till the subject is decided, unless its complication and difficulty may render an adjournment necessary.

What a lamentable prospect the country exhibited at the moment these lines were written! It was the sixth of December. Congress had been in session nearly three months.—They found the credit of the government laid prostrate—the seaboard exposed to depredation—the pay of the army in arrears—and every thing in a situation that was calculated to excite energy and decision among a nation of Sybarites. And what was the result? There had probably been one or two hundred flowery speeches

* Including its East India possessions, the above is the number of the subjects of the British empire.

made—amendments and postponements innumerable—and only two important acts passed—one for borrowing three millions of dollars—and the other for buying or building twenty schooners.

To those who were actuated by a sincere regard for the welfare and safety of their country, these proceedings were a source of the most poignant uneasiness. They were utterly unaccountable, and irreconcilable with the plainest dictates of reason and common sense. Laying aside all considerations of public spirit or patriotism, a due regard to personal interest and personal safety, ought to have prescribed a totally different line of conduct.

The majority, imbecile and feeble, endeavoured to shelter themselves by censuring the factious and turbulent minority who made these long speeches for the purpose of embarrassing them, and protracting their debates and proceedings. This plea cannot bear examination. Were it valid, a minority of six or eight persons, possessed of the faculty of making "*long talks*," might at all times totally baffle a majority, and paralyze the operations of government. Suppose each member of the minority to make a speech of a day or two on every subject that arose for discussion—allow a reasonable time for replication to the majority—and the whole year would be inadequate for that portion of business which the British parliament would with ease despatch in a month.

Besides the procrastination arising from the displays of oratory which I have stated, there is another source of delay, equally injurious. Private and trifling business obtrudes itself on the attention of congress, and occupies a large portion of the time which is loudly called for by the important affairs of the nation. The former ought never to be allowed to interfere injuriously with the important concerns of the nation.

Here I must notice one particular case, of the most extraordinary kind that ever occupied the attention of a public body.—Never was there a greater mockery of a deliberative assembly. A stud horse, called Romulus, belonging to a Mr. David Dardin, was impressed by a continental officer, in the year 1781.—Having been valued at 750 pounds specie, General Greene, disgusted by the extravagance of the price, returned him. He was afterwards impressed by another officer, and never returned.—The widow of the owner, Mrs. Amy Dardin, has been a very assiduous applicant to congress for remuneration from that period; and the subject has, at various sessions, occupied a large portion of the time of that body. The wages of congress during the time of the debates, would, I am persuaded, purchase horses for the best appointed regiment of dragoons in Christendom.—A worthy member from Virginia used to ride Romulus into congress in great state, every year during his life. He is now no more. Who has been appointed "master of the horse" in

his place, I cannot state. But that he has a successor, is beyond a doubt; for Dardin's horse was curvetting and prancing as usual, even during the late very important session.

A gentleman to whom I mentioned this circumstance, informs me, that in the year 1802 and 1803, there were two pamphlets published on this subject, at the expense of the nation, *for the use of the members*, the cost of which would perhaps have paid for the horse.

To render this procedure more culpable, as well as more farcical, the senate of the United States was on the 7th or 8th or 9th of February, 1815, when every moment of its time was inexpressibly invaluable, gravely debating a bill for the remuneration of Mrs. Dardin! And it was then within a month of the close of its session—and had made no provision for the defence of our cities, liable to hourly destruction, nor for the restoration of public credit! The mind is lost in the most profound astonishment and indignation at the contemplation of such a futile, such a puerile mode of managing public business. The annals of legislation can hardly produce any parallel.

One of the two things. The claim is just or unjust. If the former, it is disgraceful and dishonourable not to have discharged it. If otherwise, it is truly insufferable to have the public taxed by such importunity.

Neglect of public Opinion.

Of all the errors of the two administrations of Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Madison, the least criminal, but probably the most pernicious in its results, is, the indifference they have displayed towards the unfounded allegations whereby they were borne down, and their reputation and usefulness destroyed. This may have arisen from an absurd reliance on the good sense of the public—or on the rectitude of their own intentions—perhaps from their indolence or inattention. It was probably founded, if it arose from either of the two first motives, upon a trite, but fallacious maxim, which antiquity hath bequeathed us—"Truth is great, and will prevail." Millions of times has this captivating maxim been pronounced; and it is almost universally admitted as incontrovertible. Yet the history of the world in almost every page bears testimony to its fallacy. Truth, unaided by industry, and activity, and energy, combats at very unequal odds against falsehood, supported by these auxiliaries. That truth, "other things being equal," is an overmatch for falsehood, I freely grant. But the friends of the former, if they rely wholly on its intrinsic merits, and do not exercise a due degree of vigilance, will be miserably deceived in their calculations.

A supposed case in point. A matron is charged with having been seen entering a brothel in the face of day, with a notorious seducer. The story spreads. It is universally believed. Her

character is destroyed. She is shunned as contaminatory. Six months afterwards, she produces a host of unexceptionable witnesses to prove an alibi. They establish, incontrovertibly, that at the time stated, and for months before and after, she was in China, or Japan. It is in vain. Her character is gone. The waters of the Atlantic would not purify her. She pays for her neglect and folly, the mighty forfeit of a destroyed reputation.

Thus has it been with the administrations of Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Madison. They have been charged with criminal conduct, frequently of the most flagrant kind. The charges have been passed over in silence for a considerable time. Not being denied, they were presumed to be admitted. And in fact, how can the public determine, whether silence under accusation arises from conscious guilt, a reliance upon conscious rectitude, or an absurd and criminal neglect of public opinion?

I say, "*a criminal neglect of public opinion.*" This declaration is not lightly hazarded. The character of a public officer is in some sort public property. A private person may perhaps allow his to be destroyed, without inflicting misfortune on any person but himself. But the destruction of that of a public officer is really a public injury—as it materially impairs, if it does not destroy, his usefulness.

There is in the history of General Washington, a circumstance which appears a departure from the sound, masculine good sense that almost universally presided over his conduct. During the revolutionary war, some of the British emissaries published a collection of letters ascribed to him, which were partly genuine, but interpolated with forgeries, and partly letters altogether forged. They were calculated to inspire strong doubts of his devotion to, and confidence in, the revolution. They were edited by a masterly pen.

The attack was unavailing. The attachment to, and confidence in, the general, were unimpaired. The pamphlet sunk into oblivion.

In the year 1795, during the discussion excited by Jay's treaty, it was reprinted as a genuine collection, and had an extensive circulation, in order to depreciate the character of the general. He did not at the time notice it. He allowed it to take its course, apparently indifferent as to the consequences. But at the close of his public functions, he recorded in the office of the secretary of state a formal denunciation of the forgery. This procedure was highly injudicious. If the pamphlet were entitled to any animadversion, the proper period was that of its republication, and when of course it would produce all the injury that could result from it to his public character.

The instances of neglects of this kind on the part of Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Madison, are numberless. I shall only instance two. A charge was alleged against the former, of having sent

two millions of dollars to France, for some secret and sinister purpose, which I cannot now recollect. It had been in universal circulation throughout the union, without any formal or satisfactory contradiction, for many months. At length, after it had done all the mischief it was calculated to produce, an authentic documental disproof crept out, *exactly like the lady's alibi, and with the same effect.*

One other instance, and I have done with this part of my subject. The offer of the Russian mediation was made by M. Daschkoff in March, 1813. Mr. Pickering shortly afterwards published in Boston, a series of letters on the subject, which were republished in almost every town and city of the United States. He openly and unqualifiedly asserted that the whole transaction was a fraud and imposture—solely calculated to delude the citizens into subscriptions for the pending loan.—He denied the offer of a mediation altogether, and boldly referred to M. Daschkoff and Dr. Logan, to prove his statements correct. If ever an accusation demanded attention and disproof, this was of that description. It was advanced under his own signature, by a man who had held high official stations, and who possessed very considerable standing with the opposers of the government. But the same fatal and unpardonable neglect prevailed as in so many other instances. The allegation was allowed to produce its full effect without any other attempt at counteraction, than a few anonymous paragraphs of denial.

To render this error more palpable, a motion was made in the senate of the United States, on the 2d of June, 1813, for a disclosure of the correspondence. Of this motion to bring the real state of the affair before the public, the government ought to have gladly availed itself. But it was rejected.

At length, when the affair had in some measure sunk into oblivion, on the 18th of January, 1814, a motion was carried in the house of Representatives of the United States, for the publication of the correspondence on the subject. It then appeared that the accusation was calumnious and unfounded—and that the transaction reflected a high degree of credit as well on the potent monarch, who took so warm an interest in our affairs, as on our government, for its prompt acceptance of the offer of mediation. But the disclosure was too late to counteract any of the pernicious effects that had resulted from the calumny. Many persons to this day believe the whole transaction to have been a deception.

CHAPTER VIII.

Capture of Washington. Causes. Mismanagement. Fort Washington. Trial of Captain Dyson. Extraordinary Sentence. Loans. Injury of Public Credit. Retrospection.

Capture of Washington.

On the 24th of August, 1814, the capital of the United States was taken by the enemy. His force was by no means of such magnitude as would have prevented the disaster from being accompanied by disgrace. Had it been overwhelming, the loss might have excited regret, but we should have been spared mortification and dishonour. But as it stands a subject for historical record, the loss, although very great, is undeserving of consideration. Placed beside the disgrace, it sinks into insignificance like a molehill beside a mountain.

The force of the enemy is variously stated. The highest estimate is 6,000. Dr. Catlett, who had a favourable opportunity of ascertaining with precision, states it at 3,540. Every person with whom I have conversed, that saw them, has been of opinion that they were so jaded with their march, and so dispirited, that, had suitable preparations been made, they might have been easily defeated, and probably captured.

They landed at Benedict, on the 18th of August, and proceeded in a tolerably regular course towards Washington, which was the only object worthy of their attention. They were six days on their march. And there was hardly any preparation for their reception, till three or four days before their arrival at that city. The secretary at war ridiculed the idea of their attacking Washington, till within three days of the battle of Bladensburg.

One obvious plan of defence, which would have struck the mind of a mere tyro in military affairs, was to have garrisoned the capitol and the president's house, with as powerful a force as could have conveniently operated there. The strength of these two buildings would have enabled the garrisons to withstand any assault, and defend themselves, until troops could have been collected to encounter the enemy.

It is not for me to decide on whom the censure ought to fall—on the president—the secretary at war—on the district general, Winder—or on the whole together. But let that point be determined as it may, it cannot be denied, that nothing but the most culpable neglect could have led to the results that took place—results which could not fail to prove injurious to the national character in Europe, and which, had not the news of the exploits of the brave and illustrious Macdonough and Maccomb, arrived there coterminously with the account of this disgraceful disaster, would have materially and perniciously affected the negotiation at Ghent.

When the preceding strictures were written, I had not seen the Report of the Committee appointed to investigate the subject, which I have recently examined with attention. It is clearly established by the documents annexed to this report, that the disasters arose from a series of the most extraordinary and unaccountable mismanagement. I shall enumerate a few of the instances in brief.

Let me previously observe, that a cabinet council was held at Washington, on the 1st of July, wherein it was resolved to establish a new military district, to comprise the cities of Washington, Baltimore, and the adjacent country. The command of it was given to general Winder, who had explicit directions to make preparations to repel the enemy, should he make any attempt on the seat of government, which the council judged highly probable.

Among the errors committed, the following are the most prominent:

1. There was no attempt to fortify those parts of the country calculated for defence, although General Van Ness, on behalf of the citizens of the District of Columbia, had made repeated and earnest applications to the secretary at war on the subject, and although the latter had as repeatedly promised to pay attention to their requests.

2. There was not the slightest effort to arrest the progress of the enemy, from the time of his debarkation till the day of the battle of Bladensburg, although the country through which he passed was admirably calculated for the purpose.

3. There was no camp formed equidistantly between Baltimore and Washington, so as to be able to cover and protect either or both places.

4. The troops from Baltimore were not ordered out in due season. Had the orders been, as most indubitably they ought to have been, issued at least on the debarkation of the enemy, these troops would have arrived in proper time—been fit for duty—and rescued the country from the disgrace and misfortune it experienced.

5. The orders for the Baltimore troops to march, were received in Baltimore on Saturday the 20th of August. They took up the line of march the next day, Sunday the 21st. *On that evening they received an order from General Winder, by express, TO HALT UNTIL FURTHER ORDERS!* Next day, they had renewed orders to march with full speed to Bladensburg.—Those to general Stansbury were received at 10 A. M. and those to colonel Sterrett at 2 P. M. The former reached Bladensburg on the 22d at night—the latter on the 23d at night. The fatal delay arising from the orders to halt, was among the principal causes of the disaster. Colonel Sterrett's corps arrived on the ground jaded, fatigued, and harassed. They had but little rest

the night previous to the battle, owing to some false alarms, and were in every respect unfit for being led into the engagement.

6. Colonel Young's brigade, by order of general Winder, was stationed at a distance from the field of battle, where it remained inactive during the whole time of the engagement, although within hearing of the report of the cannon.

7. An efficient corps of 600 infantry, and 100 cavalry, under colonel Miner, arrived at Washington on the evening preceding the battle. The colonel applied to general Armstrong for arms, and was directed to *report himself the next morning!!!* to colonel Carberry, who had the care of the arsenal. This gentleman spent the night at his country seat, and was not to be found in the morning, although invaluable hours were spent in searching for him. At length an order for arms was procured from general Winder. Even then delay occurred, from the scrupulosity of colonel Carberry's deputy in counting the flints—and further delay in giving receipt for them. The consequence was, that this corps, which would, almost to a certainty, have decided the fate of the day in favour of its country, began its march so late, as to have no share whatever in the action, and met the retreating army after its defeat!!!

8. Had a stand been made in Washington, and the whole force, even discomfited as it was, been collected together, there is no doubt but the loss might have been retrieved. But there was not the slightest effort of the kind made. The retreat was conducted in a disorderly manner, and as much like a flight as could be.

Throughout this work, in all important cases, I do not merely refer to my authorities, as is usually done. I quote as well as refer to them. I am desirous of silencing incredulity herself. In pursuance of this plan, I submit a few short extracts from the documents published by Congress, on which the preceding views are founded.

Extracts from the letter of general Van Ness, to the committee of Congress, appointed to inquire into the causes of the capture of Washington, dated November 23, 1814.

“About the opening of the present campaign, I pressed again upon the secretary the subject generally of our defence; suggesting, in addition to the occlusion of the river, the convenience and importance of a central camp, intermediate between Baltimore, Annapolis, Washington, Alexandria, Georgetown, and the neighbouring towns and country. And in frequent interviews (in number, to be sure, very much increased by the importunate applications and solicitations to me, of both the civil and military branches of the community, whose confidence in the secretary appeared, at an early period, at best waver- ing, if not declining) sometimes official, at other times not so, which I had with him, as the campaign progressed, I did not fail to repeat the suggestion. I still received assurances, generally verbal, favourable, accompanied by an otherwise apparent indifference, and confidence in our security.”*

* Report, page 287.

"Thus had the campaign progressed, without any visible steps towards works of defence, either permanent or temporary, either on the land or water side (*I never having heard of a spade or an axe being struck in any such operation*) or towards forming a rendezvous or camp of regular troops in the neighbourhood, to the great anxiety, inquietude, and alarm of the district and surrounding country; the secretary generally treating with indifference at least, if not with levity, the idea of an attack by the enemy."^{*}

"In August last, when the increased and reinforced fleet, with the troops, ascended the Chesapeake, and were known, from authentic information, to have entered the Patuxent, I called on secretary Armstrong again; and expressed, as usual, my apprehensions, arising from want of means and preparations; adding, that from the known naval and reputed land force of the enemy, he probably meant to strike a serious blow. His reply was, "*Oh yes! by G-d, they would not come with such a fleet without meaning to strike somewhere: but they certainly will not come here. What the d—l will they do here?*" &c. After remarking that I differed very much from him, as to the probable interest they felt in destroying or capturing our seat of government, and that I believed a visit to this place would, for several reasons, be a favourite object with them, he observed, "no, no! Baltimore is the place, sir; that is of so much more consequence."[†]

"I continued to see general Winder occasionally as before, and to be astonished at the apparent sluggishness or procrastination in the preparation for the reception of the enemy, who was on his advance. I recollect well, that even after he had, according to authentic and undoubted information, ascended to the head of the ship navigation of the Patuxent, and had, for about twenty-four hours, been debarking on the hither bank of that river, and marching his troops to their encampment on the heights of Benedict (about forty miles from this on the usual route) general W in answer to an enquiry of mine, whether he had ordered on any troops from Baltimore, and whether he thought they would be here in time, said, **THAT THEY WERE ORDERED ON; AND THAT ALL HIS FEAR WAS, THAT THEY WOULD BE HERE TOO SOON.** Expressing to him my astonishment at the apprehension, he said he thought it very probable that the enemy would suddenly turn about, and make a blow at Baltimore."[‡]

Extract from General Stansbury's Report.

"The men under my command were worn down, and nearly exhausted from long and forced marches, want of food, and watching. *They had been, with very little intermission, under arms, and marching, from the time of their departure from Baltimore, with but little sleep, bad provisions, and but little opportunity to cook.* They certainly were not in a situation to go into battle; but my orders were positive; and I was determined to obey them.

"Before, and during the action, *I did not see any of the force I was led to expect would support me.* I understood since, they were on their way to my assistance, and I presume exertions were made to bring them up."[§]

Extract from Colonel Miner's Report.

"I took up my line of march, and arrived at the capitol between sunset and dark, [Aug. 23.] and immediately made my way to the president, and reported my arrival; when he referred me to general Armstrong, to whom I repaired, and informed him as to the strength of the troops, as well as to the want of arms, ammunition, &c. which made it as late as early candle-light; when I was informed by that gentleman, the arms, &c. could not be had that night, and directed to report myself next morning to colonel Carberry, who would furnish me with arms, &c. which gentleman, from early next morning, I diligently sought for, until a late hour in the forenoon, without being able to find him, and then went in search of general Winder, whom I found near the Eastern Branch; when he gave an order to the armourer for the munitions wanting, with orders to return to the capitol, there to wait further orders."^{¶¶}

* Report, page 288.

§ Idem, page 185.

† Idem, page 292.

¶ Idem, page 231.

‡ Idem, page 296.

Extract from the Report of Doctor Catlett.

"Respecting the condition of the enemy's troops, I was informed by several of the British officers, that just previous to their reaching Bladensburg (with excessive fatigue or entire exhaustion) *they were dropping off in considerable numbers; that in the action, it was only by the most extraordinary exertions that the main body could be goaded on.* Although I observed some of their flankers at times advance on the run a small distance, these were said to be only the most active of their light companies of, and attached to, their eighty fifth regiment, commanded by lieutenant-colonel Thornton, acting as brigadier; *they appeared to me to halt, as if exhausted with fatigue, at or near the place where the firing ceased on our part,* about a mile and a half on this side of Bladensburg, about two o'clock, P. M."*

Extract from the Report of the Committee of congress on the capture of Washington.

"Our forces at this time at the Old Fields, are variously estimated, with no material difference, at about three thousand men, in the following corps: about four hundred horse, under the command of the following officers: lieutenant-colonel Lavall, colonel Tilman, captains Caldwell, Thornton, Herbert, Williams, &c: four hundred regular troops, under the command of lieutenant-colonel Scott, viz thirty-sixth, thirty-eighth, and captain Morgan's company of the twelfth infantry; six hundred marines and flotilla men under commodore Barney and captain Miller, with five pieces of heavy artillery; two eighteen pounders and three twelve pounders: one thousand eight hundred militia and volunteers, general Smith's brigade of Georgetown and city militia, and Maryland militia under colonel Kramer, of which there were two companies of artillery under captain Burch and major Peter, with six six pounders each, making an aggregate of three thousand two hundred, with seventeen pieces of artillery. *The enemy was without cavalry, and had two small field pieces and one howitzer, drawn by men; and the whole country well calculated for defence, skirmishing, and to impede the march of an enemy.*"†

"The march of our army to the city was extremely rapid and precipitate: and orders were occasionally given to captains of companies to hurry on the men, who were extremely fatigued and exhausted before the camping ground was reached, near the Eastern Branch bridge, within the district of Columbia."‡

"Colonel George Miner, with his regiment of Virginia militia, composed of six hundred infantry and one hundred cavalry, arrived at the city of Washington in the twilight of the evening of the twenty third; he called on the president who referred him to the secretary of war for orders; *the secretary informed him that arms could not be had that night; but gave orders to report himself to colonel Carberry, early in the morning, who would furnish him with arms and ammunition, as he was charged with that duty by general Winder.* From early in the morning till late in the forenoon, colonel Miner sought colonel Carberry diligently, but he could not be found. He rode to head quarters, and obtained an order from general Winder upon the arsenal for arms, &c; and marched to the place with his regiment, and its care he found committed to a young man, whose caution in giving out arms, &c. very much delayed the arming and supplying this regiment."§

"The distance from Benedict to the city of Washington, by Bladensburg, is upwards of fifty miles. *The enemy was without baggage-wagons or means of transportation; his troops much exhausted with fatigue; many compelled to quit the ranks, and extraordinary exertions used to keep others in motion; and, as if unable to pursue our forces, remained on the battle ground: the enemy's advance reached the city about eight o'clock in the evening, the battle having ended about two o'clock, or before.*"¶

"The enemy, on the evening of the twenty-fifth, made the greatest exertions to leave the city of Washington. They had about forty indifferent looking hor-

* Report, page 311.

† Idem, page 21.

‡ Idem, page 23.

§ Idem, page 26.

¶ Idem, page 34.

ses, ten or twelve carts and wagons, one ox-cart, one coach and several gigs. These were sent to Bladensburg to move off the wounded. A drove of sixty or seventy cattle preceded this party. Arriving at Bladensburg, the British surgeon was ordered to select the wounded who could walk; *the forty horses were mounted by those who could ride; the carts and wagons loaded; and upwards of ninety wounded left behind.* About twelve o'clock at night the British army passed through Bladensburg; and parties continued until morning, and stragglers until after mid-day. *The retreat of the enemy to his shipping was precipitate and apparently under an alarm: and it is supposed that it was known to him that our forces had marched to Montgomery court-house.*"*

"On the twelfth of July, general Winder was authorised, in case of menaced or actual invasion, to call into service the whole quota of Maryland. On the seventeenth general Winder was authorised to call into actual service not less than two nor more than three thousand of the drafts assigned to his command, to form a permanent force to be stationed in some central position between Baltimore and the city of Washington. On the same day, seventeenth of July, general Winder was authorised to call on the state of Pennsylvania for five thousand men; on Virginia, two thousand; on the militia of the district of Columbia, in a disposable state, two thousand; together with the six thousand from Maryland, making an aggregate force of fifteen thousand drafted militia, three thousand of which were authorised to be called into actual service; the residue in case of actual or menaced invasion, besides the regular troops estimated at one thousand, making sixteen thousand, independent of marines and flotilla-men. This was the measure of defence contemplated for the military district No. 10, and the measures taken by the war department up to the seventeenth of July in execution of it."†

Destruction of Fort Washington.

One extraordinary circumstance attended this disastrous affair, which deserves to be laid before the public. Fort Washington was commanded by captain Dyson, when the British took the city of Washington. He had received orders from general Winder, should the enemy come into his rear, to blow up the fort, and retreat with his garrison. The enemy came. His orders were clear and explicit. He obeyed them—as it appears he was in duty bound.

For this act, he was brought to trial—and sentenced to be dismissed the service.

I am not a military man, and know nothing of military affairs. I am therefore liable to error when I pronounce opinions on them. But with due deference to the court martial, whereof "brigadier general Smith, of the militia of the District of Columbia, was president," I cannot but believe captain Dyson's case to be peculiarly severe: and judging on plain principles of reason and common sense, the sentence appears unjust.

Extract from the report of general Winder.

"I sent, by major Hite, directions to the commanding officer at fort Washington, to advance a guard up to the main road upon all the roads leading to the fort; and in the event of his being taken in the rear of the fort by the enemy, to blow up the fort, and retire across the river."‡

* Report, page 36.

† Idem, page 38.

‡ Idem, page 172.

I wish to have it understood that I have no personal knowledge of general Armstrong, general Winder, or captain Dyson—nor do I believe I have ever seen any of them.

Departure of general Izard from Plattsburg.

One of the most extraordinary measures of the war—a measure utterly indefensible,—has, as far as I know, almost wholly escaped censure. It affords one among ten thousand instances, to prove how seldom approbation or censure is meted out with due regard to justice.

General Izard had an army of about 8000 regulars in the neighbourhood of Plattsburg. General Prevost, at no very great distance, had the command of about 14,000 troops, principally veterans. While the eyes of the nation were directed towards that quarter, and every man interested for the honour, the happiness, the independence of his country, was tremblingly alive to the future, and filled with the most awful forebodings of a ruinous result, from the fearful odds against our little army, amazement and terror filled every breast, to find that 5 or 6000 of our troops, under the general who had directed his utmost energy to train them to service, and to acquire their confidence, were ordered to a remote situation, on an unimportant expedition, in which no laurels were, or probably could be, acquired. Thus was a most invaluable frontier exposed to all the horrors of desolation.

The annals of warfare present no instance of greater fatuity. It is difficult to conjecture what could have been the object contemplated by this wonderful movement. But whatever it might have been, had the utmost success crowned the undertaking, it could not possibly have compensated for the issue which was to have been rationally calculated on at Plattsburg.

The result, however, was highly glorious to the nation. Nothing could have been more fortunate. But this does not diminish an iota of the censure due to the measure.—The character of an action, good or bad, is not affected, except with the *canaille*,* by its success, whether prosperous or the reverse. Many of the wisest schemes ever devised have failed of success. Many of the most absurd and ridiculous have prospered. But every man whose approbation is worthy of regard, commends or reprobates a measure according to the wisdom or folly displayed in planning it.

Had general Izard's army remained at Plattsburg, and aided in the discomfiture of governor Prevost, the triumph of the United States at the Saranac would not have been so transcendently great. Its removal, therefore, how absurd soever, is a subject

* It may be proper to state, that the true distinction of the *Canaille*, is not dress, or station. It is mind. There are men worth ten thousand a year, who are of the *canaille*.

of the most serious rejoicing. It has added immensely to the laurels the nation acquired in the war.

Loans.

The last and perhaps the most grievous and unpardonable error of the democratic party—an error, pregnant with baleful consequences to the finances and credit of the country, was, their depending on loans, for the support of the war, and deferring the imposition of taxes adequate to erect the superstructure of public credit upon. This arose from the miserable, the despicable, the pernicious dread of forfeiting popularity, and losing the reins of government—a dread often the parent of the most destructive measures. The consequence of this highly reprehensible error was, that the loans were made to very considerable loss, and that the public credit of the nation was most lamentably impaired.

I HAVE now gone through a review of the principal errors and follies, the neglects and the mismanagements of the democratic party. I have detailed and canvassed them with the boldness of a freeman. I have followed the sound advice of Othello :

“Nought extenuate—nor aught set down in malice.”

On many of these points I am greatly at variance with men of powerful talents belonging to this party. Some of my facts and opinions have been controverted by a critic of considerable acumen, in one of the daily papers. I have re-examined the various subjects embraced in this volume ; and, where I have found cause to change my opinion, I have unhesitatingly done so. My object is truth. I have pursued it steadily—and, as far as I can judge of myself, without undue bias. But I well know how difficult it is for human weakness to divest itself of prejudice and partiality. To the candid reader, I submit the decision.

This detail of misconduct has been a painful task. Far more agreeable would it have been, to have descanted on the merits and talents of the president and other public functionaries. To a man of a liberal mind it is infinitely more agreeable to bestow the meed of praise, than to deal out censure. But a rough truth is preferable to a smooth falsehood. And whatever chance we have of arriving at the haven of peace and happiness depends upon a fair and candid examination of ourselves, which must infallibly result in a conviction, that, so great have been the errors, the follies, and the madness on both sides, mutual forgiveness requires no effort of generosity—it is merely an act of simple justice.

BEFORE I quit this branch of my subject, it is but proper to observe, that it is hardly possible to conceive of a more difficult and arduous situation than that in which Mr. Jefferson and Mr.

Madison have been placed. They have had to struggle with two belligerents, one supremely powerful by land, and on that element holding in awe the chief part of the civilized world—the other equally powerful by sea :—and each, in his rage against the other, violating the clearest and most indisputable rights of neutrals, and inflicting upon us, in a time of pretended peace, nearly as much injury as if we were arrayed among the belligerents. And the divisions and distractions of the country, with the formidable opposition of a powerful party, embracing all the governments of the eastern states and a considerable portion of the citizens of the rest of the union, must have caused the administration infinitely more embarrassment and difficulty than the two belligerents together. The federalists, as I shall show more fully in the sequel, after goading the government into resistance, and vilifying it for not procuring redress, thwarted, opposed, and rendered nugatory every rational effort made to accomplish the very object they professed to seek—a degree of madness and folly never-enough-to-be-deplored.

CHAPTER IX.

The federalists. Federal convention and constitution. Complaints of want of energy in the constitution. Disorganizers and Jacobins. Alien and sedition laws.

HAVING thus taken what I hope will be allowed to be a candid view of the errors and misconduct of the democratic party, it remains to render the same justice to their opponents. And I feel confident, it will appear that the latter have at least as much need to solicit forgiveness of their injured country, as the former. In the career of madness and folly which the nation has run, they have acted a conspicuous part, and may fairly dispute the palm with their competitors.

In the federal convention, this party made every possible exertion to increase the energy, and add to the authority, of the general government, and to endow it with powers at the expense of the state governments and the citizens at large. Bearing strongly in mind the disorders and convulsions of some of the very ill-balanced republics of Greece and Italy, their sole object of dread appeared to be the inroads of anarchy. And as mankind too generally find it difficult to steer the middle course, their apprehensions of the Scylla of anarchy effectually blinded them to the dangers of the Charybdis of despotism. Had they possessed a complete ascendancy in the convention, it is probable they would have fallen into the opposite extreme to that which decided the tenor of the constitution.

This party was divided. A small but very active division was composed of monarchists, who utterly disbelieved in the efficacy or security of the republican form of government, espe-

cially in a territory so extensive, as that of the United States, and embracing so numerous a population as, at no distant period, was to be taken into the calculation. The remainder were genuine republicans, men of enlightened views, and a high degree of public spirit and patriotism. They differed as widely from the monarchic part of that body, as from the democratic. It is unfortunate that their counsels did not prevail. For in government, as in almost all other human concerns, safety lies in middle courses. Violent and impassioned men lead themselves, and it is not wonderful they lead others, astray. This portion of the federal party advocated an energetic, but a republican form of government, which, on all proper occasions, might be able to command and call forth the force of the nation.

The following letter sheds considerable light on the views of Alexander Hamilton, who took a distinguished part in, and had a decisive influence on, the proceedings of that respectable body.—It is obvious that a president during good behaviour, which appears by this document to have been a favourite feature with Mr. Hamilton, could hardly be considered other than a president for life.

NEW YORK, Sept. 16, 1803.

MY DEAR SIR, I will make no apology for my delay in answering your inquiry some time since made, because I could offer none which would satisfy myself. I pray you only to believe, that it proceeded from any thing rather than want of respect or regard. I shall now comply with your request.

“The highest-toned propositions which I made in the convention were for a *president, senate, and judges, during good behaviour*; a house of representatives for three years. Though I would have enlarged the legislative power of the general government, yet I never contemplated the abolition of the state governments. But on the contrary, they were, in some particulars, constituents part of my plan.

“This plan was, in my conception, conformably with the strict theory of a government purely republican; the essential criteria of which are, that the principal organs of the executive and legislative departments be elected by the people, and hold their offices by a responsible and temporary or defeasible nature.

“A vote was taken on the proposition respecting the executive. Five states were in favour of it; among these Virginia; and though, from the manner of voting by delegations, individuals were not distinguished; it was morally certain, from the known situation of the Virginia members (six in number, two of them, Mason and Randolph, professing popular doctrines) that Madison must have concurred in the vote of Virginia. Thus, if I sinned against republicanism, Mr. Madison is not less guilty.

“I may truly then say, that I never proposed either a president or senate for life; and that I neither recommended nor meditated the annihilation of the state governments.

“And I may add, that in the course of the discussions in the convention, neither the propositions thrown out for debate, nor even those voted in the earlier stages of deliberation, were considered as evidences of a definite opinion in the proposer or voter. It appeared to be in some sort understood, that, with a view to free investigation, experimental propositions might be made, which were to be received merely as suggestions for consideration. Accordingly it is a fact, that my final opinion was against an executive during good behaviour, on account of the increased danger to the public tranquillity incident to the election of a magistrate of his degree of permanency. In the plan of a constitution which I drew up, while the convention was sitting, and which I

communicated to Mr. Madison about the close of it, perhaps a day or two after, the office of president has no longer duration than for three years.

" This plan was predicated upon these bases : 1. That the political principles of the people of this country would endure nothing but a republican government. 2. That in the actual situation of the country, it was itself right and proper that the republican theory should have a fair and full trial. 3. That, to such a trial it was essential that the government should be so constructed as to give it all the energy and stability reconcilable with the principles of that theory. These were the genuine sentiments of my heart : and upon them I acted.

" I sincerely hope that it may not hereafter be discovered, that through want of sufficient attention to the last idea, the experiment of republican government, even in this country, has not been as complete, as satisfactory, and as decisive as could be wished.

Very truly, &c.

A. HAMILTON.

TIMOTHY PICKERING, Esq.

In the conflict of opinions in the convention, a spirit of compromise was imperiously necessary in order to secure success to its labours. The tenacity of some leading men, of adverse opinions, had nearly rendered the effort abortive. According to Luther Martin, Esq. one of the Maryland delegates, the convention was several times on the verge of adjournment, without fulfilling the object of its appointment. But the good fortune of the nation prevailed : and after a session of about four months, the constitution was finally agreed upon, submitted to public discussion, and joyfully accepted by the American people.

The federal party immediately assumed the reins, and administered the government for twelve years. During this period, its want of sufficient energy, and its danger from the state governments, were frequent subjects of impassioned complaint. Every man who opposed the measures of the administration, of what kind soever they were, or from whatever motives, was stigmatized as a disorganizer and a jacobin. The last term involved the utmost extent of human atrocity. A jacobin was, in fact, an enemy to social order—to the rights of property—to religion—to morals—and ripe for rapine and spoil.

As far as laws can apply a remedy to the alleged feebleness of the general government, the reigning party sedulously endeavoured to remove the defect. They fenced round the constituted authorities, as I have stated, with an alien and sedition law. By the former, they could banish from our shores obnoxious foreigners whose period of probation had not expired. By the latter, every libel against the government, and every unlawful attempt to oppose its measures, were subject to punishment, more or less severe, in proportion to their magnitude.

The alien law, I believe, was never carried into operation. It was held *in terrorem* over several active and influential foreigners, who, in the language of the day, were rank jacobins, and of course enemies of God and man. But the case was far different with the sedition law. Several individuals could bear

testimony, from experience, to the severity with which its sanctions were enforced. Some cases occurred, of a tragi-comical kind, particularly one in New-Jersey, in which a culprit was found guilty and punished, under this law, for the simple wish that the wadding of a gun, discharged on a festival day, had made an in-road into, or singed the posteriors of Mr. Adams, then president of the United States.

But every thing in this sublunary world is liable to revolution. This is proverbially the case with power in a republican government. The people of the United States changed their rulers. By the regular course of election, they withdrew the reins from the federalists, to place them in the hands of the democrats.

This was a most unexpected revolution to the former. It wholly changed their views of the government. It has been asserted in England, that a tory in place, becomes a whig when out of place—and that a whig when provided with a place, becomes a tory. And it is painful to state that too many among us act the same farce. The government, which, administered by themselves, was regarded as miserably feeble and inefficient, became, on its transition, arbitrary and despotic; notwithstanding that among the earliest acts of the new incumbents, was the repeal not merely of the alien and sedition laws, but of the most obnoxious and oppressive taxes!

Under the effects of these new and improved political views, a most virulent warfare was begun against their successors. The gazettes patronized by, and devoted to, federalism, were unceasing in their efforts to degrade, disgrace, and defame the administration. All its errors were industriously magnified, and ascribed to the most perverse and wicked motives. Allegations wholly unfounded, and utterly improbable, were reiterated in regular succession. An almost constant and unvarying opposition was maintained to all its measures: and hardly ever was a substitute proposed for any of them. Not the slightest allowance was made for the unprecedented and convulsed state of the world. And never were more ardour and energy displayed in a struggle between two hostile nations, than the opposition manifested in their attacks upon the administration. The awful, lamentable, and ruinous consequences of this warfare, and its destruction of the vital interests of the nation, will fully appear in the sequel.

CHAPTER X.

British orders in council, November, 1793. Enforcement of the rule of 1756.

As the difficulties and dangers of our country arose principally from the belligerent invasions of our rights, I shall commence the consideration of them with the British order of 1793.

At that period, during the administration of general Washington, the following order was clandestinely issued by the British privy council :—

“ George R. Additional instruction, to all ships of war, privateers, &c.

“ That they shall stop and detain all ships laden with goods, the produce of any colony belonging to France, or carrying provisions or other supplies for the use of such colonies ; and shall bring the same, with their cargoes, to legal adjudication in our courts of admiralty.

“ By his majesty’s command,

Signed,

“ HENRY DUNDAS.”

Nov. 6, 1793.

This order, a most lawless invasion of our rights, almost unprecedented in extent, was incapable of pleading in its defence the right of retaliation, subsequently so hacknied and worn so threadbare. In a few weeks it swept the seas of our commerce. Hundreds of our vessels were captured : and many of our merchants, who had no more anticipation of such depredations, than of an attack on their vessels by the Chinese, were absolutely reduced to bankruptcy. The annals of Europe for the preceding century furnish no measure more unjustifiable.

The circumstances attending it very highly aggravated the outrage. It was issued so clandestinely, and with such an extraordinary degree of secrecy, that the first account of its existence reached the London exchange, with the details of the captures it authorized and occasioned. And the American minister at the court of St. James’s, was unable to procure a copy of it till the 25th of December.

This lawless procedure excited universal indignation throughout the United States. There was a general clamour for war among all parties. Several very violent measures were moved and debated in congress—among the rest, the sequestration of all British property in the United States, for the purpose of indemnifying our merchants. This was the project of Jonathan Dayton, of New Jersey, a leading federalist.

While Congress was engaged in debating on various modes of procuring redress, the president arrested its career, by the nomination of Judge Jay as minister extraordinary, to seek redress from the British government.

This mission eventuated in the celebrated treaty which bears that minister’s name, against which, volumes of denunciations were published by the democrats, with numberless gloomy and terrific predictions, on nearly the whole of which, as I have already stated, time has stamped the seal of false prophecy.

From this period till the year 1805, the collisions between the two nations were inconsiderable.

The United States were in a most enviable state of prosperity in the years 1800, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. No nation ever enjoyed greater happiness. The commerce of the country, and particularly its exports, had most wonderfully increased.

During the first four years of general Washington's administration, the whole value of the exports from this country, foreign and domestic, was about 100,000,000 dollars; whereas during the years 1803, 4, 5, and 6, they were more than treble that amount.

EXPORTS.	FOREIGN.	DOMESTIC.	TOTAL.
1803	13,594,000	42,206,000	55,800,000
1804	35,231,000	41,468,000	77,699,000
1805	53,179,000	42,387,000	95,566,000
1806	60,283,000	41,253,000	101,536,000
	<hr/> 163,287,000	<hr/> 167,314,000	<hr/> 330,601,000

The foreign articles were principally productions of the colonies of the enemies of Great Britain. Their amount excited her jealousy in a high degree, and led her, in the summer of 1805, to adopt the rule of the war of 1756, which rendered illegal any commerce carried on during war, by a neutral, with the colonies of a belligerent, which had not been permitted during peace. This rule was furtively carried into operation, without any previous notice, whereby our vessels and property to an immense amount were seized—carried into British ports—tried and condemned.

A circumstance attended this measure, which greatly aggravated its atrocious injustice. It was in direct hostility with previous decisions of the British courts of admiralty, which had legalized, in the clearest and most explicit manner, the trade now proscribed and subjected to condemnation.

In order to display the gross impropriety of this procedure of the British government, and its utter inconsistency with their preceding conduct and decisions, I annex a statement of the report of the king's advocate, on an application made to him in March, 1801, at the instance of Rufus King, Esq. our minister at the court of St. James's, on certain cases wherein the rule of 1756 was attempted to be enforced.

"It is now distinctly understood, and has been repeatedly so decided by the high court of appeals, that THE PRODUCE OF THE COLONIES OF THE ENEMY MAY BE IMPORTED BY A NEUTRAL INTO HIS OWN COUNTRY, AND MAY BE EXPORTED FROM THENCE, EVEN TO THE MOTHER COUNTRY OF SUCH COLONY; AND IN LIKE MANNER THE PRODUCE AND MANUFACTURES OF THE MOTHER COUNTRY MAY, IN THIS CIRCUITOUS MODE, LEGALLY FIND THEIR WAY TO THE COLONIES. The direct trade, however, between the mother country and its colonies, has not, I apprehend, been recognised as legal, either by his majesty's government, or by his tribunals.

"What is a direct trade, or what amounts to an intermediate importation into the neutral country, may sometimes be a question of some difficulty. A general definition of either, applicable to all cases, cannot well be laid down. The question must depend upon the particular circumstances of each case. Perhaps the mere touching in the neutral country, to take fresh clearances, may properly be considered as a fraudulent evasion, and is in effect the direct trade; but the high court of admiralty has expressly decided (and I see

"no reason to expect that the court of appeals will vary the rule) that landing
 "the goods and paying the duties in the neutral country breaks the continuity of the
 "voyage; and is such an importation as legalises the trade, although the goods be
 "re-shipped in the same vessel, and on account of the same neutral proprietors, and
 "be forwarded for sale to the mother country or the colony,"

"An extract from this report, containing the foregoing passage, was transmitted by the duke of Portland, in a letter of the thirtieth of March, 1801, to the lords commissioners of the admiralty. The duke's letter concludes thus: "in order, therefore, to put a stop to the inconveniences arising from these erroneous sentences of the vice admiralty courts, I have the honour to signify to your lordships the king's pleasure, that a communication of the doctrine laid down in the said report should be immediately made by your lordships to the several judges presiding in them, setting forth what is held to be the law upon the subject by the superior tribunals, for their future guidance and direction."*

The depredations above stated, excited universal indignation throughout the United States. The mercantile part of the community were exasperated to the utmost degree. The administration was stigmatized as equally regardless of the honour and interest of the nation, for not resisting these pretensions and procuring redress for the depredations. A recurrence to the gazettes of that period will fully prove that the federal party was then clamorous for war, if redress could not be procured for grievances incomparably less than those that finally provoked the late declaration of war. But it may be said, with some degree of truth, that newspapers are an equivocal criterion of the public opinion. This I well know, and freely admit: and therefore I shall lay before the reader other and most unerring proofs of the mercantile temper of this period.

Meetings of the merchants were held in almost all the commercial towns and cities in the United States. The subject was eloquently discussed. Strong memorials were agreed upon, urging the president and congress to adopt such measures as might be necessary to procure redress. In these memorials, which were couched in the most emphatical language, the pretensions of England were considered as akin to actual piracy†—as opening the door to the most flagrant frauds and impositions—as unworthy of a great and magnanimous people—and as derogatory to our reputation and honour as an independent nation. The administration was in the most impassioned style invoked to resist such pretensions; and the memorialists generally *pledged themselves most solemnly to support it in the attempt. As*

* Letter from Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney to lord Howick, dated August 20, 1806.

† "It cannot become the integrity of a great nation, to prey upon the unprotected property of a friendly power."
 Boston Memorial.

I shall devote a separate chapter [the 18th] to the consideration of the policy of the mercantile portion of the nation, I shall not here inquire how far these pledges were redeemed.

These memorials are immensely important in the formation of a correct estimate of the policy of our government. I shall, therefore, make very copious extracts from them. They are most precious documents, and present "a round, unvarnished tale" of the outrages experienced by American commerce, and the extravagant pretensions, as well as the lawless depredations of Great Britain.

CHAPTER XI.

Extracts from the Boston Memorial to Congress.

THE Boston merchants, after glancing at the vexations, insults, and barbarities, suffered from France and Spain, pass on to the consideration of the grievances inflicted by the British. They state that,

"It is their object in the present memorial, to confine their animadversions to THE MORE ALARMING, BECAUSE MORE NUMEROUS AND EXTENSIVE DETENTIONS AND CONDEMNATIONS OF AMERICAN VESSELS BY GREAT BRITAIN, and to advert to the principles recently avowed, and adopted by her courts relative to neutral trade in articles of colonial produce ;—principles, which, if admitted, or practised upon in all the latitude, which may fairly be inferred to be intended, would be *destructive of the navigation, and* **RADICALLY IMPAIR THE MOST LUCRATIVE COMMERCE OF OUR COUNTRY** : principles that had been virtually abandoned subsequently to their avowal, *even during an intermediate and inveterate war, and during the prosecution of a trade which is now interdicted and alleged to be illegal,* but which trade was at that time sanctioned by the promulgated decisions of her courts, and by an official communication from one of the highest organs of the very government, which is now attempting to destroy it, and with its suppression to **ANNIHILATE, OR GREATLY DIMINISH THE COMMERCE OF NEUTRAL NATIONS.**

"There is great cause to apprehend, that the British government means to set up as a principle, that she has a right to interdict all commerce by neutrals, to the ports of her enemies, which ports had not been opened previously to the commencement of hostilities ;—that if she permits a trade with them in any degree, she has a right to prescribe the limits of it ; to investigate the intention of the parties prosecuting it ; and if such intention be not the actual disposition of the property in the neutral country, to consider the merchandize, even after the importation into such country, after having been landed therein, warehoused, and the duties paid on it, *as only in the stage of a continued and direct voyage from the colony to the mother country, or vice versa ;* and therefore illegal, and liable to condemnation.

"Unless the present disposition of the British admiralty courts, and navy officers, can be counteracted and removed, a widely-dispersed and unprotected commerce, extending to every region of the globe, will only serve **TO INVITE DEPREDAATION, TO BANKRUPT OURSELVES, AND ENRICH OTHERS, UNTIL SUCH COMMERCE BE SWEEPED FROM THE FACE OF THE OCEAN,** and leave nothing in its stead, but sentiments of hostility and acts of contention.

"A tacit submission to pretensions thus lofty and comprehensive, but which your memorialists trust are most of them untenable, would, they conceive, be **AN ABANDONMENT OF RIGHTS OPENLY RECOGNIZED AND A**

DERELICTION OF THE MOST IMPORTANT COMMERCIAL INTERESTS OF OUR COUNTRY.

"Reason, and the most powerful considerations of equity, enjoin it as a **DUTY ON THE UNITED STATES TO OPPOSE THESE PRETENSIONS**; for circumstanced as these states are, possessing an immensely extended and fertile territory, producing mostly the necessities of life, which, with the merchandise obtained from abroad by the industry and enterprize of her citizens, she is obliged to barter, or furnish in payment for importations of foreign produce or manufactures; it behoves her strenuously to contend for the right of an open commerce in innocent articles between other nations that are willing to accord it, and herself; for if the right be not both claimed and admitted, scarcely any of the European powers can in future be engaged in warfare without making the United States, in opposition both to her efforts and wishes, **EITHER A VICTIM, OR PARTY IN THE CONTEST.**

"As to the inquisitorial right of search into the ownership of neutral property set up by Great Britain, and the doctrine appended to it, that a neutral importer shall not again export his goods, but that they shall be first alienated and passed into the possession of others—your memorialists believe them to be **UNSOUND IN POINT OF PRINCIPLE, OFFENSIVE IN PRACTICE, AND NUGATORY IN EFFECT.**

"At any rate, whether the doctrine were sound or not, or whether it injured Great Britain or not, it cannot become the integrity and magnanimity of a great and powerful nation, at once, and without notice, to reverse her rule of conduct towards other states, and **TO PREY UPON THE UNPROTECTED PROPERTY OF A FRIENDLY POWER**, the extension of whose commerce had been invited by the formal avowal of her intentions, and prosecuted, under a reliance on her good faith, and from the confidence reposed, that her courts, uniform to their principles, would never be influenced by the time-serving politics of the moment.

"In all events, fully relying that the subject of our differences with Great Britain will *receive the due consideration of government*; and that such measures will in consequence be *promptly adopted*, as will tend to **DISSEMBARRASS OUR COMMERCE, ASSERT OUR RIGHTS, AND SUPPORT THE DIGNITY OF THE UNITED STATES,**

"Your memorialists have the honour to remain, in behalf of their constituents and themselves, most respectfully,

James Lloyd, jr.
Arnold Welles,
David Sears,

David Green,
George Cabot,

John Coffin Jones,
Thomas H. Perkins,

Boston, January 20, 1805.

CHAPTER XII.

Extracts from the New York memorial.

"They have been suddenly confounded by unexpected intelligence of *the arrestation, on the high seas, of a large portion of their property, which had been embarked with the most unsuspecting confidence.* The feelings of your memorialists are not only excited by the losses which they have actually sustained, in consequence of a measure insusceptible of previous calculation, but, also, from the state of uncertainty in which they are placed with respect to future commercial operations.

"In the recent decision, which prohibits an importer of colonial produce from exporting it to Europe, they perceive with concern, either a nugatory and vexatious regulation, or a meditated blow at what they deem an incontestible and valuable right.

"If the arrival of a ship in the country to which it belongs; the landing of the cargo; the inspection of the custom house; the payment or security of duties; do not terminate a voyage, then we confess our ignorance on a point, which, never having been before questioned, has been assumed by us as an acknowledged truth. If the entry for exportation; the embarkation of merchandise; the re-inspection of the custom house; the bond for securing a delivery

in a foreign country ; and a public clearance, do not indicate the commencement of a new voyage ; then we are yet to learn the meaning of the expression.

" But these embarrassments, though perplexing and vexatious, are not those which principally occasion our solicitude ; we are compelled to consider the late decisions of the British tribunals as preliminary steps towards a system of controlling the importations and exportations of colonial productions, and thereby **ANNIHILATING THE MOST LUCRATIVE BRANCHES OF OUR COMMERCE**. If we owed this trade solely to the favour of Great Britain, still we might ask, what urgent motive, what imperious necessity, required that the favour should be resumed at *a period when our commerce was spread over the ocean*, and when a change so essential might destroy its security, and subject us to incalculable losses. We deny, however, that the rights of commerce, as claimed by us, are to be deemed favours ; on the contrary, if the law of nations is other than a temporary rule, prescribed by an arbitrary will, and enforced by power, then we appeal to its most universal and inviolable principle in our defence. This principle is, that the goods of a neutral, consisting of articles, not contraband of war, in a neutral vessel, employed in a direct trade between neutral countries and ports of a belligerent country, not invested or blockaded, are protected.

" Whatever theoretical opinions may heretofore have been advanced, there has existed no such practical rule [as that of 1756] which, under the unparalleled circumstances of the present war, **MUST INFALLIBLY DESTROY THE COMMERCE OF THIS COUNTRY**.

" With these preliminary facts in view, we request permission to detail some of the most important consequences of the assumed rule, that neutrals may be restrained in time of war to their accustomed trade in time of peace. The injustice of such a rule, in relation to the United States, will be most manifest ; the individuals employed in commerce would not alone be affected : all the internal relations of our country would be disturbed ; the interests of those districts which are most remote from our principal ports, would, in proportion to their dependence on foreign supplies, be most severely depressed.

" If Great Britain permits commerce *between her subjects and the colonies of her enemies*, may we not, with the consent of those colonies, participate in the same commerce ? If our commerce with the enemies of Great Britain may now be confined to the system established in time of peace, may we not apprehend that the principle will be retaliated in respect to our commerce with the colonies of Great Britain ? In that case, **WHAT CAN ENSUE BUT WAR, PILLAGE, AND DEVASTATION ?**

" These are not imaginary suppositions. They illustrate the most important principles of our commerce. They evince the necessity of a circuitous trade, to enable us to realize the great value of exports of our own native productions, by which, alone, we acquire the power to liquidate the balance against us, in our commerce with Great Britain : they demonstrate, that the position against which we contend, is not a rule of the law of nations. **THE LAW OF NATIONS ORDAINS NO RULE, WHICH IS UNEQUAL AND UNJUST.**

" It is, however, with much surprise, that we have recently discovered, that the very circumstances upon which our hopes of security were reposed, have been urged as arguments to justify an invasion of our rights ; and that **HAVING TOTALLY SUPPRESSED THE EXTERNAL COMMERCE OF HER ENEMIES, GREAT BRITAIN IS NOW COUNSELLED TO APPROPRIATE TO HERSELF THAT OF HER FRIENDS.**

We wish only for justice : and believing that a commercial nation which disregards justice, thereby undermines the citadel of her power : we rely on the effect of mutual interests and wishes in promoting a cordial explanation and fair adjustment of every cause of misunderstanding ; in particular we rely on the government of our country, **THAT OUR RIGHTS WILL NOT BE ABANDONED**, and that **NO ARGUMENT IN FAVOUR OF AN USURPATION WILL EVER BE DERIVED FROM OUR ACQUIESCENCE.**

“Your memorialists conclude with remarking, that they deem the present situation of public affairs to be peculiarly critical and perilous ; and such as requires all the prudence, the wisdom, and the energy of the government, SUPPORTED BY THE CO-OPERATION OF ALL GOOD CITIZENS. By mutual exertions, under the benign influence of providence upon this hitherto favoured nation, we hope the clouds which threaten to obscure its prosperity may be dispelled. AND WE PLEDGE OUR UNITED SUPPORT IN FAVOUR OF ALL THE MEASURES ADOPTED TO VINDICATE AND SECURE THE JUST RIGHTS OF OUR COUNTRY.”

New York, Dec. 28, 1805.

Signed on behalf of the merchants, by

John Broome, chairman,

Isaac Lawrence,	Eben. Stevens,	Elisha Coit,	Edmond Seaman,
Henry J. Wyckoff,	Wm. W. Woolsey,	Saml. A. Lawrence,	Thomas Farmer,
Goelet Hoyt,	Chls. McEvers, jr.	George Griswold,	Charles Wright,
James Arden,	William Codman,	W. Henderson,	Wm. Clarkson,
James Maxwell,	Oliver Wolcott,	William Bayard,	John B. Murray,
W. Edgar,	Thos. Carpenter,	Rensselaer Havens,	Robert Lenox,
John De Peyster,	G. M. Woolsey,	James Scott,	Henry Post,
John B. Coles,	Daniel Ludlow,	John Kane,	Archibald Gracie,
Leffert Lefferts,	William Lovet,	John Franklin,	Gulian Ludlow,
John Murray,	Benjamin Bailey,	John Taylor,	P. Shermerhorn,
J. R. Livingston,	W. Van Zandt,	D. M. Clarkson,	John P. Mumford,
Benj. G. Minturn,	I. Clason,	Samuel Russel,	John Clendining,

CHAPTER XIII.

Extracts from the memorial of the Merchants of Philadelphia.

I PROCEED to state the sentiments of the merchants of the great city of Philadelphia, on this invasion of their rights and those of the nation. We shall see that they felt the same sense of injustice of these measures, with their brethren of Boston and New York ; made the same strong requisition for protection ; and gave an equal pledge of full support.

“A jealousy of our enterprise and prosperity, has excited a design of checking the commercial growth of our country, the fruit of which has been an attempt to innovate upon ancient and approved principles, and introduce unheard-of articles and provisions into the code of public law.

“It becomes your memorialists to state, that the pressure of these evils has greatly increased, and that others, of even superior magnitude, have arisen, which assume a most alarming and distressing form. What were considered irregularities, insusceptible of prevention, have, by continuance and success, strengthened into REGULAR AND SYSTEMATIC PLUNDER. What were regarded as mischiefs incident to a state of war, temporary though not remediless, are vindicated upon the ground of right ; and their practice is reiterated under the authority of government, and receives the solemn sanction of law.

“They moreover foresee, in the prevalence of the principles, and the continuance of the practices alluded to, nothing but THE RUIN OF INDIVIDUALS, THE DESTRUCTION OF THEIR COMMERCE, AND THE DEGRADATION OF THEIR COUNTRY.

“Could the judgment or even the charity of your memorialists see, in the new doctrines of the British court, nothing but the revival and enforcement of an ancient and established principle, which friendship had relaxed, or favour permitted to slumber, they might regret the departed good, but could impute no injustice to the hand that withdrew it. They are struck, however, with the novelty of these doctrines ; their unequivocal hostility to neutral interests and rights ; their inconsistency with former declarations of their ministry, and decisions of their courts, and with the extraordinary time and manner of their announcement.

"The effect of this novel principle upon neutral interests is of the most serious and alarming character. IT GOES TO NOTHING SHORT OF THE DESTRUCTION OF NEUTRAL COMMERCE; and from the well-known neutral situation and character of the United States, to *nothing short of inflicting a most deep and deadly wound upon their trade*

"But your memorialists cannot but consider, that this principle has not the weight of a consistent and uniform support by the government which professes to uphold it. In 1801, the declaration of its ministry and the decisions of its courts, were unequivocally, "that the produce of the colonies of the enemy may be imported by a neutral into his own country, and be re-exported from thence, even to the mother country of such colony;" and also, "that landing the goods, and paying the duties in the neutral country, breaks the continuity of the voyage, and is such an importation as legalises the trade, although the goods be re-shipped in the same vessel, and on account of the same neutral proprietors, and forwarded for sale to the mother country." In 1805, it is decided, that landing and paying the duties does not break the continuity of the voyage; and the course of trade pointed out to the neutral, four years before, as legal and safe, is now unsatisfactory to the belligerent, and ATTENDED INFALLIBLY WITH CONFISCATION. What clear and immutable principle of the law of nations, can that be, your memorialists would ask, which is supported by the high court of admiralty, and avowed by the ministry in 1801, and which is prostrated by the ministry and the high court of appeals in 1805? *Such a principle must be considered as rather partaking of the shifting character of conscience, than of that of permanent right and established law.*

"The time and manner of announcing it accord with the principle itself. At a moment when mercantile enterprise, confiding in the explanations on this point given by the British ministry to our ambassador, is strained to the utmost, a new decision of the court of appeals is announced, and EVERY SAIL IS STRETCHED TO COLLECT THE UNWARY AMERICANS, WHO ARE UNSUSPECTINGLY CONFIDING IN WHAT WAS THE LAW OF NATIONS.

"In the principles they have here submitted to your consideration, they feel all the confidence of justice, and all the tenacity of truth. TO SURRENDER THEM, THEY CONCEIVE, WOULD DEROGATE FROM THE NATIONAL CHARACTER AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES. FROM THE JUSTICE OF GOVERNMENT THEY HOPE FOR THEIR AVOWAL; FROM THE SPIRIT OF GOVERNMENT THEY HOPE FOR THEIR DEFENCE; AND FROM THE BLESSING OF HEAVEN THEY HOPE FOR THEIR ESTABLISHMENT.

"As citizens, *they claim protection*; and they conceive that the claim is enforced by the consideration, that from their industry and enterprise is collected a revenue which no nation has been able to equal, without a correspondent expense for the protection of the means.

"To preserve peace with all nations, is admitted, without reserve, to be both the interest and the policy of the United States. They therefore presume to suggest, that every measure, *not inconsistent with the honour of the nation*, by which the great objects of redress and security may be attained, should first be used. IF SUCH MEASURES PROVE INEFFECTUAL, WHATEVER MAY BE THE SACRIFICE ON THEIR PART, IT WILL BE MET WITH SUBMISSION."

Thos. Fitzsimons, chairman,

John Craig,

W. Sims,

Robert Ralston,

James Yard,

Robert Waln,

Jac. Gerard Koch, Wm. Montgomery, George Latimer,

Thos. W. Francis, Abraham Kintzing, Chandler Price,

Thomas English, Philip Nicklin, L. Clapier,

Joseph S. Lewis, Thomas Allibone, Daniel W. Coxe,

Manuel Eyre,

R. E. Hobart, Secretary.

The preceding list embraces decided men of both the hostile parties, and of various nations—Americans, English, Irish, French, and Dutch.

CHAPTER XIV.

Extracts from the Baltimore Memorial.

THE memorial of the merchants of Baltimore is more diffuse and argumentative than any of the preceding. It is a most masterly composition, and may be regarded as a complete and unanswerable defence of neutral rights against belligerent pretensions and encroachments. Its maxims ought to be committed to memory by every statesman, in all those countries, whose interest it is to preserve a neutral situation.

"It would not be desired that the state of things which Great Britain had herself prescribed, and which use and habit had rendered familiar and intelligible to all, should be disturbed by oppressive innovations; far less that these innovations should, by a *tyrannical retrospection*, be made to justify the seizure and confiscation of their property, committed to the high seas, under the protection of the existing rule, and without warning of the intended change. In this their just hope, your memorialists have been fatally disappointed. **THEIR VESSELS AND EFFECTS TO A LARGE AMOUNT, HAVE LATELY BEEN CAPTURED BY THE COMMISSIONED CRUISERS OF GREAT BRITAIN**, upon the foundation of **NEW PRINCIPLES SUDDENLY INVENTED**, and applied to this habitual traffic; and suggested and promulgated, for the first time, by sentences of condemnation; by which, *unavoidable ignorance has been considered as criminal*, and **AN HONOURABLE CONFIDENCE IN THE JUSTICE OF A FRIENDLY NATION, PURSUED WITH PENALTY AND FORFEITURE**.

"Your memorialists are in no situation to state the precise nature of the rules to which their most important interests have been sacrificed: and it is not the least of their complaints against them, that *they are undefined and undefinable; equivocal in their form, and the fit instruments of oppression, by reason of their ambiguity*.

"When we see a powerful state, in possession of a commerce, of which the world affords no examples, *endeavoring to interpolate into the laws of nations casuistical niceties and wayward distinctions, which forbid a citizen of another independent commercial country to export from that country what unquestionably belongs to him*, only because he imported it himself, and yet allow him to sell a right of exporting it to another; which prohibit an end, because it arises out of one intention, but permit it when it arises out of two; which, dividing an act into stages, search into the mind for a correspondent division of it in the contemplation of its author, and determine its innocence or criminality accordingly; which, not denying that the property acquired in an authorised traffic by neutral nations from belligerents, may become incorporated into the national stock, and, under the shelter of its neutral character, thus superinduced, and still preserved, be afterwards transported to every quarter of the globe, reject the only epoch, which can distinctly mark the incorporation, and point out none other in its place; which, proposing to fix with accuracy and precision, the line of demarcation, beyond which neutrals are trespassers upon the wide domain of belligerent rights, involve every thing in darkness and confusion; *there can be but one opinion as to the purpose which all this is to accomplish*.

"Your memorialists object, in the strongest terms, against this new criterion of legality, because of its inevitable tendency to injustice; because of *its peculiar capacity to embarrass with seizure, and ruin with confiscation, the whole of our trade with Europe in the surplus of our colonial importations*.

"For the loss and damage which capture brings along with it, *British courts of prize grant no adequate indemnity*. Redress to any extent is difficult; to a competent extent impossible. And even the costs which an iniquitous seizure compels a neutral merchant to incur, in the defence of his violated rights, before their own tribunals, are seldom decreed, and never paid.

"The reasons upon which Great Britain assumes to herself a right to interdict the independent nations of the earth, a commercial intercourse with the colonies of her enemies (out of the relaxation of which pretended right has

arisen the distinction in her courts, between the American trade from the colonies to the United States, and from the same colonies to Europe) will, we are confidently persuaded, **BE REPELLED WITH FIRMNESS AND EFFECT BY OUR GOVERNMENT.**

"She forbids us from transporting in our vessels, as in peace we could, the property of her enemies; enforces against us a rigorous list of contraband: dums up the great channels of our ordinary trade; abridges, trammels, and obstructs what she permits us to prosecute; and then refers us to our accustomed traffic in time of peace for the criterion of our commercial rights, IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY THE CONSUMMATION OF THAT RUIN, WITH WHICH OUR LAWFUL COMMERCE IS MENACED BY HER MAXIMS AND HER CONDUCT.

"The pernicious qualities of this doctrine are enhanced and aggravated, as from its nature might be expected, by the fact that **GREAT BRITAIN GIVES NO NOTICE OF THE TIME WHEN, OR THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH, SHE MEANS TO APPLY, AND ENFORCE IT.** Her orders of the sixth of November, 1793, by which the seas were swept of our vessels and effects, were for the first time, announced by the ships of war, and privateers, by which they were carried into execution.

"The late decisions of her courts, which are in the true spirit of this doctrine, and are calculated to restore it in practice, to that high tone of severity, which milder decisions had almost concealed from the world, came upon us by surprise. And the captures, of which the Dutch complained, in the seven years war, were preceded by no warning. **THUS IS THIS PRINCIPLE MOST RAPACIOUS AND OPPRESSIVE IN ALL ITS BEARINGS.** Harsh and mysterious in itself, it has always been, and ever must be, used to betray neutral merchants into a trade, supposed to be lawful, and then to give them up to pillage and ruin.

"But there can be no security while a malignant and deceitful principle like this hangs over us. It is just what the belligerent chooses to make it, *looming, unseen, and unfelt, or visible, active, and noxious.* It may come abroad when least expected: and the moment of confidence may be the moment of destruction.

It may sleep for a time; but no man knows when it is to awake, to shed its baneful influence upon the commerce of the world. It clothes itself, from season to season, in what may be called relaxations, but again, without any previous intimation to the deluded citizens of the neutral powers, these relaxations are suddenly laid aside, either in the whole, or in part, and the work of confiscation commences. Nearly ten months of the late war had elapsed before it announced itself at all: and when it did so, it was in its most formidable shape, and in its fullest power and expansion.

"Your memorialists feel themselves bound to state, that, according to authentic information lately received, the government of Great Britain does, at this moment, grant licences to neutral vessels taking in a proportion of their cargoes there, to proceed on trading voyages to the colonies of Spain, from which she would exclude us; upon the condition, that the return cargoes shall be carried to Great Britain, to swell the gains of her merchants, and to give her a monopoly of the commerce of the world. This great belligerent right, then, upon which so much has been supposed to depend, sinks into an article of barter. It is used, not as a hostile instrument wielded by a warlike state, by which her enemies are to be wounded, or their colonies subdued, but as the selfish means of commercial aggrandizement, for the impoverishment and ruin of her friends; as an engine by which Great Britain is to be lifted up to a vast height of prosperity, and the trade of neutrals crippled, and crushed, and destroyed. Such acts are a most intelligible commentary upon the principle in question. They show that it is a hollow and fallacious principle, susceptible of the worst abuse, and incapable of a just and honourable application. They shew that in the hands of a great maritime state, it is not, in its ostensible character of a weapon of hostility, that it is prized; but rather as one of the means of establishing an unbounded monopoly, by which every enterprise calculated to promote national wealth and power, shall be made to begin and end in Great Britain alone. Such acts may well be considered as pronouncing the condemnation of the principle against which we contend, as withdrawing from it the only pretext, upon which it was possible to rest it. Great

Britain does not pretend that this principle has any warrant in the opinion of writers on public law. She does not pretend, and cannot pretend, that it derives any countenance from the conduct of other nations. *She is confessedly solitary in the use of this invention, by which RAPACITY IS SYSTEMATISED, AND A STATE OF NEUTRALITY AND WAR ARE MADE SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME.* In this absence of all other authority, her courts have made an appeal to her own early example, for the justification of her own recent practice. Your memorialists join in that appeal, as affording the most conclusive and authoritative reprobation of the practice, which it is intended to support by it.

“The solemn renunciation of the principle in question, in the face of the whole world, by her highest tribunal in matters of prize, reiterated in a succession of decrees, down to the year 1786, and afterwards, is powerfully confirmed by the acquiescence of Great Britain, during the first, most important, and active period of the late war, in the free and unlimited prosecution, by neutrals, of the whole colony trade of France. She did, indeed, at last, prohibit that trade, by an instruction, *UNPRECEDENTED IN THE ANNALS OF MARITIME DEPREDATIONS*; but the revival of her discarded rule was characterized with such circumstances of iniquity and violence, as rather to heighten, by the effect of contrast, the veneration of mankind for the past justice of her tribunals. The world has not forgotten the instruction to which we allude, or the enormities by which its true character was developed. Produced in mystery, at a moment when universal confidence in the integrity of her government had brought upon the ocean, a prey of vast value and importance; sent abroad to the different naval stations with such studied secrecy that it would almost seem to have been intended to make an experiment, *HOW FAR LAW AND HONOUR COULD BE OUTRAGED BY A NATION PROVERBIAL FOR RESPECTING BOTH*: the heralds by whom it was first announced were the commanders of her commissioned cruisers, who at the same instant carried it into effect, with every circumstance of aggravation, if, of such an act, there can be any aggravation. Upon such conduct there was but one sentiment. It was condemned by reason and justice. It was condemned by that law which flows from, and is founded upon them. *IT WAS CONDEMNED AND WILL FOREVER CONTINUE TO BE CONDEMNED BY THE UNIVERSAL VOICE OF THE CIVILIZED WORLD.*”

Thomas Tenant,	Henry Fayson,	Benjamin Williams,	John Donnel,
William Wilson,	William Lorman,	Luke Tiernan,	T. Swan,
William Taylor,	T. Hollingsworth,	Joseph Sterret,	Robert Gilmor,
George Stiles,	Steuart Brown,	James Calhoun,	J. A. Buchanan,
John Collins,	Samuel Sterret,	Alexander M'Kim,	David Stewart,
Hugh Thompson,	William Patterson,	Mark Pringle,	Samuel Taylor.
John Sherlock,	John Stricker,		

Baltimore, January 21, 1806.

This list, like that signed to the Philadelphia memorial, embraces federalists and democrats indiscriminately—as well as citizens of various nations.

CHAPTER XV.

Extracts from the Memorials of Newhaven and Newburyport,

Extracts from the memorial of the chamber of commerce of Newhaven.

“Your memorialists cannot behold without surprise and regret, a powerful and respectable nation, bending the principles of the common law of nations, to answer political purposes, and introducing a versatile policy into the solemn adjudications of her courts. **WE HOLD IT TO BE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT ALL NATIONS SHOULD COMBINE AGAINST SUCH INNOVATIONS UPON THEIR RIGHTS**; and, in particular, that the United States, whose geographical position gives them the best chance of maintaining neutrality, during wars in Europe, **SHOULD FIRMLY RESIST EVERY ENCROACHMENT UPON THE RIGHTS OF NEUTRAL COMMERCE.**”

"With these impressions of the necessity of measures for defending our commercial rights, which shall be firm, but temperate, and bold, yet marked with a spirit of conciliation, your memorialists cordially unite with their fellow-citizens of other commercial towns, in expressing their sentiments freely to the legislative and executive authorities of their country; with assurances of their disposition TO GIVE AID AND SUPPORT TO EVERY MEASURE OF GOVERNMENT CALCULATED TO ACCOMPLISH THIS IMPORTANT OBJECT."

Signed by order,

HENRY DAGGETT,

President of the Chamber of Commerce.

Newhaven, February 7, 1806.

Extracts from the memorial of the merchants of Newburyport.

"In many cases our vessels and cargoes have been captured, tried and condemned in courts of law, under unusual and alarming pretences, which, if permitted to continue, **THREATEN THE RUIN OF OUR COMMERCIAL INTERESTS.**

"So far from obtaining redress of our grievances by the ordinary modes and processes of law, we have in most cases been subject to heavy costs, and suffered embarrassing and distressing detention of property, even where no pretence could be found to authorise the seizure of it.

"Having sustained these losses and injuries in the prosecution of our lawful commerce, and in the exercise of our just rights, we rely with confidence on the wisdom, firmness, and justice of our government, to obtain for us that compensation, and to grant to us that protection, which **A REGARD TO THE HONOUR OF OUR COUNTRY**, no less than the rights of our citizens must dictate and require.

Eben. Stocker,	Stephen Howard,	Edward Tappan,	} Committee.
John Pearson,	William Bartlet,	Moses Howard,	
Newburyport, December, 1805.		William Faris,	

The same outrages having been experienced by the citizens of Newhaven and Newburyport as by those of other parts of the union, we of course find the same style of complaint—the same call for redress—the same pledge of support—in one case explicitly expressed, in the other unequivocally implied.

CHAPTER XVI.

Extracts from the Memorial of the merchants of Salem, Ms.

"Your memorialists have witnessed with unhesitating approbation the disposition to neutrality, patronised by the general government, at times when national wrongs have been pressed with peculiar aggravations, and seemed to point to summary redress. Firmness and moderation have happily secured all the advantages of successful war, and the sober appeal of reason carried conviction to foreign nations.

"Your memorialists, however, have witnessed, with deep regret, and deep anxiety, that to some of their tribunals they can no longer appeal for safety. New interpretations of old rules, and new glosses on ancient doctrines, have been arrayed to controul the circuit of neutral commerce, and restrain, if not annihilate, its most beneficial operations. Their surprise has been the greater because the nation who has adopted them, is one from whom we had a right to expect the most conciliatory conduct; since with her, ultimately centre the proceeds of our commerce, and from her we purchase the greatest portion of her staple manufactures.

"The interests of Great Britain and the United States, seem in this respect mutual. We consume the products of her industry; and give her, in return, besides large sums of money, raw materials by which she may levy new contributions. Similarity of manners and habits, of language and education, have added

artificial inducements for intercourse, and gained for her among us a respect not slightly to be viewed, or inconsiderately forfeited. *On all occasions the United States have exhibited towards her an amicable interest, and a just, it may be added, a generous policy.* If, therefore, we had favours to ask or receive, our claims have been peculiarly strong upon her; because we have been emphatically the sinews of her opulence. But it is believed that the United States never asked of any nation more than justice, and are willing to be bound by the established rules of commerce. Your memorialists therefore express deep regret, because a confidence has been shaken which may not easily be restored; and deep anxiety, because the principles alluded to, if conceded, ***MUST EVENTUALLY PROSTRATE OUR TRADE, OR LEAVE IT AT THE ARBITRARY DISCRETION OF BELLIGERENTS.*** Whether peace or war prevail, the baneful influence will every where be felt; and in the latter predicament, we shall, as neutrals, share the mischiefs of it without the chances of benefit.

“The principle, recently established by Great Britain, is, as your memorialists understand it, that *it is not competent for a neutral to carry on, in war, any trade, which he is not accustomed to do in peace; and that he shall not be permitted to effect that in a circuitous, which is inhibited in a direct trade:* as corollaries from this principle, she insists that the colonial trade exercised by neutrals, shall not extend beyond the accustomed peace establishment; and that whenever the neutral imports into his own country colonial produce with the *intention* to tranship it to the mother country, if a direct intercourse be interdicted in peace, the circuitry of the route shall not protect the property from confiscation. It seems admitted that such circuitous route, with such intention, is not considered as evidence of enemy's property, confiscable within ordinary rules; but as a distinct, substantial, and condemnatory principle, independent both in efficacy and application. For it yields not to the most clear proof of neutral property, or innocent though misdirected conduct. The unaccustomed trade, or the importation with specific intentions, are the tests by which every voyage is to be tried.

“In another view, the rule appears to your memorialists as not less untenable and unjust. It is stated, as a part of it, that if colonial produce be imported by any person with an *intention to tranship* it on his own account to the mother country, it is subject to confiscation. But if imported for the purpose of general commerce, and thrown into the market for general transhipment, it is within the exception. To distinguish between *general* and *particular intentions*, and to separate things so subtle in their own natures, and almost incapable of proof, for the purposes of national decisions, seems a *refinement reserved for the present age.* The foundation of this modern doctrine is laid in this principle, that the neutral has no right, by an extension of his trade, to afford supplies to the belligerent to ward off the blows of his enemy, and to oppose for a longer period the dominion of his force. But to this your memorialists deem it a conclusive answer, that the proposition proves too much; that, if true, it is a foundation for a far more broad and sweeping principle; that *every commerce with the belligerent is inhibited to neutrals; for every commerce assists him in resistance, and diminishes his necessities.* A doctrine thus comprehensive, has never yet been avowed, and it is presumed never will be. Yet such must be the logical conclusion; and it shews irresistibly the absurdity of the assumed premises.

“The accustomed, as well as the unaccustomed trade, is within the terms, and must stand or fall together. Either the doctrine is unsound, ***AND ASSUMED AS A MERE PRÉTEXT FOR PREDATORY SEIZURES;*** or neutrals have no rights as such; and must endure the calamities inflicted by belligerents in a contest in which they have no voice, and in which they can reap only injury.

“Other considerations add force to the preceding remarks. It is well known that in time of war neutrals cannot carry on even their accustomed trade in its full extent. They are prohibited from trading in contraband goods, and to blockaded ports. Variations necessarily arise in the relations of the hostile powers, which the neutral ought to possess a right to turn to his profit, as an

indemnity for the obstructions of his old trade. These obstructions are of a very serious nature. When exercised in the mildest form, they produce *OPPRESSIVE SEARCHES AND DELAYS, EXPENSIVE LITIGATION, AND OFTEN A TOTAL FAILURE OF AN OTHERWISE LUCRATIVE VOYAGE*. Reason would therefore seem to declare, that for the hazards of this nature, the benefits arising to neutrals from war, are not more than a just equivalent.

"It is somewhat singular, that *a belligerent should invite a trade with itself, which it declares fraudulent with its enemy; and should lift the arm of power to crush the neutral, whose conduct is criminal only when it ceases to be partial!*

"Such are the remarks your memorialists respectfully submit upon the rule considered in itself. On this examination they confess it appears to them, fundamentally incorrect. It subjects commerce to fluctuating decisions; overthrows the ordinary rules of evidence; and places an immense power to be wielded at the uncontrollable discretion of magistrates appointed by a single party.

"It therefore wants all the discriminative features of a fundamental proposition of the law of nations; uniformity, precision and general applicability. It would, in their opinion, if established, create greater evils than it professes to redress, by perpetuating strife, destroying the emoluments of trade, embarrassing commercial intercourse, and *LETTING LOOSE THE PASSIONS TO PREY ON THE MISERIES, AND PLUNDER THE PROPERTY OF THE INNOCENT*. It would subject neutrals to hazards nearly as perilous as those of actual hostilities, and independent of its influence in stimulating to revenge and retaliation, *IT WOULD TRANSFER THE BENEFITS OF PEACE TO ANY VICTORIOUS USURPER OF THE OCEAN*.

"It is conceded by the British Civilians that during the American revolution, the doctrine was entirely intermitted, and the commerce of neutrals was pursued according to the ancient code. Many cases of this period might be cited from the admiralty records, which overthrow the rule, and expressly vindicate the opposite. If precedents are to decide, the judgments of a tribunal established in Great Britain under her sole appointment, and acting with open powers, must surely, when acquiescence creates the law, complete the renunciation of the contested rule.

"It is not the least singularity attending the conduct of the present war, that *Great Britain has licensed her subjects in a trade which she declares fraudulent in others; that she admits them unmolested to supply her enemy with means of resistance, when she declares confiscation is the penalty of neutral succour*. Were the rule ever so just in itself, it certainly demands relaxation, when the belligerent partakes the profit, and connives at the breach. If its foundation be the unlawfulness of affording assistance to a distressed enemy, surely it ought not to be enforced when that assistance is an authorised object of speculation with the distressing belligerent.

"It is our pride to believe that the American merchants, with very few exceptions, are as distinguished for good faith as any on earth. The imputation thrown on them is a naked pretext to repel the odium of vexatious injuries, and excuse violations of law, which cannot be justified.

"Your memorialists wish to take no part in the contests which now convulse the world; but acting with impartiality towards all nations, to reap the fruits of a just neutrality. If, however, conciliation cannot effect the purpose of justice, and *AN APPEAL TO ARMS* be the last and necessary protection of honour, they feel no disposition to decline the common danger, or shrink from the common contribution.

"Relying on the wisdom and firmness of the general government in this behalf, they feel no hesitation to *PLEDGE THEIR LIVES* and *PROPERTIES* in support of the measures which may be adopted to vindicate the public rights, and redress the public wrongs."

John Hathorne, Joseph Sprague,
B. Crowninshield, jr, Joseph White, jr.

Jonathan Mason, }
Joseph Story, } Committee.

Salem, January 20, 1806,

CHAPTER XVII.

Reflections on the memorials. Uniform call for redress. Uniform pledge of support.

A re-perusal of these important, these invaluable documents is recommended to the reader. Without bearing in mind their contents, it is impossible to form a correct estimate of the policy of this nation, or of the merits and demerits of the two parties, whose senseless, envenomed, and infuriated hostility was, of late, rapidly sending to perdition the noblest country, the happiest people, and the best form of government in the world.

We must not forget for an instant, the cause of these impassioned complaints, these invocations for redress, these pledges of support. This is the most important item in the affair. It was simply the right to re-export the productions of the colonies of the enemies of Great Britain—a right which, however clear and indefeasible, was wholly unessential to the prosperity of our country. We might have abandoned it without the sacrifice of an iota of the happiness of our citizens, or the real honour of the nation.

No man of decency can deny, after the perusal of these documents, that the mercantile citizens of the United States urged—it would not be extravagant to say, goaded—the government into a resistance of the high-handed and oppressive pretensions and outrages of Great Britain. Every paragraph establishes this important fact. The expression of the public sentiment on this subject was nearly simultaneous from Newburyport to Baltimore.

That they calculated upon war, as the dernier resort, is obvious from the phraseology. It cannot be misunderstood. When the Boston merchants express their reliance, that

“Such measures will be promptly adopted, as will tend to disembarass commerce, ASSERT OUR RIGHTS, and support the dignity of the United States,” it would be absurd and ridiculous to suppose these measures were to be limited to mere negotiation, the utter inefficacy of which had been so often experienced. A child would spurn at the idea of “*asserting the rights and supporting the dignity of the United States,*” by negotiation alone. This had already proved a feeble resource, and might have been protracted for a century, without “*asserting*” any of “*our rights.*” Their views were not so limited. No. War, war, war, must indubitably have been in their contemplation, should negotiation have an unfavourable issue.

Can any man of common sense doubt, can any man of character deny, that the merchants of Philadelphia calculated on WAR, when, after having suggested,

“That every measure not inconsistent with the honour and interests of the nation, by which the great objects of redress and security might be attained, should be first tried,” they add

“If such measures should prove ineffectual, whatever may be the sacrifice on their part, it will be met with submission?”

When the merchants of Newburyport

"Rely with confidence on the FIRMNESS and JUSTICE of the government; to obtain for them compensation and protection,"

they must have been insane, if they did not calculate upon WAR as the *ultima ratio*. These are the worthy citizens who stand recorded in the annals of their country, as having since *patriotically* pledged themselves to resist their own government, "EVEN UNTO BLOOD."*

And who can pretend, that the merchants of Newhaven, when they called upon the government

"Firmly to resist every encroachment upon the rights of neutral nations," did not calculate upon war? And did they not most solemnly pledge themselves to support war, should it eventually be declared, when they tendered the

"Assurances of their disposition to give aid and support to EVERY MEASURE calculated to accomplish this important object?"

And when the New York merchants declared their

"Reliance upon the government of their country, that their rights would not be abandoned,"

and that the crisis required

"ALL THE ENERGY, as well as the prudence and wisdom of the government," can there be found a man who will pretend that war was not calculated on, unless other means might be found to accomplish the end in view? It cannot be.

And is there not a clear and explicit pledge to be found at the close of their memorial—

"We pledge our united support *in favour of all the measures adopted to vindicate and secure the just rights of our country.*"

I am credibly informed that there are subscribed to this memorial, names of persons who lately prayed, fervently and openly, for the destruction of the armies of the United States invading Canada! Most wonderful consistency and patriotism!

But the merchants of Salem are more explicit on the subject of war than most of their mercantile brethren elsewhere. They leave no room for inference or supposition. They most unambiguously declare their views.

"If, however, conciliation cannot effect the purpose, and AN APPEAL TO ARMS be the last and necessary protection of honour, they feel no disposition to decline the common danger, or shrink from the common contribution."

And was there ever, since the world was formed, a more solemn pledge given, than the one with which they close their memorial, and which I here repeat—

"Relying on the wisdom and firmness of the general government, in this behalf, they feel no hesitation, to *pledge their lives and properties* in support of

* This monstrous expression was contained in one of their addresses to the state legislature, in 1814.

the measures which may be adopted to VINDICATE THE PUBLIC RIGHTS, AND REDRESS THE PUBLIC WRONGS."

In the next chapter, I shall investigate the question, how far these pledges were redeemed.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Character of merchants by Edmund Burke. Illiberal and unfounded. Merchants as various in character as other classes of men.

EDMUND BURKE has left on record a most unfavourable character of merchants, which has been a thousand times quoted to their disparagement. He has, if my memory do not deceive me, asserted, that they have no national attachment or patriotism—that their ledger is their Bible—and gold their God.

His character is unfounded and illiberal. All sweeping denunciations of entire classes are unjust. The merchants are as various in their characters as any other description of men. There are among them numbers of persons of the highest respectability—great patriotism—a high sense of honour—great liberality—and possessing all the other virtues than can adorn the human character. There are likewise some as base and vile as the others are excellent.

There is nothing in mercantile affairs, or commerce, that has a tendency to deteriorate those who follow the profession. It is inconceivable how it should be otherwise. The large scale on which commerce is conducted, is calculated to expand, not to illiberalize the mind.

Moreover, a considerable portion of the merchants having enjoyed the advantages of the best education, must, from that circumstance alone, have a fair chance of not meriting the denunciation of Edmund Burke.

That the American merchants are, in general, shrewd, intelligent, and penetrating, cannot be denied. They are, in these respects, at least on a level with the merchants of any other country.

It must, however, be acknowledged, that in the course they have steered from the commencement of the year 1806, when the preceding memorials were presented to Congress, till the declaration of war, and during its continuance, they have been as lamentably blind to their own vital interests, to the highest interests of their country, and to their duty as citizens, as if they were almost altogether deficient of the reasoning faculty.

They have inflicted incalculable injury on themselves and their country. Indeed, so intimately in this case were the interests of both connected, that they were, necessarily and equally, affected by the same wound. I hope to make this appear to their conviction, and that of the public.

The reader has seen that the mercantile part of the community felt the highest indignation in 1806, at the pretensions of England to limit the American trade in the colonial productions of her enemies; that they very strongly remonstrated with the government to resist those pretensions; and that *they pledged themselves to their country and to the world, to support whatever measures might be necessary to obtain redress—obviously, evidently, and undeniably contemplating even war with all its horrors.* I propose to examine how their practice corresponded with their professions and pledges.

The pacific measures adopted to effect the object of their desires were—a prohibition of the importation of some of the most important of the manufactures of Great Britain—an embargo, when the injuries we experienced from that nation had vastly increased—and non-intercourse.

Did the American merchants redeem their pledge? Did they preserve their faith? Did they support the government in all or any of these measures?

No. They indubitably did not. There is not a candid federalist from New-Hampshire to Georgia, that will assert that the merchants, as a corps, supported the government in any of these measures. I say distinctly, *as a corps.* There were illustrious exceptions. But their fidelity in redeeming the pledge was unavailing. *It was forfeited by the corps—completely forfeited.*

The clear, indisputable, and melancholy fact is, that after having impelled and goaded the administration into measures to procure redress, they not merely withheld their support from those measures, but actually, as far as depended on them, prevented their success. They hung hostilely on the skirts of the government, and defeated the embargo, non-intercourse, and all the other restrictive measures.

I have thus far considered the point in respect to their duty as citizens, their plighted faith, and the obligation they thereby incurred to support the government in measures which had arisen out of their memorials, remonstrances, and solemn pledges.

I now enter on the consideration of their conduct, as it demonstrates an unparalleled blindness towards their own interests, and those of their country.

Whatever misjudging prejudice, or faction, devotion to England, or hostility to France, may pretend, the solemn fact is, that the United States were most grievously outraged and injured by Great Britain. The violence or excesses of France, enormous, and iniquitous, and indefensible as they were, afforded no justification to those of her enemy. “Retaliation,” *in the words of Mr. Bayard and Mr. Lloyd,** “was A MERE PRE-

* In a subsequent chapter, I shall quote the sentiments of these gentlemen at full length.

TENCE." *If A rob me of my hat, it does not follow that B has a right to retaliate on HIM, by robbing ME of my coat or waistcoat. And still less, if A threaten to rob me, but has not the power to do it, has B a right to retaliate on him by robbing me.* France pretended to blockade England, and seize neutral vessels bound there—but was unable to effect her purpose through her destitution of naval power. England *retaliated on France* by SEIZING OUR VESSELS bound to that country; and persevered in that lawless course for entire years, having depredated on the United States to the amount of many millions, and with every species of aggravation, of which such an outrage is susceptible—and, forsooth, *all was perpetrated to punish France, whom she was at the same time supplying with our productions herself!!!* There is not in the history of the world any conduct more gross or less defensible.

When we are laid in our graves, and our factions and convulsions have sunk into oblivion, posterity will pass a heavy sentence of condemnation upon these odious, these oppressive, these scandalous transactions.

That America has been the aggrieved nation, and England wholly the aggressor, is palpable from one circumstance. In all the diplomatic intercourse that has taken place between the cabinet of St. James's and that at Washington, the former has hardly ever made the slightest complaint of injustice against the latter, except occasionally of *partiality towards France as a palliation of British violence.* This, if it mean any thing, must certainly mean that *we bore French depredation, insult, and outrage, more patiently than English outrage, insult, and depredation.* If it have any other meaning, I shall be gratified to have it demonstrated.

But we inflicted on France one solid, substantial, important, and most destructive injury, from which England wholly escaped. From 1793 to 1812, we uniformly submitted to the violation of our neutrality, to the material benefit of one belligerent and extreme disadvantage of the other. *Our commercial marine was a constant nursery for Great Britain, to supply her navy with seamen to annoy and distress her enemy.*

This was an unceasing cause of war against us by France. It was in direct hostility with fundamental principles of the law of nations. It was affording a most decisive and all-important aid to one belligerent for the destruction of the other, to an enormous extent, unparalleled in the history of Europe.

It results, from the premises, that from the declaration of war between France and England, the latter power constantly made inroads upon us—and we as constantly sought redress—and that our principal grievances were the atrocious outrages practised on our seamen, and the reiterated and intolerable infringement of our commercial rights and privileges.

Under this view of the case, the correctness of which will not, I trust, be disputed, what course ought an enlightened body of merchants to steer?

Suppose them patriotic, public-spirited, and magnanimous; a regard to the national honour and interest would impel them to uphold the government of their own country in a struggle against the lawless outrages of a foreign nation. But even suppose them base, sordid, selfish, avaricious, and without a single spark of patriotism, public spirit, or liberality, ought not their very selfishness dictate the same course? How could they fail to see that every effort to harass, to cripple, to embarrass their own government, was an effort towards enabling the foreign and aggressing nation, to triumph over their country, and to enforce its claims, to the manifest and immense injury of their own most vital interests? the fatuity of a lad who had been but six weeks in a counting-house, and did not at once perceive the cogency of these arguments would be pitiable. This point is clear and plain in theory. But it does not rest on theory. We have a strong and practical illustration of it by our own melancholy experience; an illustration which the merchants of this country will long have to deplore. By the jacobinical, seditious, and disorganizing combinations to oppose the measures calculated to procure redress, England was enabled to enforce the orders in council for four years and a half; whereby, during sixteen months, she interdicted our trade with all Europe except Sweden and her own dependencies: that is to say, *she forbade us to trade with about one hundred and thirty millions of the people of Europe.*—For the remainder of the time, when she somewhat relaxed her orders, *she proscribed our trade with at least fifty millions.*

Never has the sun in his course beheld such transcendent, such lamentable, such irreparable folly as the merchants of the United States have been guilty of in this instance. Throughout the whole of the arduous conflict between the United States and Great Britain, *they invariably thwarted, and harassed, and embarrassed their own government.* They have defended the government of Britain throughout—and as constantly laboured, in the face of reason, justice, and common sense, to put their own nation in the wrong. And for what end? *to serve the purposes of party; to enable a few ambitious men, who were out of office, and panted to get in, to accomplish this object!!!*

Once more wish to qualify these observations. There were here, as in a former case, noble exceptions among the merchants, citizens who displayed the most exalted patriotism. These exceptions do not invalidate the rule. I consider the merchants as a corps (for it is thus only they can be considered in this discussion) and as their operations on the government and nation were felt—and more particularly, as they acted in the eastern States.

Any one of the three pacific measures adopted by this government, had it been duly supported by the mercantile interest, would have obliged Great Britain to redress our wrongs, and very speedily. We should then have enjoyed an unshackled commerce. And had our merchants, either from patriotism or selfishness, submitted to a short temporary privation of business, *they would have been repaid by a tenfold harvest of most lucrative commerce.* But faction led them astray. They rendered wholly nugatory all the measures adopted to guard their interests, and to extort justice for their wrongs. Great Britain was thus encouraged to proceed in her aggressions. This led to a wasting war. To the hostile opposition of the mercantile class, therefore, we may fairly ascribe its ravages.

In all the wild, frantic, and fatuitous career of faction—from the earliest records of time to the present day, I believe there is no parallel case. Never did an intelligent, enlightened, and respectable body of men, make so immense, so wanton, so irrecoverable a sacrifice of their dearest interests, and so completely in hostility with the dictates of reason and common sense.

If Belzebub or Lucifer held the reins of government, policy and self-interest would dictate that in all contests with foreign nations, he ought to be supported, unless most manifestly and egregiously unjust. Public spirit and selfishness equally combine to enforce this precept.

How transcendently superior Great Britain towers over us in this respect! What a sublime lesson she holds out—what a noble example she offers us to follow!

She is torn by faction like America. There is a constant struggle between the incumbents in office, and those who pant after the seats they fill. But whenever the honour or vital interest of the nation is at stake, party in a great measure dies away, or, at least, becomes incapable of injuring the common cause—all unite under the national standard—and, till the end in view is accomplished, distinctions are almost wholly lost in one common designation, supporters of their country's interests and honour.

Not so in America. It is a fatal truth, that at the moment, when this page was written, [September 1814] when not merely our interest, and our honour, but even our very salvation was jeopardized, *faction raged in many places with unabated violence*; and wicked men were incessantly employed in exciting our citizens to imbrue their hands in the blood of their countrymen,* instead of preparing to oppose a vindictive enemy. May the God of peace and love dispel the clouds that impend over us—banish our discords—and once more unite us in the bonds of harmony and charity towards each other. Amen.

* This was the inevitable tendency, although not the declared purpose, of a very considerable number of the publications in certain newspapers.

CHAPTER XIX.

British Depredations brought on the tapis in the Senate of the United States. Condemnatory Resolutions passed.

IN consequence of the presentation of the mercantile memorials, the Senate of the United States took the subject into their most serious consideration; and passed the following Resolution, on the 10th Feb. 1806.

“Resolved, that the capture and condemnation, under orders of the British government, and adjudications of their courts of admiralty, of American vessels and their cargoes, on the pretext of their being employed in a trade with the enemies of Great Britain prohibited in time of peace, is AN UNPROVOKED AGGRESSION UPON THE PROPERTY OF THE CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES; A VIOLATION OF THEIR NEUTRAL RIGHTS; AND AN ENCROACHMENT UPON THEIR NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE.”*

I hope the reader will attentively peruse this resolution. It is clear and explicit. It solemnly protests against the revival of the exploded rule of the war of 1756, as

“An encroachment upon the national independence, and a violation of our neutral rights.”

Stronger language could not be well used. What renders it peculiarly remarkable, is, that it was carried by *an unanimous vote of the Senate*, 28 members present. But secondly and chiefly, I beg it may be borne in remembrance, that among the senators who thus voted, are to be found Messrs. PICKERING, Hillhouse, Bayard and Tracy.

Another resolution, passed February 14, stands in these words:—

“Resolved, that the president of the United States be requested to DEMAND the restoration of the property of their citizens captured and condemned on the pretext of its being employed in a trade with the enemies of Great Britain, prohibited in time of peace; and the indemnification of such American citizens for their losses and damages sustained by these captures and condemnations; and to enter into such arrangements with the British government, on these and all other differences between the two nations, (and particularly respecting the IMPRESSMENT OF AMERICAN SEAMEN) as may be consistent with the honour and interests of the United States, and manifest their earnest desire, for themselves and their citizens, of that justice to which they are entitled.”†

There was a division upon this resolution. It was carried by twenty affirmative, against six negative votes. Messrs. PICKERING, Hillhouse, Bayard, and Tracy were in the affirmative, as on the former resolution.

To obtain redress from Great Britain, four modes presented themselves—negociation—non-intercourse—embargo—or war.

The first in order required to be first essayed. Accordingly, the administration entered upon negociation, and, to attach more solemnity to it, Mr. Wm. Pinkney was appointed minister extraordinary, and united with Mr. Monroe, then resident at the court of St. James’s.

* Journal of the Senate for 1806—page 126

† Idem, page 131.

To give the negotiation a greater likelihood of success, an act was passed,* making a strong appeal to the interest of Great Britain. This act prohibited the importation into the United States, of a variety of her most important manufactures, viz.

“All articles of which leather is the material of chief value.

“All articles of which silk is the material of chief value.

“All articles of which hemp or flax is the material of chief value.

“All articles of which tin or brass is the material of chief value, tin in sheets excepted.

“Woolen cloths, whose invoice prices shall exceed five shillings sterling per square yard.

“Woolen hosiery of all kinds.

“Window glass, and all the manufactures of glass.

“Silver and plated wares.

“Paper of every description.

“Nails and Spikes.

“Mats and cloathing ready made.

“Millinery of all kinds.

“Playing cards.

“Beer, ale, and porter; and pictures and prints.”

This act was passed on the 18th day of April, 1806, and, as has been shown, in compliance with the remonstrances of the merchants, as a means of inducing England to abandon her unjust pretensions, and cease her depredations. And with a laudable view to afford her time to weigh its consequences, and to prevent a rupture between the two nations, its operation was not to commence till the 15th of the following November, a period of seven months. Thus reluctant was our government to have recourse to extremities, notwithstanding the grievous provocations that had been offered. It is impossible to conceive a more lenient mode of proceeding, or one reflecting more credit on the forbearance of an injured and insulted nation.

Still further to evince the wish of our rulers to preserve peace, the operation of this act was, in December 1806, suspended till the 1st of July 1807:† and moreover, the president was authorised, “if in his judgment the public good should require it, to suspend it still farther till the second Monday of December in the same year.”

Here let us pause a moment. The United States had suffered depredations on their commerce to an enormous amount, by the revival of a pretended rule of the law of nations, which had, at a former period, been clearly and distinctly abandoned, and of which revival no previous notice had been given. And instead of having recourse to reprisals, or to a declaration of war, either of which would have been perfectly just, they adopted the mild measure of restraining the commerce of the aggressor, in order to make it his interest to do them justice. Never was greater forbearance shown—never was forbearance worse required.

* Idem, page 220.

† Laws of the United States, vol. vi. page 80.

CHAPTER XX.

Attack on the Chesapeake. Proclamation interdicting our harbours to the British.

WHILE the depredations sustained by our merchants were yet under discussion, a tragical affair occurred, which still further unfortunately embroiled the two nations.

The Chesapeake, capt. Gordon, sailed from Norfolk on the 22d of June, 1807. The Leopard, of 50 guns, which was moored near her, weighed anchor shortly afterwards. She soon overtook the Chesapeake, and demanded four sailors, three of whom had deserted from the British frigate Melampus. The fourth was said to have deserted from a British merchant vessel. Commodore Barron, who was on board, refused to deliver them; and in consequence, the Leopard commenced an attack upon the American frigate, which was wholly unprepared for resistance. Three men were killed, and sixteen wounded; among the latter was the commodore, who struck his flag, and surrendered the vessel. Captain Humphreys, of the Leopard, sent an officer on board the Chesapeake, who seized four of her crew, William Ware, Daniel Martin, John Strachan, and John Wilson.

Of these four persons, one was brought to trial at Halifax, and, being found guilty of desertion, was hanged. One died in confinement. The other two were retained in bondage till June 13th, 1812, a few days previous to the declaration of war, when they were restored to freedom on board the Chesapeake, at Boston.

This outrage excited the utmost indignation throughout the United States, and for a time united all parties in the common clamour for reparation of the insult and injury, or for war. The federalists were as ardent in their denunciations of the lawless violence, as the democrats.

I have already stated the prudence of the then president, Mr. Jefferson. The attack took place on the 22d of June—and he delayed the extra meeting of congress till the 26th of October, to afford time for the effervescence of the public to subside.—This wise measure preserved the country from war.

But to guard against a repetition of these outrages and others which we had suffered within our own jurisdiction from British vessels of war, the president issued the following proclamation forbidding them the entrance into our ports and harbours.

PROCLAMATION.

During the wars, which, for some time, have unhappily prevailed among the powers of Europe, the United States of America, firm in their principles of peace, have endeavoured by justice, by a regular discharge of all their national and social duties, and by every friendly office their situation has admitted, to maintain with all the belligerents their accustomed relations of friendship, hospitality, and commercial intercourse. Taking no part in the questions which animate the powers against each other, nor permitting themselves to

entertain a wish but for the restoration of general peace, they have observed with good faith the neutrality they assumed : and they believe that no instance of a departure from its duties can be justly imputed to them by any nation. A free use of their harbours and waters, the means of refitting and of refreshment, of succour to their sick and suffering, have, at all times, and on equal principles, been extended to all, and this too amidst a constant recurrence of acts of insubordination to the laws, of violence to the persons, and of trespasses on the property of our citizens, committed by officers of one of the belligerent parties received among us. In truth, these abuses of the laws of hospitality have, with few exceptions, become habitual to the commanders of the British armed vessels hovering on our coasts, and frequenting our harbours. They have been the subject of repeated representations to their government. Assurances have been given that proper orders should restrain them within the limits of the rights of, and of the respect due to, a friendly nation : but those orders and assurances have been without effect ; no instance of punishment for past wrongs has taken place. At length, a deed, transcending all we have hitherto seen or suffered, brings the public sensibility to a serious crisis, and our forbearance to a necessary pause. A frigate of the United States, trusting to a state of peace, and leaving her harbour on a distant service, has been surprised and attacked by a British vessel of superior force—one of a squadron then lying in our waters, and covering the transaction ; and has been disabled from service, with the loss of a number of men killed and wounded.—This enormity was not only without provocation or justifiable cause, but was committed with the avowed purpose of taking by force, from a ship of war of the United States, a part of her crew ; and that no circumstance might be wanting to mark its character, it had been previously ascertained, that the seamen demanded were native citizens of the United States. Having effected his purpose, he returned to anchor with his squadron within our jurisdiction. Hospitality under such circumstances ceases to be a duty ; and a continuance of it, with such uncontrolled abuses, would tend only, by multiplying injuries and irritations, to bring on a rupture between the two nations. This extreme resort is equally opposed to the interest of both, as it is to assurances of the most friendly dispositions on the part of the British government, in the midst of which this outrage has been committed. In this light, the subject cannot but present itself to that government, and strengthen the motives to an honourable reparation of the wrong which has been done, and to that effectual controul of its naval commanders, which alone can justify the government of the United States in the exercise of those hospitalities it is now constrained to discontinue.

In consideration of these circumstances, and of the right of every nation to regulate its own police, to provide for its peace and for the safety of its citizens, and consequently to refuse the admission of armed vessels into its harbours or waters, either in such numbers or of such descriptions, as are inconsistent with these, or with the maintenance of the authority of the laws, I have thought proper, in pursuance of the authorities especially given by law, to issue this my proclamation, hereby requiring all armed vessels bearing commission under the government of Great Britain, now within the harbours or waters of the United States, immediately and without any delay, to depart from the same ; and interdicting the entrance of all the said harbours and waters to the said armed vessels, and to all others bearing commissions under the authority of the British government.

And if the said vessels, or any of them, shall fail to depart as aforesaid, or if they or any others, so interdicted, shall hereafter enter the harbours or waters aforesaid, I do in that case forbid all intercourse with them or any of them, their officers and crews ; and do prohibit all supplies and aid from being furnished to them or any of them.

And I do declare and make known, that if any person from, or within the jurisdiction and limits of the United States, shall afford any aid to any such vessel, contrary to the prohibition contained in this proclamation, either in refitting any such vessel, or in furnishing her, her officers, or crew, with supplies of any kind, or in any manner whatsoever ; or if any pilots shall assist in navigating any of the said armed vessels, unless it be for the purpose of carrying them,

in the first instance, beyond the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, or unless it be in the case of a vessel forced by distress, or charged with public despatches as hereinafter provided for, such person or persons shall, on conviction, suffer all the pains and penalties by the laws provided for such offences.

And I do hereby enjoin and require all persons bearing office, civil or military, within or under the authority of the United States, and all others, citizens or inhabitants thereof, or being within the same, with vigilance and promptitude to exert their respective authorities, and to be aiding and assisting to the carrying this proclamation, and every part thereof into full effect.

Provided nevertheless, that if any such vessel shall be forced into the harbours or waters of the United States by distress, by the dangers of the sea, or by the pursuit of an enemy, or shall enter them charged with despatches or business from their government, or shall be a public packet for the conveyance of letters or despatches, the commanding officer, immediately reporting his vessel to the collector of the district, stating the object or causes of entering the said harbours or waters, and conforming himself to the regulations in that case prescribed under the authority of the laws, shall be allowed the benefit of such regulations respecting repairs, supplies, stay, intercourse and departure, as shall be permitted under the same authority.

In testimony whereof, I have caused the seal, &c.

Given at Washington the second day of July, one thousand eight hundred and seven, and of the Independence of the United States the thirty first.

By the president,

JAMES MADISON, *Secretary of State.*

TH. JEFFERSON.

At this distance of time, it is hardly possible to realize the indignation, the abhorrence, the resentment, universally excited by the outrageous conduct of captain Humphreys. It pervaded every quarter of the union, without exception. All party distinctions were lost for the moment. Federalists and democrats, foreigners and natives, all united in the strongest call upon the government to procure redress for the outrage. War was contemplated throughout the union: and there was hardly a meeting held, of which the members did not most solemnly pledge themselves to support the constituted authorities in whatever measures might be requisite for the defence of the national rights and national honour.

To enable the reader to form some idea of the fervid state of the public mind, I submit the following extracts to his perusal. They are fair specimens of the universal sentiment on this interesting topic.

Extract from the proceedings of the citizens of Richmond, July 1, 1807.

"*Resolved*, That while we deprecate the horrors of war, and approve all honourable means of averting them, we possess the firm hope that the government of the United States will avenge this unparalleled outrage with the spirit which becomes the nation, and which the nation feels; believing as we do, that however unequal may be our naval strength, our enemies have nevertheless vulnerable points within our reach, through which we may strike them vitally."

Extract from the proceedings of the citizens of West Chester, July 4, 1807.

"*Resolved unanimously*, That we shall consider the government of Great Britain as having forfeited all claim to the friendship and hospitality of the government and people of the United States, until ample and proper satisfaction be made; and in conformity therewith, we do solemnly pledge ourselves to maintain the strict observance of the proclamation of the president of the United States, by every means in our power."

“Resolved, That we shall, at all times, be prepared to encounter all hazards, to maintain the rights and independence of our country with our lives and our fortunes; and that we will support the administration of the general government in every proper measure which it may adopt, in the alternative of a coerced retribution of our wrongs, or in calling forth the energy and resources of the people at this important crisis.”

Extract from the proceedings of the citizens of Lewistown, July 10, 1807.

“Resolved unanimously, That the repeated aggressions and violations committed by Great Britain against all neutral nations in general, and particularly against the persons and privileges of our citizens, as a free and independent people, have excited in us a just abhorrence and indignation; that the late outrage by the Leopard ship of war against the Chesapeake, we consider as a premeditated insult to our government and national character, and wearing so barbarous an aspect, that longer patience would degrade the name of Americans.

“Resolved unanimously, That if upon the meeting of Congress, it shall be found necessary to resort to hostile measures against Great Britain for the attainment of justice, we will cheerfully submit to any deprivations or hardships attendant on a state of war; and we will make every exertion to perfect ourselves in the military art, and equip ourselves to oppose the base and cowardly enemy of our country.”

Extract from the proceedings of the citizens of Alexandria, June 27, 1807.

“Resolved that the tyrannic conduct of the British nation on the ocean has justly rendered her odious among all civilized powers.

“Resolved, That we view the late savage and dastardly outrage committed by the Leopard British ship of war on the United States frigate Chesapeake, with due indignation.”

Extract from the proceedings of the citizens of Wilmington, Delaware, July 4, 1807, the venerable John Dickinson in the chair.

“Resolved, That we view with the strongest sentiments of indignation and abhorrence the late unprovoked, lawless, and ferocious attack, made by the British ship of war Leopard upon the frigate Chesapeake, and the daring insult offered thereby to the flag, the government, and the people of the United States.”

Extract from the proceedings of the citizens of Baltimore, June 30, 1807.

“Resolved unanimously, That we view with indignation and horror the wanton attack lately made upon the Chesapeake frigate by the British ship of war, Leopard, by which many of our fellow citizens have been killed and wounded, and the government and flag of our country most grossly insulted.

“Resolved unanimously, That we will with our lives and fortunes support the government in all such measures as they may adopt on this momentous occasion, to obtain redress and satisfaction for the outrage aforesaid.”

*Extract from the proceedings of the citizens of Philadelphia, July 1, 1807, Joseph Hopkinson, esq. Secretary.**

“Resolved, That the conduct of Great Britain towards the United States, has been too often marked by hostility, injustice, and oppression; and that the outrage committed by the Leopard, one of the ships of war, under the express orders of one of the admirals, upon the Chesapeake, a frigate belonging to the United States, is an act of such consummate violence and wrong, and of so barbarous and murderous a character, that it would debase and degrade any nation, and much more so, a nation of freemen, to submit to it.

“Resolved, That we will support the administration of the general government in all and every measure which may be adopted by them, to avenge the wrongs our country has suffered from Great Britain, and to compel the most rigid retribution; and that to attain a full measure of justice from her, we pledge ourselves to make any sacrifices, and to encounter any hazards.

** To readers at a distance from Philadelphia, it may not be amiss to state; that Mr. Hopkinson is and has always been as decided a federalist as Harrison Gray Otis, Timothy Pickering, or Josiah Quincy, Esqrs.*

"Resolved, That by the laws and usages of nations, a national ship is always exempt and free from examinations or search, by any foreign vessel or power.

Resolved, That *this premeditated outrage is considered as tantamount to a declaration of war on the part of Great Britain, and as evincive of an irreconcilable hostility to this nation.*

"Resolved, That we entertain a confidence, that the government of the United States *will adopt the most decisive and vigorous measures* to obtain reparation for the injuries and wrongs sustained from the government of Great Britain."

Extract from the proceedings of the citizens of Pittsburg, July 10, 1807.

"Resolved, That the late outrageous and hostile conduct of the officers of the British navy, to the flag of the United States on the coast of Virginia, has excited our highest indignation.

"Resolved, That it is the duty of every American to aid the government of our country in all measures having a tendency to protect its best interests, its honour and independence."

Extract from the proceedings of the citizens of Norfolk, June 24.

"Resolved unanimously, That we view the unprovoked, piratical, savage, and assassin-like attack upon the Chesapeake with that horror and detestation which should always attend a violation of the faith of nations and the laws of war; and we pledge our lives and our property to co-operate with the government in any measures which they may adopt, whether of vengeance or retaliation."

Extract from an address of a committee appointed in Norfolk, to their fellow Citizens, dated July 11, 1807.

"The last deed of savage ferocity, unparalleled even in the naval annals of Britain, awakened the sentiment of abhorrence in every breast. Every voice was loud in its call for reparation, commensurate to the insult; British insolence and barbarity had reached the *ne plus ultra*. They had the unblushing effrontery to claim the rights of hospitality, while their hands were crimsoned and smouking with the blood of your countrymen; even at the instant they had declared war in sight of these shores from which, not many years past, their discomfited and recreant myrmidons were driven with disgrace; in sight of those monuments, which fill your breasts with a holy and aspiring admiration for the valour and triumphs of your forefathers. The nation was unexpectedly plunged into war, and yourselves the first exposed to its ruthless blast. The choice of tame submission or resistance was forced on your consideration: with one voice you declared that your ancestors had wrested their rights, their liberties and independence from the suffocating grasp of British tyranny, by the sword; and that you, their posterity, had resolved with it to defend and to perpetuate the hallowed patrimony."

Extract from the proceedings of the citizens of New York, July 2, 1807.

"Resolved, That we consider the dastardly and unprovoked attack made on the United States armed ship Chesapeake, by his Britannic majesty's ship, the Leopard, to be a violation of our national rights, as atrocious as it is unprecedented."

Last in the long list, let me take the liberty of offering to the world the sentiments of the citizens of Boston, in town meeting, held in the court-house.

Boston, July 10, 1807.

"Resolved unanimously, That the late aggression, committed by a British ship of war on a frigate of the United States, for the avowed purpose of taking from her by force a part of her crew, was a wanton outrage upon the persons and lives of our citizens, and a direct attack on our national sovereignty and independence; that the spirited conduct of our fellow citizens at Norfolk on this occasion, before the orders of government could be obtained, was highly honourable to themselves and to the nation.

"Resolved unanimously, That *the firm, dignified, and temperate policy adopted by our executive at this momentous crisis is entitled to our most cordial approbation and support.*

“Resolved unanimously, That with all our personal influence and exertions we will aid and assist the constituted authorities in carrying the proclamation of the president of the United States, in every particular, into full and effectual execution.”

Besides the above meeting, there was another held in Boston, at Faneuil Hall, on the 16th of July, 1807, at which John Coffin Jones, esq. acted as moderator. John Quincy Adams, *Harrison Gray Otis*, Wm. Eustis, *Christopher Gore*, Charles Jones, *John C. Jones*, *Thomas H. Perkins*, *Jonathan Mason*, and John Warren, esqrs. were appointed a committee to prepare a report, which contained the following resolutions—

“Resolved, that we consider the unprovoked attack made on the United States’ armed ship *Chesapeake*, by the British ship of war *Leopard*, a wanton outrage upon the lives of our fellow citizens, a direct violation of our national honour, and an infringement of our national rights and sovereignty.

“Resolved, that we most sincerely approve the proclamation, and the firm and dispassionate course of policy pursued by the president of the United States: and we will cordially unite with our fellow citizens in affording effectual support to such measures as our government may further adopt, in the present crisis of our affairs.”

To those unacquainted with the solemnity and regularity of the proceedings in Boston town meetings, it may not be improper to state, that there is probably no town in the world whose public meetings are conducted with more propriety and decorum—and that these resolutions are as full and as fair an expression of the sentiments of the citizens of the town as ever was given.

I have already offered a few reflections on the charge of French influence, so universally alleged against Mr. Jefferson, and so generally believed by the federalists throughout the union. At the period of passing these resolves, he had been in office six years and four months, out of eight years of his presidency. And, behold, the town of Boston, after so long an experience of his conduct in this dignified and arduous office, passes on him in a report expressly drawn up by *Harrison Gray Otis*, *Christopher Gore*, and other gentlemen of the same description, the highest encomiums for his “*firm and dispassionate course of policy*,” at a crisis of the utmost delicacy. What a contrast—what a contradiction between this panegyric and the never-ending abuse, the remorseless virulence, with which he has been assailed from that period to the present, in that town, by men, the major part of whom were probably at the meeting, and concurred in this vote of approbation! Alas! alas! what a poor, miserable, contemptible, senseless animal is man! To how little purpose is he endowed with that proud, distinctive faculty, called reason, of which he makes so little use!

It is due to justice, and to the spirit of impartiality which I have studiously laboured to preserve throughout this work, to state, that previous to the sailing of the *Chesapeake*, Mr. Ha-

milton, the British consul at Norfolk, had made repeated official demands of these four seamen, which demands were repelled by the officers on board the *Chesapeake*, with the concurrence and approbation of the cabinet at Washington. This refusal led to the orders issued by admiral Berkeley, then at Halifax, to captain Humphreys, to take the men by force.

It is also due to justice, to state, that as these men had entered voluntarily on board the *Chesapeake*—and as Great Britain steadily refuses to surrender foreigners who enter her vessels voluntarily—the claim made for these four sailors was not justified or warranted by her own practice.

The following account of three of the four men thus seized, is extracted from a letter written by commodore Barron, to the secretary of the navy, and dated April, 7th, 1807. It arose from the requisition of the British consul at Norfolk, for their delivery.

“William Ware, pressed from on board the brig *Neptune*, captain Crafts, by the British frigate *Melampus*, in the bay of Biscay, has served on board the said frigate fifteen months.

“William Ware is a native American, born on Pipe creek, Frederick county, state of Maryland, at Bruce’s mills, and served his time at said mills. He also lived at Ellicott’s mills, near Baltimore, and drove a wagon several years between Hagerstown and Baltimore. He also served eighteen months on board the United States’ frigate *Chesapeake*, under the command of commodore Morris and captain James Barron. He is an Indian looking man.

“Daniel Martin was pressed at the same time and place. He is a native of Westport, in Massachusetts, about thirty miles to the Eastward of Newport, Rhode-Island; served his time out of New-York with captain Marrowby, in the *Caledonia*; refers to Mr. Benjamin Davis, merchant, and Mr. Benjamin Corce, of Westport. He is a coloured man.

“John Strachan, born on the eastern shore of Maryland, Queen Ann’s county, between Centerville and Queen’s-town; refers to Mr. John Price, and ——— Pratt, esq. on Kent island, who know his relations. Strachan sailed in the brig *Martha Bland*, captain Wyvill, from New York to Dublin, and from thence to Liverpool. He there left the brig, and shipped on board an English Guineaman. He was pressed on board the *Melampus*, off cape Finisterre. To better his situation he consented to enter, being determined to make his escape when opportunity offered. He served on board the frigate two years. He is a white man, about five feet seven inches high.

“William Ware and John Strachan have protections. Daniel Martin says he lost his, after leaving the frigate.”

While the American mind was festering under the atrocious outrage perpetrated by captain Humphreys, the British government issued a proclamation, directing the search for, and seizure of British subjects on board merchant vessels, of which I sub-join the two principal paragraphs.

“For the better execution of the purposes of this our royal proclamation, we do authorise and command all captains, masters, and others commanding our ships and vessels of war, to stop and make stay of all and every such person or persons (being our natural born subjects) as shall endeavour to transport or enter themselves into the service of any foreign state, contrary to the intent and command of this our royal proclamation; and to seize upon, take, and bring away all such persons aforesaid, who shall be found to be employed or serving in any foreign merchant ship or vessel as aforesaid: but we do strictly enjoin on

all such our captains, masters, and others, that they do permit no man to go on board such ships and vessels belonging to states at amity with us, for the purpose of seizing upon, taking, and bringing away, such persons as aforesaid, for whose discreet and orderly demeanour, the said captains cannot answer; and that they do take especial care that *no unnecessary violence* be done or offered to the vessel, or to the remainder of the crew, from out of which such persons shall be taken.

“And in case of their receiving information of any such person or persons being employed, or serving on board any ship of war belonging to such foreign state, being a state at amity with us, we do authorise and command our captains, masters, and others commanding our ships of war, *to require of the captain or commander of such foreign ship of war, that he do forthwith release and discharge such person or persons*, being our natural-born subject or subjects; and if such release and discharge shall be refused, then to transmit information of such refusal to the commander in chief of the squadron under whose orders such captains or commanders shall be then serving; which information the said commander in chief is hereby strictly directed and enjoined to transmit, with the least possible delay, to our minister residing at the seat of government of that state to which the said foreign ship of war shall belong, to demand reparation for the injury done to us by the unwarrantable detention of our natural-born subjects in the service of a foreign state.”

CHAPTER XXI.

Blockade of the Coast from the Elbe to Brest. Berlin Decree.

INSTEAD of redressing the grievances of which our merchants so loudly, and so eloquently, and so justly complained, the British government, on the 16th of May, 1806, under the administration of the celebrated Charles James Fox, issued a proclamation, blockading the coast of Germany, Holland, and France, from the Elbe to Brest, extending to about eight hundred miles. There never was an adequate force stationed to effect a legal blockade of a third part of the coast included within the proclamation.

The French government, exasperated at this offensive and unjustifiable measure, retaliated on Great Britain by the notorious Berlin decree, whereby the whole of the British dominions were declared to be in a state of blockade, although a single French vessel of war hardly dared to shew itself on the seas!!!

Imperial Decree declaring the British Isles in a state of blockade.

Imperial Camp, Berlin, November 21, 1806.

Napoleon, emperor of the French, and king of Italy, considering:

1. That England does not admit the right of nations, as universally acknowledged by all civilized people;
2. That she declares as an enemy every individual belonging to an enemy state; and in consequence makes prisoners of war, not only of the crews of armed vessels, but those also of *merchant vessels*, and even the supercargoes of the same;
3. That she extends or applies to merchant vessels, to articles of commerce, and to the property of individuals, the right of conquest, which can only be applied or extended to what belongs to an enemy state;
4. That she extends to ports not fortified, to harbours and mouths of rivers, the *right of blockade*, which, according to reason and the usages of civilized nations, is applicable only to strong or fortified ports;
5. That she declares places blockaded, before which she has not a single ves-

sel of war; although a place ought not to be considered blockaded, but when it is so invested as that no approach to it can be made without imminent hazard; that she declares even places blockaded which her united forces would be incapable of doing, such as entire coasts, and a whole empire;

6. That this unequalled abuse of the right of blockade has no other object than to interrupt the communication of different nations, and to extend the commerce and industry of England upon the ruin of those of the continent;

7. That this being the evident design of England, whoever deals on the continent in English merchandise favours that design, and becomes an accomplice;

8. That this conduct in England (worthy only of the first ages of barbarism) has benefited her to the detriment of other nations;

9. That it being right to oppose to an enemy the same arms she makes use of; to combat as she does; when all ideas of justice, and every liberal sentiment (the result of civilization among men) are disregarded:

We have resolved to enforce against England the usages which she has consecrated in her maritime code.

The present decree shall be considered as the fundamental law of the empire, until England has acknowledged that the *rights of war* are the same on land as at sea; that they cannot be extended to any private property whatever, nor to persons who are not military; and until the right of blockading be restrained to fortified places actually invested by competent forces.

Article 1. The British islands are in a state of blockade.

2. All commerce and correspondence with them is prohibited. Consequently, all letters or packets written in England, or to an Englishman, written in the *English language*, shall not be despatched from the post-offices; and shall be seized.

3. Every individual, a subject of Great Britain, of whatever rank or condition, who is found in countries occupied by our troops or those of our allies, shall be made prisoner of war.

4. Every warehouse, all merchandise or property whatever, belonging to an Englishman, are declared good prize.

5. One half of the proceeds of merchandise declared to be good prize, and forfeited as in the preceding articles, shall go to indemnify merchants who have suffered losses by the English cruisers.

6. No vessel coming directly from England or her colonies, or having been there since the publication of this decree, shall be admitted into any port.

7. Every vessel that, by a false declaration, contravenes the foregoing disposition, shall be seized, and the ship and cargo confiscated as English property.

8. [This article states, that the councils of prizes at Paris and at Milan, shall have recognisance of what may arise in the empire and in Italy under the present decree.]

9. Communications of this decree shall be made to the kings of Spain, Naples, Holland, Etruria, and to our other allies, whose subjects, as well as ours, are victims of the injuries and barbarity of the English maritime code.

10. Our ministers of foreign relations, &c. are charged with the execution of the present decree.

NAPOLEON.

Extravagant as this decree appears, it is capable of some defence; a defence not void of plausibility. It was promulgated to retaliate the blockade of a great extent of coast, of which, as I have stated, two thirds were not invested by any force whatever. And it cannot be denied that if the blockade of a single port three miles in extent, much more a long line of coast, without a force to support it, be legal, the blockade of the British dominions, or even of a whole continent, without a force, is likewise legal. And on this principle, captain Boyle's celebrated blockade of the British dominions, was quite as legal and defensible, as the blockade, during our late war, of such ports of the United States as had no naval force stationed before them.

So far as respected American vessels, the Berlin decree was not enforced for twelve months. This is a most important fact, and is not asserted lightly. It stands on respectable authority, to which no objection can lie. This authority is Alexander Baring, esq. member of the British house of commons.

*"No condemnation of an American vessel had ever taken place under it; and so little did the French privateers interfere with the trade of America with this country, that the insurance on it has been very little higher than in time of profound peace; while that of the American trade with the continent of Europe has at the same time been doubled, and even trebled, by the conduct of our cruisers."**

Besides the above authority, I annex an official proof of my position:—

Paris, November 12, 1807.

SIR, It was not till yesterday that I received from Mr. Skipwith a copy of the decree of the council of prizes, in the case of the *Horizon*. This is the first unfriendly decision of that body under the decree of the twenty-first of November, 1806. In this case, and on the petition of the defendant, the court has recommended the restoration of the whole cargo. I did not, however, think proper to join in asking as a favour, what I believed myself entitled to as a right. I subjoin a copy of my note to the minister of foreign affairs.

And I am, sir, &c.

Mr. Madison, &c.

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

CHAPTER XXII.

Orders in Council of November 11th, 1807. Milan Decree.

As a retaliation for the preceding Berlin decree, were issued the British orders in council of Nov. 11, 1807, whereby all neutral vessels bound to France, or her dependencies, or to any port from which British vessels were excluded—and further, all vessels furnished with French consular certificates of the origin of the cargoes, were declared liable to seizure and condemnation. This measure, so destructive to the rights and interests of the United States, was predicated upon our acquiescence in the Berlin decree of November, 1806, twelve months anterior, although that decree, as I have stated, had not been enforced against our commerce, and of course we had had no right to remonstrate against it. There did not, therefore, exist any appearance of that acquiescence which could have warranted this high-handed outrage.

To enable the reader to judge correctly on the subject of these celebrated orders, I annex a copy of them entire.

At the Court of the Queen's Palace, the 11th of November, 1807, present, the King's most excellent Majesty in Council.

Whereas certain orders, establishing an unprecedented system of warfare against this kingdom, and aimed especially at the destruction of its commerce and resources, were some time since issued by the government of France, by

* "Inquiry into the causes and consequences of the orders in council; and an examination of the conduct of Great Britain towards the neutral commerce of America. By Alexander Baring, esq. M. P." London, published February, 1808. Re-published in Philadelphia, by Bradford and Inskeep.

which the British islands were declared to be in a state of blockade ; thereby subjecting to capture and condemnation all vessels with their cargoes, which should continue to trade with his majesty's dominions :

" And whereas by the same orders, all trading in English merchandise is prohibited : and every article of merchandise belonging to England, or coming from her colonies, or of her manufacture, is declared lawful prize.

" And whereas the nations in alliance with France, and under her controul, were required to give, and have given, and do give, effect to such orders :

" And whereas his majesty's order of the seventh of January last, has not answered the desired purpose, either of compelling the enemy to recall those orders, or of inducing neutral nations to interpose, with effect, to obtain their revocation ; but, on the contrary, the same have been recently enforced with increased rigour :

" And whereas his majesty, under these circumstances, finds himself compelled to take further measures for asserting and vindicating his just rights, and for supporting that maritime power which the exertions and valour of his people have, under the blessing of providence, enabled him to establish and maintain, and the maintenance of which is not more essential to the safety and prosperity of his majesty's dominions, than it is to the protection of such states as still retain their independence, and to the general intercourse and happiness of mankind.

" His majesty is therefore pleased, by and with the advice of his privy council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, that *all the ports and places of France and her allies, or of any other country at war with his majesty, and all other ports or places in Europe, from which, although not at war with his majesty, the British flag is excluded, and all ports or places in the colonies belonging to his majesty's enemies, shall, from henceforth, be subject to the same restrictions in point of trade and navigation, with the exceptions hereinafter mentioned, as if the same were actually blockaded by his majesty's naval forces, in the most strict and rigorous manner. And it is hereby farther ordered and declared, that all trade in articles which are of the produce or manufacture of the said countries or colonies, shall be deemed and considered to be unlawful ; and that every vessel trading from or to the said countries or colonies, together with goods and merchandise on board, and all articles of the produce or manufacture of the said countries or colonies, shall be captured and condemned as prize to the captors.*

" But although his majesty would be fully justified, by the circumstances and considerations above recited, in establishing such a system of restrictions with respect to all the countries and colonies of his enemies without exception or qualification ; yet his majesty, being nevertheless desirous not to subject neutrals to any greater inconvenience than is absolutely inseparable from the carrying into effect his majesty's just determination to counteract the designs of his enemies, and to retort upon themselves the consequences of their own violence and injustice ; and being yet willing to hope that it may be possible (consistently with that object) still to allow to neutrals the opportunity of furnishing themselves with colonial produce for their own consumption and supply ; and even to leave open, for the present, **SUCH TRADE WITH HIS MAJESTY'S ENEMIES AS SHALL BE CARRIED ON DIRECTLY WITH THE PORTS OF HIS MAJESTY'S DOMINIONS, OR OF HIS ALLIES, in the manner hereinafter mentioned ;**

" His majesty is therefore pleased farther to order, and it is hereby ordered, that nothing herein contained shall extend to subject to capture or condemnation any vessel, or the cargo of any vessel, belonging to any country not declared by this order to be subjected to the restrictions incident to a state of blockade, which shall have cleared out with such cargo from some port or place of the country to which she belongs, either in Europe or America, or from some free port in his majesty's colonies, under circumstances in which such trade from such free port is permitted, direct to some port or place in the colonies of his majesty's enemies, or from those colonies direct to the country to which such vessel belongs, or to some free port in his majesty's colonies, in such cases and with such articles, as it may be lawful to import into such free port ; nor to any vessel, or cargo of any vessel, belonging to any country not at war

with his majesty, which have cleared out from some port or place in this kingdom, or from Gibraltar or Malta, under such regulations as his majesty may think fit to prescribe, or from any port belonging to his majesty's allies, and shall be proceeding direct to the port specified in the clearance; nor to any vessel, or the cargo of any vessel, belonging to any country not at war with his majesty, which shall be coming from any port or place in Europe, which is declared by this order to be subject to the restrictions incident to a state of blockade, **DESTINED TO SOME PORT OR PLACE IN EUROPE BELONGING TO HIS MAJESTY**, and which shall be on her voyage direct thereto; but these exceptions are not to be understood as excepting from capture or confiscation any vessel or goods which may be liable thereto in respect of having entered or departed from any port or place actually blockaded by his majesty's squadrons or ships of war, or for being enemies' property, or for any other cause than the contravention of this present order.

"And the commanders of his majesty's ships of war and privateers, and other vessels acting under his majesty's commission, shall be, and are hereby instructed, to warn any vessel which shall have commenced her voyage prior to any notice of this order, and shall be destined to any port of France, or of her allies, or of any other country at war with his majesty, or to any port or place from which the British flag, as aforesaid, is excluded, or to any colony belonging to his majesty's enemies, and which shall not have cleared out as is herein before allowed, to discontinue her voyage, and to proceed to some port or place in this kingdom, or to Gibraltar or Malta. And any vessel which, after having been so warned, or after a reasonable time shall have been afforded for the arrival of information of this his majesty's order to any port or place from which she sailed, or which, after having notice of this order, shall be found in the prosecution of any voyage contrary to the restrictions contained in this order, shall be captured, and, together with her cargo, condemned as lawful prize to the captors.

"And whereas countries not engaged in the war, have acquiesced in the orders of France, prohibiting all trade in any articles the produce or manufacture of his majesty's dominions; and the merchants of those countries have given countenance and effect to those prohibitions, by accepting from persons styling themselves commercial agents of the enemy, resident at neutral ports, certain documents termed "*certificates of origin*," being certificates obtained at the ports of shipment, *declaring that the articles of the cargo are not of the produce or manufacture of his majesty's dominions, or to that effect.*

"And whereas this expedient has been directed by France, and submitted to by such merchants, as part of the new system of warfare directed against the trade of this kingdom, and is the most effectual instrument of accomplishing the same; and it is therefore essentially necessary to resist it.

"His majesty is therefore pleased, by and with the advice of his privy council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, that if any vessel, after reasonable time shall have been afforded for receiving notice of this his majesty's order, at the port or place from which such vessel shall have cleared out, *shall be found carrying any such certificate or document as aforesaid, or any document referring to or authenticating the same*, such vessel shall be adjudged lawful prize to the captors, together with the goods laden therein, belonging to the person or persons by whom, or on whose behalf, any such document was put on board.

"And the right honourable the lords commissioners of his majesty's treasury, his majesty's principal secretaries of state, the lords commissioners of the admiralty, and the judges of the high court of admiralty, and courts of vice-admiralty, are to take the necessary measures herein, as to them shall respectively appertain.

W. FAWKENER."

The preceding orders were assigned by Napoleon as a reason for, and justification of, the Milan decree, of which, although it somewhat deranges the chronological order of the work, I here submit a copy. But I prefer grouping these three documents together, for the ease and convenience of the reader.

IMPERIAL DECREE.

Rejoinder to his Britannic majesty's Order in Council, of the 11th November, 1807.

At our Royal Palace at Milan, December 17, 1807.

"Napoleon, emperor of the French, king of Italy, protector of the Rhenish confederation.

"Observing the measures adopted by the British government on the 11th November last, by which vessels belonging to neutral, friendly, or even powers the allies of England, are made liable not only to be searched by English cruisers, but to be compulsorily detained in England, and to have a tax laid on them of so much per cent. on the cargo, to be regulated by the British legislature.

"Observing that by these acts the British government *denationalises* ships of every nation in Europe; that it is not competent for any government to detract from its own independence and rights; all the sovereigns of Europe having in trust the sovereignties and independence of the flag; that if by an unpardonable weakness, and which in the eyes of posterity would be an indelible stain, such a tyranny were allowed to be established into principles, and consecrated by usage, the English would avail themselves of it to assert it as a right, as they have availed themselves of the tolerance of governments to establish the infamous principle, that the flag of a nation does not cover goods, and to give to their right of blockade an arbitrary extension, which infringes on the sovereignty of every state; we have decreed and do decree as follows:

"I. Every ship, to whatever nation it may belong, that shall have submitted to be searched by an English ship, or to a voyage to England, or shall have paid any tax whatsoever to the English government, is thereby, and for that alone, declared to be *denationalised*; to have forfeited the protection of its king; and to have become English property.

"II. Whether the ships thus *denationalised* by the arbitrary measures of the English government, enter into our ports, or those of our allies, or whether they fall into the hands of our ships of war, or of our privateers, they are declared to be good and lawful prize.

"III. The British islands are declared to be in a state of blockade, both by land and sea. Every ship of whatever nation, or whatsoever the nature of its cargo may be, that sails from the ports of England, or those of the English colonies, and of the countries occupied by English troops, and proceeding to England or to the English colonies, or to countries occupied by English troops, is good and lawful prize, as contrary to the present decree; and may be captured by our ships of war, or our privateers, and adjudged to the captor.

"IV. These measures, which are resorted to only in just retaliation of the barbarous system adopted by England, which assimilates its legislation to that of Algiers, shall cease to have any effect with respect to all nations who shall have the firmness to compel the English government to respect their flag. They shall continue to be rigorously in force as long as that government does not return to the principle of the law of nations which regulates the relations of civilized states in a state of war. The provisions of the present decree shall be abrogated and null in fact, as soon as the English abide again by the principles of the law of nations, which are also the principles of justice and honour.

"All our ministers are charged with the execution of the present decree, which shall be inserted in the bulletin of the laws.

NAPOLEON."

On the 25th of November, 1807, an additional order in council was issued, and on the 25th of March 1808, an act of parliament passed, of both whereof the object was to permit a trade between neutral nations (the only neutral nations then were the United States and Sweden) and France and her dependencies, *on the condition that the vessels engaged in it should enter some British port, PAY A TRANSIT DUTY, and take out a li-*

cence! And the British government affected to regard this arrangement as a favour conferred on neutrals!!! This was fairly capping the climax.

It may not be unsatisfactory to the reader, to state the duties thus laid on the exports of the United States by a foreign nation. Well might Mr. Baring declare—

“It is immaterial whether it be a tax on stamps, or on cotton. This question has been the subject of a long and bloody war.”

Goods allowed to be bonded.

Barilla	-	-	10s per cwt. or	-	-	\$ 2 22
Bark (Peruvian)	-	-	6s —	-	-	1 35
Cochineal	-	-	7s —	-	-	1 57
Cocoa nuts	-	-	20s —	-	-	4 44
Coffee	-	-	28s —	-	-	6 28
Ginger	-	-	7s —	-	-	1 57
Gum Arabic, and Senegal	-	-	10s —	-	-	2 22
Hemp	-	-	15s —	-	-	3 33
Hides (raw)	-	-	3s per hide	-	-	67
Jalap	-	-	6d per lb.	-	-	11
Indigo	-	-	2s —	-	-	45
Iron (in bars)	-	-	60s — per cwt.	-	-	13 32
Pimento	-	-	2d per lb.	-	-	4
Pitch	-	-	4s 4d per 31 1-2 gal.	-	-	96
Quicksilver	-	-	1s per lb.	-	-	22
Rhubarb	-	-	2s —	-	-	45
Rice	-	-	2s per cwt.	-	-	45
Rum and Spirits single	-	-	8d per gal.	-	-	15
Do. over proof	-	-	1s 4d —	-	-	30
Sugar (brown or Muscovado)	-	-	10s per cwt.	-	-	2 22
Do. (white or clayed)	-	-	14s per cwt.	-	-	3 11
Tallow	-	-	7s —	-	-	1 57
Tar	-	-	4s 4d per 31 1-2 gal.	-	-	96
Tobacco	-	-	1d 1-2 per lb.	-	-	3
Turpentine (common)	-	-	3s 6d per cwt.	-	-	78
Wine	-	-	120s per 252 gals.	-	-	26 64
Wood (mahogany)	-	-	20s per ton	-	-	4 44
Cotton	-	-	9d per lb.	-	-	17
Timber	-	-	27s per 50 c. feet	-	-	5 98
Masts, &c. 6 inches under 8	-	-	5s per piece	-	-	1 11
— 8—12	-	-	10s —	-	-	2 22
12 and upwards	-	-	27s —	-	-	5 98

Goods not allowed to be bonded, and upon which the home consumption duties must be paid on importation.

Anchors 40 per cent on the value

Annatto	-	-	48s 4d per cwt.	-	-	\$ 10 65
Argol	-	-	5s —	-	-	1 11
Ashes	-	-	10s —	-	-	2 22
Oak bark	-	-	2s 6d —	-	-	55
Bread	-	-	4s —	-	-	90
Butter	-	-	20s —	-	-	4 44
Cable and Cordage	-	-	18s —	-	-	4 00
Wheat	-	-	10s per qr.	-	-	2 22
Wheat meal and Flour	-	-	5s per cwt.	-	-	1 11
Stock-fish	-	-	2s 6d per 120	-	-	56
Other Fish	-	-	4s per cwt.	-	-	90
Seed Oil	-	-	210s per 252 gals.	-	-	46 62
Pork	-	-	17s 6d per cwt.	-	-	3 92
Flax-seed	-	-	1s 6d per 56 lb.	-	-	33

Prize goods prohibited. Goods not enumerated, but which may be used in Great Britain; on the *present duties*, 40 per cent.

A letter from *Rathbone, Hughes and Duncan*, of Liverpool, dated in the beginning of April, 1808, has this paragraph:

"These duties to attach to the cargoes of *all vessels bound from the United States so those parts on the continent, which are under the influence of France, and arrive in this country, in compliance with the orders in council of the eleventh of November.*"

A Synopsis of part of the effects of these duties.

"A cargo of cotton, of 100 bales, of 300 lbs. each, which is about the common weight, paying 9d sterling per lb. in England, would amount to the precise sum of 50,000 dollars. The same cargo of cotton at 14 1-2 cents,* the average price for fine Louisiana cotton, would not cost at New Orleans more than 43,500 dollars. Thus the exporter would have to pay 6,500 dollars in London, as a duty for liberty to proceed to the continent, more than the original cost—to this might be added the various other charges of tonnage, &c. amounting to about 2000 dollars more.

"A cargo of tobacco may be said to consist of 400 hogsheads—for the sake of round numbers, we will suppose each hogshead to weigh only 1000 lbs. and the account stands thus—400,000 lbs. Tobacco, at 1d 1-2 sterling
per pound is 2,500*l.* sterling, or

\$11,100 00

Tonnage, at 12*s* per ton on 400 tons, is 240*l.* sterling, or

1,065 00

"Light money and various other charges and attendant expenses,
would amount to

800 00

"Amount of tribute on a cargo

12,965 00

"Of the 80,000 hogsheads we generally exported, but about 12,000 were consumed in the British islands. The rest went to the continent. Put them, as before, at 1000 lbs. each, and what is the amount of tribute on this single article? 68,000 hogsheads tobacco, weighing each 1000 lbs. is 68,000,000

lbs. at 1d 1-2d sterling per pound, is 425,000*l.* or

\$1,998,000 00

170 ships' tonnage, &c. at 2000 dollars each

340,000 00

"Amount of annual tribute on tobacco

2,338,000 00

"A ship would carry about from 3000 to 3500 barrels of flour; say for the sake of calculation, 6000 cwt.

"6,000 cwt. at 5*s* sterling per cwt. amounts to 1,500*l.*, or

\$6,660 00

"Tonnage and charges, as above

1,865 00

"Amount of tribute on one cargo of flour

8,225 00

"A ship load of fish would cost about 3,500 or 4,000 dollars, including the duties and charges."†

CHAPTER XXIII.

The orders in Council, of November 11, 1807, defended by Americans. Founded on the untenable plea of American acquiescence in the Berlin Decree. Enquiry into the causes and consequences, by A. Baring, Esq. M. P.

PERNICIOUS as were the orders in council to the most vital interests of the United States—degrading as was the condition of paying a transit duty in English ports—and unjust and unfounded as was the allegation on which these orders were predicated,

* This was written previous to the late war, and states the prices in 1807.

† For all these statements and calculations I am indebted to Niles's Weekly Register, vol. 3, page 79.

there were defenders of them in this country—Americans born. Among the number were men in high and elevated stations, possessing a great degree of public confidence and political influence. It is a most singular fact, that the cause of England has been far more ably supported in our congressional debates, and in our political speculations and essays, than in London itself. No man of character or standing in society in that city, or in the British parliament, has attempted to deny the magnitude of our wrongs. The ministry and their friends have palliated their proceedings by the miserable plea of necessity—and of retaliation—a plea that Barbarossa, or Koulikan, or Bonaparte, could with equal justice advance. But such respectable men as the Roscoes, the Whitbreads, the Barings, have bestowed on the outrageous measures of their government, the most unqualified reprobation. I have it not in my power at present to refer to the debates in parliament. But I perfectly well recollect, and such of my readers as have access to them will see at once, that the rectitude of the conduct of our government, and its mild endeavours to procure redress, have received the most unequivocal encomiums from some of the most illustrious characters in Great Britain.

The respectability of Mr. Alexander Baring is a matter of public notoriety throughout the commercial world. There is no man in England more attached to the honour and interests of his country. His testimony has been, as I have said, uniformly borne in our favour, and against the enormous injustice of the orders in council—and as it cannot fail to have a weight proportioned to his talents, integrity, and character, I shall very freely quote from such an unexceptionable source.

The orders in council of Nov. 11, 1807, were, as we have seen, predicated upon the pretence of our acquiescence in the Berlin decree. Mr. Baring having stated the fact,* that this decree had not been put into operation against our commerce, and that therefore, we had no right to remonstrate against it, proceeds,

“Unless, therefore, his majesty’s ministers have some information of which the public are not possessed, and which contradicts the very clear evidence the public do possess, we must conclude that the assertion in the orders in council that America had been guilty of that acquiescence in the decrees of France, which was to draw down, and has drawn down upon her, our menaced retaliation, *is totally void of foundation.*”†

The fallacy of the allegation of an acquiescence in the Berlin decree having been proved, Mr. Baring thus accounts for the Milan decree, which was the offspring of the orders in council of November 11, 1807.

“If what has been stated, be correct, that our orders in council are not justified, by any previous provocation, *they must be evidently acts of original aggression*; and France retaliated much in the same manner and with the same

* See page 117.

† Baring’s Enquiry, page 70.

right as we ourselves should have done, had the Berlin decree been rigidly executed.”*

The following masterly analysis of the orders in council is taken from Mr. Baring’s “Enquiry.”

“*All trade directly from America to every port and country at war with Great Britain, or from which the British flag is excluded, is totally prohibited. In this general prohibition, every port of Europe, with the exception at present of Sweden, is included: and no distinction whatever is made between the domestic produce of America, and that of the colonies, re-exported from thence!!!*”

“The trade from America to the colonies of all nations, remains unaltered by the present order. *America may export the produce of her own country, but that of no other, to Sweden.*”

“With the above exception, all articles, whether of domestic or colonial produce exported by America to Europe, *must be landed in this country [England]* from whence it is intended to permit their exportation, under such regulations as shall be hereafter determined.

“By these regulations it is understood that *duties are to be imposed on all articles so re-exported.* But it is intimated that an exception will be made in favour of such as are the produce of the United States, cotton excepted.

“Any vessel, the cargo whereof shall be accompanied with certificates of French consuls abroad, of its origin, shall, together with its cargo, be liable to seizure and condemnation.”†

It is proper here to make a solemn pause. The subject deserves the deepest, the most serious reflection. Let us examine this sketch, drawn by a masterly hand, beyond the reach of suspicion. Let us consider the despotic, the lawless claims it asserts—the prostrate, the base, the despicable state in which it places the commerce and the rights of a sovereign, an independent, an unoffending nation—a nation whose trade was of incalculable importance to the power thus daring to legislate for her, and destroy her dearest rights of sovereignty. When all this is fairly and duly weighed, let us correctly appreciate the conduct of so many Americans, who have asserted with a zeal worthy of a good cause, that England “has really done our commerce no essential injury!”‡ The annals of the world can produce nothing more indefensible—nothing more astonishing.

The end proposed by the British government in this stupendous project of usurpation, is thus ably sketched.

“*The Americans are to bring to this country all the produce of their own, and all that of our enemies’ colonies, which they export to Europe.* We are here to form a grand emporium of the costly produce of Asia and America, which is to be dispensed to the different countries of Europe, under such regulations as we may think proper, I suppose, according to their good behaviour. *Taxes are to be raised from the consumers on the continent; and they are to be contrived with such judicious skill as to secure our own West India planters a preference over those of Cuba and Martinique.*”§

“The American merchant, with the best intentions of trading legally, cannot always know what this country permits; for we admit that upholding a general principle which we never enforce, we may and do vary our permissions to neutrals under it as we please. Supposing him in this respect not liable to error, he is exposed to unjust decisions in our vice admiralty courts—a danger of

* Baring’s Enquiry, page 70.
to governor Sullivan, page 12.

† Idem, page 12. ‡ Mr. Pickering’s letter
§ Baring’s Enquiry, page 16.

no common magnitude, if we are to believe the assertion of lord Hawkesbury in the house of commons, the 29th of April, 1801, that of 318 *appeals from these courts, only 35 of the condemnations were confirmed.*"*

What a hideous picture of the rapacity and piratical proceedings of the British privateers is here exhibited! It is not unfair to suppose, that of the number of vessels captured and brought in for adjudication, one-fourth were cleared in the West Indies. Admitting this calculation, the whole number of captures embraced in the statement of lord Hawkesbury, was probably 420, of which about 100 were cleared in the West Indies—283 unjustly condemned there, and afterwards cleared in Great Britain—and only 35 really and bona fide lawful prize—so that it appears, that of every twelve vessels brought in for trial, eleven were unjustly captured!

"If we had maintained and defended this doctrine boldly and fairly against all nations, good arguments in favour of it could not be wanting. But when we have uniformly yielded it, and indeed forbore to claim it, *can it be consistent either with magnanimity or good policy, to bring it forward now, BECAUSE THE ONLY REMAINING NEUTRAL HAS A DEFENCELESS COMMERCE? If such cowardly injustice is to be one of our resources in these trying times, when elevation of sentiment and of national character are more than ever wanted, the means and strength of this powerful empire are indeed strangely misunderstood.*"†

This is the language of a dignified character—language worthy of Athens or Rome when their glory was at its zenith. Happy would it have been for Great Britain—it would have placed her character on a towering eminence, had her statesmen, instead of the course of lawless depredation they pursued, been actuated by such elevated sentiments.

"This decision [in the case of the *Essex, Orme,*] although the distinction was not made to catch the common eye, was well known to embrace the whole foreign trade of America, excepting that in her own produce. It circulated rapidly among our cruizers and privateers; and in the course of a fortnight the seas were cleared of every American ship they could find, which now crowded our ports for trial; and our West India merchants were gratified by neutral insurance and freights being at least doubled by this ingenious discovery."‡

"This decision laid the foundation of all the complaints of America of our vexatious measures against her trade, as it introduced a totally new line of conduct towards it; and that change produced the non-importation act, at which we affect so much indignation."‡

"Nor was the injury to the Americans confined to the application of these new and vexatious principles; for our privateers, apprehending little danger of being made answerable for their error, were not disposed to make nice distinctions; but detained and sent in every vessel they met with, under the most frivolous pretences; in which they were also encouraged by the expectation of actual war. Of the extent to which this was carried, some idea may be formed, when it is stated, that cargoes, wholly of American produce, and of the produce of neutral countries trading with America, were captured, and even brought to trial."§

"The owners of privateers are in the daily practice of bringing in valuable cargoes, and offering immediately to release them for one or two hundred guineas. They sometimes require a much larger sum. The London merchant is either

* Baring's Enquiry, page 43.

† Idem, page 47.

‡ Idem, page 50.

§ Idem, page 51.

§ Idem, pages 57 and 58.

“*Alas! to regret or to THIS INQUITOUS ROBBERY, or let his correspondents suffer the more expensive vexations which it is unfortunately in the power of these people to inflict.*”*

The measures resorted to by America, under these circumstances of provocation, were certainly of the *mildest species of hostility, and such as evidently showed a thirst of peace*. A law was passed prohibiting the importation of certain articles of British manufacture; by which a demonstration of commercial warfare was certainly intended. But it is such as every independent nation, even in time of peace, has a right to resort to without giving offence; and if the commerce of America were to be materially interrupted, a reduction of her importation of European articles became indispensable. This law, after different suspensions, is not yet repealed. Of its wisdom, as a commercial measure, there may be doubts; but *as an avowance of our trade, for the purpose of effecting a compact for them, we have no right to complain of it.*†

“If we had treated the commerce of America with sincerity, instead of molesting it, as we have seen, **BY A REPETITION OF THE MOST DISGRACEFUL OFFENCE**, that commerce would have suffered less, and our own ends would have been answered. Such an appeal to the good sense of that country, would certainly have been less likely to produce war than the sophistry with which they have been treated, and of which every man in it must detest the folly.”‡

“*If we were to assume an injury to a country, WHOSE RIGHT OF INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGNTY WAS VIOLATED, AND WHOSE COMMERCE WAS DESTROYED BY THIS PROCEEDING*, it would have been in vain to search for authorities or precedents any where.”§

We have seen that French consular certificates of the origin of the cargo of a vessel, by the orders in council, subjected both vessel and cargo to condemnation. On the iniquity of this feature of the orders, Mr. Baring remarks:—

“We in many cases require foreign articles, imported into this country, to be accompanied by certificates from our consuls abroad. Nothing can, therefore, be more frivolous than the assertion of our right to complain of the acquiescence of American merchants in the regulations of France respecting certificates of origin.”¶

I hope the reader will attend to the consequences of this feature of the orders in council. Let it never be forgotten. It is worthy of being borne in eternal remembrance. If they had no other odious feature, this would be sufficient to disgrace them, and their authors and abettors. Suppose Mr. George Cabot, Mr. James Lloyd, jun. Timothy Pickering, Commodore Dale, or any other citizen of the United States, to send a vessel to sea, owned by himself, manned with American sailors, and loaded with American productions—bound for the solitary corner of Europe, Sweden, which was not interdicted by the orders in council—suppose her provided with a French consular certificate of the origin of the cargo: and finally, to close our suppositions, suppose her carried into London by a British privateer, and brought before Sir William Scott for adjudication. She would most assuredly be condemned for an INFRINGEMENT OF THE LAW OF NATIONS, *in being provided with a French consular certificate!!!* What an awful mockery of justice in

* Baring's Enquiry, page 53.

† Idem, page 64.

‡ Idem, page 59.

§ Idem, page 66.

¶ Idem, page 5.

those who prescribed—what a shameful prostration and baseness of mind in those who preached submission to—such a lawless regulation, calculated to “*prey upon the unprotected property of a friendly power.*”*

“The comprehensive nature of the injury which America must suffer from our system, by leaving no class of its population unaffected by it, affords little hope of the interference of any for the preservation of peace. The great interest which a country still possessing the means of independence, should feel in the preservation of ours, *will be lost in the more immediate and perceptible consequences of our folly and injustice.*”†

“The new orders were of a description to produce a revolution in the whole commerce of the world; and a total derangement of those mutual rights and relations by which civilized nations have hitherto been connected.”‡

“It must be evident from the whole tenor of our proceedings, that commercial interest has been our moving principle throughout; that *every demonstration of the slightest hostility on the other side, has originated in our attempts to advance that interest in violating the rights and interests of others; and that if we are at last called upon to take up arms, it is on our part a quarrel about sugar and coffee, and not in support of national honour.*”§

“The consequences of such a state of things must produce ruin to every class and description of persons in America: and they are so obvious, so inevitable, that one cannot avoid thinking, that they must have occurred to the framers of this new system.”¶

“To make this limitation of neutral trade a part of the law of nations, it is not sufficient that it should be asserted by one power. It must likewise be admitted by others; which is so far from having been the case, that in all our discussions about neutral rights, we have not only never obtained from any nation a recognition of this rule, but *it does not even appear to have been at any time seriously insisted upon.*”||

“What can then be the object of holding up this rule [of 1756] as the palladium of our maritime rights, or why has it lain so long dormant? instead of America being accused of a disposition to encroachment hostile to our dignity, in refusing to admit into the law of nations, a principle which *has neither been admitted by or enforced towards others*, are we not rather ourselves wanting to our own dignity in proclaiming a law which we have never ventured to defend; in setting up a right, which, by our own treaties with foreign nations, we have ourselves encouraged them to trample on?”**

“It would have been highly interesting to know how many instances [of fraudulent ownership] had been discovered; as by pointing them out to our government, redress might have been obtained by application to that of America, whose strict attention to the character of her flag has always been remarkable.”††

“I must say, and I speak from considerable experience, that the character of the great body of merchants in America, little deserves the unjust insinuations in which writers on this subject have indulged.”‡‡

“During a considerable part of the last and present war, we have indeed respected the rights of those not concerned in it. *But the conduct even of France can furnish few stronger proofs of a disregard of them, and of more frivolous pretences by which they have been invaded, than may be found in our conduct in 1805, and still more in the recent measures which we have been considering.*”§§

“If our commercial treaties with Portugal are to be held up, as they have been, to the admiration of statesmen, we cannot fail to admire the liberal policy of America towards the produce of our industry, when we consider the large balance which she annually pays us, and our illiberal jealousy of her intercourse with other countries, from which alone that balance can be paid.”¶¶

* See Boston Memorial, page 89. † Enquiry, page 78. ‡ Idem, page 10.
§ Idem, page 79. ¶ Idem, page 18. || Idem, page 22. ** Idem, page 23.
†† Idem, page 32. ‡‡ Idem, page 36. §§ Idem, page 71. ¶¶ Idem, page 88.

"If my former observations produce, as I think they must, a conviction that the trade and property so sported with, belong to an honest neutral, there can be no doubt that OUR CONDUCT TOWARDS IT DESERVES THE NAME OF THE MOST UNQUALIFIED INJUSTICE."

I solemnly invoke the reader to re-peruse these extracts, with all the attention which their importance requires. They are overwhelming and unanswerable. They stamp with the seal of condemnation the orders in council, their British framers, and American apologists. Never was testimony more cogent. And never did power more completely forget and trample upon right and justice, than in this instance did the British ministry.

The reader who compares the style and substance of the memorials, with Mr. Baring's essay, will find that coincidence, that cogency, that irresistible conviction which result from truth and honourable principles. The American merchants, eloquently and convincingly pleading for the rights of their country, and their own personal interests, unjustly assailed—speak nearly the same language, and make use of the same arguments, as Mr. Baring, when he sought to save his country from the disgrace and dishonour of employing her transcendent naval power to overwhelm and prey upon the commerce of an unoffending neutral, merely because that neutral was not in a state to defend herself.

I trust that no apology can be necessary for these copious extracts on this all-important topic. The high standing and character of the writer, as I have already observed, and take the liberty to repeat, entitle his sentiments to peculiar attention. Moreover, as an English merchant, interest, were he swayed by such a consideration, would have led him to advocate the orders in council. But he had too high a regard for the honour of his country, to wish it to be sacrificed to paltry and sordid considerations of interest.

After the reader has with the deep attention the subject deserves, perused the above eloquent defence of American rights—exposure of our wrongs—and appeal to the honour and justice of Great Britain, written by a high-spirited and noble-minded Englishman, let him ponder for a moment on the conduct of those Americans who have devoted their talents, their industry, and their influence, to defend the outrageous proceedings of Great Britain, and to place their own country uniformly in the wrong.

What a humiliating contrast !—Mr. Baring pleading the cause of the injured United States in London—and Mr. Pickering and hundreds of other Americans pleading in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and elsewhere, against their own country, and in defence of British inroads and British violence !

The contemplation fills the mind with astonishment ! Notwithstanding the evidence is so fully before us, as to be irresistible,

it is not easy to believe that such an awful delusion could have ever existed, and to such an extravagant extent.

It would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to find in history any parallel case. Enlightened American merchants, alas! so far blinded by party and faction, as to use their utmost endeavours to prevent the government of their country from procuring redress of intolerable grievances which bore so heavily on themselves!

CHAPTER XXIV.

Embargo. Situation of American Commerce. Factious clamour. Embargo a wise, prudent, and necessary measure.

I now proceed to consider the subject of the embargo, which was one of the most potent instruments employed to exasperate and inflame the passions of the people of the eastern states, and which actually prepared a portion of them for open resistance to the government.

The justice and propriety of every measure depend on the circumstances that accompany and induce it—the motives that lead to its adoption—and the consequences it is calculated to produce. Let us apply these tests to the embargo.

The reader has had the decrees and orders in council laid before him in *extenso*. He has seen the exposition of the injustice of the latter by Mr. Baring. And he has had an opportunity himself of calculating the effects of both decrees and orders.

From a calm consideration of these documents, and of their inevitable operation on our trade, it is perfectly obvious, that had our vessels sailed in December, 1807, and January, February, March, April, and May, 1808, as freely as they had formerly done, they would have universally fallen sacrifices; those bound for France and her dependencies, to British—and those bound for the British dominions, to French cruisers.

This would have produced an almost universal bankruptcy among our insurance offices and merchants. The plunder of our ships and cargoes, and the captivity of our seamen, would have augmented the resources of the belligerents, and enfeebled ourselves. The only real question was, whether our vessels should remain at our wharves, the property of our merchants, or be carried to France and England, the prey of privateers. But for the embargo, there would have been such a calamitous scene produced as has rarely occurred in any nation. We should have suffered all the worst consequences of war, without any of its compensatory advantages. Our merchants would have once more made the “welkin ring” with their complaints of injury—their eloquent appeals to the law of nations—their clamours for redress—their reproaches of the government for its supineness—and

their solemn* pledges of support. We should have again had to negotiate in vain for reparation. And we should have been ultimately goaded into war, after having been defeated in our endeavours to escape it, and deprived of the most efficient means for its prosecution.

It has been said that the Berlin decree not having been carried into operation against American vessels; and our government not having received an authentic copy of the orders in council; therefore it was not justified in the recommendation of the embargo. And thus that degree of vigilance and care of the interests of his country and of the property of the merchants, which entitled Mr. Jefferson to a monument from the mercantile interest, has been made the ground-work of the most serious accusation!

There is no measure of the general government from its first organization to the present hour, more strongly marked with wisdom, with foresight, and with attention to duty, than this recommendation. There is, nevertheless, no measure that has generated more factious or senseless clamour—more envenomed prejudice—more unblushing misrepresentation.

The atrocious case of the *Horizon*, which was the first instance wherein the Berlin decree was carried into effect against American vessels, had previously occurred. Of this case Mr. Armstrong had transmitted an account in a letter dated Nov. 12, 1807, of which I have submitted a copy to the reader.† This letter and the documents accompanying it, established, beyond a possibility of doubt, the extreme danger of our commerce from French depredation, and French courts of admiralty.

Of the determination of the British government to meet the Berlin decree with measures of equal violence, undoubted information had been received by our administration in private letters, and even in the public papers. The recommendation of the embargo took place on the 18th of December, 1807: and *on the morning of that day, previous to the delivery of the president's message, there had been published in the National Intelligencer the following paragraph from a London paper.*

London, November 10.

“A proclamation is now, we understand, in readiness for his majesty's signature, declaring France and the whole of her vassal kingdoms in a state of siege, and *prohibiting all intercourse with her or them—and all entrance of vessels into her or their harbours, EXCEPT OF SUCH AS HAVE CLEARED LAST FROM A BRITISH PORT, EITHER HOME OR FOREIGN.*”

Various private letters to the same effect, had been received by different citizens. Thus, between the two nations, our commerce was completely cut up by the roots. The only part of

* I had written “hollow and deceptions.” But I struck the words out—how properly the reader will decide. I am doubtful myself of the correctness of the alteration.

† See page 117.

Europe, except her own dominions and dependencies, with which Great Britain allowed us to trade, was Sweden. And the Milan decree, by an extravagance of despotism, folly, and wickedness, never exceeded in the annals of piracy and rapine, regarded every neutral vessel, that had been searched by a British cruiser, as ipso facto *denationalised*, and liable to capture, bound whence or where she might. The mind is lost in astonishment at this *ne plus ultra* of wickedness, madness, and rapine. It was punishing as criminal, an act perfectly innocent—wholly unavoidable—and in which the party punished had been merely passive!

Under these circumstances, what prudent merchant would send a vessel to sea—liable to capture whatever might be her destination? For even if bound to Sweden, or any other corner of Europe, (if any such there were) not embraced in the scope of decrees and orders in council, she might be searched by an English privateer, and thus be subject to capture by the next French one that should overhaul her.

What course had a government to steer, which, bound to watch over the interests of its constituents, was sincerely disposed to perform that duty faithfully? Let any man not trammelled by faction or inveterate prejudice, calmly consider this question, and I feel most perfectly satisfied, he will reply—the alternative was, war against both nations—or a general embargo.

Notwithstanding this plain state of the case—notwithstanding the imperious necessity of the measure—there was, as I have stated, no act of the federal government, since its first organization, that excited so much outcry or clamour. It was the subject of incessant abuse in all the federal papers from New-Hampshire to Georgia, and from the Mississippi to the Atlantic. It has been ten thousand times reiterated, that it was unnecessarily oppressive—that it was wicked and tyrannical—dictated by Napoleon—a sacrifice of the dearest interests of the nation—and, to cap the climax, *unconstitutional*.

In times of faction, the public possesses a wonderful faculty of swallowing the most monstrous and improbable falsehoods. It was almost universally believed to the eastward, that the embargo was *the result of a combination between the Southern and Western States, to ruin the Eastern!!!* I have repeatedly heard this asserted by men otherwise of sound minds and cultivated understandings, and whose veracity convinced me that they did not attempt deception, but were themselves deceived. This extravagant idea proceeds upon the miserable and fatuitous supposition, that the merchant, whose vessels remain unemployed at the wharves, will in consequence be ruined; but that the agriculturist, whose wheat, flour, rice, cotton, naval stores, &c. stagnate on his hands, will thereby suffer no injury, or rather derive advantage, although they fall in value 30, 40, 50, or 60 per cent. 'Tis passing strange!

Never was there a more factious or unfounded clamour excited. Never, I repeat, was a public measure more loudly called for by existing circumstances, never one better timed, and never one that would have produced more salutary consequences, had not faction deprived it of its efficacy.

With the knowledge Mr. Jefferson possessed, of the mighty dangers impending over our commerce, he would have justly merited impeachment for a dereliction of his duty, had he not recommended an embargo for its protection.

Mr. Pickering was the earliest, most ardent, and most zealous opponent of the embargo. After having in vain exerted himself in the senate to prevent its passing, he laboured, and unfortunately with too much success, to excite a strenuous and seditious opposition to it in his own state, and in the other Eastern States. He wrote a long, elaborate, and impassioned letter against it to the governor of Massachusetts, in which he endeavoured to prove the measure wholly unnecessary—dictated by France—and adopted purely through hostility to England, who, he unqualifiedly asserted, “had done our commerce no essential injury.”

To form a correct idea of the embargo, it must be considered in two points of view, wholly distinct—one, its original enactment—the other, its long duration. The latter may have been, and I believe was, an error. But I should not hesitate at this moment, to submit the decision of the question to governor Strong, Rufus King, George Cabot, or James Lloyd, jun. whether an embargo was not an indispensable measure, at a period when all Europe, except Sweden, was declared in a state of blockade?

The embargo was laid on the 23d of December, 1807. Mr. Pickering's letter was dated Feb. 16, 1808, when it had not been two months in operation: of course its denunciations must have been levelled against the enactment of the law—and had no reference whatever to its duration.

To enable the reader to form a correct estimate of the soundness of Mr. Pickering's denunciation of this measure, let it be observed, that at the date of his letter, *full and authentic information had arrived in this country, of the enforcement of the Berlin decree, of the enactment of the orders in council, and of the Milan decree.*

I deem it therefore highly proper to place Mr. Pickering's declarations in contrast with each other—and likewise with the real state of affairs. The reader will then be enabled to decide the question correctly himself.

Let me explain the four succeeding columns. The first contains a sketch of the British depredations on American commerce, as stated in the mercantile memorials of 1805-6—the second Mr. Baring's view of the effects of the orders in council—the third, the resolution of the Senate, Feb. 10, 1806, *on which*

Mr. Pickering voted in the affirmative—and the fourth, Mr. Pickering's vindication of England, Feb. 16, 1808.

The three first paragraphs of the first column are from the Boston Memorial, signed by James Lloyd, George Cabot, &c. These gentlemen are responsible for the truth or falsehood of the allegations, in which the British government is almost in terms charged with *absolute piracy*: for, according to these gentlemen, it was "*preying upon the unprotected property of a friendly power,*" which is but a mild form of expression for piracy.

1805—6. MEMORIALS.	1808. MR. BARING.	Mr. Pickering, Feb. 10, 1806.	Mr. Pickering, Feb. 16, 1808.
"WE confine ourselves to the more alarming, because more extensive detentions and condemnations of American vessels by Great Britain."*	"All trade directly from America to every port and country at war with Great Britain, or from which the British flag is excluded, is totally prohibited. In this general prohibition, every part of Europe with the exception of Sweden, is included: and no distinction whatever is made between the domestic produce of America, and that of the colonies, re-exported from thence."*	"The capture and condemnation under orders of the British government, thousand and adjudications of war, courts of admiralty, of American vessels and their cargoes, on the pretext of their being employed in a trade with the enemies of Great Britain, prohibited in time of peace, is an unprovoked aggression upon the property of the citizens of the United States—a violation of their neutral rights—and an encroachment upon their national independence."*	"These facts demonstrate, that although England with her ships of war, have destroyed our commerce, SHE HAS REALY DONE IT NO ESSENTIAL INJURY."*
"New vessels, on their first passage from the United States to Europe, are arrested, carried out of their course, and injuriously detained under the vexatious pretence of a continuity of voyage from the country or colony of a bel- ligerent."*	"It would probably be no exaggeration to say that upwards of three fourths of all the merchants, seamen, &c. engaged in commerce or navigation in America, have, at some time or other, suffered from acts of our cruizers, which to them have appeared unjust, and which frequently must have been so. They read, it is true, of the power of France.—BUT THEY FEEL EVERY DAY THAT OF BRITAIN."†	of their being employed in a trade with the enemies of Great Britain, prohibited in time of peace, is an unprovoked aggression upon the property of the citizens of the United States—a violation of their neutral rights—and an encroachment upon their national independence."*	* Letter from the hon. Timothy Pickering, senator from the state of Mass. to his excellency the James Sullivan, governor of the said state, dated February 16, 1808, page 11.
"It cannot become the magnanimity of a great and powerful nation, to prey upon the unprotected property of a friendly power."*	"America, have, at some time or other, suffered from acts of our cruizers, which to them have appeared unjust, and which frequently must have been so. They read, it is true, of the power of France.—BUT THEY FEEL EVERY DAY THAT OF BRITAIN."†	of their being employed in a trade with the enemies of Great Britain, prohibited in time of peace, is an unprovoked aggression upon the property of the citizens of the United States—a violation of their neutral rights—and an encroachment upon their national independence."*	* Letter from the hon. Timothy Pickering, senator from the state of Mass. to his excellency the James Sullivan, governor of the said state, dated February 16, 1808, page 11.
"Having totally suppressed the external commerce of her enemies, Great Britain is now counselled to appropriate to herself that of her friends."†	"By attempting to confine the European trade of America to Great Britain, by the avowal of an intention to tax that trade on its passage to the continent, we are returning to those principles, to which, even as a colony, she would not submit. It is immaterial, whether	of their being employed in a trade with the enemies of Great Britain, prohibited in time of peace, is an unprovoked aggression upon the property of the citizens of the United States—a violation of their neutral rights—and an encroachment upon their national independence."*	* Resolutions agreed to by the senate of the U. States—Feb. 10, 1806. See page 106.
"This novel principle goes to nothing short of the destruction of neutral commerce."‡	"Every sail is stretched to collect the unwary Americans, who are unsuspectingly confiding in what was the law of nations."‡	of their being employed in a trade with the enemies of Great Britain, prohibited in time of peace, is an unprovoked aggression upon the property of the citizens of the United States—a violation of their neutral rights—and an encroachment upon their national independence."*	* Resolutions agreed to by the senate of the U. States—Feb. 10, 1806. See page 106.
"Our vessels and effects, to a large amount, have lately been captured by her commissioned cruizers, upon the foundation	"Every sail is stretched to collect the unwary Americans, who are unsuspectingly confiding in what was the law of nations."‡	of their being employed in a trade with the enemies of Great Britain, prohibited in time of peace, is an unprovoked aggression upon the property of the citizens of the United States—a violation of their neutral rights—and an encroachment upon their national independence."*	* Resolutions agreed to by the senate of the U. States—Feb. 10, 1806. See page 106.

* Boston memorial.

† New York memorial.

‡ Philadelphia memorial.

* Baring's Examination, page 12.

† Idem, page 74.

* Resolutions agreed to by the senate of the U. States—Feb. 10, 1806. See page 106.

of new principles, suddenly invented."† *on cotton* This question

"The revival of herdis- has been already the sub-
carded rule was *character-* ject of a long and bloody
ized with such circumstan- war; and it can hardly be
es of iniquity and violence supposed that America
asrathertoheightenbythe will now submit to a di-
contrast the veneration of rect attack on her sover-
mark and for the past jus- eign and independent
tice of her tribunals."* rights."*

† Baltimore memorial.

* Baring's Examination,
page 76.

It is not for me, to reconcile Mr. Pickering's sentiments* to each other—nor to the tenor of the Memorials—nor to Mr. Baring's correct view of the orders in council. Let it be observed, let it never be forgotten, that the "*unprovoked aggression*" of 1806, remained unredressed at the date of the letter to governor Sullivan, February 1808. And, further, to this "*unprovoked aggression*" of 1806, the orders in council had been added in 1807, which more than quintupled the original outrage. But even independent of this extravagant addition, it is out of my power, by all the rules of logic at my command, to satisfy my mind how "*the capture and condemnation of our vessels*"—under false "*pretexes,*" and, as appears by the memorials of the merchants, to a most enormous amount—"the *unprovoked aggression upon the property of our citizens*"—"the *violation of our neutral rights*"—and "*the encroachment upon our national independence*" can be made to accord with the broad, the sweeping, the unqualified assertion that Great Britain has "*really done our commerce no essential injury.*"

To be serious. The subject requires seriousness and sobriety. Is not this a most astonishing and never-enough-to-be-lamented instance of the horrible delusion in which strong party passions involve those who submit to their guidance? Can light and darkness—vice and virtue—seraphs and demons—be more opposite to each other than these assertions? Would it not have been a most awful inconsistency had they both been cotemporaneous—or had the state of affairs, at the period of making the second, been exactly what it was at the period of making the first? But what an immense aggravation does this inconsistency receive from the consideration, that in Feb. 1808, the first griev-

* Some of the friends of Mr. Pickering, in order to destroy the effect of the inconsistency of these sentiments, have asserted, that he did not make the declaration that "England had done our commerce no essential injury." I dare Mr. Pickering thus publicly and explicitly in the face of this nation to deny it himself. I pledge myself to prove it incontrovertibly. But he never will dare a denial. His letter, from which the extract has been made, containing this highly erroneous declaration, is in the Boston Centinel, edited by Benjamin Russell, for March 12, 1808, and in the Gazette of the United States, edited by Enos Bronson, for the 14th of said month and year.

ances had been unredressed, and others, as I have stated, incomparably more intolerable, been added? The orders in council were, in outrage, injustice, and infraction of our rights of sovereignty, as far beyond the enforcement of the rule of 1756, which was the ground of complaint in 1806, as wanton murder is beyond mere assault and battery.

Never was I more deceived in my life, than I am at this moment, if every candid, unbiassed reader do not agree with me, that the opposition to the operation of the embargo, was factious, disorganizing, absurd, and impolitic in the extreme; and that those who rendered the law nugatory and unavailing have a high crime to answer for to their injured country.

To avoid the pressure of the embargo, and to hold out inducements to our citizens to violate it, and to despatch their vessels clandestinely, the following most extraordinary order in council was published by the British government.

GEORGE R.

Instructions to the commanders of our ships of war and privateers. Given at our court at Windsor, the 11th day of April, 1808, in the 48th year of our reign.

Our will and pleasure is, that you do not interrupt any neutral vessel laden with lumber and provisions, and going to any of our colonies, islands, or settlements in the West Indies, or South America, *to whomsoever the property may appear to belong, and notwithstanding such vessel may not have regular clearances and documents on board!!!* And in case any vessel shall be met with, and being on her due course to the alleged port of destination, an endorsement shall be made on one or more of the principal papers of such vessel, specifying the destination alleged, and the place where the vessel was so visited. And in case any vessel so laden shall arrive and deliver her cargo at any of our colonies, islands, or settlements aforesaid, such vessel shall be permitted to receive her freight, and to depart, either in ballast, or with any goods that may be legally exported in such vessel, and to proceed to any unblockaded port; notwithstanding the present hostilities, or any future hostilities which may take place. *And a passport for such vessels may be granted by the governor, or other person, having the chief civil command of such colony, island, or settlement!*

G. R.

This astonishing document demands the most particular and pointed attention.—The ministers who prostituted the name of their sovereign by subscribing it to such an instrument, merit, and must receive the reprobation of every highminded Englishman, who feels for the honour or dignity of his native country. The world has never seen such another instrument. And I hope there never will be a second instance of the kind. This order alone was adequate cause of war. This at least is certain, that many wars have been declared upon infinitely less provocation. What! one of the most potent monarchs in the world, rather than do justice to an unoffending nation, on which for fourteen years, his ministers had perpetrated the most flagrant outrages, invites, and tempts, and affords facilities to its citizens, to violate the laws of their country, and openly pursue the infamous trade of smuggling!

The subject affords an ample field for, and invites to, copious comments. But I forbear. I leave it to the calm consideration of the candid reader, whether Englishman or American.

CHAPTER XXV.

Enquiry into the Constitutionality of the Act for enforcing the Embargo. Compared with acts passed during the presidency of gen. Washington and John Adams.

THE original embargo act had been openly and flagrantly violated. The public prints in Boston had audaciously and seditiously invited the citizens to set it at defiance. The British government had also, as we have seen, added the allurements of its powerful invitation. Such an invitation was unnecessary. There are always to be found in every community, men who will seek the shortest road to fortune, whether through the dark paths of smuggling, or otherwise. These men united their obstreperous brawlings, with the clamour raised by those whose grand object was to harass the government, for the chance of regaining the power they had lost. Thus the odium deserved by the crime of smuggling, was transferred to an act calculated to preserve the property of the merchants from belligerent depredation: an act, be it never forgotten, which was the mildest mode of procuring that redress for which the mercantile part of the community had so loudly clamoured—and in the pursuit of which, they had so solemnly pledged themselves to support the government !!!

To prevent these evasions, an act was passed to enforce the embargo. This was necessarily more strict and severe in its provisions than the original act. Meetings were held in various parts of the United States, denouncing the latter as oppressive and unconstitutional. A very numerous and respectable one was held in the city of Philadelphia, attended by a large proportion of the merchants, and a great number of other citizens. Of this meeting Commodore Truxton was chairman. Sundry resolutions were passed, which embraced the essence of all the objections raised against it throughout the union. I shall assume these resolutions as a text to reason upon, and shall endeavour to refute the objections.

During the administration of General Washington, an embargo act had been passed by Congress. And during his administration, and that of Mr. Adams, various other acts had been passed, embracing prohibitory and penal clauses, of a tenor similar to those of the embargo law. No federalist will pretend that any of those acts were unconstitutional. Some of their clauses were far more exceptionable than those of Mr. Jefferson's embargo act. If, therefore, the latter contain no provision whatever, which is not substantially to be found in those passed dur-

ing the administration of the two first presidents, I presume that there is not a candid federalist in the union who will hesitate to admit, that the clamour against the former, as unconstitutional, was truly "factious, disorganizing, seditious, and jacobinical."

The 9th, 10th and 11th sections were the most rigorous, the most obnoxious; and, of course, were selected by the Philadelphia meeting, as proper subjects for denunciation. I shall therefore fairly collate them with the corresponding sections of the former embargo and other acts, passed during the reign of federalism, to enable the reader to form his opinion:

Proceedings of a meeting of the Citizens of Philadelphia, Commodore Truxton in the Chair.

"Resolved, That we consider the late act of Congress, commonly called "The enforcing law," to be a direct invasion of the established principles of civil liberty, and of the express provisions of the constitution; as arbitrary and severe to a degree unnecessary, even to accomplish the objects for which the law is professed to have been enacted; as creating an enormous and dangerous augmentation of executive influence and power; and as unnecessarily exposing the citizens to the miseries of civil discord and military execution.

"Resolved, That the 9th section of this act, which authorises a ministerial officer, without *process of law*, to seize goods at his discretion, under a pretence that *he believes* they are intended for exportation, or *apparently* on the way for the territories of a foreign power, is, in our opinion, a breach of the fourth article of the amendments to the constitution, which provides "that the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated:" and of the fifth article of the amendments, which declares, "that no man shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, but by due process of law."

'ENFORCING LAW.'

Signed by JEFFERSON.

1. 'That the collectors of all the districts of the United States, shall be, and they are hereby authorised, to take into their custody specie, or any articles of domestic growth, produce or manufacture, found on board of any ship or vessel, boat, or other water craft, when there is reason to believe that they are intended for exportation:

2. 'Or when in vessels, carts, wagons, sleighs, or any other carriage; or in any manner *apparently* on their way towards the territory of a foreign nation, or the vicinity thereof, or towards a place where such articles are intended to be exported:

3. 'And not to permit such articles to be removed, until bond with sufficient sureties shall have been given for the landing, or the

PRECEDENTS

Signed by WASHINGTON and ADAMS.

1. 'That every collector, naval officer, and surveyor, or other person especially appointed by either of them for that purpose, shall have full power and authority to enter any ship or vessel, in which they shall have reason to suspect any goods, wares or merchandise subject to duty, shall be concealed, and therein to search for, seize, and secure any such goods, wares, and merchandise,' &c.—See act of 31st July, 1789, section 24. Act of 4th August, 1790, section 48.

'That it shall be the duty of the several officers of the customs to make seizure of and secure any ship or vessel, goods, wares or merchandise which shall be liable to seizure by virtue of this act, *as well without, as within their respective districts*'—See section 26 and 50 of the same act.—See also, act of the 2d March, 1799, sect. 68, 70.

'That it shall be lawful for any officer of the revenue, to go on board of any ship or vessel, whether she shall be within or without his district; and the same to inspect, search, and examine; and if it shall appear, that any breach of the laws of the United States has been committed, &c. to make seizure of the same.'—See act of 18th February, 1793, section 27.

'That any of the aforesaid articles (arms and ammunition) excepting such of them as may con-

delivery of the same in some place of the United States, where, in the opinion of the collector, there shall not be any danger of such articles being exported.'—Laws United States, vol. IX. page 192, section 9, of the act to enforce the embargo.'

stitute a part of the equipment of any vessel, which, *during the continuance of this prohibition*, shall be found on board of any vessel in any river, port, bay, or harbour, within the territories of the United States, *with an intent to be exported* from the United States to any foreign country, shall be forfeited,' &c.—See act of 22d May, 1794, section 2.

'That all goods, wares, and merchandize brought into the United States *by land*, contrary to this act, shall be forfeited, together with *the carriages, horses, and oxen*, that shall be employed in carrying the same; provided that nothing herein shall be construed to extend to household furniture and clothing, belonging to any person or persons, actually coming into any part of the United States, for the purpose of becoming an inhabitant, or inhabitants thereof.'—See act of 4th of August, 1790, section 70.

'That it shall be lawful for the President of the United States, to give instructions to the commanders of the public armed ships of the United States, to stop and examine any ship or vessel of the United States on the high seas, which *there may be reason to suspect* to be engaged in any traffic, or commerce contrary to the true tenor hereof,' &c.—Act of 9th February, 1799, section 5.

Commodore Truxtun's Third Resolution.

"*Resolved*, That the tenth section is contrary to the spirit of the constitution, inasmuch as it invests in the president a legislative authority by giving to his instructions, in certain cases, the force of law."

'ENFORCING LAW.'

'The *powers given* to the collectors, either by this or any other act, respecting the embargo, to refuse permission to put any cargo on board any vessel, boat or other water craft; to detain any vessel, or to take into their custody any articles for the purpose of preventing violations of the embargo, *shall be exercised in conformity with such instructions, as the president may give, and such general rules as he may prescribe for that purpose*, MADE IN PURSUANCE OF THE POWERS AFORESAID; which instructions and general rules, the collectors shall be bound to obey.'—*Idem*, section 10.

PRECEDENTS,

Under Washington and Adams.

'That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is authorised and empowered, *whenever in his opinion the public safety shall so require*, TO LAY AN EMBARGO on all ships and vessels in the ports of the United States, or the ships and vessels of any foreign nations, *under such regulations as the circumstances of the case may require*; and to continue or revoke the same, whenever he shall think proper. AND THE PRESIDENT IS HEREBY FULLY AUTHORISED TO GIVE ALL SUCH ORDERS TO THE OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO CARRY THE SAME INTO FULL EFFECT.'—See act of 4th June, 1794, section 1.

'That an embargo be laid on all ships and vessels in the ports of the United States, whether already cleared out or not, bound to any foreign port or place, except ships or vessels under the immediate direction of the president of the United States. AND THAT THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES BE AUTHORISED TO GIVE SUCH INSTRUCTIONS TO THE REVENUE OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES, AS SHALL APPEAR BEST ADAPTED FOR CARRYING THE SAID RESOLUTION INTO FULL EFFECT.' Resolve of the twenty-sixth of March, 1792.

‘That the president of the United States be, and he is hereby authorised, *to direct the revenue officers, and the officers commanding forts and revenue cutters, to aid in the execution of the health laws of the states, respectively, in such manner as may appear to him necessary.*’ Act of the twenty-seventh of May, 1796.

‘That it shall be lawful for the president of the United States, if he shall deem it expedient and consistent with the interest of the United States, *by his order, to remit and discontinue, for the time being, the restraints and prohibitions aforesaid, either with respect to the French Republic, or to any island, &c. with which a commercial intercourse may be safely renewed; and also to revoke such orders, whenever, in his opinion, the interest of the United States shall so require.*’ Act of the ninth of February, 1799, section 4.

‘That it shall be lawful for the president of the United States at any time during the continuance of this act, *to order all such aliens, as he shall judge dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States, or shall have reasonable ground to suspect, as concerned in any treasonable or secret machinations against the government thereof, to depart out of the territories of the United States, within such times as shall be expressed in such order.*’ Act of the twenty-fifth of June, 1798, section 1.

‘And all marshals and other officers of the United States, are required to execute all precepts and orders of the president of the United States, issued in pursuance or by virtue of this act.’ Idem, section 4.

Commodore Truxtun's fourth resolution.

“Resolved, That the eleventh section of the act violates a political and civil right, more sacred than any constitution, in authorising the military to fire upon the people, without the sanction or interposition of the civil authority. The principle contained in this section, if much further extended, might with competent force, convert our government into an absolute despotism.”

‘ENFORCING LAW.’

‘It shall be lawful for the president of the United States, *or such other person as he shall have empowered for that purpose, to employ such part of the land or naval forces, or militia of the United States, or of the territories thereof, as may be judged necessary, in conformity with the provisions of this and other acts respecting the embargo, for the purpose of preventing the illegal departure of any ship or vessel, or of detaining, taking possession of, and keeping in custody and guarding any specie or article of domestic growth, produce, or*

PRECEDENTS,

Under Washington and Adams.

‘In every case arising under this act, it shall be lawful for the president of the United States, *or such other person as he shall have empowered for that purpose, to employ such part of the land or naval forces of the United States, or of the militia thereof, as shall be judged necessary, for the purpose of taking possession of and detaining any such ship, or vessel, with her prize, or prizes, if any, in order to the execution of the penalties of this act and to the restoring of such prize or prizes, in the cases in which restoration shall have been adjudged; and also for the purpose of preventing the carrying on of any such expedition or enterprise from the territories of the United States, against the territories, or dominions of a foreign prince, or state, with whom the United States are at peace.*’ Act of the fifth of June, 1794, section 7.

‘That whenever the laws of the United States shall be opposed, or the execution thereof ob-

manufacture ; and also, for the purpose of *preventing and suppressing any armed or riotous assemblage of persons resisting the custom house officers in the exercise of their duties*, or in any manner opposing the execution of the laws laying an embargo, or otherwise violating, or assisting and abetting violations of the same.* *Idem*, section 11.*

constructed in any state, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceeding, or by the powers vested in the marshal by this act [the same powers in executing the laws of the United States as sheriffs possess for executing the state laws] it shall be lawful for the president of the United States to call forth the militia of such state, or of any other state, or states, as may be necessary, to suppress such combinations, and to cause the laws to be duly executed,' &c. Act of the twenty-fourth of May, 1792.

'Provided, that whenever it may be necessary in the judgment of the president, to use the military force hereby directed to be called forth, the president shall, forthwith, by proclamation, command such insurgents to disperse, and retire peaceably to their respective abodes, within a limited time.' *Ibid.* section 3.

To the candour of the reader I freely appeal. Let him carefully compare these various sections together. Let him more particularly observe, that by the act of June 4, 1794, congress actually vested the president with the *power of LAYING AN EMBARGO*, "*whenever, in his opinion, the public safety should require it ;*" which was, so far as respects this important branch of legislation, *an actual surrender of the legislative power into the hands of the executive magistrate*—and that they likewise conferred on him authority "*to give such orders as might be necessary to carry into effect,*" *the law which he had of his own mere motion, the "legislative power to enact."* When he has duly pondered on these circumstances—when he has fully ascertained that Mr. Jefferson's embargo act in no instance exceeded, and in many fell far short of, the rigour of former laws—will he not be lost in amazement, how it was possible so to excite the public passions, respecting this necessary measure, as to actually endanger the permanence of the union? for it is an indubitable fact that insurrection and rebellion were threatened, and very probably intended—and it has been repeatedly asserted, and is confidently believed, that the tenth congress, through apprehension of that issue alone, repealed the embargo act.

I have reason to believe, that the legislature of Massachusetts actually passed an act making the enforcement of some of the provisions of the embargo law criminal, and attaching to it certain penalties. It is out of my power to procure the act, or to state its details.

* The whole of this comparison of these acts, is taken from a pamphlet, published in Philadelphia, in 1809, and entitled "The Constitutionality of the Embargo Laws, established by Precedent"—By Alexander James Dallas, Esq. It ought to be stated as an awful fact, to shew the violence of faction, that this cogent pamphlet produced not the smallest effect on the feverish state of the public mind.

CHAPTER XXVI.

*Patriotic Proceedings.**

I ANNEX a few specimens of the style and substance of the resolutions and legislative remarks upon the embargo—in order to satisfy the reader that I have not exaggerated the deplorable and disgraceful phrenzy of the public mind.

Extract from the resolutions of the town of Gloucester, January 12th, 1809.

“Resolved, That we will mutually watch and protect what little property we have still left; that we will use all *lawful* means, ‘to arrest the disturbers and breakers of the peace,’ or such others as may, (*under pretence of authority from government*) ‘go armed by night,’ or utter any menaces, or threatening speeches, to the fear and terror of the good people of this town; and that we will ever hold in abhorrence pimps, and spies, and night-walkers, who strive to fatten on the spoils of their suffering fellow citizens.

“Resolved, That to our state government we look for counsel, protection, and relief, at this awful period of general calamity.”

Extract from the resolutions of the town of Bath, December 27, 1808.

“Resolved, That we have hitherto borne with silence the severe pressure of these ruinous laws [embargo laws;] and although we now deem it our duty to speak with firmness and decision our detestation of them, and the policy which gave rise to them, we will still keep down the spirit of indignation which swells within us at the endurance of them; and will conduct toward the national government and its several officers with suitable deference and moderation; that we do, however, despair of obtaining any redress of these grievances, from that government, while its principal offices are filled as at present; and that our only hope is, that the state governments, by their remonstrances and resolutions, may have more influence in effecting this object, than the petitions and memorials of individuals and towns.

“Resolved, therefore, That a respectful address be forwarded in the name of the people of this town to the legislature of this commonwealth, stating to them the wrongs and grievances we already suffer, and the fearful apprehensions we experience, of speedily having our calamity increased by the addition of still more restrictive and arbitrary laws; expressing to them our approbation of the measures they have already adopted upon this important subject, and requesting them to take such other immediate steps for relieving the people, either by themselves alone, or in concert with other commercial states, as the extraordinary circumstances of our situation may require.”

Extract from the memorial of the town of Boston to the legislature of Massachusetts, January 25, 1809.

“The inhabitants of the town of Boston, in town meeting assembled, respectfully represent—That they are constrained to apply to your honourable body, as the immediate guardians of their rights and liberties, for your *interposition* to procure for them relief from the grievances which they now suffer, under the operation of the laws of the general government, abolishing foreign commerce, and subjecting the coasting trade to embarrassments which threaten its annihilation. Our hope and consolation rest with the legislature of our state, to whom it is competent to devise means of relief against the unconstitutional measures of the general government; that your power is adequate to this object is evident from the organization of the confederacy.”

* The factious, and seditious, and jacobinical proceedings in the eastern states in the year 1809, that shook the government to its centre, were paraded in many of the federal papers throughout the union with great solemnity, headed with the words “PATRIOTIC PROCEEDINGS,” in staring capitals. It is truly lamentable to reflect on the extravagant lengths to which the spirit of party leads its followers. Never was the word “*patriotic*” more grossly misapplied.

Extract from the proceedings of the town of Topsfield, January 15, 1809.

"Resolved, That such has been our suffering, and so great is our alarm, occasioned by the extraordinary measures lately adopted, that we shall never be contented until we are secured from a repetition of the same evils. That a bare repeal of the obnoxious acts ought not, therefore, to satisfy a free and prudent people, any more than the repeal of the British stamp act silenced the patriots of that day; that there ought to be a solemn renunciation of the right thus assumed; and it is the opinion of this assembly, that legal and constitutional measures should be adopted for that purpose.

"This assembly declare it as their deliberate opinion, that there exists NO CAUSE OF WAR WITH GREAT BRITAIN; that such a war would be unjust, unnecessary, and extremely to be deplored; that the removal of the embargo will not necessarily involve us in war; but should this be the alternative, it ought to be a war with France, and not with Great Britain.

"Inhabiting a part of the union the most engaged in foreign commerce, they think themselves qualified to decide upon its risks, and the nature and extent of the injuries to which it is exposed; and it is their firm belief, that our commerce, unrestrained by self-destroying measures, might find many sources of profitable employment, *without interfering in any degree with those principles of maritime law, which GREAT BRITAIN deems essential to her existence, and which in an eventful moment like the present she will NEVER YIELD.*

"And this assembly cannot refrain from expressing their conviction, that neither the honour nor the permanent interests of the United States require that we should drive Great Britain, if it were in our power, to the surrender of those claims so essential to her in the mighty conflict in which she is at present engaged; a conflict interesting to humanity, to morals, to religion, and the last struggle of liberty."

Extract from a circular handbill, published at Newburyport.

"You have reposed confidence in a COWARD [Jefferson] and leaned on a broken staff too long. The day of political probation is fast verging to a close; when the fate of America will be decided; and laurels, bought with the price of freemen's blood, will grace the brows of the Gallic tyrant. Let every man who holds the name of America dear to him, stretch out his hand, and put this accursed thing, the EMBARGO, from him. Be resolute: act like the sons of liberty, of GOD, and of your country; nerve your arms with VENGEANCE against the DESPOT who would wrest the inestimable gem of your independence from you; and you shall be conquerors!

"Give ear no longer to the syren voice of democracy and Jeffersonian liberty. It is a cursed delusion, adopted by traitors, and recommended by sycophants.

"Jefferson; a man, who with the DAGGER of popular confidence first gave the stab to your liberties."

Extract from the proceedings of the town of Augusta in Maine, January 16, 1809.

"The awful crisis has arrived, when it becomes necessary for the friends of our independence, to make a firm and decided stand; when it becomes all-important to throw aside minor considerations, and unite for the common good; and when a sense of common danger draws us together to meet the approaching storm.

"With submission almost amounting to criminal apathy, we have suffered privations and restrictions never before expected of, or endured by, a free people. Now, that even the means of subsistence is at hazard, and the sacred asylum of our dwellings is no longer held inviolable; silence would be crime, and resistance would become a virtue of the first magnitude!!!

"Resolved, that the restrictions and impositions on our trade and commerce, are too great and ruinous any longer to be borne; and that the general distress of our country demands immediate relief."

"We know if the embargo be not removed, our citizens will ere long set its penalties and restrictions at defiance. It behoves us to speak; for strike we must, if speaking does not answer."

Boston Repertory.

"It is better to suffer the AMPUTATION of a Limb, than to lose the WHOLE BODY. We must prepare for the operation. Wherefore then is New

England asleep? wherefore does she SUBMIT to the oppression of *enemies* in the South? *Have we no Moses*, who is inspired by the God of our fathers, and will lead us out of Egypt?" *Boston Gazette.*

"This perpetual embargo being unconstitutional, every man will perceive that he is not bound to regard it, but may send his produce or merchandise to a foreign market in the same manner as if the government had never undertaken to prohibit it! If the petitions do not produce a relaxation or removal of the embargo, the people ought to immediately assume a higher tone.

"The government of Massachusetts has also a duty to perform. The state is still sovereign and independent." *Boston Centinel, September 10, 1808.*

Extract from the speech of Mr. Hillhouse, in the senate of the United States, on the bill for enforcing the embargo.

"In my mind the present crisis excites the most serious apprehensions. A storm seems to be gathering which portends not a tempest on the ocean, but domestic convulsions! However painful the task, a sense of duty calls upon me to raise my voice, and use my utmost exertions to prevent the passing of this bill. I feel myself bound in conscience to declare, lest the blood of those who should fall in the execution of this measure may lie on my head, that I consider this to be an act which directs a mortal blow at the liberties of my country; an act containing unconstitutional provisions, to which THE PEOPLE ARE NOT BOUND TO SUBMIT, and to which, in my opinion, they will not submit."* *Boston Centinel, Jan. 12, 1809.*

This speech requires the most serious reflection. A senator of the United States—whose age ought to have secured him from the heyday of passion and violence, and taught him sobriety and gravity, in his place invites and encourages his fellow citizens to insurrection and rebellion! And the law to which he excites resistance is not so rigorous, as laws which, I believe, he had concurred to frame: for I am persuaded he was in congress when those laws to which I have referred, were passed.

A large volume might be filled with similar "patriotic proceedings," as they were then styled, which threatened the peace of the nation with destruction. No pains had been spared to fan the flame. The public mind, by incessant appeals to the passions, had been excited to a species of delirium and madness. And such was the awful and disgraceful delusion, that the sufferings of the country by the lawless proceedings of the belligerents, were unjustly ascribed to the very measures of the government, calculated to enforce redress! Greater insanity can hardly be conceived.

CHAPTER XXVII.

John Henry's Mission to the Eastern States. Instructions from the Governor General of British America.

CONTEMPORANEOUSLY with the "patriotic proceedings," of which I have presented the reader with a slight sketch in the preceding chapter, a most extraordinary circumstance occurred in Canada. Sir James H. Craig, governor general of the British provinces in North America, employed a certain John Henry

* For the preceding extracts I am indebted to a pamphlet, styled "Things as they are," by H. Niles.

on a mission to the Eastern States, to ascertain the views of the malcontents, and how far, if they obtained "*a decided influence*," they would "*exert that influence to bring about a separation from the general union*." Also "*how far, in such an event, they would look to England for assistance, or be disposed to enter into a connection with us*" [the people of Canada.]

This is a most important feature in the history of our era. I annex the correspondence between Sir James and Mr. Henry, without comment.

No. I.

Mr. Ryland, secretary to Sir James Craig, late governor general of the British provinces in North America, to Mr. Henry.

[Most secret and confidential.]

Quebec, 26th January, 1809.

My dear sir—*The extraordinary situation of things at this time in the neighbouring states* has suggested to the governor in chief, the idea of employing you on a secret and confidential mission to Boston, provided an arrangement can be made to meet the important end in view, without throwing an absolute obstacle in the way of your professional pursuits. *The information and political observations heretofore received from you were transmitted by his excellency to the secretary of state, who has expressed his particular approbation of them; and there is no doubt that your able execution of such a mission as I have suggested, would give you a claim not only on the governor general, but on his majesty's ministers, which might eventually contribute to your advantage.* You will have the goodness, therefore, to acquaint me, for his excellency's information, whether you could make it convenient to engage in a mission of this nature, and what pecuniary assistance would be requisite to enable you to undertake it without injury to yourself.

At present it is necessary for me to add, that the governor would furnish you with a cypher for carrying on your correspondence; and that in case the leading party in any of the states wished to open a communication with this government, their views might be communicated through you.

I am, with great truth and regard, my dear sir, your most faithful, humble servant,

(Signed)

John Henry, Esq.

HERMAN W. RYLAND.

No. II.

Montreal, January 31, 1809.

I have to acknowledge the favour of your letter of the 26th inst. written by the desire of his excellency the governor in chief; and hasten to express, through you, to his excellency, my readiness to comply with his wishes.

I need not add how very flattering it is to receive from his excellency the assurance of the approbation of his majesty's secretary of state for the very humble service that I may have rendered.

If the nature of the services in which I am to be engaged require no other disbursements than for my individual expences, I do not apprehend that these can exceed my private resources.

I shall be ready to take my departure before my instructions can be made out.

I have the honour to be, &c.

J. H^r.

H. W. Ryland, Esq. Sec. &c.

No. III.

General Instructions from sir J. H. Craig, to Mr. Henry.

Quebec, 6th February, 1809.

Sir—As you have so readily undertaken the service which I have suggested to you as being likely to be attended with much benefit to the public interests, I am to request that with your earliest conveniency you will proceed to Boston,

The principal object that I recommend to your attention, is the endeavour to obtain the most accurate information of the true state of affairs in that part of the union, which, from its wealth, the number of its inhabitants, and the known intelligence and ability of several of its leading men, must naturally possess a very considerable influence over, and will indeed probably lead, the other eastern states of America in the part they may take at this important crisis.

I shall not pretend to point out to you the mode by which you will be the most likely to obtain this important information. Your own judgment, and the connections which you may have in the town, must be your guide.

I think it however necessary to put you on your guard against the sanguineness of an aspiring party. The federalists, as I understand, have at all times discovered a leaning to this disposition; and their being under its particular influence at this moment, is the more to be expected, from their having no ill-founded ground for their hopes of being *nearer the attainment of their object* than they have been for some years past.

In the general terms which I have made use of in describing the object which I recommend to your attention, it is scarcely necessary, that I should observe, I include the state of the public opinion, both with regard to their internal politics, and to the probability of a war with England; the comparative strength of the two great parties into which the country is divided; and the views and designs of that which may ultimately prevail.

It has been supposed that if the federalists of the eastern states should be successful in obtaining that decided influence, which may enable them to direct the public opinion, it is not improbable, that rather than submit to a continuance of the difficulties and distress to which they are now subject, they will exert that influence to bring about a separation from the general union. The earliest information on this subject may be of great consequence to our government; as it may also be, that it should be informed *how far, in such an event, they would look to England for assistance, or be disposed to enter into a connection with us.*

Although it would be highly inexpedient that you should in any manner appear as an avowed agent; yet if you could contrive to obtain an intimacy with any of the leading party, it may not be improper that you should insinuate, though with great caution, that if *they should wish to enter into any communication with our government through me, you are authorized to receive any such, and will safely transmit it to me:* and as it may not be impossible that they should require some document by which they may be assured, that you are really in the situation in which you represent yourself, *I enclose a credential to be produced in that view.* But I most particularly enjoin and direct, that you do not make use of this paper, unless a desire to that purpose should be expressed; and *unless you see good ground for expecting that the doing so may lead to a more confidential communication,* than you can otherwise look for.

I request to hear from you as frequently as possible: and as letters addressed to me might excite suspicion, it may be as well that you put them under cover to Mr.———. And as even the addressing letters always to the same person might attract notice, I recommend your sometimes addressing your packets to the chief justice here, or occasionally, though seldom, to Mr. Ryland; but never with the addition of his official description.

I am, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

(Signed)

J. H. CRAIG.

John Henry, Esq.

No. IV.

Credential from sir James Craig to Mr. Henry.

(Copy.)

[SEAL.]

The bearer, Mr. John Henry, is employed by me: and full confidence may be placed in him for any communication which any person may wish to make to me *on the business committed to him.* In faith of which I have given him this, under my hand and seal at Quebec, the 6th day of February, 1809.

(Signed)

J. H. CRAIG.

No. V.

To his excellency the Governor General, &c. in answer to his letter of instructions, Montreal, February 10, 1809.

Sir—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your excellency's letter of instructions, the letter of credence, and the cypher for carrying on my correspondence. I have bestowed much pains upon the cypher; and am, notwithstanding this, deficient in some points which might enable me to understand it clearly. I have compared the example with my own exemplification of the cypher, and find a difference in the results; and as the present moment seems favourable to the interference of his majesty's government in the measures pursued by the federal party in the northern states, and more especially as the assembly of Massachusetts is now in session, I think it better to set forward immediately, than wait for any further explanation of the means of carrying on a secret correspondence; which the frequency of safe private conveyances to Canada will render almost wholly unnecessary. Should it, however, be necessary at any time, I take leave to suggest that the index alone furnishes a very safe and simple mode. In it there is a number for every letter in the alphabet, and particular numbers for particular phrases; so that when I do not find in the index the particular word I want, I can spell it with the figures which stand opposite to the letters. For example, if I want to say that "troops are at Albany," I find under the letter "r" that number *fifteen* stands for "troops," and number *one hundred and twenty-five* for "Albany." The intervening words "*are at*" I supply by figures corresponding with the letters in these words.

I have the honour to be, &c.

J. H'Y.

No. VI.

Burlington, Vermont, Feb. 14, 1809.

Sir—I have remained here two days, in order fully to ascertain the progress of the arrangements heretofore made for the organization of an efficient opposition to the general government, as well as to become acquainted with the opinions of the leading people, relative to the measures of that party which has the ascendancy in the national councils.

On the subject of the embargo laws there seems but one opinion; namely, that they are *unnecessary, oppressive, and unconstitutional*. It must also be observed, that the execution of them is so invidious as to attract towards the officers of government the enmity of the people, which is of course transferable to the government itself; so that in case the state of Massachusetts should take any bold step towards resisting the execution of these laws, it is highly probable that it may calculate upon the hearty co-operation of the people of Vermont.

I learn that the governor of this state is now visiting the towns in the northern section of it; and makes no secret of his determination, as commander in chief of the militia, to refuse obedience to any command from the general government which can tend to interrupt the good understanding that prevails between the citizens of Vermont and his majesty's subjects in Canada. It is further intimated, that in case of a war, he will use his influence to preserve the state neutral; and resist, with all the force he can command, any attempt to make it a party. I need not add, that if these resolutions are carried into effect, the state of Vermont may be considered as an ally of Great Britain.

To what extent the sentiments which prevail in this quarter exist in the neighbouring states, or even in the eastern section of this state, I am not able to conjecture. I can only say, with certainty, that the leading men of the federal party act in concert; and, therefore, infer that a common sentiment pervades the whole body throughout New England.

I have seen a letter from a gentleman now at Washington, to his friend in this place; and as its contents may serve to throw some light on passing events there, I shall send either the original or a copy with this despatch. The writer of the letter is a man of character and veracity; and whether competent or not to form correct opinions himself, is probably within the reach of all the knowledge that can be obtained by the party to which he belongs. It appears by his statement, that there is a very formidable majority in congress on the side of the administration; notwithstanding which, there is every reason to hope, that the

northern states in their distinct capacity will unite and resist by force a war with Great Britain. In what mode this resistance will first show itself, is probably not yet determined upon; and may in some measure depend upon the reliance that the leading men may place upon assurances of support from his majesty's representatives in Canada; and as I shall be on the spot to tender this, whenever the moment arrives that it can be done with effect, there is no doubt that all their measures may be made subordinate to the intentions of his majesty's government. Great pains are taken by the men of talents and intelligence, to confirm the fears of the common people, as to the concurrence of the southern democrats in the projects of France; and every thing tends to encourage the belief, that the dissolution of the confederacy will be accelerated by that spirit which now actuates both political parties.

I am, &c.

A. B.

No. VII.

Windsor, Vermont, February 19, 1809.

Sir—My last was written at Burlington, the principal town in the northern part of the state of Vermont. I am now at the principal town in the eastern section.

The fallacy of men's opinions, when they act under the influence of sensibility, and are strongly excited by those hopes which always animate a rising party, leads me to doubt the correctness of the opinion which I received in the northern section of this state; which, from its contiguity to Canada, and necessary intercourse with Montreal, has a strong interest in promoting a good understanding with his majesty's government. Therefore, since my departure from Burlington, I have sought every favourable occasion of conversing with the democrats on the probable result of the policy adopted by the general government. The difference of opinion is thus expressed.

The federal party declare, that in the event of a war, *the state of Vermont will treat separately for itself with Great Britain*; and support, to the utmost, the stipulations into which it may enter, without any regard to the policy of the general government. The democrats on the other hand assert, that, in such a case as that contemplated, the people would nearly be divided into equal numbers; one of which would support the government, if it could be done without involving the people in a civil war: but at all events would risk every thing in preference to a coalition with Great Britain. This difference of opinion is not to be wholly ascribed to the prejudices of party. The people in the eastern section of Vermont are not operated upon by the same hopes and fears as those on the borders of the British colony. They are not dependent upon Montreal for the sale of their produce, nor the supply of foreign commodities. They are not apprehensive of any serious dangers or inconvenience from a state of war: and although they admit that the governor, council, and three-fourths of the representation in congress are of the federal party, yet they do not believe that the state would stand alone and resist the national government. They do not, however, deny, that should the state of Vermont continue to be represented as it is at present, it would in all probability unite with the neighbouring states in any serious plan of resistance to a war, which it might seem expedient to adopt. This I think is the safer opinion for you to rely on; if, indeed, reliance ought to be placed on any measure depending upon the will of the rabble, which is ever changing, and must ever be marked with ignorance, caprice, and inconstancy. As the crisis approaches, the difficulty of deciding upon an hazardous alternative will increase. And unfortunately there is not in Vermont any man of commanding talents, capable of attracting *general confidence*; of infusing into the people his own spirit; and, amidst the confusion of conflicting opinions, dangers and commotion, competent to lead in the path of duty or safety. The governor is an industrious, prudent man, and has more personal influence than any other. But his abilities are not suited to the situation in which a civil war would place him.

I am, &c.

A. B.

No. VIII.

Amherst, New Hampshire, February 23, 1809.

Sir—A gentleman going direct to Canada, affords a safe and favourable opportunity of giving you some further account of my progress. I will not make

use of the post-offices, when I can avoid it; because private occasions supercede the necessity of writing in cypher. And the contempt of decency and principle, which forms part of the morals of the subaltern officers of a democracy, would incline them to break a seal with the same indifference that they break their words, when either curiosity or interest is to be indulged.

I have not had sufficient time nor evidence, to enable me to *form any opinion for myself*, of the lengths to which the federal party will carry opposition to the national government in the event of a war. Much may be inferred from the result of the elections of governors, which within two months will be made in the states of Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Rhode Island. From all I know, and all I can learn of the general government, I am not apprehensive of an immediate war. The embargo is the favourite measure. And it is probable that other means will be employed to excite England to commit some act of hostility, for the sole purpose of placing the responsibility of war on that country. This I most particularly recommend to the consideration of ministers. The dread of opposition, and the loss of popularity, will certainly keep the ruling party at Washington inactive. They will risk any thing but the loss of power; and they are well aware that their power would pass away with the first calamity which their measures might bring upon the common people (from whom that power emanates) unless indeed they could find a sufficient excuse in the conduct of Great Britain. This impression cannot be too deeply felt by his majesty's ministers; nor too widely spread throughout the British nation. It will furnish a sure guide in every policy that may be adopted towards the United States.

I have the honour to be, &c.

A. B.

No. IX.

Boston, March 5, 1809.

Sir—It does not yet appear necessary that I should discover to any person the purpose of my visit to Boston; nor is it probable that I shall be compelled, for the sake of gaining more knowledge of the arrangements of the federal party in these states, to avow myself as a regular authorised agent of the British government, even with those individuals who would feel equally bound with myself to preserve, with the utmost inscrutability, so important a secret from the public eye.

I have sufficient means of information to enable me to judge of the proper period for offering the co-operation of Great Britain, and opening a correspondence between the governor general of British America and those individuals, who, from the part they take in the opposition to the national government, or the influence they may possess in any new order of things, that may grow out of the present differences, should be qualified to act in behalf of the northern states. An apprehension of any such state of things, as is presupposed by these remarks, begins to subside; since it has appeared, by the conduct of the general government, that it is seriously alarmed at the menacing attitude of the northern states. But although it is believed that there is no probability of an immediate war, yet no doubts are entertained that Mr. Madison will fall on some new expedients to bring about hostilities. What these may be, can only be deduced from what appears to be practicable. A *non-intercourse* with England and France will probably supercede the embargo; which, by opening with the rest of Europe a partial legitimate commerce, and affording strong temptations to that which is illegal, will expose the vessels to capture, detention, and embarrassment; will justify the present policy; and produce such a degree of irritation and resentment, as will enable the government of this country to throw the whole blame and responsibility of war from its shoulders upon those of the British ministry. If in this, the party attached to France should calculate with correctness, and the commerce of New England should greatly suffer; the merchants being injured and discouraged, would not only acquiesce in the restrictive system, but even submit to war. On the other hand, should the small traffic permitted by a non-intercourse law be lucrative and uninterrupted, the people would be clamorous for more, and soon compel the government to restore the friendly relations between the two countries. While I offer my opinion on this subject, I cannot but express a strong hope, that, if any terms should be proposed by either govern-

ment, to which the other might think proper to accede, that A PRINCIPAL MOTIVE TO THE ADJUSTMENT OF DIFFERENCES SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD TO ARISE FROM THE AMICABLE DISPOSITION OF THE EASTERN STATES, PARTICULARLY OF THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS. THIS, AS IT WOULD INCREASE THE POPULARITY OF THE FRIENDS OF GREAT BRITAIN, COULD NOT FAIL TO PROMOTE HER INTERESTS. If it could not be done formally and officially, nor in a correspondence between ministers, still perhaps the administration in the parliament of Great Britain might take that ground : and the suggestion would find its way into the papers both in England and America.

It cannot be too frequently repeated, that this country can only be governed and directed by the influence of opinion : as there is nothing permanent in its political institutions ; nor are the populace, under any circumstances, to be relied on, when measures become inconvenient and burdensome. I will soon write again, and am, &c.

A. B.

No. X.

Boston, March 7, 1809.

Sir—I have already given a decided opinion that a declaration of war is not to be expected ; but, contrary to all reasonable calculation, should the congress possess spirit and independence enough to place their popularity in jeopardy by so strong a measure, THE LEGISLATURE OF MASSACHUSETTS WILL GIVE THE TONE TO THE NEIGHBOURING STATES ; WILL DECLARE ITSELF PERMANENT UNTIL A NEW ELECTION OF MEMBERS ; INVITE A CONGRESS, TO BE COMPOSED OF DELEGATES FROM THE FEDERAL STATES, AND ERECT A SEPARATE GOVERNMENT FOR THEIR COMMON DEFENCE AND COMMON INTEREST.

This congress would probably begin by abrogating the offensive laws, and adopting a plan for the maintenance of the power and authority thus assumed. *They would by such an act be in a condition to make or receive proposals from Great Britain ;* and I should seize the first moment to open a correspondence with your excellency. Scarce any other aid would be necessary, and perhaps none required, than a few vessels of war from the Halifax station, to protect the maritime towns from the little navy which is at the disposal of the national government. What permanent connection between Great Britain and this section of the republic would grow out of a civil commotion, such as might be expected, no person is prepared to decide. But it seems that a strict alliance must result of necessity. At present the opposition party confine their calculations merely to resistance ; and I can assure you that at this moment they do not freely entertain the project of withdrawing the eastern states from the union, finding it a very unpopular topic ; although a course of events, such as I have already mentioned, would inevitably produce an incurable alienation of the New England from the southern states. The truth is, the common people have so long regarded the constitution of the United States with complacency, that they are now only disposed in this quarter to treat it like a truant mistress, whom they would for a time put away on a separate maintenance, but, without farther and greater provocation, would not absolutely repudiate.

In all I have written, I have been careful not to make any impression analogous to the enthusiastic confidence entertained by the opposition, nor to the hopes and expectations that animate the friends of an alliance between the northern states and Great Britain. I have abstracted myself from all the sympathies these are calculated to inspire ; because, notwithstanding that I feel the utmost confidence in the integrity of intention of the leading characters in this political drama, I cannot forget that they derive their power from a giddy, inconstant multitude ; who, unless, in the instance under consideration, they form an exception to all general rules and experience, will act inconsistently and absurdly.

I am, &c.

A. B.

No. XI.

Boston, March 10, 1809.

Sir—In my letter No. 9, I took the liberty to express my opinion of the probable effect of the non-intercourse law intended to be enacted ; and of the

O. B. 21

mode by which Great Britain may defeat the real intention of the American government in passing it. But as the sort of impunity recommended might, in its application to every species of commerce that would be carried on, be deemed by Great Britain a greater evil than war itself, a middle course might easily be adopted, which would deprive France of the benefit resulting from an intercourse with America, without, in any great degree, irritating the maritime states.

The high price of all American produce in France furnishes a temptation which mercantile avarice will be unable to resist. The consequence is obvious. But if instead of condemning the vessels and cargoes which may be arrested in pursuing this prohibited commerce, they should be compelled to go into a British port, and there permitted to sell them, I think the friends of England in these states would not utter a complaint. Indeed, I have no doubt, that if, in the prosecution of a lawful voyage, the British cruizers should treat American ships in this manner, their owners would, in the present state of the European markets, think themselves very fortunate; as it would save them the trouble and expense of landing them in a neutral port, and from thence re-shipping them to England, now the best market in Europe for the produce of this country. The government of the United States would probably complain, and Bonaparte become peremptory; but even that would only tend to render the opposition in the northern states more resolute, and accelerate the dissolution of the confederacy. The generosity and justice of Great Britain would be extolled, and the commercial states exult in the success of individuals over a government inimical to commerce, and to whose measures they can no longer submit with patient acquiescence.

A. B.

No. XII.

Boston, March 13, 1809.

Sir—You will perceive, from the accounts that will reach you in the public papers both from Washington and Massachusetts, that the federalists of the northern states have succeeded in making the congress believe, that with such an opposition as they would make to the general government, a war must be confined to their own territory, and might be even too much for that government to sustain. The consequence is, that after all the parade and menaces with which the session commenced, it has been suffered to end without carrying into effect any of the plans of the administration, except the interdiction of commercial intercourse with England and France—an event that was anticipated in my former letters.

Under what new circumstances the congress will meet in May, will depend on the state elections, and the changes that may in the mean time take place in Europe. With regard to Great Britain, she can scarce mistake her true policy in relation to America. If peace be the object, every act which can irritate the maritime states ought to be avoided; because the prevailing disposition of these will generally be sufficient to keep the government from hazarding any hostile measures. *If a war between America and France be a grand desideratum, something more must be done; an indulgent conciliatory policy must be adopted, which will leave the democrats without a pretext for hostilities; and Bonaparte, whose passions are too hot for delay, will, probably, compel this government to decide which of the two great belligerents is to be its enemy. To bring about a separation of the states, under distinct and independent governments, is an affair of more uncertainty; and, however desirable, cannot be effected but by a series of acts and long continued policy, tending to irritate the southern, and conciliate the northern people.* The former are an agricultural, the latter a commercial people. The mode of cheering and depressing either, is too obvious to require illustration. This, I am aware, is an object of much interest in Great Britain; as it would forever secure the integrity of his majesty's possessions on the continent, and MAKE THE TWO GOVERNMENTS, OR WHATEVER NUMBER THE PRESENT CONFEDERACY MIGHT FORM INTO, AS USEFUL AND AS MUCH SUBJECT TO THE INFLUENCE OF GREAT BRITAIN, AS HER COLONIES CAN BE RENDERED.* But it is an object only to be attained by

* This sentence speaks volumes against the policy of those misguided and dangerous citizens, who have been so zealous for the destruction of the union.

slow and circumspect progression; and requires for its consummation more attention to the affairs which agitate and excite parties in this country, than Great Britain has yet bestowed upon it. An unpopular war; that is, a war produced by the hatred and prejudices of one party, but against the consent of the other party, can alone produce a sudden separation of any section of this country from the common head.

At all events, it cannot be necessary to the preservation of peace, that Great Britain should make any great concessions at the present moment; *more especially as the more important changes that occur in Europe, might render it inconvenient for her to adhere to any stipulations in favour of neutral maritime nations.*

Although the non-intercourse law affords but a partial relief to the people of this country from the evils of that entire suspension of commerce to which they have reluctantly submitted for some time past, *I lament the repeal of the embargo; because it was calculated to accelerate the progress of these states towards a revolution that would have put an end to the only republic that remains, to prove that a government founded on political equality can exist in a season of trial and difficulty, or is calculated to insure either security or happiness to a people.*

I am, &c.

A. B.

No. XIII.

Boston, March 20, 1809.

Sir—The last week of this month and the first of April will be occupied in the election of governors and other executive officers in the New England states.

The federal candidate in New Hampshire is already elected by a majority of about a thousand votes. His competitor was a man of large fortune, extensive connections, and inoffensive manners. These account for the smallness of the majority.

In Connecticut, no change is necessary: and none is to be apprehended.

In Rhode Island, it is of no consequence of what party the governor is a member: as he has neither civil nor military power, being merely president of the council.

In Massachusetts, it is certain that the federal candidate will succeed.

A few weeks will be sufficient in order to determine the relative strength of parties, and convince Mr. Madison that a war with Great Britain is not a measure upon which he dare venture. Since the plan of an organised opposition to the projects of Mr. Jefferson was put into operation, the whole of the New England states have transferred their political power to his political enemies: and the reason that he has still so many adherents is, that those who consider the only true policy of America to consist in the cultivation of peace, have still great confidence, that nothing can force him (or his successor who acts up to his system, or rather is governed by it) to consent to war. They consider all the menaces and "dreadful note of preparation" to be a mere finesse, intended only to obtain concessions from England on cheap terms. From every sort of evidence, I confess I am myself of the same opinion; and am *fully persuaded that the farce which has been acting at Washington will terminate in full proof of the imbecility and spiritless temper of the actors.* A war attempted without the concurrence of both parties, and the general consent of the northern states, which constitute the bone and muscle of the country, must commence without hope, and end in disgrace. **IT SHOULD, THEREFORE, BE THE PECULIAR CARE OF GREAT BRITAIN TO FOSTER DIVISIONS BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH;** *and by succeeding in this, she may carry into effect her own projects in Europe, with a total disregard of the resentment of the democrats of this country.*

I am, &c.

A. B.

No. XIV.

Boston, April 13, 1809.

Sir—I send to Mr. R. a pamphlet entitled "Suppressed Documents." The notes and comments were written by the gentleman who has written the "analysis," which I sent by a former conveyance. These works have greatly contributed to excite the fears of the men of talents and property; who now *prefer the choice of maintaining their party by open resistance and final separation, to an alliance with France, and a war with England.* So that should the government

unexpectedly, and contrary to all reasonable calculation, attempt to involve the country in a measure of that nature, I am convinced (now that the elections have all terminated favourably) that *none of the New England states would be a party in it*. But, as I have repeatedly written, the general government does not seriously entertain any such desire or intention. Had the majority in the New England states continued to approve of the public measures, it is extremely probable that Great Britain would now have to choose between war and concession. But the aspect of things in this respect is changed; and a war would produce an incurable alienation of the eastern states, and bring the whole country in subordination to the interest of England, *whose navy would prescribe and enforce the terms upon which the commercial states should carry, and the agricultural states export, their surplus produce*. All this is as well known to the democrats as to the other party. Therefore they will avoid a war, at least until the whole nation is unanimous for it. Still, when we consider of what materials the government is formed, it is impossible to speak with any certainty of their measures. The past administration in every transaction presents to the mind only a muddy commixture of folly, weakness, and duplicity. The spell, by which the nations of Europe have been rendered inert and inefficient when they attempted to shake it off, has stretched its shadow across the Atlantic, and made a majority of the people of these states *alike blind to duty and to their interests*.

I am, &c.

A. B.

No. XV.

Boston, April 26, 1809.

SIR—Since my letter No. 14, I have had but little to communicate.

I have not yet been able to ascertain with sufficient accuracy the relative strength of the two parties in the legislative bodies in New England.

In all the states, however, governors have been elected out of the federal party; and even the southern papers indicate an unexpected augmentation of federal members in the next congress.

The correspondence between Erskine and the secretary of state at Washington, you will have seen before this can reach you. It has given much satisfaction to the federal party here; because it promises an exemption from the evil they most feared (a war with England) and justifies their partiality towards Great Britain, which, they maintain, was founded upon a full conviction of her justice and sincere disposition to preserve peace. Even the democrats affect to be satisfied with it; because, as they insist, it proves the efficacy of the restrictive system of Mr. Jefferson.

But the great benefit that will probably result from it, will be, that Bonaparte may be induced to force this country from her neutral position. Baffled in his attempt to exclude from this continent the manufactures of Great Britain, he will most likely confiscate all American property in his dominions and dependencies, and declare war. Nothing could more than this contribute to give influence and stability to the British party. *The invidious occurrences of the rebellion would be forgotten in the resentment of the people against France*; and they would be soon weaned from that attachment to her which is founded on the aid that was rendered to separate from the mother country.

While Great Britain waits for this natural, I might say necessary result of the negotiation, would it not be extremely inexpedient to conclude a treaty with the American government? Every sort of evidence and experience prove, that the democrats consider their political ascendancy in a great measure dependent upon the hostile spirit that they can keep alive towards Great Britain; and recent events demonstrate that their conduct will be predicated upon that conviction. It is therefore not to be expected that they will meet with corresponding feelings a sincere disposition on the part of England to adjust all matters in dispute. They are at heart mortified and disappointed to find, that Great Britain has been in advance of the French government, in taking advantage of the provisional clauses of the non-intercourse law. And if they show any spirit at the next session of congress towards France, it will be only because they will find Bonaparte deaf to intreaty, and insensible of past favours: or that they may think it safer to float with the tide of public feelings which will set strongly against him, unless he keep *pari passu* with England in a conciliatory policy.

When I began my letter, I intended to make some observations in relation to the boundary line—[Here ten or twelve lines of the manuscript are erased.]

I am, &c.

A. B.

No. XVI.

Boston, May 6, 1809.

SIR—Although the recent changes that have occurred, quiet all apprehensions of war, and consequently lessen *all hope of a separation of the states*, I think it necessary to transmit by the mail of each week a sketch of passing events.

On local politics I have nothing to add; and as the parade that is made in the National Intelligencer, of the sincere disposition of Mr. Madison to preserve amicable relations with Great Britain, is in my opinion calculated to awaken vigilance and distrust rather than inspire confidence, I shall (having nothing more important to write about) take leave to examine his motives. I am not surprised at his conditional removal of the non-intercourse law with respect to Great Britain, because it was made incumbent on him by the act of congress; but the observations made on his friendly dispositions towards Great Britain are a matter of no little astonishment. The whole tenor of his political life directly and unequivocally contradicts them. His speech on the British treaty in '95—his attempt to pass a law for the confiscation of "British debts" and British property—his commercial resolutions, grounded apparently on an idea of making America useful as a colony to France—his conduct while secretary of state—all form an assemblage of probabilities tending to convince me at least that he does not seriously desire a treaty in which the rights and pretensions of Great Britain would be fairly recognized. It seems impossible that he should at once divest himself of his habitual animosity and that pride of opinion, which his present situation enables him to indulge; but above all, that he should deprive his friends and supporters of the benefit of those prejudices which have been carefully fostered in the minds of the common people towards England, and which have so materially contributed to invigorate and augment the democratic party. Whatever his real motives may be, it is in this stage of the affair harmless enough to inquire into the cause of the apparent change. He probably acts under a conviction, that in the present temper of the eastern states, a war could not fail to produce a dissolution of the union; or he may have profited by the mistake of his predecessor; and is inclined to seize the present opportunity to prove to the world that he is determined to be the president of a nation rather than the head of a faction; or he has probably gone thus far to remove the impression on the mind of many, that he was under the influence of France, in order that he may with a better grace and on more tenable grounds quarrel with Great Britain in the progress of negotiating a treaty. Whatever his motives may be, I am very certain his party will not support him in any manly and generous policy. Weak men are sure to temporize when great events call upon them for decision; and are sluggish and inert at the moment when the worst of evils is inactivity. This is the character of the democrats in the northern states. Of those of the south I know but little.

A. B.

No. XVII.

Boston, May 25, 1809.

Sir, My last was under date of the 6th instant.

The unexpected change which has taken place in the feelings of political men in this country, in consequence of Mr. Madison's prompt acceptance of the friendly proposals of Great Britain, has caused a temporary suspension of the conflict of parties; and they both regard him with equal wonder and distrust. They all ascribe his conduct to various motives; but none believe him to be in earnest.

The state of New York has returned to the assembly a majority of federal members. All this proves that an anti-commercial faction cannot rule the commercial states. Two months ago the state of New York was not ranked among the states that would adopt the policy of that of Massachusetts: and any favourable change was exceedingly problematical.

I beg leave to suggest that in the present state of things in this country, my presence can contribute very little to the interest of Great Britain. If Mr. Erskine be sanctioned in all he has conceded, by his majesty's ministers, it is unnecessary for me, as indeed it would be unavailing, to make any attempt to carry into effect the original purposes of my mission. While I think it to be my duty to give this intimation to you, I beg it may be understood that I consider myself entirely at the disposal of his majesty's government.

I am, &c.

A. B.

No. XVIII.

Mr. Ryland to Mr. J. Henry, May 1, 1809.

My dear sir—The news we have received this day from the United States will, I imagine, soon bring you back to us: and if you arrive at Montreal by the middle of June, I shall probably have the pleasure of meeting you there, as I am going up with sir James and a large suite. The last letters received from you are to the thirteenth of April; and the whole are now transcribing for the purpose of being sent home, where *they cannot fail of doing you great credit; and I most sincerely hope that they may eventually contribute to your permanent advantage.* It is not necessary to repeat the assurances that no effort within the compass of my power shall be wanting to this end.

I am cruelly out of spirits at the idea of old England truckling to such a debased and accursed government as that of the United States.

(Signed)

H. W. R.

J. Henry, Esq. Boston.

No. XIX.

Mr. Ryland to Mr. Henry, dated May 4, 1809.

My dear sir—You must consider the short letter I wrote you by the last post as altogether unofficial: but I am now to intimate to you, in a more formal manner, our hope of your speedy return; as the object of your journey seems, for the present at least, to be at an end. We have London news by way of the river up to the sixth of March, which tallies to a day with what we have received by the way of the states.

(Signed)

H. W. R.

No. XX.

Montreal, June 12, 1809.

Sir—I have the honour to inform your excellency, that I received, through Mr. Secretary Ryland, your excellency's commands to return to Canada; and after the delays incident to this season of the year in a journey from Boston, arrived here yesterday.

Your excellency will have seen by the papers of the latest dates from the United States, that a formidable opposition is already organized in congress to the late measures of Mr. Madison; and it is very evident that if he be sincere in his professions of attachment to Great Britain, his party will abandon him. Sixty one members have already voted against a resolution to approve of what he has done; and I have no doubt the rest of the democratic party will follow the example, as soon as they recover from the astonishment into which his apparent defection has thrown them.

The present hopes of the federalists are founded on the probability of a war with France; but, at all events, this party is strong and well organized enough to prevent a war with England. It would now be superfluous to trouble your excellency with an account of the nature and extent of the *arrangements made by the federal party to resist any attempts of the government unfavourable to Great Britain.* They were such as do great credit to their ability and principles; and, while a judicious policy is observed by Great Britain, secure her interests in America from decay. My fear of inducing a false security on the part of his majesty's government, in their efficiency and eventual success, may have inclined me to refrain from doing them that justice in my former letters, which I willingly express.

(Signed)

JOHN HENRY

No. XXI.

Mr. Henry's memorial to lord Liverpool, enclosed in a letter to Mr. Peel, of the 13th of June, 1811, with a copy of that letter.

The undersigned most respectfully submits the following statement and memorial to the earl of Liverpool.

Long before and during the administration of your lordship's predecessor, the undersigned bestowed much personal attention to the state of parties, and to the political measures in the United States of America.

[Here is an erasure of about four lines.]

Soon after the affair of the Chesapeake frigate, when his majesty's governor general of British America had reason to believe that the two countries would be involved in a war, and had submitted to his majesty's ministers the arrangements of the English party in the United States for an efficient resistance to the general government, which would probably terminate in a separation of the northern states from the general confederacy, he applied to the undersigned, to undertake a mission to Boston, where the whole concerns of the opposition were managed. The object of the mission was to promote and encourage the federal party to resist the measures of the general government; to offer assurances of aid and support from his majesty's government of Canada; and to open a communication between the leading men engaged in that opposition and the governor general, upon such a footing as circumstances might suggest; and finally to render the plans then in contemplation subservient to the views of his majesty's government.*

The undersigned undertook the mission which lasted from the month of January to the month of June inclusive, during which period

those public acts and legislative resolutions of the assemblies of Massachusetts and Connecticut were passed, which kept the general government of the United States in check, and deterred it from carrying into execution the measures of hostility with which Great Britain was menaced.

For his service on the occasion herein recited, and the loss of time and expenses incurred, the undersigned neither sought nor received any compensation; but trusted to the known justice and liberality of his majesty's government for the reward of services which could not, he humbly conceives, be estimated in pounds, shillings and pence. On the patronage and support which was promised in the letter of sir J. Craig under date of the twenty-third of January, 1809, (wherein he gives an assurance "that the former correspondence and political information transmitted by the undersigned had met with the particular approbation of his majesty's secretary of state, and that his execution of the mission, proposed to be undertaken in that letter, would give him a claim not only on the governor general but on his majesty's ministers") the undersigned has relied, and now most respectfully claims, in whatever mode the earl of Liverpool may be pleased to adopt.

The undersigned most respectfully takes this occasion to state, that sir J. Craig promised him an employment in Canada, worth upwards of one thousand pounds a year, by his letter (herewith transmitted) under date of the thirteenth of September, 1809, which, he has just learned, has, in consequence of his absence, been given to another person. The undersigned abstains from commenting on this transaction; and respectfully suggests that the appointment of judge advocate general of the province of Lower Canada, with a salary of five hundred pounds a year, or a consulate in the United States, *sine cura*, would be considered by him a liberal discharge of any obligation that his majesty's government may entertain in relation to his service.

Copy of a letter to Mr. Peel, enclosing the foregoing.

Sir—I take the liberty of enclosing to you a memorial addressed to the earl of Liverpool; and beg you will have the goodness either to examine the documents in your office, or those in my own possession, touching the extent and legitimacy of my claims.

Mr. Ryland, the secretary of sir J. Craig, is now in London; and, from his official knowledge of the transactions and facts alluded to in the memorial, can give any information required on the subject.

J. H.

June 13, 1811.

* Vide the despatches of sir James Craig in June, 1808.

No. XXII.

Letter of the Rt. hon. the earl of Liverpool, by his secretary R. Peel, esq. recognising Mr. Henry's services, &c.

Downing Street, June 28, 1811.

Sir—I have not failed to lay before the earl of Liverpool, the memorial, together with its several enclosures, which was delivered to me a few days since, by general Loft, at your desire.

His lordship has directed me to acquaint you, that he has referred to the correspondence in this office, of the year 1808, and finds two letters from sir James Craig, dated the tenth of April, and the fifth of May, transmitting the correspondence that has passed during your residence in the northern states of America, and expressing his confidence in your ability and judgment; but lord Liverpool has not discovered any wish on the part of sir James Craig, that your claims for compensation should be referred to this country; nor, indeed, is allusion made to any kind of arrangement or agreement that had been made by that officer with you.

Under these circumstances, and had not sir James Craig determined on his immediate return to England, it would have been lord Liverpool's wish to have referred your memorial to him, as being better able to appreciate the ability and success with which you executed a mission, undertaken at his desire. Lord Liverpool will, however, transmit it to sir James Craig's successor in the government, and an assurance, that, from the recommendations he has received in your favour, and the opinion he has formed on your correspondence, he is convinced that the public service will be benefited by your active employment in a public situation.

Lord Liverpool will also feel himself bound to give the same assurance to the Marquis Wellesley, if there is any probability that it will advance the success of the application which you have made to his lordship.

I am, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

(Signed)

ROBERT PEEL.

John Henry, esq. 27, Leicester-square.

No. XXIII.

Mr. Henry to Mr. Peel, September 24, 1811. No other answer than a despatch to sir George Prevost, and the letter marked XXIV.

London, 4th September, 1811.

Sir—I have just now learned the ultimate decision of my lord Wellesley relative to the appointment which I was desirous to obtain; and find that the subsisting relations between the two countries, forbid the creating a new office in the United States, such as I was solicitous to obtain. In this state of things I have not a moment to lose in returning to Canada, and have taken my passage in the last and only ship that sails for Quebec this season. As I have no time to enter *de novo* into explanations with the gentleman who is in your office, and as I have received assurances from you, in addition to the letter of my lord Liverpool, of the 27th of June, that "his lordship would recommend me to the governor of Canada, for the first vacant situation that I would accept," I beg the favour of you to advise me how I am to get that recommendation, without loss of time.

I have the honour to be, &c.

J. H.

Robert Peel, esq. &c. &c. &c.

No. XXIV.

Copy of a letter written by Lord Liverpool, to sir George Prevost, furnished by the under secretary of state. Original in the despatch to the governor general.

Downing street, 16th Sept. 1811.

Sir—Mr. Henry, who will have the honour of delivering this letter, is the gentleman who addressed to me the memorial, a copy of which I herewith transmit, and to whom the accompanying letter from Mr. Peel was written by my direction.

In compliance with his request, I now fulfil the assurance which I have given, of stating to you my opinion of the ability and judgment which Mr. Henry has manifested on the occasion mentioned in his memorial; and of the benefit the

public service might derive from his active employment in any public situation in which you should think proper to place him.

LIVERPOOL.

To Sir George Prevost, Bart. &c. &c.

No. XXV.

Mr. Ryland to Mr. Henry.

Tuesday evening, July 2d, 1811.

Dear Henry—It gives me real pleasure to find that the apprehensions I had formed with respect to the fulfilment of your expectations, are likely to prove erroneous. As every thing which passed relative to your mission was in writing, I think you will do well in submitting to Mr. Peel all the original papers. I, myself, could give no other information relative to the subject than what they contain; as you and I had no opportunity of any verbal communication concerning it, till after your mission terminated. I never wrote you a letter in the governor's name, which had not previously been submitted to his correction.

The impression I had received of your character and abilities made me anxious to serve you, even before I had the pleasure of a personal acquaintance with you; and the same desire has operated on me ever since. I am, therefore, entitled to hope, that any opinion which I may have given, as to your best mode of obtaining employment under government, will be received with the same candour that gave rise to it. I think you will do well to persevere as you propose. I have no doubt that every letter from you which sir James sent home, will be found in Mr. Peel's office; as the established practice there, is, to bind the despatches and enclosures yearly up together.

H. W. RYLAND.

John Henry, esq.

No. XXVI.

Mr. Henry's memorial to Lord Liverpool, enclosed in Lord Liverpool's despatch.

To the right honourable the Earl of Liverpool, the undersigned most respectfully submits the following memorial.

Long before and during the administration of your lordship's predecessor, the undersigned bestowed much personal attention to the state of parties and political measures in the United States of America, and had an opportunity* [*Here an erasure of ten or twelve lines*] and to unite [*An erasure here of two or three lines*] the information transmitted by the undersigned to Sir James Craig, and by him to lord Castlereagh, *met with his lordship's approbation*,† and when the hostile preparations in the United States suggested to Sir James Craig the necessity of making corresponding arrangements of precaution and defence, for the security of his majesty's colonies, he applied to the undersigned, to take a secret and confidential mission to the northern states to

the party already mentioned; to direct their operations, and transmit regular information of the same, and to endeavour to render their plans subservient to the interest of Great Britain.† The undersigned readily undertook the mission, and spent five months in the active and zealous discharge of the duties connected with it. [An erasure here of twenty or twenty-five lines§] which deterred the general government from the purpose already mentioned, and from a coalition with France,¶ while the information which he transmitted to sir James Craig, probably saved the trouble and expense of arming the Canadian militia. All this, the undersigned performed without ever showing his commission or appearing as an authorised agent—from a thorough conviction,

* See the letter of Mr. Henry addressed to the secretary of sir James Craig, and by him transmitted to Lord in the month of April, 1808.

† See document No. 22, herewith submitted.

‡ See document No. 22 and 23, herewith submitted.

§ See letter No. 1. of the series transmitted by sir J. Craig, to the colonial department, under date February 14, 1809.

¶ See the remainder of the aforesaid letter.

tion that a discovery of his mission would furnish the French party with the means of destroying the influence of the party adhering to Great Britain in every quarter of America, and enable the general government to go to war upon popular and tenable ground.

In the application of sir James Craig to the undersigned to undertake the mission aforesaid, he says "*the information and political observations received from you heretofore were all transmitted to the secretary of state, who has expressed his particular approbation of them; and there is no doubt that your able execution of such a mission as I have above suggested, would give you a claim not only on the governor general (of British America), but on his majesty's ministers,*" &c.

The undersigned being now in England on his private affairs, and on the eve of departure for America, most humbly and respectfully submits his claims, under the stipulations aforesaid, to the earl of Liverpool, in the confident expectation that his lordship will treat them with that justice, and liberality, which, upon investigation, they may be found to merit.

It may not be superfluous to add, that the undersigned has never received in any shape whatever any compensation or patronage for the services he has rendered. This fact, Mr. Ryland, the secretary of sir James Craig, now in London, can vouch; as well as for the truth of all the matters set forth in this memorial.

I have the honour, &c.

(Signed)

J. HENRY.

27, Leicester-square, June 23, 1811.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

Embargo repealed. British and French vessels interdicted from entering our harbours. Importations from both countries prohibited. Invitation held out to both to cease their outrages on our commerce.

THE clamour excited against the embargo—the tumultuous proceedings in the eastern states—its inefficacy to answer the purpose intended, arising partly from the factious and disorganizing, and jacobinical opposition it met with, and partly from the imbecility of Mr. Jefferson's administration, in not duly enforcing it, as already stated†—all combined to produce its repeal, which took place on the first of March, 1809.

As a pacific measure, in lieu of the embargo, to induce the belligerents to respect our rights, and to cease their depredations, under pretence of retaliation upon each other, the act commonly styled the non-intercourse act, was passed, of which I annex those sections containing its leading features.

An act to interdict the Commercial Intercourse between the United States and Great Britain and France, and their dependencies; and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the senate and house of representatives of the United States of America in congress assembled, That from and after the passage of this act, the entrance of the harbours and waters of the United States, and of the territories thereof, be, and the same is hereby interdicted to all public ships and vessels belonging to Great Britain or France, excepting vessels only which may be forced in by distress, or which are charged with despatches or business from the government to which they belong, and also packets having no cargo or merchandise on board. And if any public ship or vessel as aforesaid, not being included in the exception above mentioned, shall enter any harbour or waters within the jurisdiction of the United States, or the territories thereof, it shall be lawful

* See document No. 1, herewith submitted.

† See page 56.

for the president of the United States, or such other person as he shall have empowered for that purpose, to employ such part of the land and naval forces, or of the militia of the United States, or the territories thereof, as he shall deem necessary, *to compel such ship or vessel to depart.*

Sec. 3. *And be it further enacted,* That from and after the twentieth day of May next, the entrance of the harbours and waters of the United States, and the territories thereof be, and the same is hereby interdicted to all ships or vessels sailing under the flag of Great Britain or France, or owned in whole or in part by any citizens or subjects of either; vessels hired, chartered or employed by the government of either country, for the sole purpose of carrying letters or despatches, and also vessels forced in by stress or by the dangers of the sea, only excepted. And if any ship or vessel sailing under the flag of Great Britain or France, or owned in whole or in part by any citizen or subject of either, and not excepted as aforesaid, shall, after the twentieth day of May next, arrive either with or without a cargo, within the limits of the United States, or of the territories thereof, such ship or vessel, together with the cargo, if any, which may be found on board, shall be forfeited; and may be seized and condemned in any court of the United States or the territories thereof, having competent jurisdiction: and all and every act and acts heretofore passed, which shall be within the purview of this act, shall be, and the same are hereby repealed.

Sec. 4. *And be it further enacted,* That from and after the twentieth day of May next, it shall not be lawful to import into the United States or the territories thereof, any goods, wares, or merchandise whatever, from any port or place situated in Great Britain or Ireland, or from any of the colonies or dependencies of Great Britain; nor from any port or place situated in France, or in any of her colonies or dependencies, nor from any port or place in the actual possession of either Great Britain or France. Nor shall it be lawful to import into the United States, or the territories thereof, from any foreign port or place whatever, any goods, wares, or merchandise whatever, being of the growth, produce, or manufacture of France, or of any of her colonies or dependencies; or being of the growth, produce, or manufacture of Great Britain, or Ireland, or of any of the colonies or dependencies of Great Britain; or being of the growth, produce, or manufacture of any place or country in the actual possession of either France or Great Britain: *provided,* that nothing herein contained shall be construed to affect the cargoes of ships wholly owned by a citizen or citizens of the United States, which had cleared from any port beyond the Cape of Good Hope, prior to the twenty-second day of December, one thousand eight hundred and seven, or which had departed for such port by permission of the president, under the acts supplementary to the act laying an embargo on all ships and vessels in the ports and harbours of the United States.

Sec. 11. *And be it further enacted,* That the president of the United States be, and he hereby is authorised, in case either France or Great Britain shall so revoke or modify her edicts, as that they shall cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States, to declare the same by proclamation; after which the trade of the United States, suspended by this act, and by the act laying an embargo on all ships and vessels in the ports and harbours of the United States, and the several acts supplementary thereto, may be renewed with the nation so doing: *provided,* that all penalties and forfeitures which shall have been previously incurred, by virtue of this or of any other act, the operation of which shall so cease and determine, shall be recovered and distributed, in like manner as if the same had continued in full force and virtue: and vessels bound thereafter to any foreign port or place, with which commercial intercourse shall by virtue of this section be again permitted, shall give bond to the United States with approved security, in double the value of the vessel and cargo, that they shall not proceed to any foreign port, nor trade with any country other than those with which commercial intercourse shall have been or may be permitted by this act. *Enacted March 1, 1809.*

I have already stated, that this law was preposterously and absurdly denounced, as feeble and imbecile, by ninety-nine out of every hundred democrats, in the United States. An impar-

tial view of it will prove the folly of this denunciation. It evinces a deep sense of the grievous injuries the nation had sustained from the belligerents—a sincere wish to return to the relations of peace and friendship with either or both—and an ardent desire to try every rational mode of procuring redress previous to a recourse to the horrors of war.

It held out in one hand prohibition and penalty for wrongs inflicted—in the other “the Olive Branch”—an invitation to, and premium for, a mere return to justice—a mere cessation of unprovoked hostility. The statute books of all the nations of Christendom may be searched in vain, for a law entitled to more unequivocal applause—and rarely has a law been more generally censured.

The federalists reprobated this act as well as the democrats—and with equal folly and madness—but on totally different grounds. They regarded it, forsooth, as too violent a measure—as calculated to produce war—or, in fact, absurdly enough, as a species of warfare !

“Sir, the bill before you is *war*. It is to suspend *all intercourse*, to put an end to *all the relations of amity*. *WHAT IS THAT but war ? War of the worst kind ; war under the disguise of NON-INTERCOURSE ; no power, having national feelings, or regard to national character, will SUBMIT to such COERCION.*”*

“It [non-intercourse] is cowardly ; *for it is a base attempt to bring on a war with Great Britain*. It is *FRENCH in every feature*. *It is intended as a measure of hostility against Great Britain.*”†

CHAPTER XXIX.‡

Embargo once more. Recommended to Congress by a respectable body of merchants in New-York.

THIS shall be a short chapter. Three minutes will be sufficient to glance it over. I hope, however, it will not be the least interesting in the book.

The embargo, we have seen, was enacted in December, 1807, to preserve the property of the American merchants from depredation under French decrees and British orders in council—and likewise to coerce the belligerents, through regard to their own interests, to cease violating our rights.

The merchants, and their friends universally, throughout the nation, reprobated this measure. Independent of its pretended unconstitutionality, it was denounced as tyrannical, and oppressive, and unjust towards our fellow citizens—as feeble, and imbecile, and inefficient towards those nations whose insults and outrages it was intended to prevent. *

* Mr. Hillhouse's speech on the non-intercourse bill before the senate, February 22, 1809.

† Boston Repertory.

‡ This chapter is out of its chronological order ; but its immediate connection with the subject of the preceding one, has induced me to place it here.

That these sentiments pervaded the mercantile part of the community in 1807-8, I presume no man of character will dare deny.

Consistency is commendable. Let us enquire how far the merchants practised it. On the 15th of June, 1812, a memorial was presented to Congress, from certain merchants in New-York, praying for a continuance of the embargo, and the restrictive system generally!

You are amazed, reader. You can hardly believe me. You are persuaded that I am not serious—that I am putting your credulity to a severe trial.

You are “all in the wrong.” I am as perfectly serious as I have ever been. And to remove all doubt on the subject, behold the memorial—and behold also the names of the signers—forty-two federalists and sixteen democrats. Yes—deny it, who can. Here are forty-two federal merchants, invoking congress to continue the much-abused “*restrictive system*,” as likely to *extort justice from Great Britain*.

MEMORIAL.

To the honourable the senate and house of representatives of the United States of America in congress assembled, the memorial of the subscribers, merchants and others, inhabitants of the city of New-York, respectfully sheweth:

That your memorialists feel, in common with the rest of their fellow citizens, an anxious solicitude for the honour and interests of their country, and an equal determination to assert and maintain them.

That your memorialists believe that **A CONTINUATION OF THE RESTRICTIVE MEASURES NOW IN OPERATION, WILL PRODUCE ALL THE BENEFITS, WHILE IT PREVENTS THE CALAMITIES OF WAR;** that when the British ministry become convinced that a trade with the United States cannot be renewed, but by the repeal of the orders in council, *the distress of their merchants and manufacturers, and their inability to support their armies in Spain and Portugal, will probably compel them to that measure!*

Your memorialists beg leave to remark, that *such effects are even now visible;* and it may be reasonably hoped, that a continuance of the embargo and non-importation laws a few months beyond the fourth day of July next, **WILL EFFECT A COMPLETE AND BLOODLESS TRIUMPH OF OUR RIGHTS.**

Your memorialists therefore *respectfully solicit of your honourable body, the passage of a law continuing the embargo,* and giving to the president of the United States power to discontinue the whole of the restrictive system on the rescinding of the British orders in council.

The conduct of France in burning our ships, in sequestrating our property entering her ports, expecting protection in consequence of the promised repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees, and the delay in completing a treaty with the American minister, has excited great sensation: and we hope and trust will call forth from your honourable body such retaliatory measures as may be best calculated to procure justice.

John Jacob Astor,
Samuel Adams,
Howland and Grinnel,
E. Slosson,
Israel Gibbs,
Isaac Clason,
John Slidell,

John T. Lawrence,
Joseph W. Totten,
Isaac Schermerhorn,
Alexander Ruden,
Joseph Otis,
Lewis Hartman,
Garrett Storm,

Amasa Jackson,
William J. Robinson,
Joseph Strong,
Abraham S. Hallot,
Joshua Jones,
Frederic Giraud, jun.
Robert Roberts,

John K. Townsend,
Andrew Ogden, & Co.
Thomas Storm,
Amos Butler,
Ebenezer Burrill,
Isaac Heyer,
Ralph Bulkley,
Samuel Bell,
John F. Delaplaine,
Peter Staggs,
David Taylor,
William Adees,
New York, June 1, 1812.

George Bement,
S. A. Rich,
Abraham Smith,
Thomas H. Smith, jr.
Andrew Foster,
Jacob Barker,
William Lovett,
William Edgar, jr.
Samuel Stillwell,
Jacob P. Giraud,
John Hone,
John Kane,

John Crookes,
Hugh McCormick,
John Depeyster,
Gilbert Haight,
James Lovett,
Leffert Lefferts,
Augustus Wynkoop,
John W. Gale,
Thomas Rich,
Samuel Marshall,
Elbert Herring.

A member of congress, Mr. Taylor, stated that he was informed there were on that list the names of two presidents of banks, three presidents of insurance companies, thirteen directors of banks, besides other names of "*pre-eminent standing in the commercial world.*" Ponder, I beseech you, reader, on these things. They demand the most sober and serious consideration. The embargo, and the restrictive system generally, after having been defeated and rendered nugatory by mercantile opposition, are now, by the merchants themselves, proclaimed to the world as likely to effect "*a bloodless triumph of our rights.*" What a severe satire on themselves; what a strong panegyric on their opponents—this short sentence contains!

CHAPTER XXX.

The Erskine arrangement. A most liberal and magnanimous procedure, probably never exceeded. Loudly applauded by all parties. Rejected by England.

NEVER was there a measure of more fairness and candour, than the arrangement made by our government with Mr. Erskine. The annals of diplomacy may be ransacked in vain to produce a negotiation more deserving of encomium, or more honourable to both parties. In forty-four days after Mr. Madison's inauguration, Mr. Erskine made candid overtures to our government for an accommodation of the existing differences between the two nations. They were received with a proper spirit of frankness, and with a promptitude never exceeded. The overtures were dated on the 17th of April—the reply the same day—Mr. Erskine's second letter, and the reply of the secretary of state on the 18th. And, both parties being sincerely desirous of a reconciliation, an equitable arrangement was adjusted in two days, that is to say, on the 19th, whereby neither the honour nor the interest of either nation was compromised. Friendly intercourse between them was once more restored. Never was a negotiation conducted on more liberal or candid principles. It was manly and magnanimous—and affords one of the very few instances in which diplomacy was divested of her usual attendants, chicane and fraud.

To enable the reader to form a correct opinion on this subject, I annex the whole of the correspondence between our government and the British minister. It will then appear that the transaction can hardly be too highly eulogised.

(No. I.)

MR. ERSKINE TO MR. SMITH.

Washington, 17th April, 1809.

"Sir—I have the honour to inform you, that I have received his majesty's commands to represent to the government of the United States, that his majesty is animated by the most sincere desire for an adjustment of the differences, which have unhappily so long prevailed between the two countries, the recapitulation of which might have a tendency to impede, if not prevent an amicable understanding.

"It having been represented to his majesty's government, that the congress of the United States, in their proceedings at the opening of the last session, had evinced an intention of passing certain laws, which would place the relations of Great Britain with the United States upon an equal footing, in all respects, with other belligerent powers, I have accordingly received his majesty's commands, in the event of such laws taking place, to offer, on the part of his majesty, an honourable reparation for the aggression, committed by a British naval officer, in the attack on the United States' frigate Chesapeake.

"Considering the act, passed by the congress of the United States on the first of March, (usually termed the non-intercourse act) as having produced a state of equality, in the relations of the two belligerent powers, with respect to the United States, I have to submit, conformably to instructions, for the consideration of the American government, such terms of satisfaction and reparation, as, his majesty is induced to believe, will be accepted, in the same spirit of conciliation, with which they are proposed.

"In addition to the prompt disavowal made by his majesty, on being apprized of the unauthorised act committed by his naval officer, whose recall, as a mark of the king's displeasure, from an highly important and honourable command, immediately ensued, his majesty is willing to restore the men forcibly taken out of the Chesapeake, and, if acceptable to the American government, to make a suitable provision for the unfortunate sufferers on that occasion.

"I have the honour to be, with sentiments of the highest respect and consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

"D. M. ERSKINE.

The hon. Robert Smith, esq. secretary of State, &c.

(No. II.)

MR. SMITH TO MR. ERSKINE.

Department of State, April 17, 1809.

"Sir—I have laid before the president your note in which you have, in the name and by the order of his Britannic majesty, declared that his Britannic majesty is desirous of making an honourable reparation for the aggression committed by a British naval officer in the attack on the United States' frigate the Chesapeake; that, in addition to his prompt disavowal of the act, his majesty, as a mark of his displeasure, did immediately recall the offending officer from a highly important and honourable command; and that he is willing to restore the men forcibly taken out of the Chesapeake; and, if acceptable to the American government, to make a suitable provision for the unfortunate sufferers on that occasion.

"The government of the United States having, at all times, entertained a sincere desire for an adjustment of the differences, which have so long and so unhappily subsisted between the two countries, the president cannot but receive with pleasure, assurances, that his Britannic majesty is animated by the same disposition; and that he is ready, in conformity to this disposition, to make atonement for the insult and aggression, committed by one of his naval officers in the attack on the United States' frigate, the Chesapeake."

"As it appears, at the same time, that, in making this offer, his Britannic majesty derives a motive from the equality, now existing in the relations of the United States, with the two belligerent powers, the president owes it to the occasion, and to himself, to let it be understood, that this equality is a result incident to a state of things, growing out of distinct considerations.

"With this explanation, as requisite as it is frank, I am authorised to inform you, that the president accepts of the note delivered by you, in the name and by the order of his Britannic majesty; and will consider the same, with the engagement contained therein, when fulfilled, as a satisfaction for the insult and injury of which he has complained. But I have it in express charge from the president, to state, that while he forbears to insist on a further punishment of the offending officer, he is not the less sensible of the justice and utility of such an example, nor the less persuaded that it would best comport with what is due from his Britannic majesty to his own honour.

"I have the honour to be, with the highest respect and consideration, sir, your most obedient servant,

"R. SMITH."

The honourable David M. Erskine, esq. envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of his Britannic majesty.

(No. III.)

MR. ERSKINE TO MR. SMITH.

Washington, April, 18, 1809.

"Sir—I have the honour of informing you, that his majesty, having been persuaded that the honourable reparation which he has caused to be tendered for the unauthorised attack upon the American frigate Chesapeake, would be accepted by the government of the United States in the same spirit of conciliation, with which it was proposed, has instructed me to express his satisfaction, should such a happy termination of that affair take place; not only as having removed a painful cause of difference, but as affording a fair prospect of a complete and cordial understanding being re-established between the two countries.

"The favourable change in the relations of his majesty with the United States, which has been produced by the act (usually termed the non-intercourse act) passed in the last session of congress, was also anticipated by his majesty; and has encouraged a further hope, that the re-consideration of the existing differences might lead to their satisfactory adjustment.

"On these grounds and expectations, I am instructed to communicate to the American government, his majesty's determination of sending to the United States an envoy extraordinary, invested with full powers to conclude a treaty on all the points of the relations between the two countries.

"In the mean time, with a view to contribute to the attainment of so desirable an object; his majesty would be willing to withdraw his orders in council of January and November, 1807, so far as respects the United States, in the persuasion that the president of the United States would issue a proclamation for the renewal of the intercourse with Great Britain; and that whatever difference of opinion should arise in the interpretation of the terms of such an agreement will be removed in the proposed negotiation.

"I have the honour to be, with sentiments of the highest consideration and esteem, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

"D. M. ERSKINE."

"Honourable Robert Smith, Esq. &c. &c."

(No. IV.)

MR. SMITH TO MR. ERSKINE.

Department of State, April 18, 1809.

"Sir—The note which I had the honour of receiving from you this day, I lost no time in laying before the president, who being sincerely desirous of a satisfactory adjustment of the differences unhappily existing between Great Britain and the United States, has authorised me to assure you, that he will meet, with a disposition correspondent with that of his Britannic majesty, the determination of his majesty to send to the United States a special envoy, invested with

full powers to conclude a treaty on all the points of the relations between the two countries.

"I am further authorised to assure you, that in case his Britannic majesty should, in the mean time, withdraw his orders in council of January and November, 1807, so far as respects the United States, the president will not fail to issue a proclamation by virtue of the authority, and for the purposes specified in the eleventh section of the statute, commonly called the non-intercourse act. I have the honour, &c. &c.

R. SMITH."

(No. V.)

MR. ERSKINE TO MR. SMITH.

Washington, April 19, 1809.

"Sir—In consequence of the acceptance, by the president, as stated in your letter dated the eighteenth instant, of the proposals made by me on the part of his majesty, in my letter of the same day, for the renewal of the intercourse between the respective countries, I am authorised to declare, that his majesty's orders in council of January and November, 1807, will have been withdrawn as respects the United States, on the tenth day of June next. I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

D. M. ERSKINE."

Honourable Robert Smith, &c. &c.

(No. VI.)

MR. SMITH TO MR. ERSKINE.

Department of State, April 19, 1809.

"Sir—Having laid before the president your note of this day, containing an assurance, that his Britannic majesty will, on the tenth day of June next, have withdrawn his orders in council of January and November, 1807, as far as respects the United States, I have the honour of informing you, that the president will accordingly, and in pursuance of the eleventh section of the statute, commonly called the non-intercourse act, issue a proclamation, so that the trade of the United States with Great Britain may on the same day be renewed, in the manner provided in the said section. I have the honour, &c. &c.

R. SMITH."

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

A PROCLAMATION.

"Whereas it is provided by the eleventh section of the act of congress, entitled "An act to interdict the commercial intercourse between the United States and Great Britain and France, and their dependencies; and for other purposes;" that "in case either France or Great Britain shall so revoke or modify her edicts as that they shall cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States," the president is authorised to declare the same by proclamation; after which the trade suspended by the said act, and by an act laying an embargo on all ships and vessels in the ports and harbours of the United States, and the several acts supplementary thereto, may be renewed with the nation so doing. And whereas the honourable David Montague Erskine, his Britannic majesty's envoy extraordinary, and minister plenipotentiary, has, by the order and in the name of his sovereign, declared to this government, that the British orders in council of January and November, 1807, will have been withdrawn as respects the United States, on the tenth day of June next: Now, therefore, I JAMES MADISON, President of the United States, do hereby proclaim, that the orders in council aforesaid will have been withdrawn on the said tenth day of June next: after which day the trade of the United States with Great Britain, as suspended by the act of congress above mentioned, and an act laying an embargo on all ships and vessels in the ports and harbours of the United States, and the several acts supplementary thereto, may be renewed.

L. S.

"Given under my hand and the seal of the United States, at Washington, the nineteenth day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and nine, and of the Independence of the United States, the thirty-third."

By the President,

R. SMITH, *Secretary of State.*

JAMES MADISON.

Never was a measure more loudly or unanimously applauded. Parties agreed in their encomiums on the act and the actors, who hardly ever before or since, accorded on any subject. The federalists cannot have forgotten—if they have, history will not forget—that they repeatedly asserted, in the most confident terms, that England had been at all times ready to do us justice ; —that it had been in the power of Mr. Jefferson, at any period of his administration, to have procured equally fair and honourable terms ; and that nothing but his profligate devotion to France, and deadly hostility to England, had prevented an equitable adjustment of all our differences. Mr. Madison was hailed as a truly American president. He was invited to federal entertainments—claimed as a federalist and a Washingtonian—and halcyon days of peace and plenty were augured under his administration, which was indubitably to usher in a political millennium. The farce was carried on to such an extent by the federalists, that the democrats grew jealous. They were fearful of losing the attachment of the president, whose election they had made such exertions to secure.

In an evil hour for the United States and Great Britain, this honourable arrangement was fatuitously and dishonourably rejected by the British ministry ; and thus the two countries were once more involved in the most vexatious discussions.

So far as respects the administration of Mr. Madison, this affair affords the most indubitable evidence of the utter falsehood of the charge of French Influence,* with which the wide welkin has rung, and which has been, and is, as firmly believed by hun-

* In every age, and every nation, there has been, and is some slang prevalent, by which the people are besotted, bereft of their reason, and led "to play such pranks before high heaven, as make e'en angels weep." Who is ignorant of the magical effects in Great Britain of the cry, "the church is in danger," whereby the severities and restrictions under which the protestant dissenters groaned for about one hundred and fifty years, were firmly riveted on them. The charge of "*French influence*" in the United States has been so often reiterated, and so generally believed, that it appears to thousands of our citizens both impertinent and absurd to doubt its existence. But there never has been the shadow of proof of its existence alleged. And I feel perfectly confident, that there are thousands of Englishmen in various parts of the United States, particularly in our sea-ports, any one of whom takes a more active part in our politics, and has more influence on our affairs, than any twenty Frenchmen. Talleyrand's observation on this subject is perfectly just. "In every part of America through which I have travelled, I have not found a single Englishman, who did not feel himself to be an American ; nor a single Frenchman who did not find himself a stranger."*

There are Frenchmen in New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore, who have been naturalised ten, twenty, and even thirty years, who do not interfere so

* Memoir on the Commercial Relations of the United States with England page 18.

dreds of thousands of our citizens, as any portion of "holy writ." Had there been the slightest particle of that noxious influence in our cabinet, it could not have failed to prevent such a rapid movement as healing the long-enduring and cankered breaches between the two countries in two days.

Never in the annals of mankind, did a rooted, inveterate, and contemptible prejudice exist, so completely, so unanswerably borne down by a strong and irrefutable fact, as in this case is the accusation of French influence: and yet no more attention has been paid to the strong and irresistible fact, than if it had not the slightest bearing whatever on the subject. Throughout the whole of Mr. Madison's administration, this senseless, absurd, and jacobinical cry of "French influence" has disturbed the harmony of the country—endangered its peace—and produced the most magical effects, on "the most enlightened nation in the world."

The conduct of the federalists respecting this celebrated instrument, was to the last degree inconsistent and indefensible—

They were, after it was agreed upon, as I have stated, unanimous and loud in their applause of England, for her magnanimity in offering, and of Mr. Madison, for his patriotism and public spirit in accepting, the terms proposed by Mr. Erskine. The force of the language was exhausted, in panegyrical strains. All the praises of Mr. Madison were accompanied by direct or insinuated abuse of his predecessor. The two presidents appeared like the two ends of a scale-beam. In proportion as one rose, the other sunk. Mr. Madison was elevated among the celestials—Mr. Jefferson precipitated among the infernals. There was hardly one of the party from New Hampshire to Georgia, who did not assert, that had Mr. Jefferson been disposed, he might have made an arrangement on as favourable terms at any time during his administration—for England had been at all times equally inclined to do us justice.

But when England rejected this arrangement—when she gave the lie direct to all their asseverations of her willingness to adjust the differences between the two countries, on fair and honourable principles—they still defended her. They assailed, and abused, and vilified, and degraded their own government. And Mr. Madison, who had been placed among the stars of heaven, sunk down at once below the horizon into pitchy darkness, with his predecessor. And for what? Had he committed any crime to warrant this change of opinion? No. Had he altered the

much in our politics as English, Scotch, and Irishmen frequently do within the first month after their arrival. I have never, in thirty years, known three Frenchmen in Philadelphia who took an active part in our politics. Many of them rarely exercise the elective franchise.

system of conduct which had been so highly extolled? No. His only crime was, *that England broke the faith her minister had so solemnly pledged to him, and to this cruelly-injured and outraged country!!!!!!* Alas! alas! poor human nature!

To establish fully what I have asserted, I annex extracts from the federal papers and speeches, published before and after the fatal, the monstrous, the absurd rejection of this arrangement.

"We owe it to Mr. Madison and his cabinet to say, and we do it with pride and pleasure, that they have come forward with a degree of promptitude and manliness which reflects much honour on them and the country. Mr. Madison has now done what Mr. Jefferson was requested by the British government to do in the note appended to the treaty returned by him. Mr. Madison is now effectually resisting the French decrees, by a total non-intercourse with that country; and this country will thank him for it to the latest generation." United States Gazette, April 24, 1809.

"The candour, liberality, and sincerity displayed in those documents, are alike honourable to the two governments." Poulson's American Daily Advertiser, April 22, 1809.

"The non-intercourse with France, which congress threatened, Nov. 22, 1808, and really enacted March 1st, 1809, takes place on 20th May next—this measure against France produced what no measure against England alone could obtain. *England was to be won with signs of justice and impartiality; and yielded to these considerations what she would not yield either to threats or force.*" Boston Repertory, May 9, 1809.

"Nothing here said is designed to reflect on Mr. Madison as the president of the United States. IN THE FIRST ACT IN WHICH HE HAS BEEN CALLED UPON HE HAS BEHAVED WITH WISDOM. *May he go on so.* Mr. Madison thus far has in fact acted ministerially; that is, pursuant to an act of congress, or the generally expressed voices of his countrymen." Idem.

"We will not stop to enquire whether the spirited and vigorous measures of New England—their determined public declarations that they would not submit to an unnecessary and destructive war, has induced the administration to listen to the same terms which Great Britain has always been ready to offer, and to which we have uniformly contended she was sincerely disposed." Boston Gazette, April 1809.

"That Mr. Madison does not wish to embroil us with England, we are now thoroughly convinced; *while he continues to pursue an honest and impartial policy, where he makes one enemy, he will gain a dozen friends.*" Baltimore Federal Republican, as quoted by the Philadelphia Gazette, June 22, 1809.

"Scarcely was Mr. Madison seated in the chair of state, when, contrary to all our expectations, but agreeably to our wishes, *he gave the lie to all his electioneering advocates; abandoned practically and in the face of the world the policy and course of the sage; and concluded with Mr. Erskine an agreement, which, knocking the ignominious hand-cuffs from our hands, unmooring our ships, rejoicing our hearts, and elevating our hopes, drew from the union (the jacobins excepted) an unfeigned burst of heart-cheering applause. Never statesman did an act more popular or more conducive to the true and permanent interest of his country.*" Philadelphia Gazette, June 23, 1809.

"The public documents which we this day have the satisfaction of laying before our readers are of a highly pleasing and interesting character. The note of Mr. Erskine furnishes satisfactory evidence of a real disposition on the part of his government to adjust, on permanent principles, the long subsisting differences with this country; and Mr. Smith's answer to that note evinces a candour and promptitude equally honourable to the views and wishes of the American administration. *While both parties are governed by this spirit of confidence in the assurances of each other, we can foresee no possible circumstance to impede*

their arriving at a full, liberal, and advantageous accommodation." *Philadelphia Gazette*, June 19, 1809.

"We sincerely trust that an enlightened administration will continue by its measures of prudence, economy, and wisdom, to increase the mortification and rage of men, *aliens* to the true interests and honour of our country." *Ib.*

On the second of May, 1809, Mr. Randolph moved in the house of Representatives of the United States, the following resolution—

"*Resolved*, That the promptitude and frankness with which the President of the United States has met the overtures of the government of Great Britain towards a restoration of harmony and free commercial intercourse between the two nations, meet the approbation of this house."

This occasioned a long debate, in which the federalists were universally in favour of the motion. Mr. Barent Gardenier was among the most ardent eulogists of Mr. Madison. There appeared to be no bounds to his applause.

"This tree from which we expected to gather only the fruit of bitterness and sorrow, is already yielding us fruit far different—gladness and unspeakable joy. To speak in the language of the resolution, '*the promptitude and frankness with which the president has met the overtures of Great Britain*,' while they receive the applause and gratitude of the nation, call not less imperiously for an unequivocal expression of them by this house.

"I must say that I do like the words '*promptitude and frankness*.'" The compliment they convey is highly merited, as I shall endeavour to prove.

"For bringing about this state of things, *I yield my hearty approbation to the president of the United States*; and I believe that when none of us could see the end of our troubles, the president was secretly conducting us to the late happy results.

"But at last that state of things **ORIGINALLY PROPOSED BY GREAT BRITAIN**, has been brought about, both as it regards the equality contended for, and as regards the assurance of resistance desired. The proclamation being removed, a fair adjustment could meet with no impediment from that cause. *And it is a melancholy fact, in this respect there never would have been an impediment, if this government had been willing to do originally what it has at last consented to do.*

"It is for the *promptitude and frankness* with which the president met this overture, that I thank him most cordially in behalf of my country. I approve it most heartily.

"And it is now in proof before us, as I have always said and contended, that **NOTHING** was wanting but a proper spirit of conciliation—nothing but fair and honourable dealing on the part of **THIS** country, to bring to a happy issue all the fictitious differences between this country and Great Britain; and that is now acknowledged to be true, for saying which, I have been so much censured—censured, because it suited the purposes of some people, to attribute to me a confidence in the justice of the British government, which did not become an American citizen.

"The president, very properly relying on the assurances of the British minister, that the edicts of Great Britain *would have been withdrawn*, on or before the 20th of June then next, authorised a renewal of intercourse after that day."

The governor of Massachusetts, in his speech to the legislature, unites his praises with those of Mr. Gardenier—

"We have great reason to indulge the hope of realizing those views [arising from a revival of commerce] from the prompt and amicable disposition, with which it is understood the *present* federal administration met the conciliatory

overtures of Great Britain—a disposition which is entitled to, and will certainly receive the hearty approbation of every one who sincerely loves the peace and prosperity of the nation.”

The senate and house of representatives re-echo this encomiastic strain :

“The present administration of the general government has had the wisdom to discern, and the patriotism to commence, a course of policy respecting our commerce and foreign relations, which is calculated to promote the prosperity, and to secure the peace and independence of our country.”

“The prompt acceptance by the federal administration of the conciliatory overtures of Great Britain, which opened the door for the removal of those grievous embarrassments by which the industry and enterprize of our citizens have been so long paralyzed, meets the approbation, and will ensure the support of this commonwealth.”

Messrs. Wagner and Hanson chimed in with the general strain of approbation, which was carried to the utmost extent, in order, by the contrast, to blacken the character of the former administration.

“Sophistry is busily at work in the democratic papers, to show that the accommodation with England is the result of the democratic plans—that is to say, of the embargo and non-intercourse law. If this could be made to appear, it would so far absolve their authors from the ruin and sufferings imposed by those laws, as to prove that they had some effect. But the common sense of the people is proof against the delusion; who are persuaded that what was so easily effected in April last, might have been done long before, and the nation been thereby saved from the humiliation of retiring from the exercise of its rights upon the ocean, as well as the immense loss it has suffered, and continues to sustain in the decay and depreciation of its produce. Every reflecting mind feels this at once; nor does it require any circuitous argument to be convinced, that a persevering and ardent opposition to these democratic juggles, and not a voluntary abandonment of them, broke the embargo, and placed France and Great Britain upon that equal footing, which the LATTER UNIFORMLY DECLARED WOULD INDUCE HER TO COMPROMISE.”

“Sincere and general as has been the joy spread by the return of a good understanding with England, will be the indignation, which at no distant day, a calm review of the snares which have been laid to entrap our peace, and extinguish our prosperity, will unavoidably inspire. The current of the disapprobation of this conspiracy is not at a stand. It has much greater progress to make; nor will it stop until it places an insuperable bar against even the aspiring party which, till lately, has lorded it without opposition over the state of Maryland.”*

I shall add to these extracts the sentiments of Mr. Coleman, editor of the New-York Evening Post, which are as strong and decisive as any of the others.

“Look at the files of this paper for a twelve month. You will find it insisted upon that *Great Britain wished for an adjustment of differences, and would come to an accommodation the moment we gave her a chance to do so, by placing her on an equal footing with France.*—Mr. Erskine very promptly begins, by stating, on our government’s placing England on a footing with France, England will make reparation—JUST PRECISELY WHAT I HAVE SAID A HUNDRED TIMES OVER IN THIS PAPER, SHE WOULD VERY GLADLY DO.

“The first part of the second resolution accompanying the report of the committee of foreign relations, contemplated an arrangement by which the respective belligerents would be placed in a state of equality as to the exclusion of

* Federal Republican, July 4, 1809.

their ships of war from our harbours. This report was sent to England; and immediately the British minister DIRECTED Mr. Erskine to make the propositions which have lately been acceded to and published, provided any measure *was adopted* which would place *Great Britain* in a state of equality with *her enemies*, as to the admission or exclusion of her ships of war from our harbours. The NON-INTERCOURSE ACT WAS OF THIS NATURE. Mr. Erskine stated the *intentions of his government*, and an agreement has been made.”*

“Well may the merchants of Alexandria rejoice at Mr. Madison’s return to the good old principle of FEDERALISM. Let the *crazy* professors of *Jeffersonism* give themselves up to weeping and wailing, and all the afflicting stings of jealousy and mortification. The federalists WILL pay homage to Mr. Madison, while he continues to pursue the course he has taken.”†

Relying on the good faith of Great Britain, our government immediately removed the restrictions on her commerce; restored the intercourse between the two nations to the state in which it had been previous to the misunderstanding; and naturally expected to be met on the same fair and honourable ground by the other contracting party. But other counsels fatally prevailed at St. James’s. The solemn contract made by its minister plenipotentiary was rejected on the ground of his having “exceeded his instructions.”

Had Mr. Erskine made a wanton sacrifice of the honour and interests of his country—the rejection of his arrangement might be palliated, perhaps justified. But no man who has any regard to his character, will pretend this to have been the case. Both were equally secured. And to prevent any difficulty in the adjustment of the dispute—to evince more fully Mr. Madison’s sincere wish for harmony, the thorny and difficult subject of impressment was laid aside for future negotiation.

“But Mr. Erskine exceeded his instructions.” What, in the name of heaven, I ask, must have been the instructions that did not warrant an envoy extraordinary to propose or ratify such an arrangement; so simple, so fair, and so honourable?

But admitting for a moment, that Mr. Erskine exceeded his instructions—or let us even suppose that he had made this arrangement of his own mere motion, without any instructions whatever—what reasonable objection could be made to it? Could the most partial friend of England, if actuated by honourable views, require better terms?

Let us analyse this arrangement—let us state the *quid pro quo*—

To America it offered

1. A repeal of the orders in council—
2. Atonement for the outrage on the Chesapeake.

* New York Evening Post, April 26, 1809.

† Federal Republican.

‡ The mass of the extracts in this chapter are chiefly taken from “Things as they are.”

To England

1. A restoration of all the immense advantages of the most valuable commerce in the world—

2. A continuation of the suspension of intercourse between the United States and France.

I freely appeal at this moment to George Cabot, James Lloyd, jr. governor Strong, Timothy Pickering, Alexander Contee Hanson, or to Lord Castlereagh, to decide whether there were any thing in these terms that could warrant the government of a mighty nation to break the faith pledged by its minister—and to attach shame, disgrace, and dishonour to that minister in the eyes of his own nation and of the whole world? Neither of these gentlemen will dare to aver that there was.

The reader who has perused with attention the Erskine arrangement, and considered the advantageous terms it insured to England, will be struck with surprise at its rejection. He will naturally ask, by what ill-starred and fatal councils were the British ministry influenced? This is a question not easily answered. I shall attempt a solution.

A recurrence to the 26th chapter of this work, will show the tumultuous, disorganizing, and jacobinical proceedings that occurred in Massachusetts in the early part of the year 1809. Open resistance to the embargo was advocated in the news papers—preached from the pulpit—plainly menaced in the legislature—and publicly proclaimed in inflammatory resolutions of town meetings.

Intelligence of these disgraceful, these jacobinical proceedings reached England contemporaneously with the account of Mr. Erskine's arrangement. It is highly probable that the British ministry deceived themselves into the opinion that our government would be obliged to abandon the restrictive system altogether; that they would then be able to enforce the orders in council, without losing the advantages of our trade; and that these considerations induced them to reject the arrangement.

This I offer merely as a conjecture. That it is plausible cannot be denied. But in our times there will probably be no opportunity of fully ascertaining how far it is correct.

Another reason has been assigned. It is said that George III. was irritated at the implied censure of his government respecting the conduct of admiral Berkeley, which, it is asserted, so far wounded his feelings as to induce him to reject the arrangement. Many of our citizens have defended the rejection on this ground. Let us calmly and boldly investigate the affair.

The United States are in a state of profound peace. One of their frigates leaves port. She expects no attack. She is therefore unprepared for resistance. She is followed by a vessel of superior force, belonging to a friendly power. This vessel has just enjoyed the hospitalities of our ports. She overtakes our frigate,

She imperiously demands four seamen, said to be British. British or Americans, they had entered voluntarily. And let it be borne in remembrance, the demand is made by a nation which holds in bondage, thousands of our citizens, who, in the pursuit of their lawful vocations, have been seized by force and violence, and often with bloodshed and desperate wounds. And further let it be also borne in remembrance, the demand is made by a nation which HAS PROCLAIMED, AS AN IRREVOCABLE LAW TO ALL THE WORLD, that *she will hold, at every hazard, those seamen, natives of whatsoever country they may be, who enter her service voluntarily.** The demand is repelled. Our frigate is attacked. Our unresisting citizens are cruelly murdered!!! The decks of the vessel flow with blood!! She is taken. The crew is overhauled. Four of them are outrageously seized, and made prisoners. One is ignominiously hanged!! The other three, fully proved to be impressed Americans, are held in bondage—I can go no farther—My pen refuses its office—Does not this blood cry to heaven for vengeance on the murderers? Can the foul stain be effaced but with blood? “Whoso sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed.”

But, reader, I was wrong. My feelings led me astray. The atonement was worthy of the justice of the monarch whose subjects perpetrated—worthy of the nation which suffered—the horrible outrage. For “*Admiral Berkley was recalled from a highly important and honourable command, as a mark of the king’s displeasure! !*”† But let it be added, he was recalled to be placed on a better station.—He was removed from Halifax to be stationed at Lisbon‡—And this was the only mark of displeasure he ever experienced. In 1810, he was promoted from the rank of vice-admiral to that of admiral. He is now lord high admiral of Portugal.

To be serious. Every man of a correct mind and sound principles felt that his Britannic majesty owed it to himself to have displayed his disapprobation of the foul deed in some decisive mode. The offender ought to have been severely punished. And therefore it is impossible not to approve the dignified but mild style in which the president treats the transaction:—

“I am authorised to inform you, that the president accepts of the note delivered by you, in the name and by the order of his Britannic majesty; and will consider the same, with the engagement contained therein, when fulfilled, as a *satisfaction for the insult and injury of which he has complained.* But I have it in express charge from the president to state, that while he forbears to insist on a further punishment of the offending officer, *he is not the less sensible of the jus-*

* This reason, a complete *sic volo, sic jubeo—stat pro ratione voluntas*—has been repeatedly assigned, to justify a refusal of the surrender of natives of America, held in bondage on board British vessels of war, when claimed by the proper agents of our government.

† See Mr. Erskine’s letter No. 1.

‡ The outrage was committed in June. He did not leave Halifax till December.

rice and utility of such an example, nor the less persuaded that it would best comport with what is due from his Britannic majesty to his own honour."

To enable us to form a correct idea of this transaction, let us suppose that commodore Barron had anchored in Portsmouth or Plymouth—that twenty of his sailors had voluntarily entered on board a British frigate—that he had demanded them—had followed the frigate to sea—attacked her—killed part of her crew—seized as many as he judged proper—and, finally, to cap the climax, hanged one of them. What would be the result? Vengeance! vengeance! would have been the cry from the Orkneys to the Land's End—and nothing would appease the insulted dignity of England, but Copenhagenizing New-York, or Baltimore, or Philadelphia, or Charleston.

"My dear sir, one of my oxen has gored one of your cows."
 "Well, to be sure, you will make reparation—you will send me a cow in the place of the one I have lost. To that you cannot make any objections." "It is all very right. But hold, I mistook. It is all the other way. *It was your ox that gored my cow.*" So, so, we'll see about it. Call some other time."
 "My good sir—this is not very correct. *The business would have been soon settled, had you been as willing to do justice to others, as to receive it from them.*"

SINCE the above was written, I have consulted Mr. Canning's despatches to Mr. Erskine, by which it appears that the British government calculated on Mr. Erskine's adjusting the differences between the two nations on the following basis :

Extract of a letter from Mr. Canning, secretary, to the honourable David M. Erskine, dated Foreign Office, January 23, 1809.

"1. That the American government is prepared in the event of his majesty's consenting to withdraw the orders in council of January and November, 1807, to withdraw contemporaneously on its part the interdiction of its harbours to ships of war, and all non-intercourse and non-importation acts, so far as respects Great Britain; leaving them in force with respect to France, and the powers which adopt or act under her decrees.

"2. (What is of the utmost importance, as precluding a new source of misunderstanding which might arise after the adjustment of the other questions) **THAT AMERICA IS WILLING TO RENOUNCE, DURING THE PRESENT WAR, THE PRETENSIONS OF CARRYING ON, IN TIME OF WAR, ALL TRADE WITH THE ENEMIES' COLONIES, FROM WHICH SHE WAS EXCLUDED DURING PEACE!!!**

"3. Great Britain, for the purpose of securing the operation of the embargo, and of the *bona fide* intention of America to prevent her citizens from trading with France, and the powers adopting and acting under the French decrees, **IS TO BE CONSIDERED AS BEING AT LIBERTY TO CAPTURE ALL SUCH AMERICAN VESSELS AS MAY BE FOUND ATTEMPTING TO TRADE WITH THE PORTS OF ANY OF THESE POWERS!!!** without which security for the observance of the embargo, the raising of it nominally with respect to Great Britain alone, would, in fact, raise it with respect to all the world.

"On these conditions his majesty would consent to withdraw the orders in council of January and November, 1807, so far as respects America."

Let us examine this most precious document with all the attention its importance demands. Let us weigh its every line—its every word. Let us see what justice, what fair dealing it meted out to this injured, this insulted, this plundered nation. Let us see how far the advocates of English liberality and English justice are borne out in their commendations of England, and their intemperate abuse of their own government.

The orders in council, existing at the date of the Erskine arrangement, blockaded France, Holland, and a part of Italy; containing a population of about fifty millions of people.

By Mr. Canning's instructions to Mr. Erskine, these orders were to be rescinded on three conditions—

1. Taking off all restrictions from the English commerce.
2. "Renouncing, during the existing war, *all trade* with the enemies' colonies from which we were excluded in time of peace:" in other words, assenting by treaty to the unjust and exploded rule of 1756.
3. Allowing the British to capture our vessels bound to France and her dependencies; WHICH, reader, is NEITHER MORE NOR LESS, THAN WEAVING THE ORDERS IN COUNCIL INTO A TREATY—and giving our own solemn sanction to the extravagant pretensions of Great Britain to limit our trade, which pretensions we had steadily resisted.

Stupendous injustice!—Never before were such revolting propositions made to any nation, not absolutely subjugated. What! Make a treaty by which we should let loose upon our defenceless commerce, the whole host of the thousand public ships of war, and hundreds of privateers, of the greatest naval power in the world! The mind is lost in astonishment at such an unparalleled requisition.

But gross, and insulting, and outrageous as was this proposition—destructive as its acceptance would have been to the vital interests of this country—there was, I believe, no federal printer from New Hampshire to Georgia, that expressed a single word of censure of the conduct of England for her daring and insulting demands, or for her breach of the contract. No. England was uniformly right—their own government as uniformly wrong. It seemed impossible for England to commit any act, or make any demand that would not be justified—

Let me establish these allegations—

"It having been shewn, that the plea of ignorance is inadmissible in the case of the Erskine arrangement; that it was the secretary's duty to know the power of the minister before he proceeded to act upon it; that to act upon an unknown power, is to act without power: it follows that our administration, if they understood their business, must have been aware that *they were negotiating with an unauthorised individual*; unauthorised quoad hoc, as to this particular subject; with one *who had shewn no authority for the purpose*. Consequently they had no reason to rely on, nor to expect, a fulfilment of the compact by the British government, *knowing, as they did, that it had been agreed upon without*

any adequate information of the terms having been authorized by that government."

United States Gazette, Dec. 11, 1809.

"No expression has escaped any member of the British cabinet, either in parliament or elsewhere, making indecorous insinuations against the United States, or manifesting a temper unfriendly to conciliation. On the contrary they have declared a *wish to renew amicable negotiation*; having named a minister for that purpose; and, with at least apparent sincerity, have expressed their fears that this unfortunate error of Mr. Erskine may increase the difficulties of a friendly arrangement between the two countries." United States' Gazette, October 5, 1809.

"By letters from well-informed men in England, we are assured that *the conduct of Mr. Erskine is condemned by all parties in that country*; that the temper of the public is far beyond that of the ministry. A very general opinion prevails there, that it will be very difficult to keep any terms with this country; *that we are governed by men devoted to the interests of France, who are determined to insist on terms from England which never can be obtained!!!*" Boston Palladium, August 11, 1809.

"It is a truth which the wisest and best patriots of America have long and seriously deplored, that *the past administration had furnished no symptom of impartiality between the two belligerents*, previous to the act inhibiting the entrance of our ports to the armed vessels of the one as well as of the other. In that spirit which Mr. Smith still retains, and now labours to revive in the bosom of others, *hostility to England and tame subserviency to France, are known to have been its characteristic features!!!* The facts are in the possession of every man; which prove that the feelings of the great body of the people, not their leaders, preserved us from a war in which a complete success would have riveted chains on ourselves." United States' Gazette, October 18, 1809.

"For our part, *we have had but one opinion from the commencement of this mysterious affair*; and we have made bold to express it. It is, that *Mr. Erskine acted contrary to his instructions!!!* and that *secretary Smith knew what these instructions were!!!*" Ibid.

"In short, *Mr. Erskine surrendered every thing, and got nothing in return!!!*" Ibid.

"*The people have been flagrantly deceived, and grossly abused!!!* The matter rests between *Mr. Erskine and our administration!!!* Wherever the blame shall attach, it is for the people to apply or originate the remedy." Federal Republican, July 31.

Mr. Hanson states, that "*Mr. Erskine surrendered every thing, and got nothing in return!*" What a stupendous disregard of fact is embraced in these few words! It is impossible to exceed it. What did he surrender? Merely the odious, the unjust orders in council! And did he receive nothing in return? Was the immense trade of the United States nothing? Was it nothing to perpetuate the non-intercourse with France, till she rescinded her piratical decrees? I aver in the face of this nation, and defy Mr. Hanson to controvert the fact, that England gained immensely—and that she surrendered nothing but what justice ought to have induced her to have surrendered long before, of her own accord.

"He [Mr. Erskine] also declares that the British government have undoubtedly a right to disavow the agreement; and *they have done every thing that became an honourable nation to prevent evil consequences arising to the citizens of this country from trusting to the terms of the agreement being fulfilled.*" United States' Gazette, October 5, 1809.

"It will be observed that this show of words, and these negative statements, after all, by the president, serve only to make the public believe, that *he had no reason to apprehend a disavowal.* He is not hardy enough to say, that under the circumstances of the case, *the British government was bound to abide by Ex-*

skine's act ; or that they conducted perfidiously in disavowing it. Yet this aspersion, one of the most injurious and provoking that can be thrown upon a nation, has been uttered, and incessantly repeated, for several months, in every democratic paper in the union." United States' Gazette, December 20, 1809.

"If, as asserted by Mr. Erskine, his powers were communicated to our cabinet in substance ; if the heads of departments did early communicate to the leading members of both branches of their own politics, *the incompetency of his powers, and the probability of the rejection of the agreement by Great Britain ;* then that adjustment, *so far from being a proof of a disposition to make peace and settle our differences,* IS THE STRONGEST EVIDENCE OF A HOSTILE TEMPER : because Mr. Madison knew, that the revulsion and the disappointment occasioned by it among our citizens, would excite new clamours, and would break to pieces that formidable phalanx of men, who, during our embarrassments, had learned to speak and think more favourably, and of course more justly, of Great Britain." United States' Gazette, December 9, 1809.

"If such has been his aim (and perhaps a deeper politician does not exist) it has been completely attained. His own party are again roused to a war pitch. *Even some federalists are open in their censure of Great Britain for DOING HER DUTY TO HERSELF,* and exercising a right we have always claimed and received ; and other federalists doubt, and are in favour of waiting to hear Mr. Erskine's explanation, and STILL PROPOSE TO PLACE AN ILL DESERVED CONFIDENCE IN MR. MADISON." *Ibid.*

On this last paragraph I shall make but one observation, to which I request attention. It is, that according to the United States' Gazette, it was, in December, "THE DUTY" OF ENGLAND "TO HERSELF," to reject an arrangement which the same Gazette in April stated *she had repeatedly in vain pressed on Mr. Jefferson!!!*

Now, my dear reader, whoever you be, that have come thus far with me, let me solemnly invoke you, in the name of the living God, to make a pause here. As you value your beloved country—as you prize its honour—its happiness—your own welfare—the happiness, the welfare of your posterity—review this whole subject. I must once more bring it before your eyes.

A British envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary informs our government that he has orders to propose an arrangement of two or three leading points of difference between the two countries, preparatory to a treaty. His overtures are accepted. An arrangement is made. It is highly advantageous to both nations, but more particularly to that of the envoy. There is not the slightest sacrifice of its honour or interest. After this arrangement is completed, we are assured a thousand times that England had been always ready to arrange our differences on these very terms. The United States' Gazette, and other opposition newspapers, expressly state that "she had repeatedly requested Mr. Jefferson to do the same thing."—And yet, when the compact is rejected, these same papers assert that the envoy extraordinary had no power to make the convention—defend England for the breach of her engagement—and, as I have already stated, transfer the odium to their own government!!! No powers of language are adequate to express the astonishment, the indignation this procedure excites.

To facilitate a comparison of the astonishing, the never-enough-to-be-lamented contradictions of opinion that were promulgated on this subject, by the same persons, for the purpose of poisoning the public mind, I place in opposite columns some of the statements that preceded, and those that followed the rejection of the Erskine arrangement. The human mind cannot conceive any thing more completely inconsistent.

BEFORE REJECTION.

"As to the revocation of the *orders in council* it is merely necessary to observe, that the *terms*, which our government has *now* accepted, *might have been obtained at any time past*; **THEY WERE ALWAYS IN OUR POWER.**" Federal Republican, May 3, 1809.

"Let Mr. Erskine's overture for an accommodation be viewed in whatever light it may suit democratic ingenuity to place it, and they will find that the delusion so long kept up is effectually dissipated; their *diabolical* schemes completely frustrated.

"Great Britain, in the *true spirit of amity*, is *willing to meet us.*" Idem.

"To the honour of England, and the confusion of *French* spies, and convict fugitives from the British dominions, her ministry seized the first favourable moment to make honourable reparation for the insult offered our flag, and to negotiate a commercial treaty." Idem, April 25.

"The authority vested in Mr. Erskine to offer the terms to this government which have been acceded to, was merely provisional, and was not to be exercised unless the anticipated change in our political relations, on which they were predicated, should take place. Mr. Erskine has since received *positive* instructions from his government to make the arrangement already concluded. These *new instructions*, which manifest the *earnest* desire of England to heal the differences between the two countries, are occasioned by a knowledge that the non-intercourse law had actually passed, placing the belligerents on a fair footing of impartiality. In spite of all the intrigues and deceptions of the French party, we are convinced that a happy termination will be put to our disputes with England."

Fed. Rep. June 17.

"It was the policy of Mr. Jefferson to keep alive in the midst of our peo-

AFTER REJECTION.

"What was but a few days ago a doubtful point, is now settled by the publication of Mr. Erskine's instructions. Sufficient information has been received, to convince all candid persons, that the rancour with which the English cabinet has been pursued, and the violent abuse with which it has been assailed, was *undeserved*. We do not entertain a doubt, when all the circumstances shall have been disclosed, that *it will appear that secretary Smith actually saw Erskine's instructions*; and that the arrangement was made, merely as an experiment. We feel confident that the thing will be put upon this footing. *If then the United States will be ultimately injured by this act, they will judge where the blame lies.*"

Fed. Rep. July 27, 1809.

"Our cabinet, certainly not a little interested in strengthening the cause of democracy, have prevailed upon Mr. Erskine to do an act which has extricated their party from the most embarrassing and difficult situation that it was possible for them to be placed in, which they [the cabinet] knew would not be ratified: they at a single dash, rid themselves of all the obnoxious measures which brought so much ridicule and disgrace upon their party, and have contrived for a time, to heap odium upon England. In the next place by seeming to improve the first opportunity of an arrangement with England, they disproved to appearance the charge of animosity to England and partiality for France."

"These were the important advantages which Mr. Secretary Smith flattered himself would be the fruit of his cunning. By effecting an arrangement which he knew was unauthorized on the part of Mr. Erskine, and would necessarily be rejected by the British government; he calculated

BEFORE REJECTION.

ple a perpetual irritation against the government of Great Britain; we are happy to find that Mr. Madison has more liberal views.

Fed. Rep. June 10, 1809.

"Peace with England The war party and French partizans are thrown into complete confusion. The perseverance of the Eastern States, aided by the returning sense of a formidable body of the people to the Southward, have **DRIVEN ADMINISTRATION FROM ITS GROUND**. Since Mr. Jefferson has retired in disgrace into private life, his successor has been compelled to abandon the ruinous policy under which the country has so long suffered. With the magnanimity and frankness characteristic of a great and enlightened nation, England made a second attempt to renew the terms of amity and peace between the two nations. The particulars of the correspondence between Mr. Erskine and the secretary of state are given in this day's paper. It proves what we have so often repeated, and which has ever been stubbornly denied by the democrats, that Great Britain was always influenced by a sincere desire to accommodate her unfortunate differences with America. The preservation of the country has grown out of the efforts of the minority of congress."

Idem, April 21, 1809.

"We shall not stop to inquire whether the spirited and vigorous measures of New England—their determined public declarations that they would not submit to an unnecessary and destructive war, have induced the administration to listen to the same terms which Great Britain has always been ready to offer, and to which we have uniformly contended she was sincerely disposed."

Boston Gaz. April, 1809.

AFTER REJECTION.

that the administration would be rendered greatly popular, and the resentment of the people proportionably augmented against England, whenever the disavowal should be received. Whenever it shall be made to appear that the nation has been deceived, the trick will recoil upon the Secretary and his party with tenfold effect. The American people cannot bear knavery and imposition. If they discover that a fraud has been practised upon them at home, the attempt to raise a clamour against others, will be found but a poor protection to their popularity." Idem.

"Those who were most violent at first in calumniating England, are now willing at least to suspend their decision, if not to admit that our own cabinet in some measure will participate in Mr. Erskine's blame."

Fed. Rep. Aug. 2, 1809.

"Every one acknowledges, that had our executive concluded the arrangement of April last, with Mr. Erskine, knowing that he was unauthorised, the whole responsibility for the consequences, however serious, would have rested upon themselves. It has been maintained by the editor of this Gazette, and is now demonstrated by the indubitable authorities, adduced by Mr. Dana, that to have done so without knowing that he was authorised, was equally unwarrantable, and left the administration no ground on which to claim a ratification of the proceeding by the British government. It is proved beyond a doubt, that the government might, with just as much propriety, have cajoled with general Smith, or any other individual; concluded a convention; proceeded to carry it into execution on their part: and then raised a clamour against the government of Great Britain, and accused them of perfidy and breach of faith for not recognizing and fulfilling the stipulations."

Idem. Dec. 28, 1809.

A folio volume might be filled with such frothy, elaborate, and anti-American defences of the British, and inculpations of the United States' government. But I feel satisfied that I have produced enough; that none but the wilfully blind can deny, that no cause could ever boast of more ardent, more zealous, or more industrious advocates than the cause of Great Britain has experienced in Boston, New-York, and Philadelphia: and that there

never was an administration pursued with more remorseless virulence, and with less semblance of justice, than Mr. Madison's has been in this instance.

After the reader has carefully perused those wretched attempts to palliate the miserable folly and madness of the British ministry in the rejection of such an advantageous and honourable arrangement of the differences between the two nations, and to transfer from that ministry the high degree of odium it so justly deserved, to the administration of the American government, I beg he will attentively examine the following view of the subject, taken from Bell's Weekly Messenger, of which the truth and candour are entitled to the highest approbation :

"But the point of fact is, that the disavowal of Mr. Erskine's act is of a piece with the general conduct of England towards America. Whenever circumstances have in any way admitted it, our tone towards America has always been insulting, and our conduct every thing but friendly. Every new hope on the continent; every straw to the drowning expectations of Europe has but aggravated this unworthy sentiment. In our prosperity we have bullied America; and when things are not so well with us, we have vented our strife in injurious language and unworthy conduct towards her. Whilst there were any hopes in Spain, America could get nothing direct from us. But disappointment brought us to our senses, and the negotiation was renewed. The coalition war on the continent has since broke out, and we begin to repent of our condescension.

"In this manner has the American negotiation been on and off, during some years.—Our demands rising with our hopes and prosperity, and our moderation co-existent with our disappointment."*

CHAPTER XXXI.

Impressment of American seamen. Plea of James Madison. Of John Quincy Adams. Of Wm. Cobbett. Of Weekly Register.

AN idea is very prevalent, that the impressment of our seamen by the British vessels of war is a grievance of little moment, to which the malice entertained by our administration against England, has attached an importance of which it is utterly undeserving. Hundreds of thousands of our citizens have been duped into the belief, that this item of grievance was created under Mr. Jefferson, or at least incalculably exaggerated by him and his successor. Never was there a more egregious error. Never was fraud more successful in propagating—never was factitious credulity more deceived in believing—a tale as foreign from the truth as Erebus is from Heaven.

Mr. Madison has been ten thousand times cursed for his folly and wickedness in involving this country in war for the purpose of securing a few seamen, said to be vagabond English, Irish, and Scotchmen, the scum of the earth, from the claims of their lawful prince. It has been asserted that few or none of the natives of this country are impressed—that when such an acci-

* The chief part of the extracts in this chapter are taken from "Things as they are," written and published by H. Niles, editor of the Weekly Register

dent takes place, redress is easily had—and further, that England is, and has at all times been, ready to make any arrangement whereby our sailors may be guarded against impressment, provided she can be secured against the loss of hers.

These assertions are utterly false. From the commencement of the war of the French revolution, to the late declaration of hostilities, this has been a constant, unceasing subject of reclamation and complaint to the British government, as well under the administrations of General Washington and Mr. Adams, as under those of Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Madison. And disgraceful, dishonourable, and infamous, would it have been to any of the presidents, had they been deaf to the complaints, and callous to the sufferings, of the American slaves, stolen by force and fraud from their families, and freedom, and favoured country, to perish, fighting the battles of their enslavers.

“The practice has no parallel, either for atrocity or extent, in any thing of modern times, but the business of negro stealing on the coast of unfortunate Africa.”*

I submit to the reader the following eloquent and unanswerable pleas against this nefarious practice. They so far transcend any thing I could myself write on the subject, that I shall deserve thanks for sparing my own, and substituting these lucubrations.

From the instructions of James Madison, esq. secretary of state, to James Monroe, esq. minister plenipotentiary at the court of London.

“Were it allowable that British subjects should be taken out of American vessels on the high seas, it might at least be required that *the proof of their allegiance should lie on the British side*. This obvious and just rule is however reversed. And every seaman on board, though going from an American port, sailing under an American flag, and sometimes even speaking an idiom proving him not to be a British subject, is presumed to be such, *unless proved to be an American citizen*. It may be safely affirmed, that *this is an outrage which has no precedent, and which Great Britain would be among the last nations in the world to suffer, if offered to her own subjects, and her own flag*.

“Great Britain has the less to say on the subject, as it is in *direct contradiction to the principles on which she proceeds in other cases*. Whilst she claims and seizes on the high seas, her own subjects voluntarily serving in American vessels, she has constantly given, when she could give, as a reason for not discharging from her service American citizens, that they had voluntarily engaged in it. Nay more, whilst she impresses her own subjects from the American service, although they have been settled, and married, and naturalized in the United States, she constantly refuses to release from her’s, American seamen pressed into it, whenever she can give for a reason, that they are either settled, or married, within her dominions. *Thus, when the voluntary consent of the individual favours her pretensions, she pleads the validity of that consent, When the voluntary consent of the individual stands in the way of her pretensions, it goes for nothing. When marriage or residence can be pleaded in her favour, she avails herself of the plea. When marriage, residence, and naturalization are against her, no respect whatever is paid to either. She takes, by force, her own subjects voluntarily serving in our vessels. She keeps by force American citizens involuntarily serving in her’s. More flagrant inconsistencies cannot be imagined.*”

* Weekly Register.

Never, since the world was formed, was there a stronger, or more irresistible train of argument, or collection of facts, than in the preceding paragraph. Never were flagrant injustice, outrage, and violence more completely established, and eternally shut out from the possibility of defence.

From a letter of John Q. Adams, esq. to H. G. Otis, esq.

"The impressed American citizens, however, upon *duly authenticated proof*, are delivered up. Indeed ! how unreasonable then were complaint ! how effectual a remedy for the wrong ! an American vessel, bound to an European port, has two, three, or four native Americans impressed by a British man of war, bound to the East or West Indies. When the American captain arrives at his port of destination, he makes his protest, and sends it to the nearest American minister or consul. When he returns home, he transmits the duplicate of his protest to the Secretary of State. In process of time, the names of the impressed men, and of the ship into which they have been impressed, are received by the agent in London. He makes his demand that the men may be delivered up—the lords of the admiralty, after a considerable time for enquiry and advisement, return for answer, that *the ship is on a foreign station, and their lordships can therefore take no further steps in the matter*—or, that the ship has been taken, and that the men have been received in exchange for French prisoners—or, that they had no *protections* (the impressing officers often having taken them from the men)—or, that the men were *probably British subjects* ; or, that they had entered, and taken the bounty ; (to which the officers know how to reduce them)—or, that they have been married, or settled in England. In all these cases, without further ceremony, their discharge is refused. Sometimes, their lordships, in a vein of humour, inform the agent that the man has been discharged as *unserviceable*. Sometimes, in a sterner tone, they say he is an *impostor*. Or, perhaps by way of consolation to his relatives and friends, they report that he has fallen in battle, against nations in amity with his country. Sometimes they coolly return, that there is *no such man on board the ship* : and what has become of him, the agonies of a wife and children in his native land may be left to conjecture. When all these and many other apologies for refusal fail, the native American seaman is discharged—and when, by the charitable aid of his government, he has found his way home, he comes to be informed, that *all is as it should be—that the number of his fellow sufferers is small—that it was impossible to distinguish him from an Englishman—and that he was delivered up, on duly authenticated proof.*"

Extract from Cobbett's Register.

"Our ships of war, when they meet an American vessel at sea, board her, and take out of her by force, any seamen, whom our officers assert to be British subjects. *There is no rule by which they are bound. They act at discretion ; and the consequence is, that great numbers of native Americans have been impressed, and great numbers of them are now in our navy.* The total number so held at any one time cannot, perhaps, be ascertained ; but from a statement published in America, it appears that Mr. Lyman, the late consul here, stated the number, about two years ago, at FOURTEEN THOUSAND. That many of these men have died on board our ships—that many have been wounded—that many have been killed in action—and that many have been worn out in the service, there can be no doubt. Some obtain their release through the application of the American consul here : and of these the sufferers have in many instances been very great. There have been instances where men have thus got free after having been flogged through the fleet for desertion.

"But it has been asked, whether we are not to take our sailors where we find them ? To which America answers, yes ; but take only your own : "*take,*" said Mr. Lyman, "*your whole pound of flesh ; but not a drop of blood.*" She says that she wishes not to have in her ships any British sailors : and she is willing to give them up, whenever the fact of their being British sailors can be proved. Let them, she says, be brought before any magistrate, or any public civil authority, in any one of your own ports, at home or abroad ; and she is willing to

abide by the decision. But, let not men be seized in her ships upon the high seas (and sometimes at the mouths of her own rivers) where there is no body to judge between the parties, and *where the British officer going on board is at once ACCUSER, WITNESS, JUDGE, and CAPTOR !*"

From Niles's Weekly Register, vol. 3, page 303.

"If the most dignified officer in the naval service of our enemy were to plunder neutral vessels of a *box of cod-fish*, or a *bale of cotton*, on suspicion that it was even *enemy's property*, it might cost him his whole fortune, with an ignominious dismissal. The law of nations allows him to send in the vessel for adjudication: and it becomes him to prove the fact he suspected. If he fail in this, he is often mulcted in heavy damages by the courts of law of his own country. But *in the business of man-stealing*, he is judge and jury—he takes when and where he pleases, and is irresponsible for his conduct. If complaint be made, he silences it by the broad plea, "*that his majesty wanted men*:" and if the man stolen is restored to liberty after years of dangers and servitude, without one cent for his hazard and toils, *there are knaves who produce his case in evidence of "British magnanimity!"*

After the reader has carefully perused the preceding arguments, I request he will read and compare the sentiments of Mr. Pickering on the subject of impressment at two different periods, the first when he was secretary of state, and the second when he was senator of the United States.

Mr. Pickering, 1796.

"*The British naval officers often impress SWEDES, DANES, and OTHER FOREIGNERS, from the vessels of the U. States. THEY HAVE EVEN SOMETIMES IMPRESSED FRENCHMEN!* If there should be time to make out the copy of a protest lately received, it shall be enclosed, describing the impress of A DANE and A PORTUGUESE. This surely is an abuse easy to correct. *They cannot pretend an inability to distinguish these foreigners from their own subjects. They may with as much reason rob the American vessels of the property or merchandise of the Swedes, Danes, or Portuguese, as seize and detain in their service the subjects of those nations found on board American vessels.* The president is extremely anxious to have this business of impress placed on a reasonable footing."*

Mr. Pickering, 1808.

"The evil we complain of arises from the impossibility of always distinguishing the persons of two nations who a few years since were one people, who exhibit the same manners, speak the same language, and possess similar features.†

"The British ships of war, agreeably to a right claimed and exercised for ages; a right claimed and exercised during the whole of the administrations of Washington, of Adams, and of Jefferson, continue to take some of the British seamen found on board our merchant vessels,, and with them a SMALL NUMBER OF OUTS, FROM THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF DISTINGUISHING ENGLISHMEN FROM CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES.†

"It is perfectly well known that GREAT BRITAIN DESIRES TO OBTAIN ONLY HER OWN SUBJECTS.†

I cannot allow these extracts to pass without imploring the reader to ponder well on their contents—to compare them together carefully.—The history of the human race, from the earliest records of time, furnishes no stronger instance of contradiction, or inconsistency. Mr. Pickering, when his station as secretary of state, rendered it a duty to defend the rights of his country, clearly and explicitly asserts, that the British impressed

* Letter from Timothy Pickering, esq. secretary of state, to Rufus King, esq. minister at the court of London, dated October 26, 1796.

† Letter from Timothy Pickering, to honourable James Sullivan, governor of Massachusetts, February 1808, page 13.

Swedes, Danes, Portuguese, and even Frenchmen, from on board our vessels. Afterwards, to answer the purposes of faction, he states, in direct contradiction to facts of the utmost notoriety, that they impressed Americans merely through "the impossibility of distinguishing them from their own subjects!" What an awful perversion of facts!

CHAPTER XXXII.

Impressment during the administration of general Washington.

Extract of a letter from T. Jefferson, esq. secretary of state, to Thomas Pinckney, minister plenipotentiary of the United States at London, Department of State, June 11, 1792.

"The peculiar custom in England of impressing seamen on every appearance of war, will occasionally expose our seamen to peculiar oppressions and vexations. It will be expedient that you take proper opportunities, in the mean time, of conferring with the minister on this subject, in order to form some arrangement for the protection of our seamen on those occasions. We entirely reject the mode which was the subject of conversation between Mr. Morris and him; which was, that our seamen should carry about them certificates of their citizenship. *This is a condition never yet submitted to by any nation; one, with which seamen would never have the precaution to comply; the casualties of their calling would expose them to the constant destruction or loss of this paper evidence; and thus the British government would be armed with legal authority to impress the whole of our seamen.* The simplest rule will be, that the vessel being American, shall be evidence that the seamen on board of her are such. If they apprehend that our vessels might thus become asylums for the fugitives of their own nation from impress gangs, the number of men to be protected by a vessel may be limited by her tonnage; and one or two officers only be permitted to enter the vessel in order to examine the number; but *no press gang should be allowed ever to go on board an American vessel, till after it shall be found that there are more than the stipulated number on board, nor till after the master shall have refused to deliver the supernumeraries (to be named by himself) to the press officer who has come on board for that purpose; and even then the American consul shall be called in.* In order to urge a settlement of this point before a new occasion may arise, it may not be amiss to draw their attention to *the peculiar irritation excited on the last occasion, and the difficulty of avoiding our making immediate reprisals on their seamen here.* You will be so good as to communicate to me what shall pass on this subject, and it may be an article of convention to be entered into either there or here."

From the same to the same.

October 12, 1792.

"I enclose you a copy of a letter from Messrs. Blow and Melhado, merchants, of Virginia, complaining of the taking away of their sailors, on the coast of Africa, by the commander of a British armed vessel. *So many instances of this kind have happened,* that it is quite necessary their government should explain themselves on the subject, and be led to disavow and punish such conduct. I leave to your discretion to endeavour to obtain this satisfaction by such friendly discussions as may be most likely to produce the desired effect, and secure to our commerce that protection against British violence, which it has never experienced from any other nation. No law forbids the seaman of any nation, to engage in time of peace, on board a foreign vessel: no law authorises such seaman to break his contract, nor the armed vessels of his nation to interpose force for his rescue."

From the same to the same.

November 6, 1792.

"I enclose you now the copy of a letter from Mr. Pintard, our consul at Madeira, exhibiting another attempt at the practice on which I wrote to you in

my last, made by captain Hargood, of the British frigate *Hyæna*, to take seamen from on board an American vessel bound to the East Indies. It is unnecessary to develop to you the inconveniences of this conduct, and the impossibility of letting it go on. *I hope you will be able to make the British ministry sensible of the necessity of punishing the past and preventing the future.*"

Extract of a note from Mr. Jay, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States at London, to lord Grenville, secretary of foreign affairs, dated

London, July 30, 1809.

"The undersigned finds it also to be his duty to present, that the irregularities before mentioned extend not only to the capture and condemnation of American vessels and property, and to unusual and personal severities, but even to the impressment of American citizens, to serve on board of armed vessels. He forbears to dwell on the injuries done to those unfortunate individuals, or on the emotions which they must naturally excite, either in the breasts of the nation to which they belong, or of the just and humane of every country. His reliance on the justice and benevolence of his majesty, leads him to indulge a pleasing expectation, that orders will be given, that Americans so circumstanced be immediately liberated, and that persons honoured with his majesty's commissions do in future abstain from similar violences.

"It is with cordial satisfaction that the undersigned reflects on the impressions which such an equitable and conciliatory measure would make on the people of the United States, and how naturally they would inspire and cherish those sentiments and dispositions which never fail to preserve as well as to produce respect, esteem, and friendship."

Extract from the instructions given by Timothy Pickering, esq. secretary of state, to Rufus King, esq. minister at the court of London.

June 8, 1796.

The long and fruitless attempts that have been made to protect American seamen from British impresses, prove that the subject is in its nature difficult.

"The simplest rule would be, that the vessel being American, should be evidence that the seamen are such. But it will be an important point gained, if, on the high seas, our flag can protect those of whatever nation, who sail under it. And for this, humanity, as well as interest, powerfully plead. Merchant vessels carry no more hands than their safety renders necessary. To withdraw any of them on the ocean, is to expose both lives and property to destruction. We have a right then to expect, that the British government will make no difficulty in acceding to this very interesting provision. And the same motives should operate with nearly equal force, to procure for us the like exemption in all the British colonies, but especially in the West Indies. In the latter the consequence of an impress is the detention of the vessel. By the detention, the vessel is injured or destroyed by the worms, and the remnant of the crew exposed to the fatal diseases of the climate. Hence a longer detention ensues. The voyage becomes unprofitable to the merchant; and humanity deplores the loss of many valuable lives. But there is another cogent reason for an exemption from impresses in the British colonies—that THE PRACTICE WILL BE, AS IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN, SUBJECT TO MONSTROUS ABUSES; and the supreme power is so remote, that THE EVILS BECOME IRREMEDIAL, BEFORE REDRESS CAN EVEN BE SOUGHT FOR.

"To guard against abuses on the part of American citizens, every master of a vessel, on his arrival in any port of the British colonies, may be required to report his crew, at the proper office. If, afterwards, any addition be made to them by British subjects, these may be taken away. In the ports of Great Britain and Ireland, the impress of British subjects, found on board of our vessels, must doubtless be admitted. But this should be controlled by regulations to prevent insults and injuries, and to administer prompt relief where American citizens (which will assuredly happen) shall be mistaken for British subjects.

"There are three classes of men, concerning whom there can be no difficulty. 1. Native American citizens. 2. American citizens, wherever born, who were such at the definitive treaty of peace. 3. Foreigners, other than British subjects, sail-

ing in American vessels, and whose persons ought to be as sacred, as it respects the British, as those of native citizens. The 4th class consists of British born subjects, but who, or many of whom, may have become citizens subsequent to the treaty of peace, or who hereafter may be admitted to the rights of citizens. It is this class alone, about which any pretence of right to impress can be made. With regard to these, it may be attempted to protect them, as well in time of war as of peace, in the following cases: First, when they shall have served in American vessels, public or private, for the same term in which foreigners serving in British vessels would acquire the rights of British subjects, which is understood to be three years; or secondly, if so much cannot be obtained, when those persons, originally British subjects, shall have resided five years in the United States, and been formally admitted to the rights of citizens, according to our laws.

"It must often happen that sailors will lose their certificates; provision should therefore be made for the admission of other reasonable proof of their citizenship, such as their own oaths, with those of the masters, mates, or other creditable witnesses. The rolls of the crews, or shipping papers, may also be authenticated by the collectors of the customs; and then they ought to be admitted as of equal validity with the individual certificates."

From the same to the same.

September 10, 1796.

"I enclose a letter from Francis S. Taylor, deputy collector of Norfolk, respecting four impressed seamen. It appears to be written with candour, and merits attention. If, as the captain of the *Prevoyante* (Wemyss) says, the dignity of the British government will not permit an enquiry on board their ships for American seamen, *their doom is fixed for the war*; and thus **THE RIGHTS OF AN INDEPENDENT NATION ARE TO BE SACRIFICED TO BRITISH DIGNITY.** Justice requires that such enquiries and examinations be made; because, otherwise, the liberation of our seamen will be impossible. *For the British government, then, to make professions of respect to the rights of our citizens, and willingness to release them, and yet deny the only means of ascertaining those rights, is an insulting tantalism.*

"*If the British government have any regard to our rights, any respect for our nation, and place any value on our friendship, they will even facilitate to us the means of releasing our oppressed citizens.* The subject of our impressed seamen makes a part of our instructions; but the president now renews his desire that their relief may engage your special attention."

CHAPTER XXXIII.

Impressment during the administration of Mr. Adams. Letter from Rufus King. From Silas Talbot. From Timothy Pickering. Instructions of Judge Marshall to Rufus King.

I now proceed, in chronological order, to state the views of our government upon—the remonstrances of our public officers against—and the redress afforded or refused in—the odious outrage of impressment, during the administration of Mr. Adams.

I begin with Rufus King, esq. whose name, from the ground he now takes in politics, is a tower of strength on this subject.

"The subject [of impressment] in all its details, has come under my observation; and its importance, I confess, is much greater than I had supposed it. Instead of a few, and these in many instances equivocal cases, I have, since the month of July last, made application for the discharge from British men of war, of two hundred and seventy-one seamen, who, stating themselves to be Americans, have claimed my interference: of this number eighty-six have by the admiralty been ordered to be discharged: thirty-seven more have been detained

as British subjects, or as American volunteers, or for want of proof that they are Americans ; and to my applications for the discharge of the remaining one hundred and forty-eight, I have received no answer ; the ships on board of which these seamen were detained, having, in many instances, sailed before an examination was made, in consequence of my applications.

"It is certain, that some of those who have applied to me, are not American citizens. BUT THE EXCEPTIONS ARE IN MY OPINION FEW ; and the evidence, exclusive of certificates, has been such as in most cases to satisfy me that THE APPLICANTS WERE REAL AMERICANS, who had been forced into the British service ; and who with singular constancy have generally persevered in refusing pay and bounty, though in many instances they have been in service more than two years.

Timothy Pickering, esq. Secretary of State.

RUFUS KING.

To this document, I most earnestly invite and invoke the attention of the American nation, and of all the people of Christendom. It affords the most conclusive defence of the strong ground taken on this subject by the administration ; and sets the seal of eternal contradiction on the assertion, so often repeated, that the poor, miserable, enslaved, and by-his-country-abandoned sailor—the pride—the glory—the bulwark of that ungrateful country—is "*readily surrendered, when impressed by mistake.*" Let no man ever dare again to hazard the assertion. It is not true. It never was true.

Mr. King tells a plain story. He applied for the emancipation of 271 American slaves, forced to fight for their enslavers. Not quite a third were discharged : and more than one half of the whole number were debarred of any chance of redress, by a plain and simple process ; the vessels, on board of which they were, having "in many instances sailed before an examination was had in consequence of his application."

Extract of a letter from Silas Talbot, esq.

Kingston, July 4, 1797.

"Admiral Sir Hyde Parker, having gained information, that my application to the civil authority of this island, to obtain the release of such American citizens as were found to be detained on board his majesty's ships of war, had been attended with some success, he immediately issued a general order to all captains and commanders of ships and vessels of war, *directing them not to obey any writ of habeas corpus, nor suffer any men to leave their ships in consequence of any such writ.* Since the above-mentioned order was issued, writs have been obtained against captain Elphinstone, of the Tartar frigate, to produce three Americans, named in the writ, before the chief justice ; and against captain Foster, of the Albicore, to produce four ; and also, against captain Otway, of the Ceres frigate, to produce twenty Americans, in like manner before the chief justice. All those writs were served : but none of them was obeyed. Attachments against the said captains have been ordered by the court : and a writ of attachment against captain Otway was taken out fifteen days since. But the marshal has not been able, as he says, to serve it on captain Otway : and from all that I can learn, there is not any probability that he will serve the writ : so that *the laws in this island, it seems, cannot be administered for the relief of American citizens, who are held in British slavery ; many of whom, as they write me from on board captain Otway's ship, HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO THE GANGWAY, AND WHIPPED, FOR WRITING TO THEIR AGENT TO GET THEM DISCHARGED !*"

SILAS TALBOT

Timothy Pickering, esq. Secretary of State.

Here again we find what redress the American slave had to expect. He was brought to the gangway, and **IGNOMINIOUSLY SCOURGED** for daring to try to have his case taken into the cognizance of the American agent for the relief of impressed seamen!!!

Extract of a letter from the Secretary of State.

August 15, 1797.

"If any naval officer shall have committed such an outrage on any American seamen, as to **BRING THEM TO THE GANGWAY**, as you mention, or to inflict any kind of punishment on them, especially for seeking opportunities to inform you of their situation, for the purpose of obtaining the just relief to which they are entitled, pray endeavour to get proofs of the fact, that I may make it the subject of a special representation to the British government."

Silas Talbot, esq.

TIMOTHY PICKERING.

Extract of a Letter from the Same.

Trenton, October 3, 1797.

"Lord Grenville's observations on the act of congress for the relief and protection of American seamen, present difficulties which demand consideration at the ensuing session. But your reasoning in your letter to his lordship of the thirtieth of last November, is conclusive against the British pretences to retain real American seamen who are married in their dominions, or who have voluntarily entered on board British vessels. *It behoves the honour and faith of the British government, to adhere to their principle on natural allegiance wholly, or to renounce it wholly*: and an answer on this point would have become his lordship's candour.

"I consider colonel Talbot's agency in the West Indies to be no longer very important. *The rigid conduct of admiral sir Hyde Parker (who from the beginning has thrown obstacles in the way) leaves but little room to get our seamen released.* The opposition of the officers in general, induced colonel Talbot to take out writs of habeas corpus at Jamaica, by which, directly or in their consequences, *he obtained the discharge of nearly fifty seamen.* But admiral Parker has for some time past *forbidden his officers to pay any attention to such writs: and colonel Talbot informed me that some of our seamen have been punished for attempting to send letters to him to inform of their situation.*

"Mr. Liston assured me, that the British officers have orders not to impress any American seamen, and of course not to retain against their will any already impressed: but *if they persist in obstructing every channel of information and proof of their citizenship, such orders are, and will continue deceptive.*"

Rufus King, esq.

TIMOTHY PICKERING.

Extract of a letter from Rufus King, esq.

London, March 15, 1799.

"I mentioned our dissatisfaction with the continuation of the practice of taking out of our ships, met on the main ocean, such of their crews as did not possess certificates of American citizenship; denying, as I have often done, in former conferences, upon the same subject, any right on the part of Great Britain, upon which the practice could be founded; and suggesting that *our ships of war, by permission of our government, might with equal right, pursue the same practice toward their merchantmen*:

"That not only seamen who spoke the English language, and who were evidently English or American subjects, but also **ALL DANISH, SWEDISH, AND OTHER FOREIGN SEAMEN, WHO COULD NOT RECEIVE AMERICAN PROTECTIONS, WERE INDISCRIMINATELY TAKEN FROM THEIR VOLUNTARY SERVICE IN OUR NEUTRAL EMPLOY, and forced into the war in the naval service of Great Britain**:

"That on this subject **WE HAD AGAIN AND AGAIN OFFERED TO CONCUR IN A CONVENTION, WHICH WE THOUGHT PRACTICABLE TO BE FORMED, AND WHICH SHOULD SETTLE THESE QUESTIONS IN A MANNER THAT WOULD BE SATISFACTORY FOR ENGLAND AND SAFE FOR US.**

"That to decline such a convention, and to persist in a practice which we were persuaded could not be vindicated, especially to the extent it was carried, seemed less equitable and moderate than we had a right to expect :

"Lord Grenville stated no precise principle upon which he supposed this practice could be justified : and the conversation upon this point, like many others upon the same subject, ended without a prospect of satisfaction. *The French and Spaniards, and every other nation, might pursue the same conduct as rightfully as Great Britain does.* With respect to foreign seamen in our employ, *this government has, if I recollect, yielded the point, though their own officers continue the practice.* We are assured all Americans shall be discharged on application for that purpose, and that orders to this effect have been given to their naval commanders ; but *this is far short of satisfaction ; indeed, TO ACQUIESCE IN IT, IS TO GIVE UP THE RIGHT.*"

RUFUS KING.

Thomas Pickering, esq. secretary of state.

I beg the reader will most carefully and attentively re-peruse the second and third paragraphs of the preceding document.

The second confirms the statement made by Mr. Pickering, when secretary of state, that Danes, Swedes and other foreigners, were impressed out of our vessels—and utterly contradicts and disproves his recent declaration, that the impressment of our seamen arose from the difficulty of discriminating between an Englishman and an American. What a farcical procedure it would be, to seize *by mistake* upon Danes, and Swedes, and Portuguese, as Englishmen !

But the fact established by the third paragraph is still more important. It is, that this country "had again and again offered to settle these questions in a manner that would be satisfactory for England and safe for the United States :—" and further, that "England had declined such a convention." And yet, Mr. Pickering has confidently stated the contrary, in direct opposition to the fact, and to his own knowledge and experience.—I request attention to his declaration on this subject :—

"Our government well know, that Great Britain *is perfectly willing to adopt any arrangement that can be devised that will secure to her service the seamen who are her own subjects, and at the same time, exempt ours from impressment.*"*

"*No man who regards the truth, will question the disposition of the British government to adopt any arrangement that will secure to Great Britain the service of her own subjects.*"†

These facts and assertions scorn the aid of comment. The dullest and most Bæotian reader must be struck with the astonishing contradiction and inconsistency they display.

With Mr. Pickering I am almost wholly unacquainted. He is far advanced in years—and has held the highest and most confidential offices. He has been honoured with the regard and esteem of the party to which he belongs, of whom he is considered as one of the leaders. He has asserted of himself,

* Letter of the honourable Timothy Pickering to his excellency James Sullivan, governor of Massachusetts, February 16, 1808, page 13.

† *Idem*, page 8.

"I may claim some share of attention and credit; that share which is due to the man who defies the world to point, in the whole course of a long and public life, at one instance of deception; at a single departure from truth."*

He and his friends are called on to reconcile the above statements with the facts of the case. It will give pleasure if he can, at the close of his long career, justify himself on this point to his own conscience, and to his own country, before whose bar he is thus solemnly cited.

One other observation, and I dismiss this letter.—Mr. King explicitly states, and with perfect justice, that to acquiesce in the idea that the surrender of our seamen is a satisfaction for the injury, is to admit the right of impressment, against which he most zealously and patriotically contended.

Extract from a report of Timothy Pickering, esq. secretary of state, to Congress. December 9, 1799.

"Admiral Parker paid no attention to the agent's application on behalf of our impressed seamen; the admiral having determined, and informed the agent of the determination, that no proofs would be regarded by him, unless specially presented by the American government through the British minister; *nor then, but in the single case of native Americans.* Under this determination there will be detained, not only the subjects of his Britannic majesty, naturalised since the peace of 1783; but all who, born elsewhere, were then resident in, and had become citizens of the United States; also, all foreigners, as GERMANS, SWEDES, DANES, PORTUGUESE, AND ITALIANS, who voluntarily serve in the vessels of the United States. And it is a fact that **SUCH FOREIGNERS HAVE FREQUENTLY BEEN IMPRESSED**; although their language and other circumstances demonstrate **THAT THEY WERE NOT BRITISH SUBJECTS.**"

Here again we have Timothy Pickering, secretary of state, *versus* Timothy Pickering, senator of the United States. As secretary, he bears the strongest testimony on the subject of the latitudinarian principles on which impressment is conducted.

The subject strikes me in a new point of light. An American vessel is met at sea by a British frigate.—The crew are brought trembling before that right reverend and worshipful magistrate, the lieutenant. All who cannot speak plain English are seized;—as, being French, Germans, Danes, Italians, or Hottentots, they cannot be natives of the United States, and are not therefore entitled to protection from our flag. This scrutiny is soon over. Another then takes place. And of those who speak plain English, he seizes as many as he supposes, or pretends to suppose, to be British subjects!!! And yet we have men in elevated stations who defend this practice! Would to God that every man, how high, or how proud, or how exalted soever he be, who is an advocate for impressment, were himself impressed and enslaved on board a British man of war, with hard biscuit and junk beef for food, and a cat-o'-nine tails to

* Letter of the honourable Timothy Pickering to his excellency James Sullivan, governor of Massachusetts. February 16, 1808, page 13

his back, to punish his refractory spirit, in case he dared to complain !

Extract of a letter from John Marshall, esq. secretary of state, to Rufus King, esq. minister plenipotentiary of the United States at London, dated
Department of State, September 20, 1800.

“The impressment of our seamen is an injury of very serious magnitude, which deeply affects the feelings and the honour of the nation.

“This valuable class of men is composed of natives and foreigners, who engage voluntarily in our service.

“No right has been asserted to impress the natives of America. Yet they are impressed; they are dragged on board of British ships of war, with evidence of citizenship in their hands, and forced by violence there to serve, until conclusive testimonials of their birth can be obtained. These must most generally be sought for on this side of the Atlantic. In the mean time, **ACKNOWLEDGED VIOLENCE IS PRACTISED ON A CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES, BY COMPELLING HIM TO ENGAGE AND CONTINUE IN FOREIGN SERVICE.** Although the lords of the admiralty uniformly direct their discharge on the production of this testimony; **YET MANY MUST PERISH, UNRELIEVED, AND ALL ARE DETAINED A CONSIDERABLE TIME, IN LAWLESS AND INJURIOUS CONFINEMENT.**

“It is the duty, as well as the right, of a friendly nation, to require that measures be taken by the British government to prevent the continued repetition of such violence by its agents. This can only be done by punishing and frowning on those who perpetrate it. **THE MERE RELEASE OF THE INJURED, AFTER A LONG COURSE OF SERVING AND SUFFERING, IS NO COMPENSATION FOR THE PAST, AND NO SECURITY FOR THE FUTURE.** It is impossible not to believe that the decisive interference of the government in this respect, would prevent a practice, the continuance of which must inevitably produce discord between two nations, which ought to be the friends of each other.

“Those seamen who were born in a foreign country, and have been adopted by this, were either the subjects of Britain or some other power.

“The right to impress those who were British subjects has been asserted; and the right to impress those of every other nation has not been disclaimed.

“Neither the one practice nor the other can be justified.

“With the naturalization of foreigners, no other nation can interfere, further than the rights of that other are affected. The rights of Britain are certainly not affected by the naturalization of other than British subjects. Consequently, those persons, who, according to our laws, are citizens must be so considered by Britain, and every other power not having a conflicting claim to the person.

“THE UNITED STATES, THEREFORE, REQUIRE POSITIVELY, THAT THEIR SEAMEN WHO ARE NOT BRITISH SUBJECTS, WHETHER BORN IN AMERICA OR ELSEWHERE, SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM IMPRESSMENT.

“The case of British subjects, whether naturalized or not, is more questionable; but the right even to impress them is denied. The practice of the British government itself, may certainly, in a controversy with that government, be relied on. The privileges it claims and exercises, may certainly be ceded to others. To deny this would be to deny the equality of nations, and to make it a question of power and not of right.

“If the practice of the British government may be quoted, that practice is to maintain and defend in their sea-service all those, of any nation, who have voluntarily engaged in it, or who, according to their laws, have become British subjects.

“Alien seamen, not British subjects, engaged in our merchant service, ought to be equally exempt with citizens from impressments: we have a right to engage them, and have a right to, and an interest in, their persons, to the extent of the service contracted to be performed. *Britain has no pretext of right to their persons or to their service.* **TO TEAR THEM, THEN, FROM OUR POS-**

SESSION IS AT THE SAME TIME AN INSULT AND AN INJURY. IT IS AN ACT OF VIOLENCE FOR WHICH THERE EXISTS NO PALLIATIVE.

"We know well that the difficulty of distinguishing between native Americans and British subjects, has been used with respect to natives, as an apology for the injuries complained of. It is not pretended that this apology can be extended to the case of foreigners; and with respect to natives, we doubt the existence of the difficulty alleged. We know well that among that class of people called seamen, we can readily distinguish between a native American, and a person raised to manhood in Great Britain or Ireland; and we do not perceive any reason why the capacity of making this distinction should not be possessed in the same degree by one nation as by the other.

"If therefore no regulation can be formed which shall effectually secure all seamen on board American merchantmen, we have a right to expect from the justice of the British government, from its regard for the friendship of the United States and its own honour, that it will manifest the sincerity of its wishes to redress this offence, by punishing those who commit it.

"We hope, however, that an arrangement may be entered into, satisfactory and beneficial to both parties. The article which appears to have been transmitted by my predecessor, while it satisfies this country, will probably restore to the naval service of Great Britain a greater number of seamen than will be lost by it. Should we even be mistaken in this calculation, yet the difference cannot be put into competition with the mischief which may result from the irritation justly excited by this practice, throughout the United States. The extent and justice of the resentment it produces, may be estimated in Britain by inquiring what impressions would be made on them by similar conduct on the part of this government.

"Should we impress from the merchant service of Britain not only Americans but foreigners, and even British subjects, how long would such a course of injury unredressed be permitted to pass unrevenged? How long would the government be content with unsuccessful remonstrance? I believe, sir, that only the most prompt correction of, or compensation for, the abuse, would be admitted as satisfaction in such a case.

"If the principles of this government forbid it to retaliate by impressments, there is yet another mode which might be resorted to. We might authorise our ships of war, though not to impress, yet to recruit sailors on board British merchantmen. Such are the inducements to enter into our naval service, that we believe even this practice would very seriously affect the navigation of Britain. How, sir, would it be received by the British nation?

"Is it not more advisable to desist from, and to take effectual measures to prevent an acknowledged wrong, than by perseverance in that wrong, to excite against themselves the well founded resentment of America, and force our government into measures which may possibly terminate in open rupture?"

JOHN MARSHALL.

To this able, eloquent, and acute defence of the rights of our oppressed and outraged sailors, and of our insulted sovereignty, the most pointed and particular attention of the reader is requested. The elevated rank and respectable standing of the writer, entitle it to the utmost weight and influence. It sets the seal of reprobation on the impressment of the free citizens of a friendly neutral nation, by armed bands in the service of a belligerent: the most flagitious outrage ever perpetrated in a time of pretended peace.

Extract of a letter from Rufus King, esq. to the secretary of state, dated London February 23, 1801.

"The progress which had been made in our negociation with this government, was such as must have brought it to a speedy conclusion, had not a

change taken place in the department of foreign affairs; that the result would in the main have been satisfactory, is more than I am authorised to say, although I flattered myself with the hope that it would be so. Lord Hawkesbury assures me that he will give to the several subjects, which have been pretty fully discussed, an early and impartial consideration; and I am in hopes that lord Vincent will likewise be inclined to attend to our reiterated remonstrances against the impressment of our seamen, and the vexations of our trade.

RUFUS KING."

CHAPTER XXXIV.

Mr. Liston's projet of a convention respecting deserters. Objected to by Mr. Pickering, Mr. Stoddart, Mr. Wolcott, and Mr. M^r Henry. Rejected.

IN the year 1800, Mr. Liston, the British minister, submitted to Mr. Adams, president of the United States, a *projet* of a treaty for the mutual delivery of deserters, of which I annex the seventh and ninth articles, being those which alone bear on the subject of impressment.

7. "It is, however, understood, that this stipulation is not to extend to authorise either of the parties to demand the delivery of any sailors, subjects or citizens belonging to the other party, who have been employed on board the vessels of either of the respective nations, and who have, in time of war or threatened hostility, voluntarily entered into the service of their own sovereign or nation, or have been compelled to enter therein, according to the laws and practice prevailing in the two countries respectively.

9. "It is, however, understood, that no stipulation in this additional article shall be construed to empower the civil or military officers of either of the contracting parties forcibly to enter into the *public ships of war*; or into the forts, garrisons or posts of the other party; or to use violence to the persons of the land or sea officers of the respective nations, with a view to compel the delivery of such persons as may have deserted from the naval or military service of either party as aforesaid."

This *projet* which was intended to sanction impressment on board private vessels, by the exception of "*public ships of war*," was submitted to the heads of departments, and to the attorney general, for their opinions, which I subjoin.

From Timothy Pickering, esq. secretary of state, to Mr. Adams.

February 20, 1800.

"The secretary has the honour to lay before the president Mr. Liston's note of the fourth of February, together with his *projet* of a treaty for the reciprocal delivery of deserters; which appears to the secretary utterly inadmissible, UNLESS IT WOULD PUT AN END TO IMPRESSMENTS—which Mr. Liston seemed to imagine—while the seventh paragraph of his *projet* expressly recognizes the right of impressing British subjects, and consequently American citizens as at present."

TIMOTHY PICKERING."

B. Stoddart, esq. secretary of the navy, to the president

February 26, 1800.

"The secretary of the navy is clearly of opinion, that it is better to have no article, and meet all consequences, than not to enumerate merchant vessels on the high seas, among the things not to be entered in search of deserters."

Oliver Wolcott, esq. secretary of the treasury, to the president.

April 26, 1800.

"The *projet* of a treaty proposed by the minister of his Britannic majesty, for the reciprocal delivery of deserters from the land and naval service, does

not sufficiently provide against the impressment of American seamen ; and is therefore deemed inadmissible."

As a substitute for Mr. Liston's seventh article, Mr. Pickering proposed the following :

"It is, however, understood, that nothing in these stipulations shall be construed to empower the civil, military, or naval officers of either of the contracting parties, forcibly to enter into the territory, forts, posts, or vessels of the other party—or to use violence to the persons of the commanders or the officers of the forts, posts, or vessels of the other party, with a view to compel the delivery of such persons as shall desert as aforesaid."

This article was intended fully to secure from impressment, even in our private as well as public vessels, not merely our own citizens, but also the subjects of Great Britain ; in a word, to put an end entirely to the practice of impressment on board our vessels.

Mr. Wolcott, secretary of the treasury, proposed a substitute for the article objected to, still more clearly and explicitly annihilating the pretensions of England to impress seamen of any description on board our vessels.

"It is, however, understood, that nothing in the foregoing stipulations shall be construed to empower the civil or any other officers, of either party, forcibly to enter the forts, posts, or any other place within or under the jurisdiction of the other party ; nor to empower the naval commanders or other officers of either party forcibly to enter any public or private vessels of the other party, on the high seas, with a view to compel the delivery of any person whatever ; on the contrary, it is expressly declared to be the understanding of the contracting parties, that the mutual restorations of persons claimed as deserters, shall only be made by the free and voluntary consent of the military officers employed in the land service, or the commanders of the public or private ships or vessels of the two parties, or in pursuance of the decisions of the courts, judges, or other competent civil officers of the two nations, in all cases arising within their respective jurisdictions.

O. WOLCOTT."

James M'Henry, secretary of war, to the president.

War Department, April 16, 1800.

"The secretary thinks the projet of Mr. Liston may be substantially accepted, except the 7th article, which seems to provide that the United States shall not demand the delivery of any sailors, although their citizens, if they have been employed in British vessels, and who have in time of war, or threatened hostilities, voluntarily entered into the British service, or have been compelled to enter therein, according to the law and practice prevailing in Great Britain. This article is very inaccurately expressed ; for it says, "employed or entered into the service of their own sovereign or nation, or have been compelled to enter therein," &c. *If this article means, what it is apprehended it does, it is wholly inadmissible.* It establishes a principle reprobated by this country. The counter-projet of the secretary of state, in substance, meets the secretary's approbation ; but it is submitted, whether the adoption of part of the draft by the secretary of the treasury, will not improve it.

"All which is respectfully submitted.

JAMES M'HENRY."

April 30, 1800.

"The attorney general having read and considered the letter of the secretary of state, and the projet of an article drawn by the secretary of the treasury, on the subject of deserters, which are proposed to be sent to the British minister here, expresses his entire approbation of the same.

CHARLES LEE."

CHAPTER XXXV.

Horrors of Impressment, as submitted to congress, by Timothy Pickering, secretary of state.

To afford a specimen of the treatment of some of the impressed American seamen, whose cases it has become fashionable to treat with indifference, and whose awful sufferings have been palliated or denied, I submit extracts from authentic documents on the subject. It will incontrovertibly appear that the horrors of this odious and execrable business of impressment have been quintupled by the odious and execrable manner in which it has been conducted.

Extract from the deposition of Eliphalet Ladd, second mate on board the Thomas and Sarah, of Philadelphia, and a native of Exeter, New Hampshire, annexed to a report submitted to congress by Timothy Pickering, esq. secretary of state.

Kingston, June 19, 1799.

Eliphalet Ladd maketh oath, that on Wednesday, the 12th inst. he came on shore with two seamen belonging to said ship, named John Edes, and Israel Randol, in order to land a boat load of staves; that a press gang came up, and laid hold of John Edes; that one of the press gang, named Moody, *with a broad sword cut this deponent on the forehead, and made a wound of three inches!!* They then took deponent, together with Edes, and conducted them in different boats on board the Brunswick man of war; that the boat on board of which Edes was, made the ship some little time before that the deponent was in; and on deponent's nearing the ship, *he heard the cries of a man flogging!!!* and on going up the side of the Brunswick, he perceived Edes, who was crying; and addressing himself to the first lieutenant, a Mr. Harris, saying, here is a man who can attest to what I have told you. The lieutenant then laying hold of deponent by the arm, said, *go along on the quarter deck, you damned rascal you!!!* which deponent accordingly did; that all the impressed men were then examined, and afterwards ordered by the lieutenant into the waist; that when they got there, Edes pulled off his shirt, and **SHOWED DEPONENT HIS BACK, WHICH WAS BRUISED FROM HIS SHOULDERS TO HIS HIPS!!!** He then informed, *he had just been whipped with ropes' ends,* as deponent was going up the ship's sides, by the boatswain and his mates, by orders of the lieutenant; that deponent remained on board the Brunswick all that day and the next night, *during which no surgical or medical assistance was given to the wound he had received on his head, nor to the bruises of the said Edes, who, during the night, called out several times from extreme pain; and the next morning was barely able to move himself;* that between nine and ten o'clock the next morning, the whole of the impressed men were again ordered on the quarter deck, and stationed, except deponent and Edes; that while the examination was going on, the captain of the Thomas and Sarah was coming on board, but was prevented by the lieutenant, who ordered the centinel to keep him off; that at about eleven o'clock the captain of the Brunswick came on board; and at three o'clock deponent was discharged, but Edes retained.

"ELIPHALET LADD."

Sworn before

William Savage, justice of the peace, &c.

Further extract from the preceding report of Timothy Pickering, esq. secretary of state, to congress.

Richard Carter, of the Pomona, of Portsmouth, impressed at the same time with Ladd and Edes, among other items of his deposition, swore, "he was violently forced into a boat, and **STRUCK TWICE, WITH A DRAWN CUTLASS,** by one of the press gang; and that two men with pistols placed over this deponent, who loaded their pistols in the presence of this deponent, and threatened to blow out his brains if he attempted to move or speak: and then they

carried this deponent, and John Edes, one of the seamen of the ship *Thomas and Sarah*, an American citizen, whom they had also seized, on board the said *Brunswick*: this deponent and the said John Edes were ordered to go on the quarter deck, where Mr. Harris, the first lieutenant of the said ship, abused this deponent and said John Edes; and gave them in charge to the master of said ship, while he went to look for the boatswain's mate; and soon after returned with the boatswain's mate, whom he ordered to take this deponent and the said John Edes, and to beat them; in obedience to which orders, *the said John Edes and this deponent were severely beaten, particularly this deponent, the boatswain's mate doubling a rope of about three inches and a half thick, and BEATING THIS DEPONENT WITH GREAT VIOLENCE OVER THE HEAD, FACE, NECK, SHOULDERS, BACK AND STOMACH, UNTIL HE HAD TIRED HIMSELF!!! and then he gave the same rope to one of the mariners of the said ship Brunswick; and he also severely beat this deponent in the same manner!! and this deponent saith, he received upwards of a hundred blows!! and was thereby greatly bruised, and his face cut, and his stomach, as well internally as externally, injured, so that deponent brought up a quantity of blood for several days.*

"Sworn before me,

WILLIAM SAVAGE."

To avoid prolixity, I have omitted the residue of this deposition. The deponent was liberated by *habeas corpus*.

Annexed to this deposition is that of the physician, who attended Richard Carter, who declared, that

"From the situation in which he found the said Carter, he verily believed he had been very severely beaten some days previous, his blood being very much extravasated. and from the appearance of the bruises, it must have been done with a thick rope."

It is difficult to find terms to pour out the abhorrence and indignation excited by the abominable scenes depicted in these depositions and narratives. Language fails in the attempt. Shame, disgrace, dishonour, and infamy, will attend the councils and counsellors of America, for the base submission to such monstrous cruelty. The outrage ought to have been met at the threshold.—Atonement to the sufferers ought to have been made at the public expense, that is, as far as such horrible injuries can be atoned for—and demand made for the re-payment of the money thus employed. If not complied with, full and complete retaliation ought to have taken place.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

Impressment during the administration of Mr. Jefferson. Letter from Rufus King. Arrangement with lord St. Vincent rejected by Mr. King.

Letter from Rufus King, esq. to the secretary of state.

New York, July, 1803.

"Sir—As soon as the war appeared to me unavoidable, I thought it advisable to renew the attempt to form an arrangement with the British government for the protection of our seamen. With this view I had several conferences, both with lord Hawkesbury and Mr. Addington, who avowed a sincere disposition to do whatever might be in their power to prevent the dissatisfaction on this subject, that had so frequently manifested itself during the late war: *with very candid professions, I, however, found several objections*, in discussing the project with the first lord of the admiralty. Lord Hawkesbury having promised to sign

any agreement upon the subject that I should conclude with lord St. Vincent. I endeavoured to qualify and remove the objections he offered to our project : and finally, the day before I left London, lord St. Vincent consented to the following regulations :

“ 1. No seaman or seafaring person shall, *upon the high seas, and without the jurisdiction of either party*, be demanded or taken out of any ship or vessel belonging to the citizens or subjects of one of the parties, *by the public or private armed ships or men of war*, belonging to or in the service of the other party ; and strict orders shall be given for the due observance of this engagement.

“ 2. Each party will prohibit its citizens or subjects from clandestinely concealing or carrying away from the territories or colonial possessions of the other, any seaman belonging to the other party.

“ 3. These regulations shall be in force for five years, and no longer.

“ On parting with his lordship, I engaged to draw up, in the form of a convention, and send him these articles, in the course of the evening, who promised to forward them, with his approbation, to lord Hawkesbury. I accordingly prepared and sent the draft to his lordship, who sent me a letter in the course of the night, stating that on further reflection he was of opinion, *that the narrow seas should be expressly excepted*, they having been, as his lordship remarked, immemorially considered to be within the dominions of Great Britain ; that with this correction he had sent the proposed convention to lord Hawkesbury, who, his lordship presumed, would not sign it before he should have consulted the judge of the high court of admiralty, sir William Scott.

“ As I had supposed, from the tenor of my conferences with lord St. Vincent, that the doctrine of the *mare clausum* would not be revived against us on this occasion, but that England would be content with the limited jurisdiction or dominion over the seas, adjacent to her territories, which is assigned by the law of nations to other states, I was not a little disappointed on receiving this communication ; and after weighing well the nature of the principle, and the disadvantages of its admission, *I concluded to abandon the negotiation rather than to acquiesce in the doctrine it proposed to establish.*

“ I regret, not to have been able to put this business on a satisfactory footing, knowing, as I do, its very great importance to both parties. But I flatter myself that I have not misjudged the interests of our country, *in refusing to sanction a principle that might be productive of more extensive evils than those it was our aim to prevent.*

RUFUS KING.”

THIS is a most important document, and must never for an instant be overlooked in forming a decision on the question of impressment. Mr. King was united with, and a leader among those men who were lately hunting down Mr. Madison, and preparing the way for anarchy and civil war : and the chief pretence was the stand Mr. Madison made against impressment. Nevertheless, we find that he took higher ground himself—and that it is indisputably true, that more than one half of the miseries of our poor, oppressed, and enslaved seamen, are chargeable to his account. And whatever may be the maledictions which his friends are showering down upon Mr. Madison, a double portion of them has been richly earned by Mr. King. For it appears, that had he been so disposed, he might have rescued our sailors from the horrors of impressment, every where but on the narrow seas, which would have greatly abridged their sufferings, as well as our complaints against Great Britain. And yet, lately, with a most wonderful and hideous degree of inconsistency, he has, as I have stated, been persecuting and trying to crush Mr. Madison for the attempt to protect our seamen, in

whose favour he himself formerly displayed such a high degree of solicitude!

To evince how universal has been the indignation of our mercantile citizens against the oppression of, and cruelties perpetrated upon, our seamen, I annex impressive extracts from documents on the subject.

Extract from a memorial to congress, of the inhabitants of Salem, January 20, 1806:

"Your memorialists are sorry, that other instances of hostile conduct have been manifested by Great Britain, less direct in their nature, but not less derogatory from our sovereignty than those enumerated. **THE IMPRESSMENT OF OUR SEAMEN**, notwithstanding clear proofs of citizenship, the violation of our jurisdiction by capture at the mouths of our harbours, and insulting treatment of our ships on the ocean, are subjects worthy of the serious consideration of our national councils, and will, we have no doubt, receive an early, prompt, and decisive attention."

Signed in behalf of the inhabitants, by their authority,

John Hathorne,	Joseph Sprague,	Jonathian Mason,
Benjamin Crowninshield, jun.	Joseph White, jun.	Joseph Story.

Extract from a memorial of a general meeting of the merchants of New York, December 26, 1845.

"But it is not on account of our pecuniary losses alone that we complain. The constancy and valour of the seamen of the United States are justly themes of patriotic exultation. From their connexion with us, *we consider their cause as our cause; their rights as our rights; their interests as our interests, Our feelings are indignant at the recital of their wrongs.*"

John Jacob Astor,	Samuel Bell,	Abraham Smith,	Joshua Jones,
Samuel Adams,	J. F. Delaplaine,	Thomas H. Smith, jun.	Fred. Giraud, jun.
Howland & Grinnel,	Peter Staggs,	Andrew Foster,	Robert Roberts,
E. Slossom,	David Taylor,	Jacob Barker,	John Crookes,
Israel Gibbs,	Wm. Adee,	William Lovett,	Hugh M'Cormick,
Isaac Clason,	John T. Lawrence,	Wm. Edgar, jun.	John Depeyster,
John Slidell,	Joseph W. Totten,	Samuel Stilwell,	Gilbert Haight,
John K. Townsend,	I. Schermerhorn,	Jacob P. Giraud,	James Lovett,
And. Ogden & Co.	Alexander Ruden,	John Hone,	Leffert Lefferts,
Thomas Storm,	Joseph Otis,	John Kane,	Aug. Wynkoop,
Amos Butler,	Lewis Hartman,	Amasa Jackson,	John W. Gale,
Ebenezer Burrill,	Garret Storm,	Wm. J. Robinson,	Thomas Rich,
Isaac Heyer,	George Bement,	Joseph Strong,	Samuel Marshall,
Ralph Bulkley,	S. A. Rich,	Abraham S. Hallet,	Elbert Herring.

This beautiful piece of composition does equal honour to the head and heart of the writer. But many of these subscribers have violated their engagements. They have not redeemed the solemn pledge that accompanied this *morceau*. They have most indubitably done all in their power to fasten the horrors of impressment, with adamant chains, on those illustrious men, "whose cause—whose rights—whose interests—they considered as their own cause—their own rights—their own interests." For no man beyond the rank of an idiot, can doubt, that every step taken to cripple the government—which game they lately played on a large scale—was a step towards laying the nation, tied neck and heels, at the feet of England, to prescribe what terms she pleased, and of course to perpetuate the miseries of impressment.

Extract from the memorial of the merchants of Philadelphia to Congress, December 1805.

"That our seamen should be exposed to the **MEANEST INSULTS, AND MOST WANTON CRUELITIES**, and the fruits of our industry and enterprise fall a prey to the profligate, cannot but excite both feeling and indignation, and call loudly for the aid and protection of government."

T. Fitzsimons,	L. Clapier,	W. Montgomery,	Thomas English,
W. Sims,	Manuel Eyre,	George Latimer,	Philip Nicklin,
J. Gerard Koch,	John Craig,	Daniel W. Coxe,	Chandler Price,
Joseph S. Lewis,	Robert Ralston,	Ab. Kintzing,	Robert Waln,
Thomas Allibone,	Th. W. Francis,	James Yard,	R. E. Hobart, sec'y.

Some of the gentlemen who signed this petition, stand in precisely the same situation as some of the signers of New-York. The observations made on those--of course apply to these.

Extract from the memorial of the merchants of Baltimore, dated January 21, 1806.

"Your memorialists will not trespass upon your time with a recital of the various acts by which our coasts and even our ports and harbours have been converted into scenes of violence and depredation; and our gallant countrymen *oppressed and persecuted*."

Thomas Tenant,	William Patterson,	Steuart Brown,	William Taylor,
John Donnel,	John Sherlock,	David Stewart,	Robert Gilmor,
Luke Tiernan,	Henry Payson,	Mark Pringle,	James Calhoun,
T. Hollingsworth,	William Wilson,	John Stricker,	Samuel Steret,
George Stiles,	T. Swan,	Benjamin Williams,	Hugh Thompson,
J. A. Buchanan,	Joseph Steret,	William Lorman,	Samuel Taylor.
Alexander M'Kim,			

Extract from a memorial to Congress of the merchants of Newhaven, agreed to February 7, 1806.

"In regard to **THE IMPRESSMENT OF AMERICAN SEAMEN**, your memorialists feel in common with their fellow citizens, a lively indignation at the abuses of power often exercised by British officers upon American citizens. We have full confidence that the government of the United States will adopt and pursue such measures for restraining these injurious proceedings as the honour and interests of the United States may require."

After the murder of captain Pearce, entering the port of New-York, by captain Whitby, of the *Leander*, within the jurisdiction of the United States, there were meetings held in various parts of the country, to express their abhorrence of the outrage. On the 26th of April, 1806, at the Tontine Coffee House in New-York, there was a numerous and very respectable meeting of federalists, who appointed *Rufus King*, Ebenezer Stevens, Oliver Wolcott, William W. Woolsey, and William Henderson, to draw up and report a set of resolutions for the occasion. In their report, which was unanimously agreed to, was the following philippic against the administration, for permitting **IMPRESSMENT** among other grievances.

"Resolved, That the suffering foreign armed ships to station themselves off our harbour, and there to stop, search, and capture our vessels—to **IMPRESS, WOUND, AND MURDER OUR CITIZENS**, is a gross and criminal neglect of the highest duties of government; and that an administration which patiently permits the same, *is not entitled to the confidence of a brave and free people*."

"Resolved, That the murder of John Pearce, one of our fellow citizens, by a shot from a British ship of war, at the entrance of our harbour, and within half a mile of the shore, while he was engaged in peaceably navigating a coast-

ing vessel, laden with provisions for our market, is an act that excites our detestation and abhorrence ; and calls upon our government for the adoption of prompt and vigorous measures to prevent a repetition of such wanton and inhuman conduct, and so flagrant a violation of our sovereignty."

Some of my readers may not know—but it is perfectly proper that all should know, that captain Whitby was brought to trial in England, and *honourably acquitted*, notwithstanding the most undeniable evidence of the crime was dispatched to England at the expense of our government. For the murder of Pearce, no atonement has ever been made. It still cries shame and disgrace on his passive countrymen.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

Documents on impressment continued.

Deposition of Isaac Clark.

"I Isaac Clark, of Salem, in the county of Essex, and commonwealth of Massachusetts, on solemn oath declare, that I was born in the town of Randolph, in the county of Norfolk; have sailed out of Salem aforesaid, about seven years; that on the 14th of June, 1809, I was impressed and forcibly taken from the ship Jane, of Norfolk, by the sailing master (his name was Car) of his majesty's ship Porcupine, Robert Elliot, commander. I had a protection from the custom-house in Salem, which I showed to captain Elliot; *he swore that I was an Englishman; tore my protection to pieces before my eyes, and threw it overboard, and ordered me go to work.* I told him I did not belong to his flag, and I would do no work under it. He then *ordered my legs to be put in irons, and THE NEXT MORNING ORDERED THE MASTER AT ARMS TO TAKE ME ON DECK, AND GIVE ME TWO DOZEN LASHES:* after receiving them, he ordered him to keep me in irons, and give me one biscuit and one pint of water for twenty four hours. After keeping me in this situation one week, I was brought on deck, and asked by captain Elliot, if I would go to my duty. On my refusing, he ordered me to strip, *tied me up a second time, and gave me two dozen more,* and kept me on the same allowance another week—then ordering me on deck again, asked if I would go to work. I still persisted that I was an American; and that he had no right to command my services, and I would do no work on board his ship. He told me he would punish me until I was willing to work; and *gave me the third two dozen lashes, ordered a very heavy chain put round my neck (such as they had used to sling the lower yard) fastened to a ring bolt in the deck, and that no person, except the master at arms, should speak to me, or give me any thing to eat or drink, but one biscuit and a pint of water for twenty four hours, until I would go to work.* I was kept in this situation nine weeks, when, *being exhausted by hunger and thirst,* I was obliged to yield. After being on board the ship more than two years and a half, and being *wounded in an action with a French frigate,* I was sent to the hospital. When partially recovered, I was sent on board the Impregnable, 98 gun ship. *My wound growing worse, I was returned to the hospital,* when the American consul received a copy of my protection from Salem, and procured my discharge on the 29th day of April last. There were seven impressed Americans on board the Porcupine, three of whom entered.

ISAAC CLARK.

Essex, ss. Dec. 23, 1812.

"Then Isaac Clark personally appeared, and made solemn oath that the facts in the foregoing declaration, by him made and subscribed, were true in all their parts—before

JOHN PUNCHARD, } Justices of the peace and of
M. TOWNSEND, } the quorum.

From Com. Rogers to the Secretary of the Navy.

U. S. Frigate President, Boston, Jan. 14, 1813.

"Sir—Herewith you will receive two muster books, of his Britannic majesty's vessels *Moselle* and *Sappho*, found on board the British packet *Swallow*

"As the British have always denied that they detained on board their ships of war, American citizens, knowing them to be such, I send you the enclosed, as a public document of their own, to prove how ill such an assertion accords with their practice.

"It will appear by these two muster books, that as late as August last, *about an eighth part of the Moselle and Sappho's crews were Americans*; consequently, if there is only a quarter of that proportion on board their other vessels, that they have an infinitely greater number of Americans in their service than any American has yet an idea of.

"Any further comment of mine on this subject, I consider unnecessary; as the documents speak too plain for themselves.

JOHN RODGERS.

"The hon. Paul Hamilton, Secretary of the Navy."

Extract of a letter from Commodore Porter to M. Carey, dated

Washington, July 13, 1815.

"After closing my letter of this morning, I received yours of yesterday: and, as the only means of procuring the information required, have consulted Commodore Rodgers, who informs me, that there appeared on the muster books of the *Moselle* and *Sappho*, the names of from thirty five to forty men, who were reported to the admiralty office, as impressed American seamen. The places of their nativity are also noted. The complement of men for each of the vessels was about 160. With respect, &c.

DAVID PORTER.

"I Beekman Ver Plank Hoffman, of the town of Poughkeepsie, do certify, that I am a lieutenant in the United States' navy; that I was a lieutenant on board the *Constitution* in the action and capture of the *Java*; and was sent on board that vessel; and after the crew were removed, set her on fire, and blew her up.

"Among the crew of the *Java*, THIRTEEN IMPRESSED AMERICAN SEAMEN were found, three of whom had entered the British service, and were left: the other ten were liberated as Americans."

Poughkeepsie, April 16, 1813.

B. V. HOFFMAN.

"Richard Thompson, being sworn, saith, that he is a native of New Paltz, opposite Poughkeepsie; that he sailed from Wilmington about the twenty-eighth of April, 1810, on board the brig *Warren*, William Kelly, captain, for Cork. On the homeward passage, in September following, he was impressed and taken on board the *Peacock*, a British sloop of war, and compelled to do his duty; that while on board that vessel, he made many unsuccessful attempts to write to his friends, to inform them of his situation. He further saith, that after he had heard of the war, himself and two other impressed American seamen who were on board the *Peacock*, went aft to the captain; claimed to be considered as American prisoners of war; and refused to do duty any longer.

"We were ordered off the quarter deck, and the captain called for the master-at-arms, and ordered us to be put in irons. We were then kept in irons about twenty-four hours, when we were taken out, brought to the gangway, STRIPPED OF OUR CLOTHES, TIED AND WHIPPED, EACH ONE DOZEN AND A HALF LASHES, AND PUT TO DUTY.

"He further saith, that he was kept on board the *Peacock*, and did duty till the action with the *Hornet*. After the *Hornet* hoisted American colours, he and the other impressed Americans again went to the captain of the *Peacock*, and asked to be sent below; said it was an American ship; and that they did not wish to fight against their country. The captain ordered us to our quarters; called midshipman Stone to do his duty; and if we did not do our duty, TO BLOW OUR BRAINS OUT; "aye, aye!" was answered by Stone, who then

held a pistol at my breast, and ordered us to our places. We then continued at our places, and were compelled to fight till the Peacock struck; and we were liberated after about two years and eight months."

Poughkeepsie, April 17, 1813.

his
RICHARD X THOMPSON.
mark.

Read over and signed } JOSEPH HARRIS.
in the presence of } JOHN FRIAR.

Extract from the log book of an officer on board his majesty's ship Guerriere, in the action with the Constitution.

"The Guerriere was a frigate of one thousand and eighty tons burden, taken from the French in 1806; and had three hundred and two men and boys belonging to her. There were ten American seamen on board, who had belonged to her for some years. But as the declaration of war against Great Britain was not known when she sailed, there had been no opportunity of discharging them; and captain Dacres considering it as unjust to compel a native of the United States to fight against his countrymen, granted them permission to quit their quarters, and go below."

Captain Dacres, in his address to the court martial by which he was tried, states this fact in the following terms:

"What considerably weakened my quarters was permitting the Americans belonging to the ship, to quit their quarters on the enemy hoisting the colours of that nation, which, though it deprived me of the men, I thought it was my duty."

Boston, February 6, 1813.

"Died at Boston, on the third instant, on board the frigate President, Godfrey Hyer, seaman, aged forty-seven. The deceased was a native of Rhode-Island, and was one of the numerous instances of impressment, which have been the cause of complaint against the English. He was taken on board an American merchant ship, and though he never voluntarily entered their service, he was detained from his country and his friends fourteen years, during which time he was present at seventeen engagements, and gained the reputation of a good seaman and a brave man.

"He at length found means to escape; and on his return to the United States, he immediately shipped on board the President, where he continued until his decease; his conduct receiving the marked approbation of his commander and the other officers of the frigate. He was interred on Thursday last at Charlestown; his funeral was attended by a lieutenant, eight midshipmen, all the petty officers, and fifty seamen of the ship; and the ceremonies were performed by the chaplain in a manner highly solemn and impressive."

From the Boston Patriot,

"My brother John Cand, of Woolwich, in the district of Maine, was prest on board his majesty's frigate Macedonian, on the tenth of June, 1810, from the ship Mount Hope, of Wiscasset, and was killed on board the Macedonian, in the battle with the United States, commodore Decatur. A disconsolate wife and child are in mourning and in sorrow, for the loss of a husband and parent, on whom they were dependent."

JOSEPH CAND.

"I John Nichols, a native of Durham, state of Massachusetts, relate and say, that I sailed from Portland in the ship Franklin, commanded by James Marks, as chief mate, bound to Liverpool, where we arrived the seventh day of February, 1809. The same day I was taken by a press gang, coming from my boarding house to the ship, and carried by them to the rendezvous, Cooper's Row, and detained one night. The next morning I gave the lieutenant my protection, and at the same time stated to him I was chief mate of the ship; also captain Marks and Mr. Porter, supercargo, came, and were refused admittance.

"I then asked the lieutenant for my protection: he answered, *I will give it to you with a hell to it;*" and immediately tore it up before my face, and sent me on board the guard ship Princess, where I remained one week, and was then sent round to Plymouth on board the Salvador guard ship; remained there one

month, after which I was drafted on board the *Aboukir*, seventy-four, where I remained three years and fourteen days.

"When the war broke out, I determined to give myself up a prisoner of war, let the consequence be what it would. Consequently on the twenty-eighth of October, I went to the captain, and gave myself up as a prisoner of war, and refused to do any more duty. Then he told me, I was an Englishman, and if I would not do duty, he would flog me; and ordered me in irons, and kept me in irons twenty-four hours, after which I was taken to the gangway, and received one dozen with the cat on my bare back.

"The captain then asked me if I would go to duty. I told him no: I would sooner die first. He then put me in irons again for twenty-four hours, and I was once more brought to the gangway, and received as before with the same questions, and answer as preceded; and the same was repeated four days successively, and I received four dozen on my bare back.

"After the fourth day I was a prisoner at large. The twenty-sixth day of December I was sent to prison without my clothes, they being refused me by the captain, after abusing me in the most insulting manner; and all I ever received for my servitude was fourteen pounds. During impressment, I have used my best endeavours to escape."

Witness, Jeduthan Upton.

JOHN NICHOLS.

From the Salem Register, July, 1813.

Captain Upton has furnished us with a list of 128 American seamen, who had been impressed on board British ships of war, and delivered up as prisoners of war, with the places of their nativity, the ships they were discharged from, the time they have served, and the number of Americans left on board the different ships at the time of their discharge. These were on board one prison ship, the *San Antonio*. Besides these, there were on board the *Chatham* prison ship, three hundred and twenty men, who have been delivered up in similar circumstances. Many of these poor fellows have been detained more than fifteen years: and about forty of the one hundred and twenty eight on board the *San Antonio* belong to this state."

To the Editors of the National Intelligencer.

"In the month of February, 1797, I belonged to the ship *Fidelity*, captain Charles Weems, lying in the harbour of St Pierre's, Martinique. About one o'clock Sunday morning, I was awakened by a noise on the deck, and on going up found the ship in possession of a press gang. In a few minutes all hands were forced out, and ordered into their boat, and in a heavy shower of rain conveyed on board the *Ceres* frigate. We were ordered on the gun deck until day light, by which time about eighty Americans were collected.

"Soon after sunrise, the ship's crew were ordered into the cabin to be overhauled. Each was questioned as to his name, &c. when I was called on for my place of birth, and answered, *Newcastle, Delaware*. The captain affected not to hear the last; but said, "*aye, Newcastle; he's a collier; the very man*. I warrant him a sailor. Send him down to the doctor." Upon which a petty officer, whom I recognized as one of the press gang, made answer, "*sir, I know this fellow. He is a schoolmate of mine, and his name is Kelly. He was born in Belfast. And, Tom, you know me well enough; so don't sham yankee any more*." "I thought," says the captain, "he was a countryman of our own; but an Irishman's all one—take him away."

"The next was a Prussian, who had shipped in *Hamburgh*, as a carpenter of the *Fidelity*, in September, 1796. He affected, when questioned, not to understand English, but answered in Dutch. Upon which the captain laughed, and said, "*This is no yankee. Send him down, and let the quarter-master put him in the mess with the other Dutchmen: they will understand him, and the boatswain will learn him to talk English*." He was accordingly kept.

"I was afterwards discharged by an order from Admiral Harvey, on the application of Mr. Craig, at that time American agent or vice-consul. I further observed that full one-third of her crew were impressed Americans."

JOHN DAVIS, of Abel.

Navy Yard, Oct. 12, 1813.

Copy of a letter from commodore Decatur to the secretary of the navy.

U. S. ship United States, New London, March 18, 1814.

"Sir—I have the honour to forward to you enclosed, a despatch received by me from captain Capel, the commanding officer of the British squadron before this port, written in reply to an application of mine, for the release of an American seaman, detained against his will on board the frigate *Statira*.

"Hiram Thayer, born in the town of Greenwich, in the commonwealth of Massachusetts, was impressed into the naval service of Great Britain, in the month of August, 1803, and detained ever since.

"About six years ago, when the *Statira* was put in commission, he was transferred to her; and has been constantly on board her to this day.

"I am informed, and in fact it was stated by captain Stackpole to lieutenant Hamilton, who was charged with the flag, that the late general Lyman, our consul at London, made application to the lords commissioners for the discharge of Thayer; but they were not satisfied with the evidence of his nativity.

"John Thayer, the father of Hiram, assures me that the certificate of the selectmen, the town clerk, and the minister of Greenwich, were forwarded some time ago to Mr. Mitchell, the resident agent for American prisoners of war at Halifax; but does not know why he was not released then.

"The son has written to the father, and informed him, that on representing his case to captain Stackpole, he told him, "*if they fell in with an American man of war, and he did not do his duty, HE SHOULD BE TIED TO THE MAST, AND SHOT AT LIKE A DOG.*"

"On Monday the 14th inst. John Thayer requested me to allow him a flag, to go off to the enemy, and ask for the release of his son. This I granted at once, and addressed a note to captain Capel, stating that I felt persuaded that the application of the father, furnished as he was with conclusive evidence of the nativity and identity of the son, would induce an immediate order for his discharge.

"The reply is enclosed. The son deserted his father at a distance in the boat, and told the lieutenant of the *Statira* that it was his father; and I understand the feelings manifested by the old man, on receiving the hand of his son, proved, beyond all other evidence, the property he had in him. There was not a doubt left on the mind of a single British officer, of Hiram Thayer's being an American citizen. And yet he is detained, not as a prisoner of war, but **COMPELLED, UNDER THE MOST CRUEL THREATS, TO SERVE THE ENEMIES OF HIS COUNTRY.**

"Thayer has so recommended himself by his sobriety, industry, and seamanship, as to be appointed a boatswain's mate, and is now serving in that capacity in the *Statira*; and he says there is due to him from the British government about two hundred and fifty pounds sterling. He has also assured his father that he has always refused to receive any bounty or advance, lest he might afford some pretext for denying him his discharge whenever a proper application should be made for it.

"I am, sir, with the highest consideration, your most obedient humble servant,
STEPHEN DECATUR."

Extract from captain Capel's letter, enclosed.

"On board his B. M. ship La Hogue, off New London, March 14, 1814.

"Sir,—I regret that it is not in my power to comply with your request in ordering the son of Mr. John Thayer to be discharged from his majesty's ship, *Statira*. But I will forward your application to the commander in chief, by the earliest opportunity, and I have no doubt he will order his immediate discharge. I am, &c.

THOMAS CAPEL, Captain," &c.

Extract of a letter from commodore Decatur to the secretary of the navy.

New London, May 17th, 1814.

"The enclosed, No. 2, is the copy of a note addressed to captain Capel of his B. M. ship *La Hogue*, on the subject of Barnard O'Brien, a native citizen of the United States. In the boat that bore the flag of truce to the *La Hogue*, the father of the man in question went.

"Captain Capel would not permit him to see his son. He directed my officer to inform me that he would answer my despatch the next day; since when I have not heard from him."

Letter to captain Capel.

"Sir—At the solicitation of Mr. Barnard O'Brien, whose son is now on board his Britannic majesty's ship *La Hogue*, under your command, I have granted a flag of truce, conducted by lieutenant Hamilton, with permission for Mr. O'Brien to attend it. His object is to effect the liberation of his son, a native citizen of the United States. He bears with him a copy of the record of the town of Groton in the state of Connecticut, signed by the town clerk and selectmen, as also a certificate from a number of respectable men in Groton, proving his nativity. With these documents I cannot doubt that he will effect the purpose of his visit.

(Signed)

STEPHEN DECATUR."

"Sir—We, the undersigned, take the liberty to solicit your assistance in behalf of Mr. Barnard O'Brien, in obtaining his son's release from the British ship *La Hogue*, off New-London.

"We are well acquainted with the young man, and know him to be an American born citizen. His letter to his father, dated on board the *La Hogue*, the 24th of March, is sufficient proof of his being on board (which letter will be shown you.) If you can give any assistance in obtaining his release, either by letting Mr. O'Brien go to the ship by a flag of truce, or in any other way, it will be considered a particular favour conferred on, sir, your most obedient servants,

Gerald Galley,

Geo. A. Sulleman,

Nath. Kimball,

Ro. S. Avery,

Jos. Tuttle,

Erastus T. Smith.

"P. S. The young man's name is Barnard O'Brien, son of Barnard O'Brien, and his wife Elizabeth O'Brien. He was born in the town of Groton, January 19th, 1785. *Extract from the records of the town of Groton.*

A true copy, certified per Amos A. Niles, town clerk.

"I certify that Amos A. Niles is town clerk for Groton, and that I believe the above certificate to be a true and correct record of Barnard O'Brien's birth. I do also certify, that I have known the said Barnard O'Brien from his youth.

Dated Groton, April 7th, 1814.

NOVES BARBER, *Selectman for Groton.*

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

State of Maryland—to wit.

I, John Gill, Notary Public, by letters patent, under the great seal of the state of Maryland, commissioned and duly qualified, residing in the city of Baltimore, in the state aforesaid, do hereby certify, attest, and make known, that on the day of the date hereof, before me personally appeared, Jas. McQuillan, master and John Wilkinson, chief mate of the ship *Strafford*, of Baltimore, owned by Messrs. Von Kapff and Brune, of the city of Baltimore, merchants, and made oath in due form of law, That while the said ship *Strafford* lay at anchor in the river Jade, say on the twenty-seventh of June, 1810, she was boarded by a boat from his Britannic majesty's brig of war *Pincher*, commanded by Samuel Burgess, which boat contained an officer and six men; that soon after they came on board, they impressed deponent Wilkinson, and the ship *Strafford's* carpenter, John Williamson; and took them on board said brig of war *Pincher*, where deponent Wilkinson was detained two months and twenty-two days, and then sent on board the *Strafford*; but John Williamson was detained on board her, and as deponents believe, still remains there, although said Wilkinson and said Williamson had regular protections from the custom house at Baltimore; and deponent Wilkinson further made oath, that at the time he was taken on board said brig, he was sick, and continued sick for some time, notwithstanding which they attempted to compel him to do ship's duty, which he refused to do; when, on the 9th July, eighteen hundred and ten, they took him and TIED HIM TO THE GANGWAY, AND FLOGGED HIM SEVERELY, GIVING HIM EIGHTEEN LASHES; after which he was threatened to be given DOUBLE AS MUCH if he would not perform duty on board said brig; and after some time (as he understands by the entreaties of captain McQuillan and the American consul at Bremen) he was sent on board said ship *Strafford*, as before

stated, say on Monday the 17th September, 1810. Of which an act having been of me requested, I have granted these presents to serve and avail as need and occasion may require.

In testimony whereof, the said deponents have hereunto subscribed their names, and I, the said Notary, have hereunto set my hand and affixed my notarial seal, the nineteenth day of March, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and eleven.

JAMES M'QUILLAN,
JOHN WILKINSON.

JOHN GILL, Not. Pub.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

Subject of Impressment concluded.

I HAVE now, as nearly in chronological order as possible, brought this odious, this detestable subject, to the last act of the drama.

Some of the actors, who stood on high ground in the opening of the piece, sink far below par in this act. They stand in conspicuous stations, and possess great influence on our destinies and those of our posterity. I regard it therefore as an impetuous duty to canvass their conduct fully and completely, and to cite them to the bar of the public, which I thus do in the most solemn manner.

Two of the gentlemen to whom I refer, are Timothy Pickering and Rufus King, esqrs. whose opinions and conduct on this important topic, have been, at different periods, in as direct hostility with each other, as day and night—truth and falsehood.

The reader has seen how laudably, how zealously, how patriotically both these gentlemen, on the subject of impressment, formerly contended for and defended the rights of their country—as well as opposed and struggled against the exorbitant and inadmissible claims of England.

But they were lately united with the Otises, the Blakes, the Hansons, and the Websters, who appeared determined to “PUT DOWN”—yes, reader, “PUT DOWN” is the word—it is strong, significant, and unequivocal—I say, “*to put down the administration*” for strenuously insisting on those rights,—for attempting to shield the seaman from the iron grasp of his enslaver.

This is a clear case. I state it in brief. Either Messrs. Pickering and King were extravagant in their demands formerly, and endangered the peace of their country by preferring exorbitant and unjust claims on a nation, “*the bulwark of our holy religion*”—“*struggling for our salvation*”—and “*fighting the battles of Christendom against Antichrist and his host*,”—or they were faithless to that country of late, and were using their utmost endeavours, for factious purposes, to defeat her in the effort to procure simple justice. There is no other alternative. Let them choose for themselves. Let the public ratify or reject the choice. I merely state the case.

Never was there a more striking or revolting instance of the deleterious spirit of faction—and of its power to deaden all the finer and more honourable feelings of human nature, than this question exhibits. It is disgraceful and humiliating to the human species. High-minded American merchants—possessed of immense fortunes—enjoying in profusion all the luxuries and delicacies this world affords—and owing these manifold blessings to the labours, the skill, and the industry of our sailors—but ungratefully regardless of the agents by whom they procure them, and blinded by party spirit, regarded with calm and stone-hearted apathy the miseries of impressment. They were not merely indifferent to the sufferings of the unfortunate seamen, “*purloined by men stealers*,” from all their humble blessings, and dragging out a miserable existence, in slavery of the most galling kind, with a rope’s end ready to punish them for murmuring out their sorrows. No. They were not, I repeat, merely indifferent. They threw themselves into the scale of their enemies. They derided the idea of struggling for the security of a few sailors, whom, in the face of heaven and earth, and in direct contradiction to the truth, they styled vagabonds from England, Ireland, and Scotland, whom our government was wickedly protecting at the hazard of the ruin of their country! Almighty father! To what an ebb is man capable of descending! Let us suppose for a moment that the illustrious Hull, Jones, Perry, Porter, Decatur, M'Donough; or any other of that constellation of heroes, who have bound their country's brows with a wreath of imperishable glory, had been pressed by a Cockburn, their proud spirits subjected to his tender mercies, and crushed by the galling chain and the rope's end! What a scene for a painter—what a subject for contemplation—what a never-dying disgrace to those whose counsels would persuade the nation to submit to such degradation!

There is one strong and striking point of view in which the subject of impressment may be considered, and which really renders the tame acquiescence in it, which was lately contended for, pregnant with awful results. *England has impressed from our ships, Danes, Swedes, and Italians, as well as native Americans. WE HAVE SUBMITTED TO IT. And Mr. Pickering, Mr. King, governor Strong, H. G. Otis, &c. plead in favour of submission.* If this be just, what right, I demand, have we to prevent all belligerents whatever, and at all times, from copying the example? Suppose France, Spain, and Italy, at war. Are not the cruisers of each nation justified in searching our vessels for the subjects of the powers to which they respectively belong, and as fully entitled to *enslave the Danes, Portuguese, Swedes, and Englishmen on board, as the British cruisers are to enslave Frenchmen, Spaniards, Danes and Portuguese?* This is a horrible view of the subject, and must

curdle the blood in the veins of every man possessed of American feeling. There is no calculating the extent or the enormity of the evil.

I must resume this topic. It is too important to be dismissed in a single paragraph. It deserves volumes. Would to heaven an apler pen were engaged in the discussion.

That British officers have been in the constant habit of impressing, without any scruple, and that they regard it as their right to impress, Danes, Portuguese, Frenchmen, Italians, and all other foreigners found on board our vessels, is true, or Timothy Pickering,* Rufus King,† and Judge Marshal,‡ have disgraced and dishonoured themselves by asserting most awful falsehoods. To their evidence on the subject, which is detailed above, I refer the reader.

If Great Britain have a right to impress Frenchmen, or Spaniards, or Dutchmen, on board our vessels, France, Spain, and Holland, have an equal right to impress Englishmen. Nothing can be more clear. Let us proceed.

The British captains assert that they find it difficult or impossible to discriminate between Englishmen and Americans. It must be far more difficult for French captains. And they will be still more excusable for any *mistakes*—and for enslaving Americans instead of Englishmen. What a frightful fate has faction prepared for our ill-starred sea-faring citizens!

I have stated that Messrs. Pickering, King, Strong, &c. “contended for submission to impressment.” This requires explanation. They did not, it is true, *in words*, contend for impressment. But this was the inevitable result of their late course of proceeding; for, as I have already stated, and beg to repeat, they laboured most indefatigably to destroy the present administration, principally for the stand made to put an end to impressment; and the consequence of the violent opposition made to the government on the subject, has been to oblige it to postpone the discussion of that important question, which may probably lead to a future war.

A committee of the legislature of Massachusetts was appointed, at a late session, to enquire into the affair of impressment. The object of the appointment was to damn the character of the administration, by diminishing the enormity of this high-handed offence, against which the Levitical law pronounced the sentence of death:—

“He that stealeth a man—and selleth him—or if he be found in his hand, he shall be put to death.”

It is painful to state—but it is my duty to state to the world—that this committee by no means did justice to the subject. They acted with most palpable partiality. They reported—

* See page 190.

† See page 188.

‡ See page 191.

wonderful to tell—impossible to believe—that at the commencement of the war, the number of impressed Americans belonging to the great commercial state of Massachusetts, on board British vessels of war, was “*only eleven !!*” *—Yes—reader—it is really *eleven*—I have read it six times over, to convince myself that I was not mistaken. But it is absolutely true, that a committee of the legislature of Massachusetts did report to that body, that at the commencement of the war, **THERE WERE BUT “ELEVEN” IMPRESSED MASSACHUSETTS’ SAILORS** on board the vessels of his Britannic majesty.

Now, reader, let me request you to consult the preceding documents carefully—and observe

1. That there were *ten Americans on board the Guerriere*, at the time of her engagement with the Constitution. This is established by the log book of one of her officers. §

2. That *there were thirteen Americans on board the Java*, † when she was captured by Bainbridge. ‡

3. That there were on board the Moselle and Sappho, as appears by the muster-books of those vessels, *at least thirty-five impressed Americans.* ||

4. That these plain facts stand on such ground as neither Timothy Pickering, Rufus King, governor Strong, George Cabot, Harrison Gray Otis, Daniel Webster, or A. C. Hanson will dare to dispute. I hereby publicly challenge them to a denial.

5. That I have thus clearly and indisputably established, that on board of four vessels there were 10, and 13, and 35 American slaves, being **AN AVERAGE OF FOURTEEN TO EACH.**

6. That there are about 500 British vessels constantly in commission.

7. That an average of fourteen amounts to 7000 on board the British fleet.

8. That this statement corresponds pretty nearly with the records of the secretary of state’s office.

And then, reader, decide what judgment must be passed on the committee, when they gravely state, that there were on

* Road to Ruin, No. IV.

§ See page 202. † See lieutenant Hoffman’s certificate, page 201.

‡ It would be unfair and uncandid not to state, that commodore Bainbridge deposed on the twentieth of February, 1813, before a committee of the house of representatives of the state of Massachusetts, that there was but one impressed American on board the Java, when he captured her. This statement he qualified in a subsequent communication, and, as far as I understand the latter, admits that there were two more. But if we wholly omit the Java, in consequence of the stupendous contradiction between the certificate of lieutenant Van Hoffman and the deposition of commodore Bainbridge, it will not materially affect the above calculation. There will remain about forty-five impressed American seamen on board three British men of war.

|| See commodore Porter’s letter, page 201.

board the British vessels of war *only eleven natives of Massachusetts !!!* It makes one sick to reflect on such obliquity of mind, and such monstrous perversion of fact.

It is, however, true, that this committee, though the world is grossly deceived by the form of expression in the report, have a salvo to prevent establishing against them the charge of falsehood. They state, that these are the results, "*as far as their enquiries went.*" But this saving clause escapes the mass of readers. They fasten on the strong allegation, that "the administration continued the war, on account of impressed seamen; and that there were *only eleven natives of Massachusetts impressed.*" All the rest escapes notice.

"*As far as their enquiries went*" is a very equivocal expression. They may have stopped at the threshold—or they may have gone half way—or they may have gone through the business completely. That their enquiries did not go very far, is, however, pretty certain.

The words "*American slaves,*" will startle some delicate ears. This strong expression is nevertheless correct. When an Algerine corsair attacks one of our vessels, and seizes it and the crew, *the latter are justly regarded as slaves.* Yet *their case is far better than that of the Americans impressed by British cruisers.* The Algerine slaves work for task-masters. So do the British slaves. The Algerine slaves are flogged if they refuse "to do their duty." So are the British. The Algerine slaves have wretched fare. So have the British. Thus far they are on a parallel. But here the parallel ceases. *The Algerine slave is never forced to jeopardize his life in battle—he is never forced to point a gun that may slaughter his countrymen.* But this the British slave must do, or "**BE TIED TO THE MAST, AND SHOT AT LIKE A DOG !!!**"* Is he not then the most miserable of slaves?†

When the preceding chapter was written, I had not seen the Report of the Committee of the House of Representatives of Massachusetts, to which I have referred. I own a set of the Examiner, published by Barent Gardenier, of New-York, containing the Road to Ruin, ascribed to John Lowell, which quotes this report, and from which alone I knew of its contents, or even of its existence. I subjoin Mr. Lowell's quotations—

"I find, from indisputable documents furnished by the Rev. Mr. Taggart, member of Congress from this state, that the whole number of American seamen said to be detained at the beginning of the war, on board British vessels, did not exceed three hundred.

* See commodore Decatur's letter, page 204.

† The idea which is dilated on in this paragraph must have been suggested by a perusal of the Weekly Register, vol. III. page 349. Of this I was not aware when I wrote it. I have recently made the discovery in the examination of that invaluable work.

"I find by the investigation of a committee of our own house of representatives, that the number belonging to this state, so detained, did not exceed, *so far as their enquiries went, eleven men.*"*

On the fourth of July, 1815, I received the Report itself from Boston: and I should ill deserve the confidence that has been reposed in my work, did I not avail myself of the opportunity thus afforded me, to lay an abstract of some of its documents before the reader.

Extract from the deposition of John Eldridge.

"I reside in Yarmouth in the county of Barnstable. I have been the master of a vessel about seventeen years, within the last twenty-four years; and have had on board my vessels from seven to sixteen men; on an average about eight or nine. About the year 1803, while I was lying at Trinidad, in the sloop Stork, one of my men, while on shore, had quitted his boat, and was taken up by the press gang. His name was William Boynton, and he was, as he told me, an American. The next day I was informed by the officer of the press gang, that the man was taken, and immediately upon my application on board the ship where he was placed, he was returned to me, with some money he had about him. He had left his protection on board the vessel at the time when he was taken.

"In 1810, while I was at Martinique, a Portuguese boy named Joseph Friay, belonging to my vessel, was impressed from the vessel; he was detained two days: but upon my application he was discharged; he had no protection, nor any indenture of apprenticeship: he was a servant to my mate."

Extract from the deposition of William Parsons.

"I reside in Boston, and have been engaged in commerce and navigation about thirty years. I have employed in my vessels, annually, upon an average, about fifty seamen, until the time of the embargo. *I have no recollection of any of my seamen being impressed for the last twenty years, except in one instance.*"

Extract from the deposition of Caleb Loring.

"I reside in Boston. I have been engaged in commerce and navigation between eighteen and nineteen years. I have employed upon an average, annually, about forty seamen in foreign trade.

"I recollect, at present, *but one instance of any of my seamen being impressed by the British*; in July, 1809, two seamen, belonging to the ship Hugh Johnson, while she was lying at Palermo, were taken from her by a British man of war; I do not know their names—one of them was an Englishman, the other was an American."

Extract from the deposition of Moses Townsend, esq.

"I, Moses Townsend, of Salem, in the county of Essex, esquire, do depose and say—that I have been engaged in commerce and navigation for about thirty years, and was master of a ship about twenty years. I have usually had crews of ten and twelve men, upon an average. I never had any men impressed from any of the vessels under my command, except once while I was at Bristol, in England. On that occasion, I had three or four men impressed, belonging to the ship Light Horse, under my command; they were taken in the evening, and upon my application through the American consul, they were released the next day."

Extract from the deposition of Joseph Mudge.

"I, Joseph Mudge, of Lynn, in the county of Essex, mariner, do depose and say—that I have followed the occupation of a mariner for about twenty years, and have been master from the first of January 1800 (except about four months of the year 1812, while I was mate of a vessel, in order to get a passage to the United States from abroad.)

"I have had seamen frequently taken from me by British cruizers; but never had any man that I knew to be an American, taken from me, that was not released upon my application."

* Road to Ruin, No. 4, from the Boston Centinel. See Examiner, vol. I. p. 10.

Extract from the deposition of Andrew Harraden.

"I, Andrew Harraden, of Salem, in the county of Essex, mariner, depose and say—that I have followed the occupation of a mariner about thirty-two years, of which I have been master from the year 1791 to this time, excepting two voyages performed during that period. *I have never had any seamen impressed from my vessels, except in one instance.* In the year 1802, while at Cape Francois, in the month of August, a man by the name of George Randall, of Boston, was taken from my vessel by a French press-master and his gang, and carried on board a French frigate lying at that port. On application to the commandant of the port, he was released the next morning. *None of my men were ever taken or detained by the English.*"

Deposition of Nahum Mitchell.

I, Nahum Mitchell, of Bridgewater, in the county of Plymouth, depose and say—that I was born, and have always lived, in Bridgewater. I have never heard of any cases of persons impressed from that town. There never was any man of the name of William Robinson within my knowledge impressed from that place. I have been a selectman five years; but not within ten years past.

Feb. 16, 1813. SUFFOLK, ss.

NAHUM MITCHELL.

Sworn before me, ALEXANDER TOWNSEND, justice of the peace.

Deposition of William Orne.

I, William Orne, of Salem, in the county of Essex, merchant, depose and say,

That during the last twenty years, I have employed, upon an average, about sixty men annually, in my vessels. The only cases of impressment from my vessels, that I know of, are the following:

In 1803, the ship Essex, Joseph Orne, master, being bound from Salem to Amsterdam, had a man, by the name of James Newhall, on board, who was impressed on the passage. Newhall said he was born in Windsor, in Connecticut; and at the time of his being taken, told the captain of my ship, that he had forgotten to take out his protection from America; and the captain desired me to send it out to the consul, in London.

I wrote to the selectmen of Windsor, who answered me, that there was no such man belonged to either of the towns of Windsor or East Windsor. Not long after, the man returned to Salem, and was found to be a British subject.

In 1810, John Hanson, a Swede, was taken out of my brig Industry; he had no American protection, but had a Swedish document. He soon after returned to Salem, and I have paid him off.

WILLIAM ORNE.

SUFFOLK, ss.

Sworn to before me,

Boston, February 19, 1813.

JAMES SAVAGE, justice of the peace.

Deposition of John Tucker.

I, John Tucker, of Gloucester, in the county of Essex, do depose and say,

That I have been master of a vessel for about forty-seven years, and until the last seven years. I never had any men impressed from any of my vessels. About the year 1796, while I was lying at St. Pierre's, Martinique, an English officer from one of the frigates there, demanded a sight of the protections of my men; as the laws of my country, as he said, made it necessary that my men should have them. I told him, I knew of no such law, having been absent about twelve months from my country. He told me, he should take my men on board for examination. I followed them on board; they were detained about an hour, and then discharged.

I know of no case of impressment from the town of Gloucester, except the following:

A relation of mine, by the name of Aaron Burnham, has been in the British service about two years, and says he was impressed on shore in a British port; he has written home frequently, but has never expressed any desire to be discharged, that I have heard of. His father and I are very near neighbours; and I have frequently conversed with him, when he has informed me of receiving his son's letters. But he never stated that his son was desirous of returning.

Daniel Parsons and Ignatius Parsons, I have heard, were on board the British navy; but I have no knowledge of their having been impressed.

About the year 1796 (it was before our seamen took protections) while I was at Amsterdam, three of my men, viz. Jonathan Cook, John Medley, and John —, an Englishman, requested a discharge from my vessel, and entered on board an English merchant ship, at that place. They went to Lisbon; and while there, were impressed on shore by some British ship. Cook has since been home, and is now again in the British merchant service. I have never heard of Medley since. He has left a family in Gloucester: but they have never applied, to my knowledge, for a discharge. Cook and Medley were both of Gloucester.

Benjamin Oakes, of Gloucester, was taken about two years ago, as I have understood, and that it was for the want of a protection; a protection has been sent out to him, at Halifax: and he has not yet returned.

Nathaniel Riggs, of Gloucester, was on board a British ship, into which he had entered and served, and received his wages and prize money. He has been at home four or five years.

JOHN TUCKER.

Boston, February 18, 1813.

Deposition of Israel Thorndike.

I, Israel Thorndike, of Boston, in the county of Suffolk, esquire, depose and say,

That I have for a considerable part of the time, for ten or twelve years past, (excepting the time of the embargo) usually employed, on an average, more than two hundred seamen annually, on board my own vessels, and those which I have had under freight and charter. The average of the length of the voyages, I should think, was about six to eight months; not exceeding eight months.

I have not had more than six or seven men, to my recollection, impressed from my vessels, and those vessels employed by me, during that period. I cannot now recollect the names of the men; from the ship *Alexander Hodgdon*, two or three men were taken about the year 1805 or 1806. They were, as I understood from the captain, all foreigners. I think they were shipped in Leghorn; and I think they were impressed on a voyage from that place to the East Indies. I do not know whether they had any protections or documents, or not; and have not since heard of them.

The brig *Hector* had one man impressed from her, off the isle of France, about 1803 or 1804. He was, as I was informed by the captain, a Frenchman; and I am inclined to believe, he was shipped at Beverly; but do not know whether he had a protection or not, nor have I heard of him since.

The brig —, *Swansey*, master, lost one man in Liverpool, about 1809. His name was *Neptune*, an African, and he had there entered into the British service, while in a state of intoxication, as I was informed by the supercargo. The man had formerly been a servant in my family. I have not since heard of him. The brig *Gilpin* had two men taken from her, while on her voyage to Russia, in 1811, as I was informed by my clerks, who had their information from the captain. These two men were both foreigners, as I have been informed. I have heard nothing of them since; nor do I know whether they had any protections or not.

Daniel Parker, a British subject, who had a wife and family in Beverly, was impressed from one of my vessels, about twenty years since, in the Downs, or some other port of England. He was, as I was informed, requested by an officer of my vessel, at the time when he was taken, to declare that he was an American; but said he would not deny his country, and surrendered himself. This information I had from the captain of my vessel, the *Fabius*. He has since returned to his family in Beverly. I think he returned about twelve, or fifteen years since. I have no recollection of any other cases of impressment from any other vessel in which I had a concern.

ISRAEL THORNDIKE.

The deposition of Edward Lander.

I, Edward Lander, of Salem, in the county of Essex, merchant, depose and say,

That while I was in Leith, in the year 1811, in October, two men belonging to the *Rachel*, owned by the honourable William Gray, were taken from the ves-

sel by an English boat. Their names were Israel Foster and—Tuck, of Beverly, in Massachusetts. Foster was released the next day, or the day after, and returned home in the same vessel. The other was put on board the *Dia-dem*, sixty-four, which went to sea before the application reached her. At the request of the captain of the *Rachel*, I wrote a letter to the American consul at London (Mr. Lyman) which captain Mattinly (master of the *Rachel*) signed and forwarded. The letter was written the day after the men were taken, but before the return of the man who was released, as I have stated above.

I have understood, since my return to this country, that Tuck effected his escape at Spithead, by means of a waterman, in about one month after his impressment. They were both Americans, and had protections.

EDWARD LANDER.

February 18, 1813.

The deposition of Asa T. Newhall.

I, Asa T. Newhall, of Lynnfield, in the county of Essex, esquire, depose and say,

That I know of no cases of impressed seamen belonging to Lynnfield, except the following: Andrew Mansfield, of Lynnfield, sailed from Boston about fourteen years ago; and was impressed (on his first voyage) and detained on board a British man of war. His brother, Isaac, being on board the same vessel from which he was impressed, gave the information to his mother on his return. Soon after which, his mother forwarded documents for his release. He told me that he was shifted into several different vessels, which, he said, he supposed was the reason why he did not receive his documents sooner.

After being some time under impressment, and in order to obtain better treatment, he entered; not having any prospect of being soon released; after he had entered, and two or three years after his impressment, evidence of his being an American reached the ship he was in. His release was refused, on account of his having entered. He remained in the British service about seven years; at the end of which time he was discharged, and received his wages; he returned home soon after.

Amos Newhall, of Lynnfield, sailed from Boston, about nine years since, and has since been seen on board a British man of war, as I have understood from his brother; but whether he was impressed or not, his friends do not know.

SUFFOLK, s. s.

ASA T. NEWHALL.

Boston, February 27, 1813.

Extract from the deposition of Josiah Orne.

"I, Josiah Orne, of Salem, in the county of Essex, mariner, depose and say—that I have been master of a vessel about twenty-seven years.

"I never had any men impressed from the vessels under my command by the English—except in one instance—that was in 1801."

Extract from Nathaniel Hooper's deposition.

"I, Nathaniel Hooper, of Marblehead, merchant, do depose and say—that I have been engaged in commerce and navigation with my father and brothers for about nineteen years past; and for about seven years previous to the embargo, we employed usually upon an average about fifty seamen in our vessels. We have never had any men impressed from any of our vessels, that we know of."

Extract from Benjamin T. Reed's deposition.

"I, Benjamin T. Reed, of Marblehead, in the county of Essex, merchant, depose and say—that I have, with my brother, been engaged in trade and navigation for about eighteen years past. Before the embargo, we usually employed two vessels annually, the crews of which would be from twelve to fifteen men—we never had any men impressed from our vessels previous to the embargo, to my recollection."

There are various other depositions annexed to the Report, the tenor and tendency whereof are generally of a similar character to the above.

The contradiction and inconsistency between these documents, and those I have produced in the preceding chapters, are so strong, so striking, and so utterly unaccountable, as to make us stand aghast with astonishment. To reconcile them in any shape or mode is totally impossible. Were we to place full and implicit reliance upon the depositions just quoted, it would almost appear that impressment had been a matter of little or no consequence ; and that it had been most extravagantly exaggerated, to delude and deceive the public mind. But then what becomes of the strong and precise statements of Silas Taibot,* of Kutus King,† of Timothy Pickering,‡ of judge Marshall,§ of commodore Rodgers,¶ &c. witnesses who cannot possibly be suspected of anti-Anglican partialities, views, or prejudices ?

If the prevailing opinions of the great extent of impressment be unfounded, and if deception or delusion have been attempted, these gentlemen must have concurred in it, as well as their political antagonists ; for their testimony is among the most conclusive that has been produced on the subject.

The statement of commodore Rodgers, respecting the muster books of the Moselle and Sappho, is the most recent document on the subject, and is beyond the reach of suspicion.

To the reader I unhesitatingly submit the subject. Let him, whether Federalist or Democrat, honestly raise the scales of truth and justice—let him impartially weigh the evidence on both sides : and let him decide according to the credibility of these warring and irreconcilable documents.

In addition to the information contained in the preceding pages, I have now before me a most powerful document on the subject of impressment. It is

“ A statement of applications made to the British government on 1538 cases of impressed seamen, claiming to be citizens of the United States, from the eleventh of March, 1803, till the thirty-first of August, 1804 ; by George Erving, agent of the United States for the relief and protection of their seamen.”

I subjoin an abstract :

Number of applications,	- - -	1538
Of which are duplicates of former ones,	- - -	306
Original applications,	- - -	1232
		<hr/> 1538
Refused to be discharged, having no documents,		383
Ordered to be discharged,	- - -	437
Said not to be on board the ships specified,		105
Refused to be discharged, said to have taken the bounty, and entered,	- - -	120
Said to be married in England,	- - -	17
		<hr/> 1062

* See page 187. † See page 188. ‡ See page 190. § See page 191. ¶ See page 201.

Brought forward,	- - - - -	1062
Said to have deserted,	- - - - -	13
Said to have been drowned, or died,	- - - - -	2
Ships, on board of which stated not in commission,	- - - - -	3
Refused to be discharged, said to be British subjects,	- - - - -	49
Refused to be discharged, said to be prisoners of war,	- - - - -	2
Do not appear to have been impressed,	- - - - -	6
On board ships stated to be on a foreign station,	- - - - -	22
Ships lost, on board of which were stated to be	- - - - -	6

Refused to be discharged, documents being insufficient, viz.

1. Protections from consuls and vice-consuls,	- - - - -	88
2. Notarial affidavits made in the United States,	- - - - -	15
3. Notarial affidavits made in England,	- - - - -	27
4. Collectors' protections,	- - - - -	41
5. Discharges granted from King's ships, they being American citizens,	- - - - -	4
6. Of different descriptions, and which were kept by the impress officers,	- - - - -	35
7. Applications yet unanswered,	- - - - -	163

1538

This abstract deserves to be read and examined over and over. Every line of it claims the deepest and most serious consideration. It appears that in less than eighteen months, twelve hundred and thirty-two persons were impressed out of American vessels, exclusive of the very great number, who, we may reasonably conclude, had no means of conveying their applications for redress to the proper organ. An entire volume might be written as a commentary on this memorial of British outrage and injustice, and of American disgrace and dishonour.

The first item is hideous. Three hundred and eighty-three impressed Americans were doomed to remediless slavery, because they were not branded with the mark U. S. or provided with a badge, a pass, a license, or certificate! Suppose commodore Perry, or commodore Macdonough, or commodore Porter, had impressed three hundred and eighty-three men from on board of British vessels, under pretence of their being Americans—(and has the Almighty given any right to a British captain or commodore beyond what he has vested in an American captain or commodore?) and suppose Mr. Merry, Mr. Liston, Francis James Jackson, Mr. Rose, or Mr. Foster, had demanded them—and that our secretary of state had peremptorily refused to surrender them, because they had not the regular brand of G. R. or a proper certificate or protection, would Great Britain have submitted to the slow process of further demanding and waiting for redress? Indubitably not.

One hundred and five were doomed to slavery, by a removal from the vessels by which they were impressed, to others. An

easy and summary process, by which the doors of redress are eternally barred with adamantine fastenings.

One hundred and twenty of these sufferers were withheld because they had taken the bounty, or voluntarily entered! In forming an estimate of the justice of this plea, we must not lose sight of the subsequent cruel tragedy acted by order of commodore Berkley, on board the Chesapeake, in order to seize men who had voluntarily entered on board that vessel. If this be not—*give no right—take no wrong*—I cannot divine what deserves the title.

I am tired of this vile, this odious, this detestable subject. It excites to loathing and abhorrence. I must draw to a close. But there is one more point that I must touch upon—and that is, that of the whole number of fifteen hundred and thirty-eight, there are only forty-nine asserted to be British subjects! The American, who, after these statements, can advocate the atrocious practice of impressment, must be utterly lost to a sense of justice for his countrymen, or regard to the national rights or national honour.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

An apology for an egregious error committed by the writer, on the subject of preparation for war. The whole session one continued series of preparations. Nineteen acts bearing strong notes of martial arrangement.

I DEEM it indispensably necessary to correct a most egregious error into which I was betrayed by the haste in which my first edition was compiled and written. I therein enumerated, among the errors of Mr. Madison's administration, the neglect to make due preparation for the war, "previous to the commencement of hostilities." I deeply regret to have cast such a superficial glance at the subject; to have allowed myself to be so grossly deceived; and to have contributed to lead my reader astray. There were ample preparations made, as may be seen by the following list of acts passed during that session of congress, towards the close of which war was declared.

Previous to the declaration of war.

1. An act for completing the existing military establishment. December 24, 1811.
2. An act to raise an additional military force. This act provided for raising ten regiments of infantry, two regiments of artillery, and one regiment of dragoons, to be enlisted for five years, unless sooner discharged. The infantry amounted to about 20,000 men—the artillery to 4000—and the cavalry to 1000. Jan. 11, 1812.
3. An act authorising the purchase of ordnance and ordnance stores, camp equipage, and other quarter-master's stores and small arms. Jan. 11, 1812.

4. An act authorising the president of the United States to accept and authorise certain volunteer militia corps, not to exceed 50,000 men. For this purpose there was an appropriation of 1,000,000 dollars. Feb. 6, 1812.

5. An act appropriating 108,772 dollars for the expenses incident to six companies of mounted rangers. Feb. 20, 1812.

6. An act making appropriations for the support of the military establishment of the United States for 1812, viz.

For the pay of the army	-	-	-	869,968
Forage	-	-	-	104,624
Subsistence	-	-	-	685,000
Clothing	-	-	-	293,804
Bounties and premiums	-	-	-	70,000
Medical department	-	-	-	50,000
Ordnance and ordnance stores	-	-	-	1,135,000
Fortifications	-	-	-	296,049
For the quarter-master's department	-	-	-	735,000
For the purchase of horses	-	-	-	150,000
Contingencies	-	-	-	50,000
Indian department	-	-	-	164,000
Militia of Louisiana, &c.	-	-	-	32,000

Passed February 21, 1812.

\$4,635,445

7. An act making appropriations for the support of an additional military force :

For pay	-	-	-	-	1,406,857
Forage	-	-	-	-	154,435
Subsistence	-	-	-	-	1,074,097
Clothing	-	-	-	-	863,244
Bounties and premiums	-	-	-	-	442,260
Horses for dragoons	-	-	-	-	282,000
Quarter-master's department	-	-	-	-	408,760
Medical department,	-	-	-	-	125,000
Contingencies	-	-	-	-	355,911

Passed February 21, 1812.

\$5,112,564

8. An act making appropriations for the support of the navy of the United States, for 1812.

Pay and subsistence	-	-	-	-	\$1,123,341
Provisions	-	-	-	-	559,757
Medicines	-	-	-	-	40,000
Repairs of vessels	-	-	-	-	315,000
Freight, store-rent, &c.	-	-	-	-	115,000
Navy yards, &c.	-	-	-	-	60,000
Ordnance and ordnance stores	-	-	-	-	280,000
Saltpetre, sulphur, &c.	-	-	-	-	180,000
Pay and subsistence of marine corps	-	-	-	-	154,346

Clothing for marine corps	-	-	-	-	49,281
Military stores for do.	-	-	-	-	1,777
Medicines, &c.	-	-	-	-	3,501
Quarter-master's stores	-	-	-	-	20,000

Passed February 24, 1812. 2,902,003

9. An act making a further appropriation for the defence of our maritime frontier. This act appropriated for the purpose \$500,000. Passed March 10, 1812.

10. An act for a loan of \$11,000,000 for defraying the above expenses. Passed March 14, 1812.

11. An act concerning the naval establishment, for repairing the frigates Constellation, Chesapeake, and Adams. For this purpose there was appropriated \$300,000.

By this act there was an appropriation made of \$200,000 annually, for three years, for the purchase of a stock of timber for ship-building. The first appropriation was for rebuilding the frigates Philadelphia, General Green, New-York, and Boston. Passed March 30, 1812.

12. An act in addition to the act to raise an additional military force. Passed March 30, 1812.

13. An act to authorise a detachment from the militia of the United States, to the amount of 100,000 men. This act contained a clause appropriating one million of dollars towards defraying the expenses to accrue under it. Passed April 10, 1812.

14. An act for the organization of a corps of artificers. Passed April 23, 1812.

15. An act for the better regulation of the ordnance. Passed May 14, 1812.

Subsequent to the declaration of war.

16. An act for the more perfect organization of the army of the United States. Passed June 26, 1812.

17. An act making a further appropriation for the defence of the maritime frontier, and for the support of the army of the United States. Passed July 5, 1812.

18. An act making additional appropriations for the military establishment, and for the Indian department. Passed July 6, 1812.

19. An act making further provision for the army of the United States. Passed July 6, 1812.

It therefore appears, that nearly the whole session was spent in making preparation for hostility—for offensive and defensive operations. I shall not easily forgive myself the very extraordinary error, of which I have acknowledged myself guilty on this subject. I shall regard it as a monition as long as I live, against precipitate decision. And may I take the liberty of hinting to the reader, whoever he be, that he may derive a use-

ful lesson from the fact? If, with the attention I have been in the habit of paying to public affairs—reading two or three newspapers every day—and perfectly convinced of the justice of the war—I have nevertheless fallen into such a palpable, such a monstrous error, on so plain a point—if I have brought so unjust an accusation against the congress which declared war—how difficult may it be for persons remote from opportunities of judging correctly, and liable to be misled by interested or factious men, to form accurate opinions?

A further and most convincing proof of the magnitude of the error which I committed, is to be found in the circumstance, that on the 12th of July, 1812, only twenty-four days after the declaration of war, general Hull, at the head of two thousand five hundred men, well appointed, had penetrated into Canada: and, had the same talents and bravery that displayed themselves at Yorktown, Chippewa, Bridgewater, the Sarenac, New-Orleans, and other places, presided over their movements, there is no doubt that in the first campaign, the whole of Upper Canada, and perhaps Lower Canada, with the exception of Quebec, might have been subdued. This army had 3750 muskets, 36 pieces of cannon, 1080 rounds of fixed ammunition for the cannon, 200 tons of cannon ball, 150 tons of lead, 75,000 musket cartridges made up, &c. &c. &c.*

CHAPTER XL.

Reproaches of the minority against the imbecility of the majority. Pernicious consequences of newspaper misrepresentation. British deceived by their friends.

WHILE the serious preparations detailed in the preceding chapter were going forward, the federal printers throughout the union were pretty generally and zealously employed in ridiculing the idea of war—persuading the public that all these measures were illusory, and intended to intimidate the British ministry—and that our government possessed neither the courage nor the means to venture on hostility.

I have already quoted the notorious declaration made by several members of congress, particularly Mr. Josiah Quincy, that “*the majority could not be kicked into war.*”

This course of proceeding is not easily accounted for. It must have had some motive. And it requires an extraordinary degree of charity to ascribe it to a motive either laudable, or in fact not highly sinister or patriotic.

Suppose, for a moment, that our rulers did not really mean war—that they were actually destitute of the means of carrying it on—that they were “*too cowardly to be kicked into it*”—was it

* See Weekly Register, vol. 3. page 93.

wise, was it prudent, was it honourable, was it politic, to blazon our deficiencies to the world—to assure England that she might safely, and with impunity, continue the perpetration of her outrages on an unoffending neutral, because that neutral could not be *kicked into war to resist those outrages*? Surely not.

In pursuance of the plan I have followed throughout this work, of establishing all points of importance by indisputable evidence, I subjoin a few of the paragraphs to which I refer. The two first are of a date much earlier than the declaration of war—and prove how long this system had been pursued. They will satisfy the most incredulous reader.

Smoke! Smoke!

“Our correspondent suggests, in the event of certain measures already taken by the executive failing, then to augment the force by new levies—or by forming ten corps of 1200 men each, to be selected from the militia of a certain age of the several states, who may volunteer for such corps during the war. It is to us a most astonishing and inconceivable thing, that on reading the above, any man should be alarmed, and think our government are about to take *decisive steps*. Will our administration never be understood? Shall we forever be the dupes of a contemptible farce, which has been exhibiting for years, to make people wonder and stare? My life on it, our executive has no more idea of declaring war than my grandmother.” Boston Repertory, January 9, 1810.

“Our government will not make war on Great Britain; but will keep up a constant irritation on some pretence or other, for the sake of maintaining their influence as a party. The more the public suffer, the more irritable they will be; and government will trust to their address to direct that irritability against Great Britain.” Boston Repertory, April 17, 1810.

“The 25,000 men bill passed congress—and in this city [New York] the sensation produced by it was not half equal to that which was caused by the governor’s notice of banks. Mr. Gallatin recommended a whiskey tax, &c. and every body laughed to think what a queer thing it was for a man, who had figured so much in the whiskey insurrection, to be the author of such a measure. The New York Gazette, however, still graced its columns, and we too sometimes, with “for Liverpool—for London,” &c. &c. The committee of ways and means at last come out with their Pandora’s box of taxes. *Yet nobody dreams of war*. The mechanics, the banks, nay the insurance offices go on as usual. Last of all the loan for 11,000,000 of dollars—*Still no alteration of the public pulse*—no concern by friend or foe of administration. All is well! In the name of wonder, how or why is all this! Exposed as the city of New York is, why this security, this apathy? *Are all the proceedings of government a farce*, and that so palpable a one, as to be understood by the most stupid? Or what is the reason that not the slightest anxiety is felt by ourselves? if government is in earnest, why have they not, why do they not proceed more rapidly? *Why is our shipping permitted to run into certain capture?* *Either the government is most false and hypocritical, or the people out of their senses?*” New York Evening Post, Feb. 1812.

“When I see such a palpable failure in all the means, natural and necessary, for carrying on the war—when I see the exposure of your sea-board—when I see the actual military force, instead of being increased in efficiency, in fact *reducing, neither promises, nor asseverations, nor oaths, shall make me believe that you will go to war at the end of ninety days. Opposuit natura*. Nature has decided against you. Instead of that feast of war, to which we were invited, at the beginning of the session, we have served up to us the old dish of restrictions. There is no need of prophecy to tell the result. At the end of ninety days, you will find that your preparation is not sufficient. *The horrors of war will be preached up very assiduously during our recess*. Familiarity with embargo will diminish its dread. The restrictive system becomes identified with some per-

sonal, local, paltry interest. The navigating states are sacrificed : and the spirit and character of the country are prostrated in the dust, by fear or by avarice." Mr. Quincey's speech on the embargo, April 3, 1812.

"The project of attacking Canada is now given up. Some other plan is to be devised." Philadelphia Gazette, January 30, 1812.

"They [the leaders of congress] have already gone far enough in war. They are conscious they *cannot commence, prosecute, and terminate a war*; that the hands which begin will never finish it. *They shrink from it. They already stagger under the weight.*

"*They are frightened as the aspect becomes a little serious*, and wish to go home and think of it." Philadelphia Gazette, January 20, 1812.

"If you think a vote to raise 25,000 men, looks like war, *quiet your apprehensions*. You do not understand what is here called management. **THERE WILL, AS I BELIEVE, BE NO WAR.** *The war whoop, the orders in council, the non-importation, and presidential caucusing will vanish before summer.*"—Baltimore Federal Gazette, as quoted in the Philadelphia Gazette, January 13, 1812.

"I tell you James Madison will not dare to march a man to Canada with the avowed spirit of warfare—not a man, sir—no—not one—in our present defenceless state. *No no more of this dream.*" Philadelphia Gazette, Jan. 27, 1812.

"We are firmly persuaded, that the majority in congress *do not mean to declare war at present*; **THAT THEY DARE NOT**; and that all their threats are but contemptible vapouring, which will die away like the vapourings of a drunken man, before they rise." Boston Repertory, Dec. 24, 1811.

"There will be much talk and little business this session. **WAR IS OUT OF THE QUESTION.** But it was determined in caucus last Sunday evening, *to look big, and keep a stiff upper lip.*" Philadelphia Gazette, November 9, 1811.

"It is amazingly mal-a-propos, and moreover very vexatious, that while our centinels of public liberty are legislating away in "The full tide of successful experiment" at Washington, *their well laid plans are failing every where; the two main sinews of their darling, war, appear to be most miserably relaxed.* **NEITHER MEN ARE TO BE HAD—NOR MONEY TO PAY THEM.**" Alexandria Gazette, as quoted in the Philadelphia Gazette, May 14, 1812.

This paragraph was published only five weeks before the declaration of war. It was, with hundreds of others of similar character, calculated to keep up the delusion to the last, at home and abroad.

During the period when those paragraphs were publishing in our Gazettes, I felt the most serious uneasiness on the subject. I believed their effect would be to produce war. I repeatedly expressed my fears on the subject, and was convinced that they would delude England into a belief, that she might laugh our efforts to scorn—and that she would persevere in her obnoxious course till we were finally "*kicked into war.*" Among other gentlemen to whom I communicated my apprehensions on this subject, were James Milnor, Adam Seybert, and William Anderson, esqrs. then representatives in Congress from this state. It was in the gallery of the house of representatives, and, as far as I recollect, early in May, 1812.

The efforts to spread this delusion were not confined to this side of the Atlantic. No. The same industry was employed in letters to correspondents in England and Ireland, which made their appearance in the public papers in those kingdoms. Never was more application employed on any subject—and never was application more unholy or pernicious.

I submit to the reader, an extract from one of those letters. It is a fair specimen of hundreds which really appear to have been dictated by *the most serious apprehensions lest the British should relax, and* LEST WE MIGHT THUS ESCAPE WAR.

From the Londonderry Journal, June 16, 1812.

Extract of a letter to a gentleman in this place, dated

PHILADELPHIA, May 8, 1812.

"You will perceive by the copy of a bill which I enclose, that we Americans are *"at our dirty work again."* But *I advise you not to be alarmed at the violence of our proceedings. We shall continue to bluster. This is our characteristic. And we would do more, if we could. But it is not in our power. We have not a dollar in the treasury—no army deserving the name of one—and are actually without a navy.* Added to this, *not a moiety of the loan of eleven millions will ever be procured."*

I wish the reader, before he closes this chapter, to weigh well its contents. Let him dive into the most profound recesses of the human heart. Let him try to discover the main spring that dictated paragraphs and letters, fraught with such ruinous consequences to both nations.

The effect of this vile course of proceeding was highly pernicious in two points of view, widely different from each other. It fatally held out every possible encouragement to the British ministry to persevere in the career of depredation on American commerce, and in their utter disregard to, and violation of, the rights and the sovereignty of the United States. It was, moreover, calculated to goad, and I have no doubt did contribute to goad, our rulers into war.

Reader, let me illustrate this point by a plain case which occurs in our streets every day. Two boys have a quarrel—but are not very willing to come to an open rupture, lest their eyes, and noses, and mouths, should suffer violence in the affray. Some of the humane spectators pat them on the backs, and try to persuade each that his antagonist *"cannot be kicked into war"*—at the same time appealing to his pride to resent the insult. This *laudable* course seldom fails of success. The united influence of regard for his own honour, and reliance on his antagonist's cowardice, excites the courage of one or both just to the point of aggression. This was the horrible result between the United States and England, of a procedure which never can be too highly censured.

I could pursue this subject to a very great extent. It admits of a wide field of investigation: but I leave it with the reader. I have barely erected a finger post to direct his career.

I am fully persuaded that Great Britain did not desire actual war with the United States. Had her ministers really believed the alternative to be, war, or a repeal of the orders in council, they would, in all probability, have repealed them in season. But their friends on this side of the Atlantic most cruelly deceived

them. Every day's experience proves that *one indiscreet, imprudent, or injudicious friend does more injury than three enemies*. The friends of England in this country have afforded undeniable proofs of the correctness of the maxim. The writers whom I have quoted above, and others of similar character, have inflicted on her more injury than ten times the number of the most violent anti-Anglicans in the country.

CHAPTER XLI.

War proceedings in congress. Yeas and nays. Inexplicable conduct.

THIS, reader, is a dry and dull chapter. It is little more than reiterated lists of names. It cannot afford much entertainment. But if you have fairly travelled with me thus far, I deprecate your passing over these few pages. What they may want in entertainment, I hope they will compensate in instruction.

When the vote was finally taken on the declaration of war, there were forty-nine members in the negative, whose names are subjoined—

Nays—Messrs. Baker, Bartlett, Bleeker, Boyd, Breckenridge, Brigham, Champion, Chittenden, Cooke, Davenport, Ely, Emott, Fitch, Gold, Goldsborough, Huffy, Jackson, Key, Law, Lewis, Maxwell, M'Bryde, Metcalf, Minor, Mitchell, Mosely, Newbold, Pearson, Pitkin, Potter, Quincy, Randolph, Reed, Ridgely, Rodman, Sammons, Stanford, Stewart, Stow, Sturges, Sullivan, Taggart, Talmadge, Tallman, Tracy, Van Cortlandt, Wheaton, White, Wilson.—49.

I annex a statement of the votes on various measures preparatory to war. The names of those who finally voted against the war, are in *Italic*.

December, 16, 1811.

"The question was taken on the following resolution :

"That it is expedient to authorise the President, under proper regulations, to accept the service of any number of volunteers, not exceeding fifty thousand; to be organized, trained, and held in readiness to act on such service as the exigencies of government may require :

"And decided thus :

"Yeas—Alston, Archer, Avery, Bacon, *Baker*, Bard, *Bartlett*, Bassett, Bibb, Blackledge, *Bleeker*, Blount, *Boyd*, *Breckenridge*, Brown, Burwell, Butler, Calhoun, Cheeves, *Chittenden*, Cochran, Clopton, *Cooke*, Condit, Crawford, Davis, Dawson, Desha, Dinsmoor, *Emott*, Findley, Fisk, *Fitch*, Franklin, Gholson, *Gold*, *Goldsborough*, Goodwyn, Green, Grundy, B. Hall, O. Hall, Hawes, Harper, *Huffy*, Hyneman, Johnson, Kent, King, Lacock, Lefevre, Little, Lvingston, Lowndes, Lyle, Macon, *Maxwell*, Moore, *M'Bryde*, M'Coy, M'Kee, M'Kim, *Metcalf*, *Minor*, *Mitchell*, Morgan, Morrow, *Mosely*, Nelson, Newbold, Newton, Ormsby, Paulding, *Pearson*, Pickens, Piper, *Pitkin*, Pond, Porter, *Quincy*, *Reed*, *Ridgely*, Ringgold, Rhea, Roane, Roberts, *Rodman*, Sage, *Sammons*, Seaver, Sevier, Seybert, Shaw, Sheffield, Smilie, G. Smith, *Stow*, Strong, *Sullivan*, *Talmadge*, *Tallman*, *Tracy*, Troup, Turner, *Van Cortlandt*, *White*, Whitehill, Williams, Widgery, *Wilson*, Winn, Wright.—113.

"Nays—Messrs. Bigelow, *Brigham*, *Champion*, *Davenport*, *Ely*, Gray, *Jackson*, *Lane*, *Lewis*, *Potter*, *Randolph*, J. Smith, *Stanford*, *Sturges*, *Taggart*, *Wheaton*—16.

Same day.

“The question was next taken on the fourth resolution of the committee on foreign relations, in the following words :

“That the President be authorised to order out from time to time, such detachments of the militia, as in his opinion the public service may require ;

“And decided as follows :

“Yeas—Messrs. Alston, Anderson, Archer, Avery, Bacon, *Baker*, Bard, *Bartlett*, Basset, Bibb, Blackledge, *Bleecker*, Blount, *Boyd*, *Breckenridge*, Brown, Burwell, Butler, Calhoun, Cheeves, *Chittenden*, Cochran, Clopton, *Cooke*, Condit, Crawford, Davis, Dawson, Desha, Dinsmoor, Earle, *Emott*, Findley, Fisk, *Fitch*, Franklin, Gholson, *Gold*, *Goldsborough*, Goodwin, Gray, Green, Grundy, B. Hall, O. Hall, Harper, Hawes, Hufty, Hyneman, Johnson, Kent, King, Lacock, Lefevre, *Lewis*, Little, Livingston, Lowndes, Lyle, *Macon*, *Maxwell*, Moore, *M^r Bryde*, *M^cCoy*, *M^cKim*, *Metcalf*, *Milnor*, *Mitchill*, Morgan, Morrow, *Mosely*, Nelson, *Newbold*, Newton, Ormsby, Paulding, *Pearson*, Pickens, Piper, *Pitkin*, Pond, Porter, *Potter*, Quincy, *Randolph*, *Reed*, *Ridgeley*, Ringgold, Rhea, Roane, Roberts, *Rodman*, G. Smith, J. Smith, Stanford, Strong, *Sullivan*, *Talmadge*, *Tallman*, *Tracy*, Troup, Turner, *Van Cortlandt*, *Wheaton*, *White*, Whitehill, Williams, Widgery, *Wilson*, Winn, Wright.—120.

“Nays. Messrs. Bigelow, *Brigham*, *Champion*, *Davenport*, *Jackson*, *Law*, *Sturges*, *Taggart*.—8.

Same day.

“The question was taken on the fifth resolution, in the words following :

“That all the vessels not now in service belonging to the navy, and worthy of repair, be immediately fitted up and put in commission,

“And carried as follows :

“Yeas. Messrs. Alston, Anderson, Archer, Avery, Bacon, *Baker*, Bard, *Bartlett*, Basset, Bigelow, Blackledge, *Bleecker*, Blount, *Breckenridge*, *Brigham*, Burwell, Butler, Calhoun, *Champion*, Cheeves, *Chittenden*, Cochran, Clopton, *Cooke*, Condit, Crawford, Davis, Dawson, Desha, Dinsmoor, Earle, *Ely*, *Emott*, Findley, *Fitch*, Franklin, Gholson, *Gold*, *Goldsborough*, Goodwyn, Green, Grundy, B. Hall, O. Hall, Harper, Hawes, Hyneman, *Jackson*, Johnson, Kent, King, Lacock, *Law*, Lefevre, Little, Livingston, Lowndes, Lyle, *Maxwell*, Moore, *M^r Bryde*, *M^cCoy*, *M^cKim*, *Metcalf*, *Milnor*, *Mitchill*, Morgan, Morrow, *Mosely*, Nelson, *Newbold*, Newton, Ormsby, Paulding, *Pearson*, Pickens, Piper, *Pitkin*, Pond, Porter, *Quincy*, *Reed*, *Ridgeley*, Ringgold, Rhea, Roane, Roberts, Sage, *Sammons*, Seaver, Sevier, Seybert, Shaw, G. Smith, Strong, *Sturges*, *Sullivan*, *Taggart*, *Talmadge*, *Tallman*, *Tracy*, Troup, Turner, *Van Cortlandt*, *Wheaton*, *White*, Widgery, *Wilson*, Winn, Wright.—111.

“Nays. Messrs. Bibb, *Boyd*, *Brown*, Gray, *Hufty*, *Lewis*, *Macon*, *Potter*, *Randolph*, *Rodman*, *Sheffey*, *Smilie*, Stanford, Whitehill, Williams.—15.

December 19, 1811.

“The question was taken on the following resolution, and carried.

“That it is expedient to permit our merchant vessels, owned exclusively by resident citizens, and commanded and navigated solely by citizens, to arm under proper regulations to be prescribed by law, in self-defence against all unlawful proceedings towards them on the high seas.

“Yeas. Messrs. Alston, Anderson, Avery, Bacon, *Baker*, Basset, Bibb, Bigelow, Blackledge, *Bleecker*, *Breckenridge*, *Brigham*, Butler, Calhoun, *Champion*, Cheeves, *Chittenden*, Clopton, *Cooke*, Condit, Crawford, *Davenport*, Davis, Dawson, Desha, Dinsmoor, *Ely*, Findley, *Fitch*, Franklin, Gholson, *Gold*, *Goldsborough*, Goodwyn, Green, Grundy, B. Hall, O. Hall, Harper, Hawes, Hyneman, *Jackson*, Johnson, King, Lacock, *Law*, Lefevre, Little, Livingston, Lyle, *Maxwell*, Moore, *M^r Bryde*, *M^cCoy*, *Metcalf*, *Milnor*, Morgan, *Mosely*, Nelson, *Newbold*, Newton, Ormsby, Paulding, *Pearson*, Pickens, Piper, *Pitkin*, Pleasants Pond, Porter, *Pearson*, *Quincy*, *Reed*, *Ridgeley*, Ringgold, Rhea, Roane, Sage, *Sammons*, Seaver, Sevier, Shaw, *Smilie*, J. Smith, *Sturges*, *Taggart*, *Tallman*, *Tracy*, Troup, Turner, *Van Cortlandt*, *Wheaton*, *White*, Widgery, *Wilson*, *Bartlett*, *Potter*.—97.

"Nays. Messrs. Archer, Bard, Blount, *Boyd*, Brown, Cochran, *Hufty*, Kent, Lowndes, Macon, M'Kee, M'Kim, *Mitchill*, Morrow, Roberts, Rodman, Sheffield, *Stanford*, *Stewart*, Whitehill, Williams, Wright—22."

"January 6, 1812.

"The house took up the bill for raising an additional military force, which finally passed, 94 to 34. The yeas and nays were as follows:

"Yeas. Messrs. Alston, Anderson, Archer, Avery, Bacon, Bard, *Bartlett*, Basset, Bibb, Blackledge, *Bleecker*, Blount, Brown, Burwell, Butler, Calhoun, Cheeves, Clay, Cochran, Cropton, Condit, Crawford, Davis, Dawson, Desha, Dinsmoor, Earle, *Emott*, Findley, Fisk, Franklin, Gholson, *Gold*, Green, Grundy, B. Hall, O. Hall, Harper, Hawes, Hyneman, Johnson, Kent, King, Lacock, Lefevre, Little, Livingston, Lowndes, Lyle, *Maxwell*, Moore, M'Coy, M'Kee, M'Kim, *Metcalf*, *Milnor*, *Mitchill*, Morgan, Morrow, Nelson, New, Newton, Ormsby, Paudling, Pickens, Piper, Pond, Porter, *Quincy*, *Reed*, Ringgold, Rhea, Roane, Roberts, Sage, *Sammons*, Seaver, Sevier, Seybert, Shaw, G. Smith, J. Smith, Strong, *Sullivan*, *Tallman*, Talliaferro, *Tracy*, Troup, Turner, *Van Cortlandt*, Williams, Widgery, Winn, Wright—94.

"Nays. Messrs. Bigelow, *Boyd*, *Breckenridge*, Brigham, *Champion*, *Chittenden*, *Davenport*, *Ely*, *Fitch*, *Hufty*, Jackson, *Key*, Law, Lewis, Macon, M'Bryde, *Mosely*, *Newbold*, Pearson, Pitkin, *Potter*, *Randolph*, Rodman, Sheffield, Smilie, *Stanford*, *Stewart*, *Stow*, Sturges, Taggart, Tallmadge, Wheaton, White, Wilson—34.

"January 20, 1812.

"The engrossed bill concerning the naval establishment was read the third time and passed. The yeas and nays on its passage were as follows:

"Yeas. Messrs. Alston, Anderson, Basset, Blackledge, *Breckenridge*, Burwell, Butler, Calhoun, Cheeves, *Chittenden*, Condit, *Davenport*, Davis, Dinsmoor, *Ely*, *Emott*, Findley, Fisk, *Fitch*, Franklin, Gholson, Goodwin, Green, Harper, Hawes, Hyneman, King, Little, Livingston, Lowndes, *Maxwell*, Moore, M'Bryde, M'Coy, M'Kim, *Milnor*, *Mitchill*, Nelson, Newton, Pitkin, Pleasants, Pond, *Potter*, Richardson, Ringgold, Rhea, Seybert, Sheffield, G. Smith, J. Smith, *Stewart*, *Stow*, Sturges, Taggart, Talliaferro, *Tracy*, Troup, Turner, *Van Cortlandt*, Wheaton, White, Wilson, Winn, Wright—65.

"Nays. Messrs. Bacon, Bibb, *Boyd*, Brown, Cochran, Crawford, Desha, O. Hall, *Hufty*, Johnson, Lacock, Lyle, Macon, M'Kee, *Metcalf*, Morgan, *Mitchill*, New, *Newbold*, Piper, Roane, Roberts, *Rodman*, Sage, Seaver, Shaw, Smilie, *Sanford*, Strong, Williams—30.

"February 19, 1812.

"The engrossed bill for authorising a loan of eleven millions of dollars, was read the third time, and the question was put "shall the bill pass its third reading?"

"Yeas. Messrs. Alston, Anderson, Archer, Bacon, Bard, Basset, Bibb, *Bleecker*, *Boyd*, Brown, Burwell, Butler, Calhoun, Cheeves, Clay, Cochran, Condit, Crawford, Davis, Dawson, Desha, Dinsmoor, Earl, *Emott*, Findley, Fisk, Franklin, Gholson, *Gold*, Goodwyn, Green, Grundy, B. Hall, O. Hall, Harper, Hawes, *Hufty*, Johnson, Kent, King, Lacock, Lefevre, Little, Livingston, Lowndes, Lyle, Macon, *Maxwell*, Moore, M'Coy, M'Kim, *Metcalf*, *Mitchill*, Morgan, Morrow, Nelson, New, Newbold, Newton, Ormsby, Pickens, Piper, Pleasants, Pond, Porter, *Potter*, *Quincy*, *Reed*, Richardson, Ringgold, Rhea, Roane, Roberts, Sage, *Sammons*, Seaver, Sevier, Seybert, Shaw, Smilie, G. Smith, J. Smith, *Stow*, Strong, *Tracy*, Troup, Turner, *Van Cortlandt*, Whitehill, Widgery, Winn, Wright—92.

"Nays. Messrs. Baker, Bigelow, *Breckenridge*, Brigham, *Champion*, *Chittenden*, *Davenport*, *Fitch*, *Goldsborough*, Gray, Jackson, Law, Lewis, *Milnor*, *Mosely*, Pearson, Pitkin, *Randolph*, Ridgeley, Rodman, Sheffield, *Stewart*, Sturges, Taggart, Tallmadge, Wheaton, White, Wilson—29."

I hope the reader has fully examined those dry lists, and has his mind prepared for the reflections I have to submit upon them.

No man will deny that a public functionary who acts with gross and manifest inconsistency in his political career, especially in matters of the highest possible importance to his constituents, forfeits their confidence. Of course it is extremely dangerous to submit to his guidance.

The war was either just or unjust.

Every man who believed it unjust, and who voted for a series of measures leading to it, betrayed his trust.

Every man who voted for the measures leading to war; who opposed it after it was declared; and who, as far as in his power, thwarted the measures adopted to carry it on, was guilty of a gross, manifest, and palpable inconsistency—and in either one or other course betrayed his trust.

That these positions are correct cannot be denied. I proceed to apply them—and shall single out an individual to make the case more striking.

Josiah Quincy voted, as we have seen, *for a set of measures, all predicated upon an approaching war. He voted for the loan to raise the money necessary to give effect to those measures. He, and forty-eight other members, who had generally voted with him for all these preparatory measures, voted against the war itself. And further, they did not merely vote against the war, but thirty-four of them published a most inflammatory protest, addressed to their constituents, to excite them to oppose it.* This protest, and other violent measures, were fatally but too successful.

I annex the names of the protestors.

Messrs. Brigham, Bigelow, M'Bride, Breckenridge, Baker, Bleecker, Champion, Chittenden, Davenport, Emett, Ely, Fitch, Gold, Goldsborough, Jackson, Key, Lewis, Law, Mosely, Milnor, Potter, Pearson, Pitkin, Quincy, Reed, Ridgeley, Sullivan, Stewart, Sturges, Tallmadge, Taggart, White, Wilson, Wheaton.

The whole of the annals of legislation, from the first organization of deliberative bodies to this hour, *cannot produce a more sinister, dark, or mysterious policy.* These gentlemen, particularly Mr. Quincy, who has been so conspicuous in his opposition to the war, are most solemnly cited before the bar of the public, and called upon to explain the motives of their conduct to that country, which was brought to the jaws of perdition by the opposition which they excited against a war that they countenanced in almost every stage but the last.

CHAPTER XLII.

Declaration of war. Violently opposed.

AT length, on the 18th of June, 1812, war was declared against Great Britain in due form, after a session of above seven

months, and the most ardent debates. The final vote was carried in the senate by 19 to 13—and in the house of representatives by 79 to 49: affirmatives in both houses 98, negatives 62; that is, more than three to two, in both houses united.*

War then became the law of the land. It was the paramount duty of all good citizens to submit to it. Even those who doubted its justice or expediency, and who had opposed its adoption, were bound to acquiesce: for the first principle of all republican government,—and of all government founded on reason and justice, is, that the will of the majority, fairly and constitutionally expressed, is the supreme law. To this supreme law the minority is sacredly bound to submit. Any other doctrine is jacobinical, and disorganizing, and seditious. It has a direct tendency to overthrow all government, and introduce anarchy and civil war. If it were lawful for the minority, in the unparalleled mode they adopted, to oppose or paralyze the government, and defeat its measures, on the pretext that they were unjust, such pretexts can never be wanting. And I aver, that *it would be full as just, as righteous, as legal, and as constitutional, for Mr. Holmes, at the head of the minority in Massachusetts, to besiege governor Strong, in his house, and coerce him to retire from office, as it was for the Kings, the Websters, the Hansons, and the Gores, to besiege president Madison at Washington.*

While the federalists held the reins of government, they inculcated these maxims with great energy and effect. The least opposition to law excited their utmost indignation and abhorrence. The vocabulary of vituperation was exhausted to brand it and its perpetrators with infamy. But to enforce rules which operate to our advantage, when we have power, and to submit to those rules, when they operate against us, are widely different. And the federalists, as I have already remarked, abandoned, when in the minority, the wise and salutary maxims of political economy which they had so eloquently preached when they were the majority.

And they were not satisfied with mere preaching. They had occasional recourse to violence. A band of Philadelphia volunteers, during the western insurrection, seized a printer at Reading in his own house, by force and violence, and scourged him in the market-place for a libel, not the twentieth part as virulent as those that are at present daily published with impunity.

War is undoubtedly a tremendous evil. It can never be sufficiently deplored. It ought to be avoided by all honourable means. And the four successive administrations of the United

* A very erroneous idea has been promulgated, and found a too easy belief, that the war was carried by a small and contemptible majority. How utterly unfounded it is, appears by the above statement. Measures of great importance are rarely carried by large majorities.

States government, from the commencement of the French revolution, till 1812, deserve great credit for the laudable efforts they made to avoid war, amidst such a variety of provocations. But there are situations which present greater evils than war as an alternative. This nation was precisely in such a situation. We had borne almost every species of outrage, insult, and depredation. All our efforts to procure redress or justice had been in vain. And the uniform voice of history proves that the base submission of nations to such atrocities as were perpetrated upon us, inevitably produces a loss of national character, as well as of the respect and esteem of other nations—and invites to further outrages and depredation, till the alternative finally becomes, a loss of independence, or resistance with means and confidence impaired. The questions respecting the late war with Great Britain are, whether it was warranted by the conduct of that nation—and whether, after having been duly declared by the constituted authorities, it was not the incumbent duty of the whole nation to have united in support of it. The first of these questions is of so much importance that I shall devote to it the 44th, 45th and 46th chapters entire. I have already sufficiently discussed the second in the beginning of the present chapter.

From the hour of the declaration of war, a steady, systematical, and energetical opposition was regularly organized against it. The measure itself, and its authors and abettors, were denounced with the utmost virulence and intemperance. The war was, however, at first opposed almost altogether on the ground of inexpediency, and the want of preparation. Afterwards its opposers rose in their denunciations. They asserted it was unholy—wicked—base—perfidious—unjust—cruel—and corrupt. Every man who in any degree co-operated in it, or gave aid to carry it on—was loaded with execration. It was pronounced in one of our daily papers to be “the most wicked and unjust war that ever was waged.” The utter disregard of truth and of the moral sense of the reader, which such a declaration betrays, is calculated to excite the utmost astonishment. Can this war for an instant be compared to the atrocious and perfidious war waged by Bonaparte against Spain—to the treacherous war of England against Denmark, begun by a most lawless and unprecedented attack upon the shipping and capital of an unoffending neutral? I pass over thousands of other instances. And the assertion just quoted is so far from being true, that it is the very reverse of truth; for probably no nation ever bore injustice and depredation so long without resistance.

CHAPTER XLIII.

Peace party. Composed of warlike materials. Repeated clamour for war.

IMMEDIATELY after the declaration of war, there was a party formed, called the “Peace Party,” which combined nearly the

whole of the federalists throughout the union. Their object was, to expose the war—the administration—the congress who declared it—and all who supported it, to reprobation—and to force the government to make peace.

This party embraced various descriptions of persons, all enlisted under the banners of federalism, whom it may not be improper to enumerate.

First, those who were clamorous for war with England in 1793, for her depredations on our commerce.

Secondly, those who declared and supported the war against France in 1798.

Thirdly, those who were vociferous for war against Spain in 1803, when she interdicted us from the right of deposit at New-Orleans.

Fourthly, those who in 1805-6, urged the government to resist the aggressions of England, and to make the alternative—*redress of wrongs, or WAR.*

Fifthly, those who, after the attack upon the Chesapeake in 1807, were clamorous for war, as the only mode in which satisfaction could be had for such an outrageous insult.

To enable the reader to make a fair comparison of the several degrees of complaint at these several periods of time, I annex a synoptical view of them.

1793	1798	1803	1806	1807	1812
Clamour for war with England.	War with France.	Clamour for war with Spain.	Clamour for war with G. Britain.	Clamour for war with G. Britain.	War with Great Britain.
<i>Cause.</i>	<i>Cause.</i>	<i>Cause.</i>	<i>Cause.</i>	<i>Causes.</i>	<i>Causes.</i>
Depredations on commerce.	Depredations on commerce. Ambassadors insulted. Vile attempt to extort money.	Prohibition of the right of deposit at New Orleans.	Enforcement of the rule of 1756. Impressment.	Attack on the Chesapeake. Impressment.	Impressment. AMERICAN VESSELS, OWNED BY AMERICAN CITIZENS, LADEN WITH AMERICAN PRODUCTIONS, AND NAVIGATED BY AMERICAN SEAMEN, LIABLE TO SEIZURE AND CONDEMNATION, <i>if bound for France, Holland, or the north of Italy. In other words, the trade of the United States with fifty millions of the people of Europe interdicted.</i>

I hope the reader will pay particular attention to this table. Let him for a moment, whether federalist or democrat, divest himself of all prejudice on this subject. Let him suppose himself called to decide upon events of a former age or a distant country. Let him compare the different grievances together, and I trust he must acknowledge that those of 1812, very far outweighed all the others combined.

Let us first consider the case of the suspension of the right of deposit at New Orleans. On that occasion the federal party in congress and out of doors were loud in their clamour for war, *without even allowing time for making an attempt to procure redress by negociation.* A motion was made in congress for raising 50,000 men to sail down the Mississippi, in order to chastise the insolence of the Spaniards. The government was upbraided for its pusillanimity in not vindicating the national honour. The cry then was—"millions for defence, not a cent for tribute."

Extract of a letter from the seat of government to a friend in Massachusetts.

"Mississippi river is the common highway to the people of the western country, on which they must pass with their produce to market. *They never will suffer this highway to be obstructed or shut up. The free navigation of this river must be preserved to that portion of the American people, or THE AMERICAN EMPIRE MUST BE DISMEMBERED.* If we had a Washington at the head of our government, I should expect firm, decisive measures would upon this occasion be pursued; that a military force sufficient to take New Orleans, would immediately and without delay be assembled at the Natches, in the Mississippi territory; that upon the refusal of the Spanish government, upon demand, to fulfil the treaty, that army, thus assembled, should immediately proceed down the river, and take possession of New Orleans. But I apprehend no such vigorous measures will be adopted by our present executive. From the reduction of the army last year, what regular troops have we remaining to be employed in that service?" Boston Centinel, January 19, 1803.

"Notwithstanding the milk and water measures the administration has thought proper to adopt respecting the "Occlusion" of the port of New Orleans; the language of the people on the occlusion is directly the reverse." Boston Centinel, February 16, 1803.

Extract of a letter from Washington.

"We disapprove the timid and time-serving measures which our government has adopted relative to the violation of our treaty with Spain. The states which border on the Ohio and Mississippi are most immediately interested in what the president calls the "occlusion" of the port of New Orleans. On the fourteenth, Mr. Ross, of Pennsylvania, made a most able and animated speech in the senate, in which he described in striking colours, the situation of the western country, and urged the necessity of taking effectual measures for their relief, and in support of national honour. After having spoken more than an hour, Mr. Ross informed the senate, that he had prepared several resolutions on the subject, which he asked leave to submit. The democrats immediately moved that the galleries should be cleared. Mr. Ross then declared, that if the discussion was to be secret, he should not offer the resolutions, or make any further observations on the subject. The galleries were, however, cleared, by the majority, and the senate soon adjourned. It is understood that a grand caucus was held that evening: and the majority dreading the effect such proceedings might have on the public mind, the next morning it was determined in senate, that the discussion should be public." Boston Centinel, March 2, 1803.

"Nothing is more contagious than example. The meek and lowly spirit which influences the conduct of the executive towards Spain, has infected even the armed force on the frontier; and the pioneers of their country, WHOSE SWORDS OUGHT TO LEAP FROM THEIR SCABBARDS TO RESENT ITS INJURIES, are now seen to catch at every appearance, however evanescent, to promote the reign of humility. Even general Wilkinson, who, one would suppose, would be tremblingly alive to his country's honour, and proud of an opportunity to stimulate it to spirited measures; assumes the dulcet note, and with avidity dispatches an express to inform governor Claiborne, not that the Spanish government had restored the United States to their right by treaty: but truly "that the government has given permission for the depot of all

kinds of provisions in New Orleans, on *paying six per cent duty!*" And this information, says the able and indefatigable editor of the *Evening Post*, is introduced by the words, **THE PORT OF NEW ORLEANS OPEN**, in large capitals, by way of exultation at this joyous event." *Boston Centinel*, April 13, 1803.

"The president of the United States, in his late letters to the executives of the individual states, on the subject of the organization of the militia; speaking of the Spanish conduct at New Orleans, says, "*Rights the most essential to our welfare have been violated, and an infraction of treaty committed without colour or pretext.*" This being the acknowledged state of things, let the world judge, *whether the national honour will be more justly vindicated, and violated rights redressed, by the marokish appeal which has been made to Spanish faith and justice, and French generosity and management; by the degrading solicitation for purchased justice, or the disgraceful proffer of a bribe: or whether these ends would not more readily be obtained by the execution of the manly and spirited measures recommended by the eloquence of Morris, and the patriotism and sound understanding of Ross and the other federalists in congress; posterity will judge.*" *Boston Centinel*, April 13, 1803.

"*While we deplore the weakness and pusillanimity of our government, we sincerely congratulate our western brethren on the favourable change in their situation; and fervently pray for its long continuance. How far we may attribute this change to the spirited conduct of the federal members in congress, cannot at present be fully ascertained. We have no hesitation, however, in believing that it has at least persuaded, if not entirely originated these measures.*" *Centinel*, April 27, 1803.

"Since the adoption of the federal constitution, no subject has more forcibly affected the feelings of the citizens of the United States, than the "*occlusion*," of the port of *New Orleans* by the Spanish [or French] government. It is a subject to which the attention of the reader cannot too frequently be called. The president of the United States has not hesitated officially to declare, that by this measure "*rights the most essential to the welfare of the American people have been violated, and an infraction of the treaty committed without colour or pretext.*" The spirit of the people has been alive to the injury; and was ready to make any sacrifice to redress the wrong: but *because the federalists in congress felt the full glow of this spirit, and took the lead in proposing the necessary measures to give it efficacy; rather than they should derive any honour from their success, the administration having the power, substituted A PUSILLANIMOUS NEGOCIATION, and degrading entreaty, for that spirit of action which manly resentment for violated rights and broken faith, so loudly and so justly called for.*" *Boston Centinel*, June 15, 1803.

Louisiana purchased.

"The question will ever be, was the mode of getting the territory the best, the *cheapest*, the *most honourable* for our nation? Is the way of negotiating *cash in hand*, as cheap or honourable as that *Mr. Ross recommended*? We could have *had it for nothing.*" *Centinel*, July 2, 1803.

"All that we wanted on the river *Mississippi* was a place of deposit; that our treaty with Spain gives. It was basely withdrawn: our high-spirited rulers are asked to assert our rights. O, no; eighty thousand militia are to be held ready to defend our *turnips*, and feed the pigs and cattle. **BUT TO TAKE OUR RIGHT, TO SEIZE WHAT TREATIES GIVE, AND FRAUD WITHHOLDS; THIS IS NOT THEIR FORTE.**

"A great man has been heard to say, that war in any case was wrong: and on the question being put whether he would think it wrong to go to war if our country was invaded by a foreign army, that even then some other way might be found out. This is our honour's keeper, whom we have elected in the strange hope that he will guard it better than his own.

"Certainly the Jacobins do not need a conqueror to make them *slaves*. They are *slaves in soul*, whom even our liberty cannot raise; slaves more fascinated with a master's livery than their own rights: yet they expect this *base language* will make them popular." *Centinel*, July 9, 1803.

"AN ADMINISTRATION SO FEEBLE AND DESPICABLE, by what it can and what it cannot do, would have sunk under the competition with France:

and a hostile neighbour on the Mississippi would have in two years been our master. Conscious of their *poverty of spirit* and of means, such an administration would have resorted to the ordinary expedient of the *base*, to yield part of their wealth to save the remainder." Centinel, July 27, 1803.

"Like true *Spaniels*, we are the most *servile* to those *who most insult us*. We receive back our right as a great favour, and pay tribute for that which the despoiler could no longer withhold. The free navigation of the Mississippi, and a place of deposit on its shores, was our right: the privation of which a wrong: and A FREE AND ENTIRE RESTORATION, OR A FORCIBLE RECOVERY OF IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN THE REMEDY. True patriotism, thank God, still glows, still blazes, like a seraph in *England*. Here it smells of alien. But Great Britain must save the *unwilling* world, to save herself." Centinel, Aug. 13, 1803.

"There is no condition of disgrace granted below ours. In the *lowest deep* there is a lower deep. Our nation had better not exist at all, than exist by *sufferance and under tribute*." Centinel, Aug. 23, 1803.

Who could possibly suppose that the preceding extracts are from the Boston Centinel, owned and edited by major Benjamin Russell, who was lately so ardent, so zealous, so benignant a "*friend of peace*," and who was among the prime leaders of those "*friends of peace*," whose *peace proceedings* nearly overturned the government, spread bankruptcy in every direction, ruined thousands and tens of thousands of the best citizens in the country, and almost laid us prostrate at the feet of a vindictive and powerful enemy? The expense of war was of late with major Russell one of its chief objections. But in 1803, he was so heroically disposed that he urged war as "the cheapest and most honourable," mode of recovering our rights.

Extract from Mr. Ross's speech, delivered in the Senate, on his own motion to take forcible possession of New Orleans. February 16, 1803.

"Why not put a force at his (the president's) disposal, with which he can strike? With which he can have a pledge for your future well-being? When the Atlantic coast is willing, shall their security be lost by your votes? Are you sure that you will ever again find the same disposition? Can you recall the decisive moment that may happen in a month after your adjournment? Heretofore you have distrusted the Atlantic states; now, when they offer to pledge themselves, meet them, and close with the proposal. If the resolutions are too strong, new model them; if the measures are not adequate, propose other and more effectual measures. But as you value the best interests of the Western country, and the union with the Atlantic, seize the present occasion of securing it forever. For the present is only a question of how much power the executive shall have for the attainment of this great end: and no man desirous of the end ought to refuse the necessary means for attaining it. Your votes decide the direction this senate will take. And I devoutly wish it may be one we shall never repent."

Extract from the speech of Gouverneur Morris in the Senate the same day.

"Yes, sir, we wish for peace; but how is that blessing to be preserved? I shall repeat here a sentiment I have often had occasion to express: *In my opinion, there is nothing worth fighting for but national honour; for in the national honour is involved the national independence.* I know that a state may find itself in such unpropitious circumstances, that prudence may force a wise government to conceal the sense of indignity; but the insult should be engraved on tables of brass, with a pencil of steel; and when that time and chance which happen to all, shall bring forward the favourable moment, then let the avenging arm strike home. It is by avowing and maintaining this stern principle of honour, that peace can be preserved. He will feel with me, that our *national honour is*

the best security for our peace and prosperity; that it involves at once our wealth and our power; and in this view of the subject I must contradict a sentiment which fell from my honourable colleague (Mr. Clinton). He tells us, that the principle of this country is peace and commerce. Sir, the avowal of such a principle will leave us neither commerce nor peace. It invites others to prey on that commerce which we will not protect, and share the wealth we dare not defend. But let it be known, that you stand ready to sacrifice the last man and the last shilling in defence of national honour, and those who would have assaulted it, will beware of you."

The cause of complaint in 1806, was much greater than in 1803. But it bears no comparison with the grievances in 1812. In 1806, besides the lawless depredations on our vessels at sea, without notice, we were interdicted merely from trading with the colonies of the French and Spaniards, on other terms than they permitted in time of peace. How far this was inferior to the grievances that led to war, will appear in the next chapter.

Let us see how consistent major Russel was on the point of peace and war in 1806.

"The disputes between this country and England, so long attended with rigour on her part, and injury on ours, will not admit of much longer vain complaints and harsh recriminations. *They must terminate shortly in the silence of war, or peace.*

"At the renewal of the present war, we had proceeded for some time with all the ardour and zeal of good fortune. We have been stopped again in our career by the renewal of harsh and vexatious restrictions on the part of England. She has again appealed to principles which we cannot admit, and claimed as rights, what we cannot grant her even as an indulgence. In the exercise of these assumed rights, we find a serious source of complaint; for it has cost us much. It is, however, nothing novel. It is but a renewal of the injuries we complained of in 1793." Boston Centinel, February 15, 1806.

"They [the democrats in congress] dare not resist all aggressions alike, and assume the part of spirited impartiality as a magnanimous policy requires. If war is called for by the insulted honour of our country; if the cup of conciliation is drained to the dregs, as they declare it to be, LET WAR BE DECLARED; LET AN EMBARGO BE LAID; adequate funds provided; the strong arm of defence nerved and extended; and a powerful navy ordered. In these measures the whole country, from Georgia to Maine, convinced of the necessity, will be united." Boston Centinel, February 12, 1806.

"I do not believe we shall have war with any nation. *But our peace will be at the expense of our spirit.*" Boston Centinel, March 8, 1806.

"Our ministers in Europe; may they never hesitate to PREFER WAR to dishonour and tribute." Toast drank at the artillery election. From the Boston Centinel, June 4, 1806.

"From Washington, January 23, 1806.

"Fear, prejudice, or some other dastardly principle, is continually crossing the path of our rulers: and the loud call of our country, its commerce, and spoiled merchants, for energetic measures, is unheard, or disregarded. *My fears are, that the president's message will only be supported by windy debates, or pen and ink reports.*

"Mr. Randolph, I am told, has very much injured his health by the exertions he is said here to have made during the time the house was in conclave. He has not attended the house for several days, and is sick. From one quarter or another, the proceedings of the house, when in secret session, are leaking out. My inquiries lead me to believe, that, in the spirited measures which Randolph proposed for supporting the president's confidential message, he was joined by

every federalist in the house; by a majority of the *Virginia* representation, and some others; but that he was in the *minority*; and further, that he was opposed by all the New England democrats to a man!!" Boston Centinel, Feb. 5, 1806.

"Our seamen are impressed; they are captured; they are imprisoned; they are treated with almost every kind of indignity, while pursuing their lawful business in a regular manner. How long must this be borne? Has our government yet to learn, that *no nation ever was or ever will be respected abroad, but in proportion as it exacts respect by punishing wanton insults upon its dignity, and wanton depredation upon the property of its citizens*; that its doing justice to other nations cannot secure it respect, unless it has both ability and disposition to enforce measures of justice from them; and that constant firmness of national attitude and conduct prevents insults, while pusillanimity invites them." New Hampshire Gazette, July 31, 1805.

"TO WHOM IT SUITS.

"Look at the situation of our sea-coast, defenceless, a prey to picaroons, privateers, and armed vessels of all nations. Our ports blockaded, our coasters and shipping robbed, our forts insulted, our harbours converted into private depots, where the very vessels which rob and disgrace us, are supplied with provisions, stores, and God knows what; and where, it is more than probable, they have their agents, confederates, or co-partners. See the powers of Europe acting towards America, as if it were meant to insult her, or rather, indeed, sporting with her tameness in the eyes of the looking-on world. Disagreeing, fighting, and at enmity with each other, in every thing else, in this one thing they perfectly agree, *in treating America with indignity, insult, and deriding contempt.*

"Are you yet aware, sir, when it will end? Are you sure that, if neglected, it will not amount to a height too great to be reached without strainings that may produce fatal convulsions in the state? For God's sake, for the honour of your country, for your own credit, *rouse; let loose the spirit of the country; let loose its money bags; and save its honour; the nation will one and all support you.*" New Hampshire Gazette, January 31, 1805.

In 1807, the cause of complaint was still less substantial than in either of the other instances.

Not to tire the reader with proofs of the public clamours for war at this period, I deem it abundantly sufficient to refer him to the twentieth chapter of this work, wherein he will find evidence to satisfy the most incredulous.

Any man who was a partisan of war in the above cases, and reprobates the late war as unjust and unnecessary, betrays a most awful degree of inconsistency. And yet it is an indisputable fact, that the most violent, the most clamorous, the most jacobinical, and the most seditious, among the late "*Friends of Peace*," were among the most strenuous advocates for, and "*Friends of War*," on the former occasions.

The Boston Centinel, after the declaration of hostilities, regarded war as the most frightful of all possible evils. But this was not always its view of the subject. Within a fortnight after laying the embargo, that measure was pronounced more formidable than war itself.

"The embargo, which the government has just laid, is of a new and alarming nature. *War, great as the evil is, has less terror, and will produce less misery than an embargo on such principles.*" Boston Centinel, January 2, 1808.

CHAPTER XLIV.

Inquiry into the justice of the War.

THOSE who were unacquainted with the causes that led to the late war, might, from the publications that have appeared against it, believe that the United States were wholly the aggressors—that England had been a tame and submissive sufferer of degradation, outrage, and insult—and that our rulers had been wantonly led, by inordinate and accursed ambition, to engage in a ruinous and destructive war, in order to enrich themselves—squander away the public treasure—and impoverish the nation. They were, it would appear, actuated by as unholy motives as ever impelled Attila, Genghis Khan, or Bonaparte, to perpetrate outrage and cruelty to the utmost extent of their power.

These allegations were made in the strongest language in the public papers in London. The prince regent appealed to the world, that Great Britain had not been the aggressor in the war. And, as we have seen, the lords of the admiralty asserted that war was declared “*after all the grievances of this country had been removed.*”

The federal papers re-echoed and magnified the accusations of the British writers; and succeeded so far as to inflame a large portion of the public with the most frantic exasperation against the rulers of their choice, whom they suspected of having abused their confidence.

Governors of states in their addresses, as well as senates and houses of representatives in their replies, took the same ground; and assumed it as incontrovertible that guilt, and profligacy, and corruption, were the parents of the declaration of war.

The house of representatives of Massachusetts, regardless of the holy rule, “*judge not, lest ye be judged,*” in the most unqualified manner, with an utter destitution of the least semblance of charity, asserted, that

“The real cause of war must be traced to the first systematical abandonment of the policy of Washington, and the friends and framers of the constitution; to implacable animosity against those men, and their universal exclusion from all concern in the government of the country; to the influence of worthless foreigners over the press, and the deliberations of the government in all its branches: to *jealousy of the commercial states, fear of their power, contempt of their pursuits, and ignorance of their true character and importance*; to the cupidity of certain states for the wilderness reserved for the miserable aborigines; to a violent passion for conquest,” &c.

With *equal candour*, the senate of the state, not to be outdone by the other legislative branch, declared that

“The war was founded in falsehood, declared without necessity, and its real object was extent of territory by unjust conquests, and to aid the late tyrant of Europe in his views of aggrandisement.”

* The absurdity and total want of foundation of these allegations I shall fully establish in a subsequent chapter.

In these awful accusations, there is no allowance for human imperfection—or error in judgment—or difference in opinion. They are preferred in the strongest form which our language admits, and involve the highest possible degree of turpitude.

If these allegations be true, the president who recommended war, and the legislature of the United States which declared it, betrayed their trust, and are base, abandoned, and wicked. If they be false, the legislature of Massachusetts are base, abandoned and wicked. There is no alternative. One or other description of persons must sink in the estimation of contemporaries and posterity.

Let us examine the case. Let us investigate the truth. If our rulers be thus base—thus abandoned—thus wicked—thus corrupt—let them be devoted to the detestation they have so richly earned. But if the allegations be false—if the war were just—if the nation drank the chalice of outrage, insult, injury, and depredation, to the last dregs, before she had recourse to arms, let us, at every hazard, cling to our rulers—to our form of government—to the national honour—to the national interest.

The conduct of Great Britain to this country for a series of years, had been a constant succession of insult, aggression, and depredation. Our harbours had been insulted and outraged—our commerce had been most wantonly spoliated—our citizens had been enslaved, scourged, and slaughtered, fighting the battles of those who held them in cruel bondage. We had, in a word, experienced numberless and most wanton injuries and outrages of various kinds. But the two most prominent causes of war, assigned by the president in that message which recommended, and by the committee in the report which contained, a declaration of hostilities, were impressment and the orders in council. If those causes really existed, the war could not have been "*founded in falsehood.*" I shall proceed to the examination of both topics. But I previously quote the words of the message and of the report. On the subject of impressment, the president declares,

"The practice is so far from affecting British subjects alone, that, under the pretext of searching for those, THOUSANDS OF AMERICAN CITIZENS, under the safeguard of public law, and their national flag, have been torn from their country, and every thing dear to them; have been dragged on board ships of war of a foreign nation; and exposed, under the severities of their discipline, to be exiled to the most distant and deadly climes; to risk their lives in the battles of their oppressors; and to be the melancholy instruments of taking away those of their own brethren."

And the committee, on the same topic, state,

"We will now proceed to other wrongs which have been more severely felt. Among these is THE IMPRESSMENT OF OUR SEAMEN, a practice which has been unceasingly maintained by Great Britain in the wars to which she has been a party since our revolution. *Your committee cannot convey in adequate*

terms the deep sense which they entertain of the injustice and oppression of this proceeding. Under the pretext of impressing British seamen, our fellow-citizens are seized in British ports, on the high seas, and in every other quarter to which the British power extends; are taken on board British men of war, and compelled to serve there as British subjects. In this mode our citizens are wantonly snatched from their country and their families; deprived of their liberty; doomed to an ignominious and slavish bondage; compelled to fight the battles of a foreign country, and often perish in them. Our flag has given them no protection: it has been unceasingly violated, and our vessels exposed to danger by the loss of the men taken from them. Your committee need not remark, that while the practice is continued, **IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE UNITED STATES TO CONSIDER THEMSELVES AN INDEPENDENT NATION.** Every new case is a proof of their degradation. Its continuance is the more unjustifiable, because *the United States have repeatedly proposed to the British government an arrangement which would secure to it the controul of its own people.* An exemption of the citizens of the United States from this degrading oppression, and their flag from violation, is all that they have sought."

On the orders in council, the president observes,

"Under pretended blockades, without the presence of an adequate force, and sometimes without the practicability of applying one, **OUR COMMERCE HAS BEEN PLUNDERED IN EVERY SEA.** The great staples of our country have been cut off from their legitimate markets: and a destructive blow aimed at our agricultural and maritime interests. In aggravation of these predatory measures, *they have been considered as in force from the date of their notification*; a retrospective effect being thus added, as has been done in other important cases, to the unlawfulness of the course pursued. And to render the outrage the more signal, these mock blockades have been reiterated and enforced in the face of official communications from the British government, declaring, as the true definition of a legal blockade, "that particular ports must be actually invested, and previous warning given to vessels bound to them, not to enter."

"Not content with these occasional expedients for laying waste our neutral trade, the cabinet of Great Britain resorted, at length, to the sweeping system of blockades, under the name of orders in council, which has been moulded and managed, as might best suit its political views, its commercial jealousies, or the avidity of British cruisers."

And the committee states,

By the last orders in council of the 11th of November, 1807,

"The British government declared direct and positive war against the United States. *The dominion of the ocean was completely usurped by it; all commerce forbidden; and every flag driven from it, or subjected to capture and condemnation, which did not subserve the policy of the British government, by paying it a tribute and sailing under its sanction.* From this period the United States have incurred the heaviest and most mortifying humiliations. They have borne the calamities of war without retorting them on its authors."

I shall discuss each item separately.

1. Orders in Council.

To repel the charge that the "*war was founded in falsehood*," so far as respects this item, it would be sufficient to establish their existence on the day war was declared. This is obvious. For if they existed, then the war could not be "*founded in falsehood*." But I shall not rest satisfied with this alone.

War was declared at Washington on the 18th of June, 1812. The repeal, as it is called, of the orders in council, took place on the 22d of that month in London. It is clear, therefore, that the charge of "*falsehood*" here is utterly unfounded.

By an official statement presented to congress by the secretary of state, on the 6th of July, 1812, it appears that the British captures, prior to the orders in council, were 528, and subsequent thereto, 389.

It is difficult to form an estimate of these vessels. I am no merchant, and have no adequate data to guide me. I have enquired of mercantile characters, and have been told, that from the great value of the cottons, tobaccoes, &c. of the outward cargoes to France, and the silks, brandies, &c. of the homeward cargoes, 30 or 40,000 dollars would be a fair average. But I will suppose 25,000 dollars for vessel and cargo, which, I presume, is moderate. This extends to the enormous amount of

13,200,000 dollars,

depredated previous to the orders in council ; and

9,725,000 dollars,

during the existence of those orders ; for the latter of which there is not the least chance of redress.

But the sum, of which our citizens were despoiled, by no means constitutes the whole of the grievance. The enormous limitation and restriction of the trade of a sovereign and independent nation, was at least of equal magnitude, in point of outrage, with the pecuniary loss ; for it is a sacred and indisputable truth, that from November 11, 1807, till the day war was declared, *American ships, owned by American merchants, navigated by American seamen, and laden with American productions, were liable to seizure and condemnation, if bound to France, Holland, or the northern part of Italy : and for about twenty months of that period, they were subject to capture and condemnation if bound to any part whatever of Europe except the British dominions.*

I implore the reader by all that is candid, to consider this single sentence. Let him read it once more carefully. It is a fair statement of the relative situation of the two countries. *The commerce of the United States with nearly one-third of the population of Europe was subject to condemnation !* Let him lay his hand on his heart, and answer the question, was not this adequate cause for war ? Was not this a greater grievance than the *sixpenny* tax on tea, which led to the American Revolution ? Have not more than nine-tenths of all the wars that have ever existed been declared for less causes ? *We were forbidden by Great Britain, under penalty of confiscation, to carry on trade with about fifty millions of the inhabitants of Europe.* And yet, we are gravely told, that “ the war was founded in falsehood !!! ” Wonderful, wonderful delusion !!

At that period England herself carried on with France and her dependencies, under licenses, the very trade which she rendered illegal when carried on by the United States !!! And several Ame-

rican vessels, bound for France, and taken by British cruisers, were actually, without breaking bulk, taken into French ports by the captors, or those who purchased from them !!!

Having presented the reader with a short specimen of the denunciations of the war, I lay before him some opinions of a directly contrary tendency.

The first authority is highly exalted and respectable. It is no less than the emperor Alexander. This monarch, in the very commendable offer of his mediation, declares, that

"His majesty takes pleasure in doing justice to the wisdom of the United States ; and is convinced that it has done all that it could, to avoid this rupture."

The next authority is governor Plumer, of New-Hampshire, who in a short speech to the legislature of that state, Nov. 18, 1812, states that Great Britain

"Has for a series of years by her conduct evinced a deadly hostility to our national rights, to our commerce, peace, and prosperity. She has wantonly impressed thousands of our unoffending seamen ; immured them within the walls of her floating castles ; held them in servitude for an unlimited period, often for life ; and compelled them to fight, not only with nations with whom we are at peace, but to turn their arms against their own country. She has violated the rights and peace of our coasts ; wantonly shed the blood of our citizens in our harbours ; and instead of punishing, has rewarded her guilty officers. Under pretended blockades, unaccompanied by the presence of an adequate force, she has unjustly deprived us of a market for the products of our industry ; and, by her orders in council, has, to a great extent, swept our commerce from the ocean : thus assuming a right to regulate our foreign trade in war, and laying a foundation to prescribe law for us in time of peace. She has permitted her subjects publicly to forge and vend our ships' papers, to carry on a commerce with that very enemy from whose ports she interdicted our trade. Whilst her accredited minister, under the mask of friendship, was treating with our government, her spies were endeavouring to alienate our citizens, subvert our government, and dismember the union of the states."

The senate of Massachusetts, June 26, 1812, agreed upon an address to the people of that state, of which I subjoin three paragraphs—

"We will not enter into a detail of the injuries inflicted on us, nor of the flimsy pretexts by which Great Britain has endeavoured to justify her outrages. It is sufficient to say, that she no longer pretends to disguise her ambitious designs, under pretence of retaliation on her enemy. She asserts her right to unbounded dominion, only because she assumes unbounded power. She annexes conditions to the repeal of her orders in council, which she knows we have no right to require of her enemy ; which she knows are impossible ; thus adding insult to injury ; thus adding mockery to her long train of perpetrated injuries. With the boldness of the highwayman, she has, at last, stripped the mask from violence, and vindicates her aggressions on the only plea of tyrants, that of whim and convenience."

"It was not sufficient that we were remote from European politics, and courted peace under every sacrifice ; acquiesced in minor injuries ; remonstrated against those of a deeper dye ; forbore until forbearance became pusillanimity ; and finally retired from the scene of controversy, with the delusive hope that a spirit of moderation might succeed that of violence and rapine. We were hunted on the ocean. Our property was seized upon by the convulsive grasp of our now open and acknowledged enemy, and our citizens forced into a cruel and ignominious vassalage. And when we retired, we were pursued to the threshold of our territory ; outrages of an enormous cast, perpetrated in our bays and har-

bours ; the tomahawk of the savage uplifted against the parent, the wife, the infant, on our frontiers ; and spies and incendiaries sent into the bosom of our country, to plot the dismemberment of our union, and involve us in all the horrors of a civil war.

“The constituted authorities of the United States in congress assembled, submitting the justice of their cause to the God of battles, have at length declared war against this implacable foe ; *a war for the liberty of our citizens ; a war for our national sovereignty and independence ; a war for our republican form of government against the machinations of despotism.*”

On the 26th of December, 1811, the legislature of Ohio published a resolution and address on the subject of our foreign relations, in which they pledged themselves to a full support of the government, in the event of a declaration of war. This pledge they have nobly redeemed. I submit one paragraph of the address.

“The conduct of Great Britain towards this country is a gross departure from the known and established laws of nations. Our rights, as well those derived through the immemorial usages of nations, as those secured by compact, have been outraged without acknowledgment ; even without remorse. Solemn stipulations by treaty, and implied engagements, have given place to views of an overreaching, selfish, and depraved policy. *Life, liberty, and property, have been the sport of measures, unjust, cruel, and without a parallel.* The flag of freedom and of impartial neutrality has been wantonly insulted. *Tears of the widows and orphans of murdered Americans have flowed in vain.* Our countrymen have been torn from the embrace of liberty and plenty. The cords of conjugal, filial, fraternal, and paternal affection, have been broken. *Almost every sea and ocean buoys upon its surface the victims of capture and impressment.* Vain is every effort and sacrifice for an honourable state of safety and tranquillity. Mission has followed mission ; remonstrance has succeeded remonstrance ; forbearance has stepped on the heels of forbearance, till the mind revolts at the thought of a prolonged endurance.”

The senate of Maryland, on the 22d of Dec. 1812, passed a set of resolutions, approving of the war, from which I subjoin an extract.

“Whenever the pursuit of a pacific policy is rendered utterly inconsistent with the national interest, prosperity and happiness, by the *unprovoked injuries and lawless outrages of foreign power* ; whenever those rights are assailed, without the full and perfect enjoyment of which a nation can no longer claim the character and attributes of sovereignty and independence ; whenever the right of a free people to navigate the common highway of nations, for the purpose of transporting to, and vending the surplus products of their soil and industry at, a foreign market, is attempted to be controlled and subjected to such arbitrary rules and regulations as the jealousy or injustice of a foreign power may think proper to prescribe ; whenever their citizens, in the exercise of their ordinary occupations, and labouring to obtain the means of subsistence for themselves and their families, are torn by the ruthless hand of violence from their country, their connections, and their home ; whenever the tender ties of parent and child, of husband and wife, are wholly disregarded by the inexorable cruelty of the unfeeling oppressor, who, usurping the high prerogative of heaven, and anticipating the dread office of death, converts those sacred relations into a premature orphanage and widowhood ; not that orphanage and widowhood which “spring from the grave,” unless the floating dungeons into which they are cast, and compelled to fight the battles of their oppressors, may be compared to the awful and gloomy mansions of the tomb ; whenever injuries and oppressions, such as these, are inflicted by a foreign power, upon the persons and properties of our citizens, and an appeal to the justice of such power to obtain redress, proves wholly useless and unavailing ; in such cases, as it is the duty of those to whom the sa-

cred trust of protecting the rights of the citizens and the honour of the nation, is confided, to take such measures as the exigency of the case may require, to protect the one, and vindicate the other: Therefore

“Resolved, that the war waged by the United States against Great Britain, is just, necessary, and politic; and ought to be supported by the united strength and resources of the nation, until the grand object is obtained for which it was declared.”

CHAPTER XLV.

Consideration of the orders in Council continued. Strong and unequivocal reprobation of them by James Lloyd and James Bayard, Esqrs. and Governor Griswold. Extract of a letter from Harrison Gray Otis, Esq.

I MIGHT have dismissed this part of my subject with the last chapter. But as it is of vital importance—as Great Britain and the United States are at issue on it in the face of an anxious and enquiring world, whose judgment we await on the subject—I judge it advisable to enter into it more fully.

The only defence ever attempted of these outrageous proceedings is on the principle of “retaliation.” This is completely invalidated by Mr. Baring, *supra* page 117. It is also unequivocally abandoned by the most prominent and influential leaders of the federal party.

James Lloyd, Esq. senator of the United States for the state of Massachusetts, a most decided federalist, a steady, undeviating, and zealous opposer of the administration and of all its measures, has pronounced sentence of condemnation in the most unequivocal terms, upon the pretence of retaliation, in a speech delivered in senate on the 28th of February, 1812.

“And how is it possible, that a third and neutral party can make itself a fair object of retaliation, for measures which it did not counsel; which it did not approve; which militate strongly with its interests; which it is and ever has been anxiously desirous to remove; which it has resisted by every means in its power, that it thought expedient to use, and of these means the government of the neutral country ought to be sole judge; which it has endeavoured to get rid of even at a great sacrifice! how is it possible that a neutral country, thus conducting, can make itself a fair object of retaliation for measures which it did not originate; which it could not prevent, and cannot controul! Thus, sir, to my view the ORDERS IN COUNCIL ARE WHOLLY UNJUSTIFIABLE, LET THEM BE BOTTOMED EITHER ON THE PRINCIPLE OF RETALIATION, OR OF SELF-PRESERVATION.”

From Mr. Lloyd's authority on this topic I presume there will be no appeal. There cannot be. His decision is final. But I am not confined to Mr. Lloyd. Mr. Bayard, a gentleman of equal standing, a quondam senator of the United States from the state of Delaware, one of our late commissioners at Ghent, also a decided federalist, pronounced the same sentence on them—in a speech delivered in the senate of the United States, October 31, 1811.

“They were adopted as a measure of retaliation, though they never deserved that character. He had always considered the Berlin and Milan decrees used as

a mere pretext. Those decrees were vain and empty denunciations in relation to England. *The plain design of the British government was to deprive France of the benefits of external commerce, UNLESS THE PROFITS OF IT WERE TO BE DIVIDED WITH HERSELF. This is fully proved by the license trade. Britain carries on the very trade she denies to neutrals, and having engrossed the whole to herself, she excludes neutrals from a participation.*

"I am among the last men in the senate who would justify or defend the orders in council. **THEY VIOLATE THE PLAINEST RIGHTS OF THE NATION.** *The ground of retaliation was never more than a pretext, and their plain object is to deprive France of neutral trade. It never was contended, nor does Britain now contend, that she would be justified by the laws or usages of nations, to interdict our commerce with her enemy. She COVERS HER INJUSTICE WITH THE CLOAK OF RETALIATION, and insists that she has a right to retort upon her enemy the evils of his own policy. This is a doctrine to which I am not disposed to agree. IT IS DESTRUCTIVE TO NEUTRALS. It makes them the prey of the belligerents.*

"IT IS A DOCTRINE WHICH WE MUST RESIST."

In addition to the authority of Messrs. Lloyd and Bayard, I beg leave to adduce that of the late governor of Connecticut, Roger Griswold, esq. which, though not quite so unequivocal, is sufficiently strong to satisfy every candid reader.

On the 10th of October, 1811, eight months previous to the declaration of war, governor Griswold, in an address to the legislature of the state, drew a strong portrait of the injustice of the belligerents towards us, and of the necessity of abandoning the pacific policy which our government had pursued, and adopting vigorous and decisive measures to enforce respect for our rights.

"It has been our misfortune to pursue a policy, which has rendered us contemptible in the eyes of foreign nations; and we are treated as a people, who are ready to submit to every indignity, which interest or caprice imposes upon us. It cannot, however, be too late to retrieve the national honour: and we ought to expect that our public councils will find, that a manly, impartial, and decided course of measures has now become indispensable; such a course as shall satisfy foreign nations, that whilst we desire peace, we have **THE MEANS AND THE SPIRIT TO REPEL AGGRESSIONS.** The interests of the United States undoubtedly require a secure and honorable peace. But the only guarantee which ought or can with safety be relied on for this object, is a sufficient organised force, and **SPIRIT TO USE IT WITH EFFECT**, when no other honourable means of redress can be resorted to. The extensive resources, aided by the geographical situation of our country, have furnished every necessary means for defending our territory and our commerce: and **WE ARE FALSE TO OURSELVES, WHEN EITHER** [i. e. our territory or our commerce] **IS INVADDED WITH IMPUNITY."**

No dispassionate reader can deny that governor Griswold in this speech makes very strong and unequivocal declarations of the necessity of vigorous, and decisive, that is to say, of war-like measures. It is impossible otherwise to interpret the impressive style in which he invokes the "*spirit to use the organized force with effect*"—and the declaration that "*we are false to ourselves when we allow our commerce or our territory to be invaded with impunity.*"

On the 12th of May, 1812, only five weeks before the declaration of war, the legislature of Connecticut met again. Governor

Griswold addressed them once more on the same subject. He explicitly declared, that

"The last six months do not appear to have produced any change in the hostile aggressions of foreign nations on the commerce of the United States."

And after referring to, and justly reprobating the burning of our vessels by the French, he emphatically adds,

"Such, however, has been the character of both, that NO CIRCUMSTANCE CAN JUSTIFY A PREFERENCE TO EITHER."

I beg the reader will give these documents a due degree of consideration. It appears that governor Griswold, on the 10th of October, 1811, unequivocally pronounced an opinion, that the aggressions of Great Britain and France were of such a nature as to warrant resistance by war. He denounced the pacific policy we had pursued, as rendering us *"contemptible in the eyes of foreign nations,"* who, in consequence, regarded us *"as a people ready to submit to every indignity which interest or caprice might impose upon us."* He called upon the government to change its system, and to convince foreign nations, that *"we have the means and the spirit to resent foreign aggressions;"*—and finally declared *"we are false to ourselves, when we suffer our commerce or our territory to be invaded with impunity."* Seven months afterwards, he reviewed these declarations, and stated that *"no circumstance could justify a preference to either"* France or England, both had so grossly outraged our rights. And yet, reader, what must be your astonishment to be told, that this same governor Griswold, immediately after the war was declared, which his speech appears to have urged, arrayed himself among, and was a leader of, the *"friends of peace,"* who denounced the war as inexpedient, and wicked, and unjust, and unholy!!!

I might have rested the cause on the united testimony of Mr. Lloyd and Mr. Bayard, and governor Griswold. They are fully sufficient for my purpose. No candid or honest man can resist them. They, with concurring voice, establish the strong, the decisive fact, that there was ample and adequate cause of war. But regarding the subject as of immense and vital importance, I am determined *"to make assurance doubly sure,"* I therefore solemnly cite before the public another evidence, still more powerful, still more overwhelming, to prove that the war was not founded in falsehood—that it was both just and righteous.

This evidence is the honorable Harrison Gray Otis, esq. a gentleman of considerable talents, great wealth, high standing, and most powerful influence in the state of Massachusetts, who has acted a very conspicuous and important part in the extraordinary events of our era. He was formerly a senator of the United States—recently a member of the legislature of Massa-

chusetts—one of the principal movers of the appointment of, and a delegate to, the Hartford Convention; (which legislature and convention denounced the war as unjust, and wicked, and profligate)—and finally, one of the “*ambassadors*” to Washington, to negotiate with the president on the part of Massachusetts. It is hardly necessary to add—but I shall be pardoned, I trust, for adding, that there is not in the United States a more uniform, undeviating, and zealous opposer of the party in power—a more decided antigallican—or a citizen less disposed to censure England or her measures unjustly, than Mr. Otis.

This gentleman, on the 14th of January, 1812, addressed to a friend in London, a letter on the relations of the two nations—which displays no small share of public spirit, and breathes a most fervent desire for the repeal of the orders in council, in order to remove the indignation and abhorrence they excited in the United States.

This letter was published in London; and, had not the counsellors of his Britannic majesty been most fatally and egregiously misguided, would have produced an immediate and decisive effect, and saved the two countries from the horrors of warfare.

Extract of a letter from Harrison Gray Otis, esq. to a friend in London, dated Boston, January 14, 1812.

“You will perceive by the papers, that our government profess the intention to assume a very warlike attitude; and that the sentiment of indignation throughout the country at the continuation of the orders in council, IS LOUD AND UNIVERSAL FROM BOTH PARTIES! The motives which induce your government to continue them, are quite incomprehensible to the BEST FRIENDS of Great Britain in this country; and THE EFFECT WILL BE TO MAKE EVERY MAN ODIOS WHO DARES TO EXPRESS A WISH FOR YOUR SUCCESS AND PROSPERITY; a sentiment still common to our best men, but which an adherence to this system will impair and destroy.

“It is too true, that the repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees has been less formal than it should have been; and that our administration have become willing dupes to the insidious policy of Napoleon.

“But why should your government mind that? Why should they not embrace any pretence for restoring harmony between our two countries, especially as it will, of consequence, be followed by hostility on the part of France? Napoleon will renew his outrages the moment we are friends; and the natural ties which cement Great Britain and America, will be drawn closer. On the contrary, the scrupulous adherence of your cabinet to an empty punctilio, will too probably unite the whole country in opposition to your nation, and sever, for generations, perhaps for ever, interests which have the most natural affinity, and men who ought to feel and love like brethren.”

Let us canvass this precious document attentively. It is fraught with meaning, and flashes conviction. Every sentence is of vital importance. Mr. Otis states, that “the sentiment of indignation against the orders in council was loud and universal from both parties.” This declaration from such a quarter is overwhelming—it is irresistible. It proves the strong sense universally prevalent, of the outrage and injustice of those orders. The concurrence of both parties, who so rarely agree in any point, demands particular attention. And surely Mr. Otis

himself, or Mr. Pickering, or Mr. King, will not deny that it is fair to infer that he must have regarded the orders in council as unjust, and wicked, and oppressive, and piratical, and utterly indefensible, when he candidly confesses, that a continuance of them would "*produce the effect to render every man odious who dared to express a wish for the success and prosperity*" of Great Britain.

Mr. Otis deprecated a war with England as one of the mightiest evils. He appears to have regarded these orders as not merely cause of war—but as likely to produce war, if continued.

What language shall I use, reader, to fix your attention to this most solemn part of my subject? Mr. Otis is so thoroughly impressed with a conviction of the injustice of the orders in council, that he explicitly states to his correspondent, that the "*sentiment of indignation throughout the country,*" at their continuance, "*is loud and universal from both parties,*" and that "*the effect of their continuance will be to render odious every man who dares to express a wish for the success and prosperity of England*"—and further, that "*an adherence to an empty punctilio will sever the two nations perhaps for ever.*" Let it be observed that these declarations were made January 14, 1812, only five months before the declaration of war—and further, that no alteration or mitigation of the rigour or injustice of those orders had taken place when war was declared. When these points are duly weighed, let the reader consider that this same Harrison Gray Otis was one of the prime movers of a seditious, I might say, a treasonable opposition to the war, on the ground of its having been "profligate and unjust." It is impossible for language to do justice to the astonishment these reflections are calculated to excite. Mr. Otis was a most influential member of the senate of Massachusetts, in February, 1814, when a report of both houses declared, that "*the war, so fertile in calamities, was waged with the worst possible views, and carried on in the worst possible manner, forming an union of weakness and wickedness, which defies for a parallel the annals of the world!*"

Here I close this part of the discussion. It were superfluous to add a line. The reader will have no difficulty to decide.

On the 18th of December, 1808, a vote was taken in the house of representatives of the United States, on the following resolution :

"*Resolved*, That the United States cannot, without a sacrifice of their rights, honour and independence, submit to the late edicts of Great Britain and France.

"And decided in the affirmative as follows; yeas, one hundred and eighteen, nays, two.

"Yeas. Messrs. Alexander, W. Alston, L. Alston, Bacon, Bard, Baker, Bassett, Blackledge, Blake, Blount, *Boul*, Boyle, Brown, Burwell, Butler, Calhoun, Campbell, *Champion*, *Chittenden*, Clay, Clopton, Culpepper, Cutts, *Daven-*

port, Dawson, Deane, Desha, Durell, Elliott, *Ely*, Findley, Fisk, Franklin, Gardner, Garnet, Gholson, Goodwyn, Gray, Green, Harris, Heister, Helms, Holland, Holmes, Howard, Humphreys, Isley, J. G. Jackson, R. S. Jackson, Jenkins, Johnson, Jones, Kelly, Kenan, *Key*, Kirkpatrick, Lambert, Lewis, Lloyd, Maccon, Marion, Masters, McCreery, *Milnor*, D. Montgomery, J. Montgomery, N. R. Moore, T. Moore, Jer. Morrow, Jno. Morrow, *Mosely*, Mumford, Nelson, *Newbold*, Newton, Nicholas, *Pitkin*, Porter, *Quincy*, *Randolph*, Rea, Rhea, J. Richards, M. Richards, Russel, Say, Seaver, Shaw, Sloan, Smelt, Smite, J. K. Smita, J. Smith, Southard, *Stanford*, Stedman, Storer, *Sturges*, *Taggart*, *Tal-
madge*, Taylor, Thomson, Trigg, Troup, Upham, Van Allen, *Van Cortlandt*,
Van Horn, Van Rensselaer, Verplank, Wharton, Whitehill, Wilbour, Williams,
A. Wilson, N. Wilson, Winn.—118.

“Nays, Messrs. Gardenier, Hoge.—2.”

This is a vote of immense importance in the decision of the question which I have been discussing. One hundred and eighteen members, out of one hundred and twenty, have recorded their deliberate opinion, that “*to submit to the edicts of Great Britain and France*” would be “*a sacrifice of the rights, honour, and independence*” of the United States.

Our government had used every peaceable means that could be devised, to induce Great Britain to revoke her orders in council, to which, according to those gentlemen, we could not submit, without “*a sacrifice of our rights, honour, and independence.*” But every effort had been in vain. The orders in council remained unrevoked.

Yet nineteen of these gentlemen, thus solemnly pledged, and committed, voted against the war, as unjust and wicked; and spared no pains to excite a seditious, a treasonable opposition to it, on the pretext of that injustice and wickedness!

Can the human mind conceive a stronger and more indefensible contradiction than this? It is impossible.

The war was in resistance of the orders in council, and, according to these gentlemen, was, of course, a war to prevent “*a sacrifice of the rights, honour, and independence of the United States.*” And if ever war can be just and holy, it surely is then just and holy, when it is waged in defence of “*the rights, honour, and independence of a nation.*”

I cannot allow myself to believe, that I shall have a single reader who will doubt or deny the correctness of this inference. It is irresistible. These gentlemen are fairly committed in the face of their country and of all Christendom.

It may be said, and has been said ten thousand times, that the same pledge was given on the subject of the French decrees; and that war ought to have been declared against one nation as well as the other. To this there are two replies. One, that the French government did repeal its decrees, although in a very ungracious and uncourteous manner. But ungracious, and uncourteous, and indecorous, as it was, *they were repealed*. That this was the fact, I appeal to Mr. Otis. He has completely settled this point for ever. On the 14th of January, 1812, as we

have seen, in a confidential letter to a friend, he declared, not that the decrees were unrepealed—but that “*the repeal was less formal than it should have been.*” The reader who does not find that this is a decisive admission that they were actually repealed, must be wilfully blind. The other reply embraces an important fact. When the question of war against Great Britain was under discussion in congress, Mr. M’Kee, of Kentucky, *moved for a declaration of war against France as well as her enemy.* This motion, on a division of the house, was negatived by a very large majority. Ten members only* voted in the affirmative, of whom seven were democrats, and but three federalists! *All the other federalists voted in the negative!* This for ever closes the clamour on the subject of the propriety of declaring war against France.

Here I make a solemn pause. The orders in council were, as we have seen, one of the most prominent grounds of war. I have established their existence and their flagitious injustice at the time of that declaration. Yet the senate of Massachusetts has declared that “*the war was founded in falsehood!!!*”

When I stated *the enormous transit duty* the British ministers attempted to collect for *permission to trade with France*, I mentioned, that to such an extravagant length was their violation of neutral rights and of our independent sovereignty carried, that, wonderful to tell, they affected to consider the permission to trade on those terms, *as a special favour!* Lest the reader might doubt or disbelieve this astonishing, this monstrous, this dishonourable, this unparalleled fact, I give him the most unequivocal authority; the celebrated Francis James Jackson. This gentleman, in a letter to the secretary of state, dated October 11, 1811, expressly states—

“*The option given to neutrals to trade with the enemies of Great Britain, through British ports, ON PAYMENT OF A TRANSIT DUTY, was originally devised and intended as a MITIGATION of what is certainly more correct, but more rigid in principle: THE TOTAL AND UNQUALIFIED INTERDICTION OF ALL TRADE WITH THE ENEMY!!!*”

There is one point of view in which the pretensions of England ought to be considered, to show their palpable and shocking injustice, their utter disregard of the rights of this nation, and their total departure from the most solemn professions previously made.

By these professions, England had pledged herself to repeal the orders in council as soon as the Berlin and Milan decrees were repealed, so far as those decrees affected our intercourse with England. We had no right to demand of France to go fur-

* See this fact stated in the speech of Mr. Clay, speaker of the house of representatives of the United States, January 8, 1815. Weekly Register, vol. iii. page 372.

ther than this in her repeal. It would have been the most arrogant presumption for our government to have prescribed to France any regulation of such parts of her trade as we were not interested in. Yet England did require a repeal of her decrees affecting her trade with other nations, as a *sine qua non* to the repeal of the orders affecting the trade of the United States.

This has been repeatedly denied, and with the utmost confidence. But denial is not disproof. And unfortunately for the friends of England, the fact has become a matter of historical record. It is to be found in a document of the most indisputable authenticity. On the 10th of June, 1812, only eight days before the declaration of war, Mr. Foster, the British minister at Washington, wrote a letter to our government, in which this idea is distinctly and unequivocally avowed, in the following words :

"I have no hesitation, sir, in saying, that Great Britain, as the case has hitherto stood, *never did, nor ever could engage, without the grossest injustice to herself and her allies, as well as to other neutral nations, to repeal her orders, as affecting America alone, leaving them in force against other states, upon a condition that France would except, singly and specially, America from the operation of her decrees.*"

Whatever reprobation the system, here avowed, loudly calls for on the ground of its gross and flagrant injustice, we must approve the candour of Mr. Foster, which clothes it in all its genuine and intrinsic deformity, and holds it up to the abhorrence of the fair and upright part of mankind of all nations.

England at this time stood pledged to this country, by repeated declarations, promulgated with the utmost solemnity, to proceed *pari passu*, with France. But notwithstanding these solemn pledges, so often reiterated, she at last fairly comes out with an explicit declaration, that the repeal of the decrees, as affecting America, was to produce no effect on the orders in council, as affecting this country. That is, as plainly as can be, that unless we could prevail on France to cease the operation of her decrees upon British trade generally, we had no reason to hope for a relaxation of the rigour and injustice of her orders in council. This is a new explanation of a *pari passu*, and would of itself, had it stood alone, have afforded a full justification of the declaration of hostilities.

No man who has the least regard to his character—who is not deprived by faction and party violence of the moral sense—can, after a perusal of the preceding observations and facts, hesitate what sentence to pronounce on the accusation, that "*the war was founded in falsehood.*"

CHAPTER XLVI.

*Enquiry into the justice of the war continued.**Impressment.*

OF the enormity of this horrible grievance, which *cries to heaven for vengeance*, I have given such copious details, in chapters 31 to 38, that I need not enter deeply into it here.

That it was ample and adequate cause of war, no man can deny, who reads the letter from commodore Porter, page 201—and the extract from the log book of the *Guerriere*, page 202—whereby it is indisputably established that there was no less than the enormous number of forty five American impressed seamen on board three British vessels.

I must once more beg leave to introduce to the reader, James Lloyd, Esq. When I shelter myself under such authority as Messrs. Otis, Pickering, Lloyd, Griswold, &c. I deem myself impregnable.

Extract of a letter from the honourable James Lloyd to the honourable Mr. Perkins.

"If Great Britain did claim and exercise the right to impress into her service, the real, *bona fide*, native citizens of the United States, an interminable war with her, or with all the nations of the earth (if it could not be otherwise prevented) might be alike just, necessary, and commendable. The ocean, for the use of the great family of mankind, should own no chartered privileges. In a time of neutrality, while abstaining from injury to others, it should be as free as air, to all who navigate it: and the IMPRESSMENT OF A NATIVE AMERICAN CITIZEN, innocent of crime, and owing elsewhere no primary or paramount allegiance, and prosecuting a lawful commerce, in a vessel of his own country, is, as it respects the individual, and as it regards an infringement of rights, AS GROSS A VIOLATION AS IF HE WERE ARRESTED, TORN AND TRANSPORTED INTO SLAVERY FROM HIS PATERNAL ROOF OR DOMESTIC ALTAR." Boston Centinel, March 6, 1813.

The mind glows with animation on reading these noble, these dignified, these manly sentiments, worthy of the most illustrious heroes of the revolution! What a wonderful contrast between them and the groveling report of the committee of the legislature of Massachusetts! This single extract were sufficient to justify the war, had there been no other ground than impressment alone.

From the commencement of the French revolutionary war, till the declaration of hostilities took place, our vessels were arrested wherever met with by British vessels of war—the crews overhauled,—and the British captains seized and enslaved whom they pleased—as they were, in the strong language of Cobbett—"CAPTORS, ACCUSERS, WITNESSES, AND JUDGES."

England would have made war against all the nations of Europe in succession, had they dared to impress her seamen. And what right had she to claim a religious veneration for her flag, when she was in the daily practice of violating ours in the grossest manner?

I request the reader's attention to this subject. Mr. Lloyd unites "*the claim*" and "*the exercise*." The former is unimportant in itself, and does not affect the question. Suppose England were to "*claim a right*" to all our vessels—to our territory—to our persons—it is no cause of war. But the moment she attempts "*to exercise the right*" to seize any of them, resistance becomes a duty.

It thus appears, that the expression "*claim*" is mere verbiage. I do by no means believe it was employed to delude the reader. But I do aver that such is its effect.

"*The exercise*" then "*by Great Britain, of the right to impress into her service the real bona fide native citizens of the United States, would*" by the explicit and unexceptionable declaration of James Lloyd, "*justify an interminable war with her.*"

The question, reader, is thus reduced within a narrow compass. It only remains to be ascertained whether "*she exercised*" the execrable "*right of impressment*" of "*real bona fide citizens*" or not. If she did, the war, according to Mr. Lloyd, was just. To prove the fact beyond the possibility of doubt, I call in very high authority. I will give up for a moment my own calculation of 7000—the secretary's statement of 6700—and even lord Castlereagh's admission of 1600.* I will rely upon the committee of the legislature of Massachusetts, and upon the reverend Mr. Taggart, member of congress from that state.

The latter admits there were three hundred impressed American seamen on board the British navy on the declaration of war. And a committee of the house of representatives of Massachusetts, "*as far as their inquiries went*" admit that there were eleven impressed natives of the state on board that navy.

I proceed logically. As "*the exercise of the right*" of impressing the "*real bona fide native citizens of the United States into the service of Great Britain, would justify an interminable war with her or all the nations of the earth,*"—and as we have clearly established that there were, at all events, 300 native citizens of the United States so impressed—it follows that Mr. Lloyd must justify the late war—and will not dare to assert that it was "*founded in falsehood.*" Q. E. D.

Before I close the subject, I beg leave to introduce higher personages on the stage.

The prince regent has publicly declared, that "*it is known to the world that this country, [Great Britain] was not the aggressor in this war :*"

* Lord Castlereagh, in the British parliament, I am assured and confidently believe admitted this number.

And the lords of the admiralty, in their proclamation, dated April, 1814, (see page 65,) express their regret on the subject of "*the unprovoked aggression of the American government in declaring war after all the causes of its original complaint had been removed.*"

To enter the lists against such formidable antagonists, is really bold and daring. But I hope I have proved, that the war was not "founded in falsehood;"—that Great Britain was notoriously "the aggressor;" and that none of "the original causes of complaint had been removed" previous to the declaration of war.

Just as this page was going to press, I met with an important document, which bears powerfully and unanswerably on this topic. It is entitled

"An abstract of the returns or lists received from general Lyman, of American seamen and citizens, who have been impressed and held on board his Britannic majesty's ships of war, from the first of October, 1807, till the thirty-first of March, 1809."

The whole number of impressed men included in these returns, is - - - - - 873

Of whom were discharged - - - - - 287

Applications unanswered - - - - - 103

In ships on foreign stations - - - - - 48

Deserted - - - - - 32

British subjects - - - - - 98

Having voluntarily entered - - - - - 34

Married in England or Ireland - - - - - 7

The remaining 264 were refused to be discharged on various grounds, of irregularity of documents, &c. &c.—But let it be borne in eternal remembrance, that *of the whole number, 873, there were only 98 who were detained as British subjects!!*

This single document is of itself abundantly sufficient to brand with infamy, beyond the power of appeal or justification, the odious practice of impressment. Eight hundred and seventy three persons, sailing under the American flag, which ought to have insured them full and complete protection, are seized with every circumstance of outrage, oppression, injury, and injustice, as British subjects—are torn from their friends and families and country—are compelled to fight the battles of Great Britain, at the risque of being slaughtered by her enemies—they are subject to the most ignominious punishment, if they dare refuse to serve; and yet, good heavens! what an abomination! when their cases are fully investigated, it is found that only 98 of them are asserted to be—*though they were all stolen under pretence that they were—British subjects!!*

I make a solemn appeal on this subject—not to the United States—not to the British nation—not to France—but to the whole world—and boldly aver, and dare contradiction, that no

nation ever perpetrated such atrocious, such horrible, such lawless violence on another nation, in a state of pretended peace and friendship ; and that no nation, with equal means of defence and offence, ever before submitted to such humiliation, such degradation, as Great Britain heaped on the United States.

CHAPTER XLVII.

Turbulence of Boston. Boston acts on Massachusetts. Massachusetts acts on the other eastern states. Jealousies and discord sedulously excited. Hateful picture of the southern states.

BOSTON, the metropolis of Massachusetts, has been for a long period, and more particularly since the close of the reign of federalism, the seat of discontent, complaint, and turbulence. She has been herself restless and uneasy—and has spread restlessness and uneasiness throughout the union. She has thwarted, harassed, and embarrassed the general government, incomparably more than all the other states together.

Whatever difficulty or distress arose from the extraordinary circumstances of the times—and great difficulty and distress were inevitable—was aggravated and magnified to the highest degree, for the purpose of inflaming the public passions. The leaders in this business were clamorous, when we were at peace in 1793, and in 1806, for war against England, on account of her depredations on their commerce, and in 1807, on account of the attack on the Chesapeake. They were equally clamorous, as we have seen, in 1803, for war against Spain, on account of the interruption of the right of deposit at New Orleans, and denounced, in the most virulent style, the imbecility and cowardice of the government. Yet from the moment when war was declared, they clamoured for peace, and reprobated the war as wicked, unjust, and unnecessary, although the causes of war were incomparably greater in 1812, than in 1793, or 1806, or 1807.* They made every possible effort to raise obstructions and difficulties, in the prosecution of the war ; and *yet reprobated the administration for their imbecility in carrying it on.* They reduced the government to bankruptcy, as I trust I shall prove ; and *reproached it for its necessities and embarrassments.* In a word, all their movements have had but one object, to enfeeble and distract the government, for the purpose of regaining their lost authority. This object has been too successfully attained.

With a population of only 33,000 inhabitants, and a commerce quite insignificant, compared with that of New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, or Charleston, Boston has, by management and address, acquired a degree of influence beyond all proportion greater than her due share—greater in fact than the

* See chapters 43 and 44.

above four cities combined—a degree of influence which has been exercised in such a manner as to become dangerous to public and private property and happiness, and to the peace and permanence of the union. It brought us to the very verge of its dissolution, and nearly to the awful consequence—a civil war.

The movers of this mighty piece of machinery—this lever that puts into convulsive motion the whole of our political fabric, are few in number. But several of them are possessed of inordinate wealth—considerable talents—great energy—and overgrown influence. They afford a signal proof how much a few men may effect by energy and concert, more especially when they are not very scrupulous about the means of accomplishing their ends. A northern confederacy has been the object for a number of years. They have repeatedly advocated in the public prints a separation of the states, on account of a pretended discordance of views and interests of the different sections.

This project of separation was formed shortly after the adoption of the federal constitution. Whether it was ventured before the public, earlier than 1796, I know not. But of its promulgation in that year, there is the most indubitable evidence. A most elaborate set of papers, under the signature of Pelham, was then published in the city of Hartford, in Connecticut, the joint production of an association of men of the first talents and influence in the state. They appeared in the Connecticut Courant, published by Hudson and Goodwin, two eminent printers, of, I believe, considerable revolutionary standing. There were then none of the long catalogue of grievances, which, since that period, have been fabricated to justify the recent attempts to dissolve the union. General Washington was president; John Adams, an eastern citizen, vice-president. There was no French influence—no Virginia dynasty—no embargo—no non-intercourse—no terrapin policy—no democratic madness—no war.—In fine, every feature in the affairs of the country was precisely according to their fondest wishes.

To sow discord, jealousy, and hostility between the different sections of the union, was the first and grand step in their career, in order to accomplish the favourite object of a separation of the states.

In fact, without this efficient instrument, all their efforts would have been utterly unavailing. It would have been impossible, had the honest yeomanry of the eastern states continued to regard their southern fellow citizens as friends and brethren, having one common interest in the promotion of the general welfare, to make them instruments in the hands of those who intended to employ them to operate the unholy work of destroying the noble, the august, the splendid fabric of our union and unparalleled form of government.

For eighteen years, therefore, the most unceasing endeavours have been used to poison the minds of the people of the eastern states towards, and to alienate them from, their fellow citizens of the southern. The people of the latter section have been pourtrayed as demons incarnate, destitute of all the good qualities that dignify or adorn human nature—that acquire esteem or regard—that entitle to respect and veneration. Nothing can exceed the virulence of these caricatures, some of which would have suited the ferocious inhabitants of New-Zealand, rather than a civilized or polished nation.

To illustrate, and remove all doubt on, this subject, I subjoin an extract from Pelham's essays, No. I.

"Negroes are, in all respects, except in regard to life and death, the cattle of the citizens of the southern states. *If they were good for food, the probability is, that even the power of destroying their lives would be enjoyed by their owners, as fully as it is over the lives of their cattle. It cannot be, that their laws prohibit the owners from killing their slaves, because those slaves are human beings, or because it is a moral evil to destroy them.* If that were the case, how can they justify their being treated, in all other respects, *like brutes?* for it is in this point of view alone, that negroes in the southern states are considered in fact as *different from cattle.* They are bought and sold; they are fed or kept hungry; they are clothed, or reduced to nakedness; they are beaten, turned out to the fury of the elements, and torn from their dearest connections, *with as little remorse as if they were beasts of the field.*"

Never was there a more infamous or unfounded caricature than this—never one more disgraceful to its author. It may not be amiss to state, and it enhances ten-fold the turpitude of the writer, that at the period when it was written, there were many slaves in Connecticut, who were subject to every one of the disadvantages that attended the southern slaves.

Its vile character is further greatly aggravated by the consideration that a large portion of these very negroes, and their ancestors, had been purchased, and rent from their homes and families, by citizens of the eastern states, who were actually at that moment, and long afterwards, engaged in the Slave Trade.

I add a few more extracts from Pelham:—

"We have reached a critical period in our political existence. The question must soon be decided, *whether we shall continue a nation, at the expense even of our union, or sink with the present mass of difficulty into confusion and slavery.*

"Many advantages were supposed to be secured, and many evils avoided, by an union of the states. I shall not deny that the supposition was well founded. But at that time those advantages and those evils were magnified to a far greater size, than either would be if the question was at this moment to be settled.

"The northern states can subsist as a nation, a republic, *without any connection with the southern.* It cannot be contested, that if the southern states were possessed of the same political ideas, an union would be still more desirable than a separation. But when it becomes a serious question, whether we shall give up our government, or part with the states south of the Potomac, no man north of that river, whose heart is not thoroughly democratic, can hesitate what decision to make.

"I shall in the future papers consider some of the great events which *will lead to a separation of the United States*, show the importance of retaining

their present constitution, even at the expense of a separation; *endeavour to prove the impossibility of an union for any long period in future, both from the moral and political habits of the citizens of the southern states; and finally examine carefully to see whether we have not already approached to the era when they must be divided.*"

It is impossible for a man of intelligence and candour to read these extracts without feeling a decided conviction that the writer and his friends were determined to use all their endeavours to dissolve the union, and endanger civil war and all its horrors, in order to promote their personal views. This affords a complete clue to all the seditious proceedings that have occurred since that period—the unceasing efforts to excite the public mind to that feverish state of discord, jealousy, and exasperation, which was necessary to prepare it for convulsion. The parties interested would, on the stage of a separate confederacy, perform the brilliant parts of kings and princes, generals, and generalissimos—whereas on the grand stage of a general union, embracing all the states, they are obliged to sustain characters of perhaps a second or third rate. "*Better to rule in hell, than obey in heaven.*"

The unholy spirit that inspired the writer of the above extracts has been, from that hour to the present, incessantly employed to excite hostility between the different sections of the union. To such horrible lengths has this spirit been carried, that many paragraphs have occasionally appeared in the Boston papers, intended, and well calculated to excite the negroes of the southern states to rise and massacre their masters. This will undoubtedly appear incredible to the reader. It is nevertheless sacredly true. It is a species of turpitude and baseness, of which the world has produced few examples.

Thus some progress was made. But it was inconsiderable. While the yeomanry of the eastern states were enriched by a beneficial commerce with the southern, they did not feel disposed to quarrel with them for their supposed want of a due degree of piety or morality.

A deeper game was requisite to be played, or all the pains taken so far, would have been wholly fruitless. This was sedulously undertaken. The press literally groaned with efforts to prove five points, wholly destitute of foundation.

First, that the eastern states were supereminently commercial.

Secondly, That the states south of the Susquehanna were wholly agricultural.

Thirdly, That there is a natural and inevitable hostility between commercial and agricultural states.

Fourthly, That this hostility has uniformly pervaded the whole southern section of the union. And

Fifthly, That all the measures of congress were dictated by this hostility; and were actually intended to ruin the commercial, meaning the eastern states.

I do not assert that these miserable, contemptible, and deceptious positions were ever laid down in regular form, as theses to argue upon. But I do aver, that they form the basis of three fourths of all the essays, paragraphs, squibs, and crackers, that have appeared in the Boston papers against the administration for many years past. "The Road to Ruin," ascribed to John Lowell, now before me, is remarkable for its virulence, its acrimony, its intemperance, and for the talents of the writer. He undoubtedly places his subject in the strongest point of light possible for such a subject. But if you extract from his essays, the assumption of these positions, all the rest is a mere *caput mortuum*—all "sound and fury." On these topics the changes are rung in endless succession. The same observation will apply, and with equal force, to hundreds, perhaps thousands of essays and paragraphs, written on the same topic.

Never was the—*gutta non vi, sed saepe cadendo*—more completely verified. These positions, however absurd, however extravagant, however ridiculous they appear in their naked form, have, by dint of incessant repetition, made such an impression upon the minds of a large portion of the people of the eastern states, that they are as thoroughly convinced of their truth, as of any problem in Euclid.

Boston having acted upon and inflamed Massachusetts, that state acted upon, and put in movement the rest of the eastern states, more particularly Connecticut and Rhode Island. New Hampshire and Vermont are but partially infected with the turbulent and jacobinical spirit that predominates in Massachusetts.

It thus happens, that a people proverbially orderly, quiet, sober, and rational, were actually so highly excited as to be ripe for revolution, and ready to overturn the whole system of social order. A conspiracy was formed, which, as I have stated, and as cannot be too often repeated, promised fair to produce a convulsion—a *dissolution of the union*—and a *civil war*, unless the seduced people of that section of the union could be recovered from the fatal delusion they laboured under, and restored to their reason.

I shall very briefly, and without much attention to order or regularity, consider these positions. They are not entitled to a serious refutation, but merely as they have been made the instruments of producing so much mischief.

Before I touch upon the commercial points, I shall offer a few observations on the high and exalted pretensions of the people of the eastern states, to superior morality and religion, over the rest of the union. There has not been, it is true, quite so much parade with these exclusive claims as on the subject of commerce. Perhaps the reason is that there was no political purpose to be answered by them. But that the people of that section of the

union are in general thoroughly persuaded that they very far excel the rest of the nation in both religion and morals, no man who has been conversant with them can deny. This folly of self righteousness, of exalting ourselves above others, is too general all over the world; but no where more prevalent, or to greater extent, than in the eastern states. To pretend to institute a comparison between the religion and morals of the people of Boston and those of Philadelphia, New York, or Baltimore, would be considered as extravagant and absurd, as a comparison of the most licentious votary of Venus, with a spotless vestal.—The Rev. Jedidiah Morse has in some degree devoted his geography to, and disgraced it by, the perpetuation of this vile prejudice. Almost every page that respects his own section of the union is highly encomiastic. He colours with the flattering tints of a partial and enamoured friend. But when once he passes the Susquehannah, what a hideous reverse!—Almost every thing is there frightful caricature. Society is at a low and melancholy ebb, and all his most sombre tints are employed in the description, in order to elevate, by the contrast, his favourite Elysium, the eastern states. He dips his pen in gall when he has to pourtray the manners, or habits, or religion, of Virginia or Maryland, either of the Carolinas or Georgia, or the western country.

I should enter far into the consideration of this procedure of Mr. Morse, but that it has been ably discussed by a superior pen. The editor of the Port Folio, himself a decided federalist, reprobates, and pronounces a just and eternal condemnation on the illiberality of thus making a school, or indeed any other book, a vehicle to excite animosities between fellow citizens of different portions of the same nation.

The character of the eastern states for morality has been various at various times. Not long since, it was at a very low ebb indeed. It is within the memory of those over whose chin no razor has ever mowed a harvest, that Yankee and sharper were regarded as nearly synonymous. And this was not among the low and illiberal, the base and vulgar. It pervaded all ranks of society. In the middle and southern states, traders were universally very much on their guard against “Yankee tricks,” when dealing with those of the eastern.

They now arrogate to themselves (and, for party purposes, their claims are sometimes admitted by their political friends here) to be, as I have stated, a superior order to their fellow-citizens.—They look down upon the people of the southern states with as much contempt, and with the same foundation, as did the Pharisee of old on the despised Publican.

Both of those views are grossly erroneous. They never, as a people, merited the opprobrium under which they formerly la-

boured. There were, it is true, many worthless miscreants among them, who, on their migration to the other states, were guilty of base tricks, which, by an illiberality disgraceful to our species, but nevertheless very common, were charged to the account of the entire people of the eastern states, and brought them under a most undeserved odium.

I feel a pride and pleasure in doing justice to the yeomanry of the eastern states. They will not suffer on a comparison with the same class of men in any part of the world. They are upright, sober, orderly and regular—shrewd, intelligent, and well informed—and I believe there is not a greater degree of genuine native urbanity among the yeomanry of any country under the canopy of Heaven. And it is lamentable and unaccountable how they have allowed themselves to be so egregiously duped as they have been. I have known them long: and my respect for them has gradually increased in proportion as my knowledge of them has extended. But I shall never admit any exclusive or super-eminent claim to the virtues which I know they possess. And I have no hesitation in averring, that although Boston, or Hartford, or Newhaven, may exhibit rather more *appearance* of religion and piety, than New York, or Philadelphia, or Baltimore, yet the latter cities possess as much of the *reality*. It would astonish and frighten many of the pious people in New York or Philadelphia, to be informed—but they may nevertheless rely upon the information as indubitably true—that a large portion of the clergy in the town of Boston, are absolute Unitarians; and scout the idea of the divinity of Jesus Christ as completely and explicitly as ever Dr. Priestly did. This is a digression. I did not intend to introduce it. But since it is here, let it remain. And let me add, that the present principal of Harvard College was known to be an Unitarian when he was elected.—This fact establishes the very great extent and prevalence of the doctrine.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

Arrogance of the Claims of the Eastern States on the subject of Commerce. Statistical Tables. Comparison of the Exports of the several States.

THE high and sounding pretensions of the eastern states on the subject of commerce have been almost universally admitted. No person has ever thought it worth while to examine into the actual state of the facts. It has been presumed, that on a point where falsehood and deception could be so easily detected, such confident assertions would not be hazarded, unless they rested on a strong foundation. And in drawing the line of demarcation between the eastern states and the rest of the union, in the minds of the mass of the community, all to the north and east of the line

was regarded as devoted exclusively to commerce—all to the south and west, chiefly to agriculture.

It is hardly possible to conceive a greater mistake. The reader will be astonished at the view I shall lay before him. I have been inexpressibly surprised myself at the developement, and even now can hardly credit my own statements. They are nevertheless indisputable.

TABLE A.

Table of Exports from the United States, of FOREIGN and DOMESTIC productions and manufactures, from 1791 to 1802. Carefully extracted from the treasury returns.

	<i>Massachusetts.</i>	<i>Maryland.</i>	<i>S. Carolina.</i>	<i>New-York.</i>	<i>Pennsylvania.</i>
1791	\$2,519,000	2,239,000	2,693,000	2,505,000	3,436,000
1792	2,888,000	2,623,000	2,428,000	2,535,000	3,820,000
1793	3,755,000	2,665,000	3,191,000	2,932,000	6,958,000
1794	5,292,000	5,686,000	3,867,000	5,442,000	6,643,000
1795	7,117,000	5,811,000	5,998,000	10,304,000	11,518,000
1796	9,949,000	9,201,000	7,620,000	12,208,000	17,513,000
1797	7,502,000	9,811,000	6,505,000	13,308,000	11,446,000
1798	8,639,000	12,746,000	6,994,000	14,300,000	8,915,000
1799	11,421,000	16,299,000	8,729,000	18,719,000	12,431,000
1800	11,326,000	12,264,000	10,663,000	14,045,000	11,949,000
1801	14,870,000	12,767,000	14,304,000	19,851,000	17,438,000
1802	13,492,000	7,914,000	10,639,000	13,792,000	12,677,000
	98,770,000	101,026,000	83,631,000	129,941,000	124,744,000
	<i>Connecticut.</i>	<i>Virginia.</i>	<i>Rhode Island.</i>	<i>Georgia.</i>	<i>N. Hampshire.</i>
1791	\$710,000	3,131,000	470,000	491,000	142,000
1792	879,000	3,552,000	698,000	459,000	181,000
1793	770,000	2,987,000	616,000	520,000	198,000
1794	812,000	3,321,000	954,000	263,000	153,000
1795	819,000	3,490,000	1,222,000	695,000	229,000
1796	1,452,000	5,268,000	1,589,000	950,000	378,000
1797	814,000	4,908,000	975,000	644,000	275,000
1798	763,000	6,113,000	947,000	961,000	361,000
1799	1,143,000	6,292,000	1,055,000	1,396,000	361,000
1800	1,114,000	4,430,000	1,322,000	1,174,000	431,000
1801	1,446,000	5,655,000	1,832,000	1,755,000	555,000
1802	1,606,000	3,978,000	2,433,000	1,854,000	565,000
	12,328,000	53,125,000	14,113,000	11,162,000	3,829,000
	<i>Vermont.</i>	<i>N. Carolina.</i>	<i>New Jersey.</i>	<i>Delaware.</i>	
1791		524,000	26,000	119,000	
1792		527,000	23,000	133,000	
1793		365,000	54,000	93,000	
1794		321,000	58,000	207,000	
1795		492,000	130,000	158,000	
1796		671,000	59,000	201,000	
1797		540,000	18,000	98,000	
1798		537,000	61,000	183,000	
1799	20,000	485,000	9,000	297,000	
1800	57,000	769,000	2,000	418,000	
1801	57,000	874,000	25,000	662,000	
1802	31,000	659,000	26,000	440,000	
	165,000	6,764,000	491,000	3,009,000	

N. B. In the preceding and succeeding tables of exports, the figures below thousands are uniformly omitted, as not material to the calculation—and affecting equally both sides of the question.

Comparative views of the exports from the different states, of foreign and domestic articles, from 1791 to 1802, inclusively.
See Table A.

I. Maryland exported more than eight times as much as Connecticut; more than seven times as much as Rhode Island; two per cent. more than “the great commercial state” of Massachusetts; and very nearly as much as Massachusetts, New-Hampshire and Vermont united.

Maryland	-	-	-	-	-	-	101,026,000
Massachusetts	-	-	-	-	-	-	98,770,000
New Hampshire	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,829,000
Vermont	-	-	-	-	-	-	165,000
							<hr/> 102,764,000
Connecticut	-	-	-	-	-	-	12,328,000
Rhode Island	-	-	-	-	-	-	14,113,000

II. Maryland exported above *two hundred and thirty per cent. more than New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, and Rhode Island.*

Maryland	-	-	-	-	-	-	101,026,000
New Hampshire	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,829,000
Vermont	-	-	-	-	-	-	165,000
Connecticut	-	-	-	-	-	-	12,328,000
Rhode Island	-	-	-	-	-	-	14,113,000
							<hr/> 30,435,000

III. South Carolina exported nearly six times as much as Rhode Island; nearly seven times as much as Connecticut; above twenty times as much as New Hampshire; 500 times as much as Vermont; and *one hundred and seventy per cent. more than those four states.*

South Carolina	-	-	-	-	-	-	83,631,000
New Hampshire	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,829,000
Connecticut	-	-	-	-	-	-	12,328,000
Rhode Island	-	-	-	-	-	-	14,113,000
Vermont	-	-	-	-	-	-	165,000
							<hr/> 30,435,000

IV. Virginia exported seventy-three per cent. more than the four minor eastern states.

Virginia	-	-	-	-	-	-	53,125,000
N. Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, and R. Island.	-	-	-	-	-	-	See No. 2. 30,435,000

V. Virginia and South Carolina exported eight per cent. more than the five “*great commercial eastern states!!!*”

Virginia	-	-	-	-	-	-	53,125,000
South Carolina	-	-	-	-	-	-	83,631,000
							<hr/> 136,756,000
Massachusetts	-	-	-	-	-	-	98,770,000
New Hampshire, Vermont, &c.	-	-	-	-	-	-	See No. 2. 30,435,000
							<hr/> 129,205,000

VI. North Carolina exported seventy per cent. more than New Hampshire and Vermont.

North Carolina	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,764,000
New Hampshire	-	-	-	-	-	3,829,000	
Vermont	-	-	-	-	-	165,000	
						<hr/>	3,994,000

VII. Georgia exported nearly as much as Connecticut.

Georgia	-	-	-	-	-	-	12,162,000
Connecticut	-	-	-	-	-	-	12,328,000

VIII. *The five southern states exported nearly twice as much as the five great commercial eastern states !!!*

Maryland	-	-	-	-	-	-	101,026,000
Virginia	-	-	-	-	-	-	53,125,000
North Carolina	-	-	-	-	-	-	6,764,000
South Carolina	-	-	-	-	-	-	83,631,000
Georgia	-	-	-	-	-	-	12,162,000
						<hr/>	256,708,000
Five eastern states. See No. 5.	-	-	-	-	-	-	129,205,000

IX. Pennsylvania alone exported nearly as much as the "five great commercial eastern states."

Pennsylvania	-	-	-	-	-	-	124,744,000
Five eastern states. See No. 5.	-	-	-	-	-	-	129,205,000

TABLE B.

FOREIGN PRODUCTIONS and MANUFACTURES exported from the United States from 1803 to 1813. Carefully taken from the treasury returns.

	<i>Massachusetts.</i>	<i>New-York.</i>	<i>Pennsylvania.</i>	<i>S. Carolina.</i>	<i>Maryland.</i>
1803	\$3,369,000	3,191,000	3,504,000	947,000	1,371,000
1804	10,591,000	8,580,000	6,851,000	2,309,000	5,213,000
1805	13,738,000	15,384,000	9,397,000	3,108,000	7,450,000
1806	14,577,000	13,709,000	13,809,000	2,946,000	10,919,000
1807	13,926,000	16,400,000	12,055,000	3,783,000	10,282,000
1808	3,619,000	3,243,000	2,946,000	260,000	1,956,000
1809	6,119,000	4,232,000	4,810,000	385,000	4,056,000
1810	7,251,000	6,313,000	6,241,000	408,000	3,213,000
1811	5,192,000	3,518,000	3,865,000	210,000	3,820,000
1812	2,648,000	2,358,000	1,313,000	11,000	1,929,000
1813	294,000	1,124,000	327,000	53,000	1,005,000
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	81,324,000	78,052,000	65,118,000	14,420,000	50,214,000
	<i>Connecticut.</i>	<i>Rhode Island.</i>	<i>Virginia.</i>	<i>Georgia.</i>	<i>N. Hampshire.</i>
1803	\$10,000	611,000	151,000	25,000	51,000
1804	29,000	817,000	395,000	74,000	262,000
1805	90,000	1,506,000	660,000	43,000	218,000
1806	193,000	1,142,000	428,000		383,000
1807	105,000	915,000	367,000	34,000	314,000
1808	15,000	102,000	18,000		2,000
1809	11,000	626,000	107,000		85,000
1810	5,000	456,000	189,000	3,000	9,000
1811	38,000	626,000	23,000	11,000	53,000
1812		150,000	17,000		9,000
1813	5,000	2,000			
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	501,000	6,953,000	2,355,000	190,000	1,386,000

	<i>Vermont.</i>	<i>N. Carolina.</i>	<i>New Jersey.</i>	<i>Delaware.</i>
1803	27,000	26,000		240,000
1804	55,000	9,000		517,000
1805	67,000	12,000		280,000
1806	102,000	3,000	7,000	374,000
1807	55,000	4,000	5,000	151,000
1808	25,000		8,000	70,000
1809	49,000		50,000	41,000
1810	26,000	2,000	37,000	40,000
1811	538,000	4,000		
1812	131,000			
1813		1,000		
	<hr/> 1,075,000	<hr/> 61,000	<hr/> 107,000	<hr/> 1,713,000

Comparative views of foreign articles, exported from 1803 to 1813. See preceding Table B.

I. Maryland exported above seven times as much as Rhode Island ; thirty-five times as much as New Hampshire ; forty-five times as much as Vermont ; one hundred times as much as Connecticut ; and above five times as much as the four minor eastern states.

Maryland	-	-	-	-	-	50,214,000
Connecticut	-	-	-	-	-	501,000
Rhode Island	-	-	-	-	-	6,953,000
New Hampshire	-	-	-	-	-	1,386,000
Vermont	-	-	-	-	-	1,075,000
						<hr/> 9,915,000

II. South Carolina exported nearly twice as much as Connecticut and Rhode Island ; above ten times as much as New Hampshire ; and above 40 per cent more than the four minor eastern states.

South Carolina	-	-	-	-	-	14,420,000
Connecticut	-	-	-	-	-	501,000
Rhode Island	-	-	-	-	-	6,953,000
						<hr/> 7,454,000
New Hampshire	-	-	-	-	-	1,386,000
Vermont, New Hampshire, Connecticut and Rhode Island. No I.						9,915,000

III. Maryland and South Carolina exported nearly eighty per cent. of the amount exported by Massachusetts and Connecticut.

Maryland	-	-	-	-	-	50,214,000
South Carolina	-	-	-	-	-	14,420,000
						<hr/> 64,634,000
Connecticut	-	-	-	-	-	501,000
Massachusetts	-	-	-	-	-	81,324,000
						<hr/> 81,825,000

IV. Virginia exported almost five times as much as Connecticut ; and above twenty per cent. more than Connecticut and New Hampshire.

Virginia	-	-	-	-	-	2,355,000
Connecticut	-	-	-	-	-	501,000
New Hampshire	-	-	-	-	-	1,386,000
						<hr/> 1,887,000

TABLE C.

DOMESTIC PRODUCTIONS and MANUFACTURES exported from the United States from 1803 to 1813. Carefully extracted from the treasury returns.

	<i>Massachusetts.</i>	<i>S. Carolina.</i>	<i>Maryland.</i>	<i>New-York.</i>	<i>Pennsylvania.</i>	
1803	\$ 5,399,000	6,863,000	3,707,000	7,626,000	4,021,000	
1804	6,303,000	5,142,000	3,938,000	7,501,000	4,178,000	
1805	5,697,000	5,957,000	3,408,000	8,098,000	4,365,000	
1806	6,621,000	6,797,000	3,661,000	8,053,000	3,765,000	
1807	6,185,000	7,129,000	4,016,000	9,957,000	4,809,000	
1808	1,508,000	1,404,000	764,000	2,362,000	1,066,000	
1809	6,022,000	2,861,000	2,570,000	8,348,000	4,238,000	
1810	5,761,000	4,881,000	3,275,000	10,928,000	4,751,000	
1811	6,042,000	4,650,000	4,553,000	8,747,000	5,694,000	
1812	3,935,000	2,024,000	3,956,000	6,603,000	4,660,000	
1813	1,513,000	2,815,000	2,782,000	7,060,000	3,249,000	
	54,986,000	50,523,000	36,630,000	85,283,000	44,796,000	
	<i>Virginia.</i>	<i>Connecticut.</i>	<i>Georgia.</i>	<i>R. Island.</i>	<i>N. Hampshire.</i>	
1803	\$5,949,000	1,238,000	2,345,000	664,000	443,000	
1804	5,394,000	1,486,000	2,003,000	917,000	453,000	
1805	4,945,000	1,353,000	2,351,000	1,065,000	389,000	
1806	4,626,000	1,522,000	82,000	949,000	411,000	
1807	4,393,000	1,519,000	3,710,000	741,000	365,000	
1808	508,000	397,000	24,000	139,000	122,000	
1809	2,786,000	655,000	1,082,000	658,000	201,000	
1810	4,632,000	762,000	2,234,000	874,000	225,000	
1811	4,798,000	994,000	2,557,000	944,000	315,000	
1812	2,983,000	720,000	1,066,000	604,000	194,000	
1813	1,819,000	968,000	1,094,000	234,000	29,000	
	42,833,000	11,614,000	18,548,000	7,789,000	3,147,000	
	<i>Vermont.</i>	<i>N. Carolina.</i>	<i>N. Jersey.</i>	<i>Delaware.</i>	<i>N. Orleans.</i>	<i>Columbia.</i>
1803	\$89,000	926,000	21,000	187,000		1,412,000
1804	135,000	919,000	24,000	180,000	1,392,000	1,157,000
1805	101,000	767,000	20,000	77,000	2,338,000	1,135,000
1806	91,000	786,000	26,000	125,000	2,357,000	1,091,000
1807	148,000	740,000	36,000	77,000	3,161,000	1,363,000
1808	83,000	117,000	12,000	38,000	537,000	281,000
1809	125,000	322,000	269,000	96,000	344,000	681,000
1810	406,000	401,000	392,000	79,000	1,753,000	984,000
1811	32,000	793,000	1,000	76,000	2,501,000	2,060,000
1812	7,000	489,000	4,000	29,000	1,012,000	1,593,000
1813		795,000	10,000	133,000	1,013,000	1,387,000
	1,217,000	7,055,000	815,000	1,097,000	16,408,000	13,144,000

Comparative views of domestic articles, exported from 1803 to 1813. See preceding Table C.

I. South Carolina exported within eight per cent. of the whole amount exported by Massachusetts ; nearly seven times as much as Rhode Island ; above four times as much as Connecticut ; and above twice as much as the four minor eastern states.

South Carolina	-	-	-	-	-	-	50,523,000
Massachusetts	-	-	-	-	-	-	54,985,000
New Hampshire	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,147,000
Vermont	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,217,000
Connecticut	-	-	-	-	-	-	11,614,000
Rhode Island	-	-	-	-	-	-	7,789,000
							<hr/> 23,767,000

II. Virginia and Maryland exported more than all the eastern states.

Virginia	-	-	-	-	-	-	42,833,000
Maryland	-	-	-	-	-	-	36,630,000
							<hr/> 79,463,000
Massachusetts	-	-	-	-	-	-	54,985,100
N. Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island, and Connecticut,	-	-	-	-	-	-	23,767,000
							<hr/> 78,752,000

III. North Carolina exported almost seventy-five per cent. more than New Hampshire and Vermont, and nearly as much as Rhode Island.

North Carolina	-	-	-	-	-	-	7,055,000
New Hampshire	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,147,000
Vermont	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,217,000
							<hr/> 4,364,000
Rhode Island	-	-	-	-	-	-	7,789,000

IV. North Carolina and Georgia exported more than the four minor eastern states.

North Carolina	-	-	-	-	-	-	7,055,000
Georgia	-	-	-	-	-	-	18,548,000
							<hr/> 25,603,000
New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, &c. (No. 1.)	-	-	-	-	-	-	23,767,000

V. Georgia exported nearly twenty per cent. more than Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Vermont.

Georgia	-	-	-	-	-	-	18,548,000
Connecticut	-	-	-	-	-	-	11,614,000
New Hampshire	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,147,000
Vermont	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,217,000
							<hr/> 15,978,000

VI. *The district of Columbia and the state of Georgia exported thirty per cent. more than New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut and Rhode Island.*

Columbia	-	-	-	-	-	-	13,144,000
Georgia	-	-	-	-	-	-	18,548,000
							<hr/> 31,692,000
N. Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, and R. Island (No. 1.)	-	-	-	-	-	-	23,767,000

VII. *Virginia, Maryland, and South Carolina exported above sixty per cent. more than the eastern states.*

Virginia	-	-	-	-	-	-	42,833,000
Maryland	-	-	-	-	-	-	36,630,000
South Carolina	-	-	-	-	-	-	50,523,000
							<hr/> 129,986,000
Five eastern states (in No. 2.)	-	-	-	-	-	-	78,752,000

XV. South Carolina exported above 250 per cent. more than Connecticut; above five hundred per cent. more than Rhode Island; and above one hundred and fifty per cent. more than both these states.

South Carolina	-	-	-	-	-	50,523,000
Connecticut	-	-	-	-	-	11,614,000
Rhode Island	-	-	-	-	-	7,789,000
						<hr/> 19,403,000

XVI. Maryland exported above fifty per cent more than the four minor eastern states.

Maryland	-	-	-	-	-	36,630,000
Four minor eastern states (No. 1.)	-	-	-	-	-	23,767,000

XVII. North Carolina and Georgia exported more than the four minor eastern states.

North Carolina	-	-	-	-	-	7,055,000
Georgia	-	-	-	-	-	18,548,000
						<hr/> 25,603,000
Four minor eastern states (No. 1.)	-	-	-	-	-	23,767,000

XVIII. South Carolina, Columbia, and New-Orleans, exported more than the five eastern states.

South Carolina	-	-	-	-	-	50,523,000
Columbia	-	-	-	-	-	13,144,000
New Orleans	-	-	-	-	-	16,408,000
						<hr/> 80,075,000
Five eastern states (No. 2.)	-	-	-	-	-	78,752,000

XIX. The five southern states, the district of Columbia, and New Orleans, exported above two hundred and thirty per cent. more than the five eastern states, and within ten per cent. as much as the middle and eastern states.

Virginia, Maryland, and South Carolina (No. 7.)						129,986,000
North Carolina	-	-	-	-	-	7,055,000
Georgia	-	-	-	-	-	18,548,000
Columbia	-	-	-	-	-	13,144,000
New Orleans	-	-	-	-	-	16,408,000
						<hr/> 185,141,000
Five eastern states (No. 2.)	-	-	-	-	-	78,752,000
New-York	-	-	-	-	-	85,283,000
Pennsylvania	-	-	-	-	-	44,796,000
						<hr/> 208,831,000

XX. New Orleans exported above twelve times as much as Vermont; above twice as much as Rhode Island; nearly 50 per cent. more than Connecticut; above three times as much as New Hampshire; and more than New Hampshire, Vermont, and Connecticut.

New Orleans	-	-	-	-	-	16,408,000
New Hampshire	-	-	-	-	-	3,147,000
Vermont	-	-	-	-	-	1,217,000
Connecticut	-	-	-	-	-	11,614,000
						<hr/> 15,978,000
Rhode Island	-	-	-	-	-	7,789,000

The reader must be tired of this investigation. What idea must the world form of the arrogance and deception of the pretensions on the one side—and, on the other, of the folly and weakness of the rest of the union, to have so long suffered them to pass without detection and exposure.

The naked fact is, that the demagogues in the eastern states, not satisfied with deriving all the benefits from the southern section of the union, that they would from so many wealthy colonies—with making princely fortunes by the carriage and exportation of its bulky and valuable productions—and supplying it with their own manufactures, and the manufactures and productions of Europe, and the East and West Indies, to an enormous amount, and at an immense profit—have uniformly treated it with outrage, insult, and injury. And, regardless of their vital interests, the eastern states lately courted their own destruction, by allowing a few restless, turbulent men to lead them blindfolded towards a separation, *pregnant with their certain ruin. Whenever that event takes place, they sink to their native insignificance.*

If a separation were desirable to any part of the union, it would be to the middle and southern states, particularly the latter, which have been so long harassed with the complaints, the restlessness, the turbulence, and the ingratitude of the eastern states, that their patience has been taxed almost beyond endurance. “*Jeshurun waxed fat, and kicked.*” And he will be severely punished for his kicking, in the event of a dissolution of the union.

It ought to be observed, that a very large portion of the exports from the eastern, consists of the productions of the southern states, first transported to Boston and other ports, coastwise. So that even the comparisons I have made, which are so mortal to the pretensions of the eastern states, place them on far better ground than they really deserve. For example—suppose, among the exports of these states, two millions of dollars’ worth of cotton, one million of dollars’ worth of flour, one million of dollars’ worth of naval stores, all drawn from the southern and middle states—they appear four millions of dollars stronger on the face of the argument, than they are in fact and in truth. And there is no doubt that this is the case to a vast extent.

CHAPTER XLIX.

Comparison of the exports, foreign and domestic, of the different states, from 1791 to 1813. Glance at tonnage.

To enable the reader to form a fair comparison between the commerce of the different states, I annex a synoptical view of

the whole of our exports from the organization of the federal government till the close of 1813. He will see, at a single glance, how very erroneous are the opinions that have hitherto prevailed on the subject; and how high even the foreign commerce of the southern states soars over that of the boasted "*commercial states*."

General total of exports of foreign and domestic productions from the year 1791 to 1813, inclusive.

	<i>Massachusetts.</i>	<i>Maryland.</i>	<i>S. Carolina.</i>	<i>New-York.</i>	<i>Pennsylvania.</i>	
A	98,770,000	101,026,000	83,631,000	129,941,000	124,744,000	
B	81,324,000	50,214,000	14,420,000	78,052,000	65,118,000	
C	54,986,000	36,630,000	50,523,000	85,283,000	44,796,000	
	<hr/> \$235,080,000	<hr/> 187,870,000	<hr/> 148,574,000	<hr/> 293,276,000	<hr/> 234,658,000	
	<i>Virginia.</i>	<i>Connecticut.</i>	<i>Georgia.</i>	<i>Rhode Island.</i>	<i>N. Hampshire.</i>	
A	53,125,000	12,328,000	12,162,000	14,113,000	3,829,000	
B	2,355,000	501,000	190,000	6,953,000	1,386,000	
C	42,833,000	11,614,000	18,548,000	7,789,000	3,147,000	
	<hr/> 98,313,000	<hr/> 24,443,000	<hr/> 30,900,000	<hr/> 28,855,000	<hr/> 8,362,000	
	<i>N. Carolina.</i>	<i>Vermont.</i>	<i>New Jersey.</i>	<i>N. Orleans.</i>	<i>Columbia.</i>	<i>Delaware.</i>
A	6,764,000	165,000	491,000			3,009,000
B	61,000	1,075,000	107,000			1,713,000
C	7,055,000	1,217,000	815,000	16,408,000	13,144,000	1,097,000
	<hr/> \$13,880,000	<hr/> 2,457,000	<hr/> 1,413,000	<hr/> 16,408,000	<hr/> 13,144,000	<hr/> 5,819,000

EXPLANATION.

The first line, A, is taken from the table A, page 260. It contains the whole amount of the exports of foreign and domestic articles, from 1791 till 1802, inclusive.

The second line, B, is taken from the table B, page 262-3. It contains the whole of the foreign articles exported from 1802 till 1813, inclusive.

The third line, C, is taken from the table C, page 264. It contains all the domestic articles exported from 1802 till 1813.

<i>Eastern section.</i>		<i>Middle section.</i>		<i>Southern section.</i>	
Mass.	235,080,000	N. Jersey	1,413,000	Maryland	187,870,000
N. Ham.	8,362,000	Delaware	5,819,000	Virginia	98,313,000
Vermont	2,457,000	N. York	293,276,000	N. Carolina	13,880,000
R. Island	28,855,000	Penn.	234,658,000	S. Carolina	148,574,000
Connec.	24,443,000			Georgia	30,900,000
				N. Orleans	16,408,000
				Columbia	13,144,000
	<hr/> \$299,197,000		<hr/> 535,166,000		<hr/> 509,089,000

I cannot allow these tables to pass without requesting attention to them in the most particular manner. As they throw an immense flood of light on a subject most egregiously misunderstood, and on which the most ruinous errors have prevailed, it behoves the reader to test his opinions by them, and lay aside the prejudices and misconceptions, if any, which he may have formed on these topics.

All the late confusion, the tendency to disorganize the country, to overturn the government, and to introduce civil war, arose from the errors prevailing on the subject of commerce,* of which the eastern states pretended to be, and were absurdly and ridiculously believed, the exclusive guardians and protectors. It is now clearly and indisputably established, that the commerce of the eastern is very far indeed inferior to that of the southern states. It appears, beyond the possibility of doubt or denial, that the five eastern states, since the formation of the government, have exported of foreign and domestic articles, *including an immense amount of southern productions*, only about

229,000,000 dollars,

of which a vast proportion was of foreign productions ; but that the southern states have in the same period exported to foreign countries no less a sum than

509,000,000 dollars,

principally of their own productions and manufactures, exclusive of the prodigious amount of their cotton, tobacco, rice, naval stores, &c. exported by the eastern states. The southern section of the union, which has been so cruelly, so wickedly, so unjustly vilified and calumniated for its hostility to commerce, is therefore actually more interested in its preservation than the eastern states, in the proportion of *five to three*. There is no instance to be found, of so palpable, so gross, so unfounded a calumny, resting on such a sandy foundation, so open to detection, and so pregnant with most ruinous consequences, having remained so long without investigation.

From a view of the preceding tables, it appears that the commerce of four of the eastern states is to the last degree insignificant, compared with that of the southern states, as will appear on the following comparisons :—

I. Virginia, since the organization of the government, has exported above four times as much as Connecticut ; considerably more than three times as much as Rhode Island ; twelve times as much as New Hampshire ; forty times as much as Vermont ; and above fifty per cent. more than those four states.

Virginia	-	-	-	-	-	98,313,000
Connecticut	-	-	-	-	-	24,443,000
Rhode Island	-	-	-	-	-	28,855,000
New Hampshire	-	-	-	-	-	8,362,000
Vermont	-	-	-	-	-	2,457,000
						<hr/> 64,117,000

* The history of the world hardly presents an instance of greater delusion or deception than prevailed on this subject.

II. Maryland has exported nearly eight times as much as Connecticut; above six times as much as Rhode Island; twenty-three times as much as New Hampshire; almost eighty times as much as Vermont; and almost three times as much as the four minor states.

Maryland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	187,870,000
Connecticut	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24,443,000
Rhode Island	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	28,855,000
New Hampshire	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8,362,000
Vermont	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,457,000
								<hr/> 64,117,000

III. North Carolina has exported almost thirty per cent. more than New Hampshire and Vermont.

North Carolina	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13,880,000
New Hampshire	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8,362,000
Vermont	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,457,000
								<hr/> 10,819,000

IV. Georgia has exported considerably more than Connecticut or Rhode Island; and almost three times as much as New Hampshire and Vermont.

Georgia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30,900,000
Connecticut	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24,443,000
Rhode Island	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	28,855,000
New Hampshire	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8,362,000
Vermont	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,457,000
								<hr/> 10,819,000

V. South Carolina has exported above five times as much as Rhode Island; above six times as much as Connecticut; and one hundred and fifty per cent. more than the four minor eastern states.

South Carolina	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	148,574,000
Rhode Island	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	28,855,000
Connecticut	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24,443,000
Four minor eastern states (see No. 1.)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	64,117,000

VI. New Orleans and the district of Columbia have exported more *of domestic productions*, in eleven years, than either Connecticut or Rhode Island in twenty-three, *of foreign and domestic*.

New Orleans, in eleven years	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16,408,000
Columbia, do. do.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13,114,000
								<hr/> 29,522,000
Connecticut, in twenty-three years	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24,443,000
Rhode Island, do. do.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	28,855,000

VII. New Orleans has exported nearly twice as much in eleven years, as New Hampshire in twenty-three.

New Hampshire, twenty-three years	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8,362,000
New Orleans, eleven years	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16,408,000

VIII. *Virginia, Maryland, and Columbia, have exported more than the whole five eastern states ! ! ! ! !*

Maryland	-	-	-	-	-	-	187,870,000
Virginia	-	-	-	-	-	-	98,313,000
Columbia	-	-	-	-	-	-	13,144,000
							<hr/>
							299,327,000!!!
Five eastern states	-	-	-	-	-	-	299,192,000!!!

IX. *The southern states have exported seventy-five per cent. more than the five eastern!!!*

Southern states	-	-	-	-	-	-	509,089,000!!!
Eastern states	-	-	-	-	-	-	209,197,000!!!

Since the preceding pages were written, I have examined an interesting work, entitled, "A geographical and statistical view of Massachusetts proper, by Rodolphus Dickinson, published anno 1813." It greatly elucidates the subject I have been discussing; and places the unsoundness of the high commercial claims of Massachusetts in nearly as strong a point of light as any of the documents I have given.

"The exports in 1809 from Boston and Charlestown, of American productions and manufactures, were 4,009,029 dollars, of which the value of rice, cotton, flour, tobacco, staves, and naval stores, *being principally the produce of the southern states, was 2,294,109 dollars.*"

The writer adds,

"This, it is presumed, bears a relative proportion in amount, to the exports of other years." Page 79.

It thus appears, that although Boston has disturbed the tranquillity of the United States by her impassioned complaints on the subject of commerce, and the injury it has sustained by the hostility of the southern states, she is indebted to those states for considerably more than half of the American articles she exports. She moreover finds an invaluable market with them for the chief part of her immense foreign importations, and for her valuable manufactures.

It really makes one's heart ache with vexation, to find that such mighty, such ruinous errors prevailed on those important topics—errors that generated the most baleful passions, which were hourly increased by artificial excitements, and which threatened us with the most awful consequences.

The reader must not be surprised at the frequent repetition of this sentiment. For "out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh;"—and having been convinced that this was beyond all comparison the most awful danger that threatened us, it is not to be wondered at, that it engrosses so large a space in this book.

I shall conclude this topic with one observation, that there has rarely, perhaps never, occurred an instance of one nation more highly indebted to another than the eastern states are to the southern, and yet making such a very miserable and ungrateful return.

I imagined that in the preceding chapters I had fully exhausted the comparison of the commercial importance of the several sections of the United States. I had, at all events, convinced every man whose mind was open to conviction, that the arrogant claims on this subject, of the eastern states, were utterly unfounded; and that the middle and southern sections had as much more interest in the protection of commerce than their eastern brethren, as the merchant who loads a wagon, with 10,000 dollars worth of goods, has more interest in the intercourse between the seller and the consumer, than the owner of the wagon.

But I find I did not do full justice to the subject. A new view of it has been presented to the public by the indefatigable editor of the Weekly Register, which far transcends the views I took. But even Mr. Niles has not pursued the argument to the full extent of which it is susceptible.

The exports of cotton from the port of Savannah alone, from the 20th of March till the 30th of June, 1815, a period of three months and ten days, were

Sea Island, 21,000 bales, each 300 lbs. at 33 1-3 cents,	-	-	-	-	2,100,000
Upland, 55,582 bales, each 300 lbs. at twenty cents,	-	-	-	-	3,334,000
					<hr/> 5,434,000
Supposing all the other articles to amount to					1,066,000
					<hr/> 6,500,000

and also supposing the exports of the remaining eight months and twenty days to amount to only half that sum, it is at the rate of nearly 10,000,000 dollars for the year.

A review of the tables in page 267, will show that the whole of the exports, of every kind, foreign and domestic, from the state of Massachusetts, for twenty three years, were only 235,000,000 dollars, which is an average of about 10,000,000 per annum, whereof considerably more than half was foreign. It therefore follows, that the *domestic exports* of the single port of Savannah this year, [1815] will equal the average of the exports of every kind, *foreign and domestic*, from the mighty, the powerful, the commercial state of Massachusetts, from the time of the organization of the government till the close of the year 1815!!!

Tonnage.

The eastern states, which maintained such arrogant commercial claims, on the ground of their exports and imports, likewise preferred high pretensions on their transcendant superiority in point of shipping. These towering claims are unfounded, al-

though not in the same degree with the others. Let the reader decide. I have before me a statement of the tonnage of the United States for two years, from which I submit a few extracts, in order to inter these pretensions in the same grave with the rest.

<i>Tonnage of</i>	1806	1810
Boston,	133,257	149,121
New York,	243,533	268,541
Philadelphia,	121,443	125,258
Baltimore,	102,434	103,444
Portland,	33,007	32,599
Portsmouth,	27,719	28,820
Bath,	23,033	20,344
Newburyport,	36,574	39,100
Salem,	43,537	41,462
Norfolk,	90,943	48,643
Charleston,	40,819	52,888

Thus it appears, that in the year 1810, the tonnage of Norfolk, as well as of Charleston, was considerably superior to that of any port in the eastern or middle states, except Boston, New-York, and Philadelphia; and that the tonnage of Baltimore was more than double that of any port in the eastern states, except Boston.

The aggregate tonnage of Vermont, New-Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Connecticut, in tons
 1811, was - - - - - 108,000

That of the city of Baltimore in the same year
 was - - - - - 103,000

that is, the tonnage of the single port of Baltimore, was very nearly equal to the whole amount of the tonnage of these four states, which have made such a clamour on the subject of commerce. The tonnage of the whole district of Maryland for that year was 143,000 tons, being an excess of 35,000 tons, or nearly one third more than those states !!!*

The clearances from the port of Savannah, *exclusive of coasters*, for April, May, and June, 1815, were 191, and the entries, also *exclusive of coasters*, were 203.—Whereas the foreign entries into the port of Boston for five months, March, April, May, June, and July, 1815, were only 212—and the foreign clearances only 270. That is, I beg peculiar attention to this point, the foreign entries into Savannah, *in three months*, were 203, and into Boston *in five months*, only 212! What a developement of the relative commerce of both ports! how utterly beyond all expectation or calculation! What a strong proof of the arrogance and folly of the towering pretensions of the “Nation of New England!!!”

* See Weekly Register, Vol. VIII, page 370, to which I am indebted for these facts.

CHAPTER L.

Another source of excitement among the citizens of the eastern states. Duties on imports. Statistics. Southern states pay very nearly as much impost as the eastern. Wonderful delusion!

THOSE demagogues whose unceasing efforts were employed to excite the passions of the yeomanry of the eastern states, and prepare them for insurrection and a dissolution of the union, raised a great clamour on the subject of the enormous amount of duties paid by those states, and the insignificance of the sums paid by the southern section of the nation. They thence inferred the injustice and the inequality of the union, and its oppressive operation upon the former section.

This item of complaint is, if possible, more fallacious than the one discussed in the preceding chapters. The disadvantage is all on the other side of the question. The eastern states import largely from Europe, and from the East and West Indies, for the supply of the southern states. The former, it is true, bond or pay the duties in the first instance. This appears to give them a wonderful superiority in the table of duties. But it can hardly be necessary to inform the reader, that the merchant who bonds the duties, is not the actual payer of them. Mr. Edward Thomson, of this city, has imported, during this year, [1815] and of course will pay duties on, goods to the amount of probably above 2,000,000 of dollars. His consumption of dutiable articles is probably not 2000 dollars. Who can be so ignorant as to pretend, that the government is beholden to him for the amount of the duties! They are paid by the farmers of Chester, and Bucks, and Lancaster, and Delaware, and Berks counties, and of the southern and western states, &c. &c. The duties are added by the merchant to the first cost, with a profit on both—and the ultimate consumer is the real payer.

The eastern states have thus levied taxes not merely on Maryland, Virginia, North and South Carolina, and Georgia, but even on Pennsylvania; for strange as it may seem, it is nevertheless true, that notwithstanding the immense wealth, the ardent enterprise, and the great commercial advantages of Philadelphia, immoderate quantities of East India and Chinese goods have been consigned for sale here, from Boston, Salem, and other eastern ports.

But even, independent of the importation of the eastern for the southern states, the facts are unfairly stated. If the former actually consumed all the foreign articles they import, the duties they pay, compared with those paid by the southern states, will not warrant their holding the high, and arrogant, and insulting tone they have always assumed.

To enable the reader to form a correct opinion on the subject, I annex a set of tables of the

Net amount of the duties paid by the different states from the year 1791 to 1812, inclusive, taken from the records of the treasury department, and submitted to congress by Joseph Nourse, esq. register of the treasury.

	<i>New Hampshire.</i>	<i>Vermont.</i>	<i>Connecticut.</i>	<i>R. Island.</i>
1791	53,000		206,000	146,000
1792	41,000		142,000	46,000
1793	44,000		154,000	133,000
1794	38,000	1,000	171,000	89,000
1795	44,000		155,000	244,000
1796	53,000	1,000	141,000	137,000
1797	27,000		115,000	276,000
1798	72,000	1,000	127,000	104,000
1799	99,000	2,000	289,000	260,000
1800	142,000	2,000	169,000	393,000
1801	133,000		328,000	284,000
1802	119,000		262,000	178,000
1803	122,000	1,000	301,000	266,000
1804	108,000		348,000	421,000
1805	109,000		354,000	349,000
1806	117,000		325,000	361,000
1807	99,000		314,000	123,000
1808	19,000		197,000	270,000
1809	39,000	9,000	129,000	35,000
1810	53,000	9,000	157,000	435,000
1811	62,000	5,000	240,000	318,000
1812	122,000	116,000	829,000	452,000
<hr/>				
	1,715,000	147,000	5,453,000	5,420,000

	<i>Massachusetts.</i>	<i>New-York.</i>	<i>Pennsylvania.</i>	<i>Maryland.</i>	<i>Virginia.</i>
1791	977,000	1,564,000	1,491,000	641,000	851,000
1792	678,000	1,169,000	1,096,000	449,000	474,000
1793	950,000	1,195,000	1,804,000	869,000	388,000
1794	1,004,000	1,860,000	1,473,000	795,000	389,000
1795	1,415,000	2,000,000	2,271,000	523,000	396,000
1796	1,334,000	2,158,000	2,012,000	761,000	598,000
1797	1,372,000	2,059,000	1,743,000	1,145,000	606,000
1798	1,168,000	1,743,000	1,029,000	885,000	629,000
1799	1,607,000	2,373,000	1,259,000	1,161,000	896,000
1800	1,974,000	2,741,000	1,350,000	623,000	644,000
1801	2,929,000	3,810,000	2,123,000	1,001,000	746,000
1802	1,525,000	2,490,000	1,410,000	634,000	689,000
1803	2,490,000	3,524,000	1,655,000	936,000	713,000
1804	4,630,000	3,872,000	2,609,000	1,538,000	902,000
1805	3,308,000	4,882,000	2,300,000	1,130,000	805,000
1806	3,524,000	4,875,000	3,017,000	1,446,000	620,000
1807	3,576,000	4,926,000	3,162,000	1,633,000	506,000
1808	1,184,000	2,764,000	1,647,000	588,000	110,000
1809	1,384,000	2,981,000	1,405,000	155,000	257,000
1810	2,774,000	4,419,000	2,539,000	928,000	461,000
1811	1,816,000	1,979,000	1,840,000	722,000	195,000
1812	2,719,000	2,890,000	2,090,000	1,782,000	690,000
<hr/>					
	44,338,000	62,274,000	41,325,000	20,345,000	12,565,000

	<i>N. Carolina.</i>	<i>S. Carolina.</i>	<i>Georgia.</i>	<i>Columbia.</i>	<i>N. Orleans</i>
1791	\$115,000	538,000	91,000		
1792	78,000	360,000	53,000		
1793	63,000	359,000	35,000		
1794	78,000	651,000	87,000		
1795	99,000	710,000	54,000		
1796	68,000	56,000	31,000		
1797	105,000	700,000	62,000		
1798	120,000	239,000			
1799	154,000	858,000			
1800	126,000	1,159,000			
1801	125,000	1,002,000	663,000	94,000	
1802	252,000	280,000	211,000	133,000	
1803	159,000	646,000	182,000	143,000	
1804	186,000	718,000	180,000	128,000	279,000
1805	165,000	843,000	95,000	119,000	342,000
1806	202,000	871,000	183,000	137,000	361,000
1807	196,000	735,000	489,000	123,000	480,000
1808	16,000	225,000	35,000	20,000	77,000
1809	65,000	377,000	6,000	60,000	134,000
1810	58,000	567,000	134,000	50,000	244,000
1811	44,000	338,000	56,000	45,000	148,000
1812	47,000	433,000	260,000	80,000	137,000
	<hr/> 2,621,000	<hr/> 12,665,000	<hr/> 2,907,000	<hr/> 1,132,000	<hr/> 2,202,000

In these tables, as in those of exports, there is no account taken of any sums below one thousand dollars. This operates equally on both sides, and cannot affect the comparison, which is the object in view.

From the foregoing tables, the following results appear.

I. The southern states have paid nearly as large an amount of duties to the government, as the eastern.

Maryland	-	-	-	20,345,000
Virginia	-	-	-	12,565,000
North Carolina	-	-	-	2,621,000
South Carolina	-	-	-	12,665,000
Georgia	-	-	-	2,907,000
Columbia	-	-	-	1,132,000
Orleans	-	-	-	2,202,000
				<hr/> 54,437,000
Massachusetts				44,338,000
New Hampshire	-	-	-	1,715,000
Vermont	-	-	-	147,000
Connecticut	-	-	-	5,463,000
Rhode Island	-	-	-	5,420,000
				<hr/> 12,745,000
				57,083,000

II. The single state of South Carolina paid very nearly as much duties as the four minor eastern states.

South Carolina	-	-	-	12,665,000
Four minor eastern states (see No. 1.)	-	-	-	12,745,000

III. New Orleans paid twenty per cent. more in *nine* years, than New Hampshire and Vermont in *twenty-two*.

Orleans	-	-	-	2,402,000
New Hampshire	-	-	-	1,715,000
Vermont	-	-	-	147,000
				<hr/> 1,862,000

IV. Virginia alone paid very nearly as much as the four minor eastern states.

Virginia	-	-	-	-	12,565,000
Four minor eastern states (see No. 1.)	-	-	-	-	12,745,000

V. New York and Pennsylvania paid nearly ninety per cent. more than the five eastern states.

New York	-	-	-	-	62,274,000
Pennsylvania	-	-	-	-	41,325,000
					<hr/> 103,599,000
Five eastern states (see No. 1.)	-	-	-	-	57,083,000

VI. South Carolina paid more than twice the amount of duties paid by either Connecticut or Rhode Island; seven times as much as New Hampshire; and ninety times as much as Vermont.

South Carolina	-	-	-	-	12,665,000
Connecticut	-	-	-	-	5,463,000
Rhode Island	-	-	-	-	5,420,000
New Hampshire	-	-	-	-	1,715,000
Vermont	-	-	-	-	147,000

Synopsis of duties paid from 1791 to 1812 inclusive.

<i>Eastern section.</i>		<i>Middle section.</i>		<i>Southern section.</i>	
Mass.	44,338,000	N. Jersey	259,000	Maryland	20,345,000
N. Hamp.	1,715,000	Delaware	1,223,000	Virginia	12,565,000
Vermont	147,000	N. York	62,274,000	N. Carolina	2,621,000
Connect.	5,463,000	Pennsylvania	41,325,000	S. Carolina	12,665,000
R. Island	5,420,000			Georgia	2,907,000
				Columbia	1,132,000
				Orleans	2,202,000
<hr/> \$57,083,000		<hr/> \$105,981,000		<hr/> \$54,437,000	

Those who consider the very expensive habits of the players of Virginia and South Carolina, and the immense amount of foreign goods received in those states from the eastern ones, as well as from New York, Pennsylvania, and Maryland, and how very large a proportion of the foreign merchandize imported by Massachusetts, is exported to the other states, can hardly doubt, that Virginia and South Carolina actually consume each as large an amount of dutiable articles, and of course in fact really pay as much duties, as that state. A due consideration of the great number of coasters, which, in time of peace, are constantly plying from the ports of the eastern and middle to those of the southern states, will afford a strong support to this opinion. A very large proportion of the cargoes of the coasters bound to the southern ports consists of imported goods which have paid duties; and the residue generally of articles of domestic manufacture. The return cargoes are all of raw materials for manufactures, or articles of the highest value for exportation to Europe and elsewhere. It is not easy to conceive of a more advantageous commerce for the mother coun-

tries, as, in this case, the middle and eastern states may be justly styled. I repeat it, and hope the solemn truth will be borne in constant remembrance, that the southern states are virtually colonies to those states whose demagogues have never ceased slandering and vilifying them.

I dismiss this part of my subject, I hope for ever. I trust that the assertion of the commercial superiority of the eastern states, will never again be urged on this community.

CHAPTER LI.

Fallacy of the opinion of any hostility in the southern, against the eastern states. Commercial and agricultural states mutually dependent on, and beneficial to each other.

HAVING, I hope, completely settled the question of the comparative pretensions of the different sections of the union to commercial pre-eminence, I proceed to consider the positions, which assert the necessary hostility between an agricultural section of a country and a commercial one—the actual existence of that hostility in the southern states—and its baneful influence on the measures of congress.

On these fallacious positions, the changes have been rung in endless succession, not merely by a crowd of anonymous writers, but even public bodies whose stations entitle them to respect, have disgraced themselves by their dissemination. The lucubrations on this subject, published in Boston alone, would fill folio volumes. Throughout the whole, confident and unfounded assertion is substituted in the place of fact, reason, and argument.

To enable the reader to form an idea of the errors prevalent on this topic, I annex a few extracts.

“They have seen at first an ill-concealed, but at last an open and undisguised jealousy of the wealth and power of the commercial states, operating in CONTINUAL EFFORTS TO EMBARRASS AND DESTROY THAT COMMERCE, WHICH IS THEIR LIFE AND SUPPORT.”

This is the language of a report to the legislature of Massachusetts, made by a joint committee of both houses, Feb. 11, 1814, on which was founded the most inflammatory appeal to the citizens of the eastern states. This report asserted the propriety, justice, and necessity of forcible resistance to the measures of the general government, adding

“The question is not a question of power or right with this legislature, but of time or expediency.”

The committee proceed—

“There exists in all parts of this commonwealth, a fear, and in many a settled belief, that the course of foreign and domestic policy pursued by the government of the United States, for several years past, has its foundation in a DELIBERATE INTENTION TO IMPAIR, IF NOT TO DESTROY, THAT FREE

SPIRIT AND EXERCISE OF COMMERCE, which, aided by the habits, manners, and institutions of our ancestors, and the blessings of divine providence, have been the principal source of the freedom, wealth, and general prosperity of this recently happy and flourishing people.

"These opinions are not confined to the maritime borders of the state, whose interests are more immediately affected, and whose inhabitants have daily before their eyes perishing ships, deserted warehouses, and starving mechanics and labourers: but are loudly responded from the interior, where the people generally sympathise in the present distress of their brethren on the sea-coast, and wisely foresee, in their ruin, their own approaching wretchedness."

The committee continue—

"The memorialists see, in this deplorable descent from national greatness, **A DETERMINATION TO HARASS AND ANNIHILATE THAT SPIRIT OF COMMERCE** which has ever been the handmaid of civil and religious liberty; and to *break the free spirit of this people by depriving them of their civil employment*, and thus forcing the sons of commerce to populate and enrich the wilderness, for the benefit of those whose avarice has contributed largely to the war now desolating the country."

This is the strain and style in which this miserable, this hack-nied, this destructive prejudice has been a hundred thousand times repeated, without even the shadow of foundation. Although these extracts are abundantly sufficient for my purpose, yet I judge it not improper to make a short addition from the address of the Hartford convention.

"Events may prove, that the causes of our calamities are deep and permanent. They may be found to proceed, not merely from the blindness of prejudice, pride of opinion, violence of party spirit, or the confusion of the times: but *they may be traced to implacable combinations of individuals, or states, to monopolise power and office*, **AND TO TRAMPLE WITHOUT REMORSE UPON THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF THE COMMERCIAL SECTIONS OF THE UNION.**

"The administration, after a *long perseverance in plans to baffle every effort of commercial enterprise*, had fatally succeeded in their attempts, at the epoch of the war."

The convention enter into an enumeration of the causes which have led to the public distress, and close the catalogue, with

"Lastly and principally, a visionary and superficial theory in regard to commerce, **ACCOMPANIED BY A REAL HATRED, BUT A FEIGNED REGARD TO ITS INTERESTS**, and a ruinous perseverance in efforts to render it an instrument of coercion and war."

Never since faction first disturbed the peace of mankind, and made this earth a suitable abode for demons incarnate, did she employ a more hollow, fallacious, or unfounded pretext, to justify her lawless proceedings, than is here to be combated. It is not merely untrue. It is the reverse of truth. It has not even the shadow of plausibility.

In all this wretched effort to excite the hostility of fellow citizens against each other—to prepare the inhabitants of one section of the country to imbrue their hands in the blood of those of another—to renew in this holy, this blessed land, the horrors of the French revolution—to enable American Marats, and Dantons, and Legendres, and Robespierres, to rule us with a

rod of iron—an all-important and overwhelming fact is withheld from sight—a fact which destroys the whole of this miserable declamation as completely as ever the broad glare of the torch of truth dispelled the Cimmerian darkness of error and delusion. This mighty fact escaped my attention in all the former editions of this book. It is, that all the measures which are assumed as full proof of hostility to commerce, and charged to the debit of the southern states, have been supported by the powerful commercial states of Pennsylvania and New York ; steadily and un-deviatingly by the former, and by the latter with very few and slight exceptions. And further, that a considerable part of them have been supported by respectable portions of the representatives in congress, from New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island, and even Massachusetts ; for the three first states were, till lately, frequently represented almost wholly by democrats, who very generally advocated the measures herein reprobated. And it is further to be remarked, that the great commercial cities of the union have been very generally represented by citizens who have given their full aid and support to the measures in question. Until lately, the majority for or against the administration, even in Massachusetts, rarely exceeded two or three thousand. The election for governor in that state in 1812, was contested with great ardour. The friends and the enemies of the administration made the utmost exertions to call forth their whole strength—and the votes were, for

Caleb Strong	-	-	-	52,696
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Elbridge Gerry	-	-	-	51,326
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And it is well known that Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Gerry, the democratic candidates, were elected four or five times within a space of ten years, which embraced nearly the whole of the measures thus violently denounced. And I presume, no man of candour will deny, that the struggle between the different candidates, on those occasions, was as fair and unerring a criterion of the voice of the state on the approval or reprobation of the measures of the general government, as if the votes had been taken for president of the United States.

Let us for a moment suppose, for sake of argument, that the eastern states are, as they pretend to be, exclusively commercial—and that the southern are exclusively agricultural. This is placing the case in the most advantageous point of light its friends could desire. Could there be any stronger bond of affinity between two nations, or two sections of the same nation, than the mutual wants which this supposed case implies ? The agricultural portion would have imperious necessity for the ships, the seamen, and the capital of the commercial portion, for the purchase and transportation of her superfluous productions. And the navigation and capital of the commercial portion would

find all the advantages they could require in the transportation and sale of the productions of the other.

The agricultural portion, as I have already stated, would be merely in the situation of colonies to the commercial. What are the grand advantages of colonies to parent countries? Merely to increase their navigation—to afford an asylum for their superabundant population—to furnish raw materials for the employment of their artisans and manufacturers—and to purchase the productions of the labours of those artisans and manufacturers.

All these favourable effects have been produced to an almost incalculable extent on the eastern, by their connexion and intercourse with the western and southern states. It therefore irresistibly follows, I repeat, that the latter have literally been but colonies to the middle, and more particularly to the eastern states. The hardy and enterprising Yankees pervade every bay, river, creek, and inlet of the southern states; and for their *notions* carry off the solid coin of the country to replenish their coffers. They every where undersell and undermine the established southern storekeepers. Moreover, the cotton, the rice, the flour, the tobacco, and the naval stores of the southern states, have enabled the ship-owners of the eastern states to amass those over-grown nabob fortunes, which render them too aspiring to submit to the equal form of government which we enjoy. They have literally lived upon the industry of the southern states. Without the latter, their section of the union would rank very low indeed in the scale of nations.

This state of things, so eminently advantageous to the eastern states, has never created faction, or complaint, or convulsions, or threats of dissolving the union, in the southern. They have cheerfully supported a government whose chief attention has been directed to the promotion of commerce—and which never did and never would have experienced any great difficulty with foreign nations but from the effort to protect the mercantile interests against the depredations of those nations.

It requires little effort to prove, and little capacity to perceive, that there is and ever will be a commercial rivalry between Boston and Providence—between Philadelphia and New York—between Baltimore and Philadelphia. But that a serious, thinking people, like those of the eastern states, should have ever been duped to believe that there is any real cause of jealousy or hostility between the commercial and agricultural sections of the country, is a folly, of which it is hardly possible to find a parallel in the history of the madness and idiocy of the human species.

To view the subject once more—although it really does not deserve further attention. Suppose, still, the southern states

wholly agricultural, and the middle and eastern wholly commercial, and that the former have an overwhelming majority in the legislature of the union. How could it ever enter into the mind of any rational being to imagine, that the majority could for a moment be ignorant of the plain truth, that every stroke aimed at commerce was a stroke at their own vital interests?

It is well known, that the representatives of the southern and western states are generally gentlemen of the highest grade of talents in congress. From causes which it is neither necessary nor proper here to detail, the middle states have rarely made as respectable a figure in that body as could have been wished. The eastern have not been quite so unfortunate. It requires, however, but a moderate portion of candour to acknowledge, that although they are occasionally represented in congress, by men of considerable talents, they are in the aggregate far below Virginia, South Carolina, Kentucky, &c. And could this plain truth escape the Eppeses, the Gileses, the Clays, and the Popes, that it was impossible to injure commerce without inflicting an equal injury on agriculture?

The agricultural portion of this great nation could infinitely better dispense with the commercial, than the latter with the former. Never, since commerce first began, did a nation, having bulky raw materials to sell, and having demands for large quantities of merchandise, find any difficulty in creating a marine, or, amidst naval competitors for her trade, in securing the transportation of her commodities, and the purchase of merchandise, on fair and advantageous terms. But the decay of Portugal, Venice, Genoa, the Hanse Towns, and other great commercial states, proves, that a nation possessed of a considerable marine, but labouring under great natural disadvantages, may, if it affront or offend the nations on which it depends, be reduced to its native and intrinsic insignificance.

The disadvantages of the eastern states are very considerable. The sterility of the soil will leave them eternally dependent upon the southern states; for their situation imperiously forces them to have recourse to manufactures and commerce. Their agriculture must always be comparatively insignificant. They therefore, I repeat, owe their greatness principally to their immensely valuable trade with those states, which their ungrateful writers and demagogues are constantly vilifying and abusing, and which afford the principal pabulum for the commerce of the middle and eastern states. Those demagogues are, as I have stated, unceasingly exciting animosities between the two sections of the union, by pretending a rivalry of interest, which is wholly unfounded. There is, let me repeat, real cause of jealousy between Rhode Island and Massachusetts: but none between either of them and Virginia or South Carolina. The latter are, and will forever continue, great agricultural

states. Their immense and increasing productions will find the most valuable employment for the shipping and for the manufactures of the eastern and middle states.

Should a separation take place, which I hope and trust in the goodness of Heaven is far remote, the eastern states will repent it first and last. They will have reason eternally to detest the unhallowed councils of those restless demagogues, who shall have plunged them into the abyss of ruin. Their hardy sons, who now migrate to the southward and westward by hundreds, will abandon their native soil by thousands—and daily add strength to the rival section of the nation, and equally enfeeble the parent states. The latter will dwindle into the insignificance from which they have been elevated by the tribute they have levied upon Virginia and her southern sisters.

The horrors of an immediate civil war, and of a constant border war, *such as formerly existed between England and Scotland*, are the only considerations that render *a separation from Massachusetts a measure to be at all deprecated*. Were we insured from these two evils, a separation would be an advantage to the rest of the union; for she has harassed the national councils to a most intolerable and shameful degree.

She has appeared determined, *if she could not rule the country herself, to send it to destruction headlong*. She has been for years the source of most of the difficulties of the union. We should not have had war but for her.* And among the features of the present crisis, the most lamentable one is, that she cannot suffer the consequences of her folly, her arrogance, her restlessness, her faction, her jacobinism, her anti-Washingtonism, without inflicting an equal degree of misfortune on her innocent neighbours. Could she suffer alone, it were "*a consummation most devoutly to be wished*." A strong navigation act, and discriminating duties, would soon bring her to her senses, and convince her of the immeasurable folly and madness she has been guilty of. They would sink her to her proper level—that level, which her ungrateful soil—her insignificance in point of population—and the narrow limits of her territory, prescribe—and which, I repeat, nothing but the advantages she has derived from her persecuted, insulted, outraged, and defamed sister states, could have enabled her to pass. She would repent of her infatuation, and most anxiously seek to be restored to a confederacy, on the major part of which she had unceasingly levied heavy contributions, and to which she owed all that

* This assertion has been cavilled at by a Boston writer, but not refuted. Boston, by her jacobinical and seditious opposition to the peaceable measures adopted to obtain from England that redress for which she herself had so loudly insisted on the interference of government; and by her excitement of a similar opposition throughout the eastern states generally, defeated those measures, and encouraged England to proceed in her outrages; which finally led to war.

prosperity, that wealth, and that consequence, which had rendered her dizzy, inflated her with pride and arrogance, and brought on her downfall.

CHAPTER LII.

Money the sinews of war. Associations to prevent the success of the Loans. Efforts to bankrupt the Government.

MONEY has long been proverbially styled the sinews of war. It is no misnomer. Soldiers cannot be raised—nor put in motion—nor arrayed in the field of battle, without money to clothe and feed them. A government at war, and destitute of funds or credit, must succumb to its adversary—bend the neck to the yoke—make humble submission—and receive the law from the conqueror. To these truths history bears ample and uniform testimony.

Under these impressions, shortly after the declaration of war, there was a combination formed to prevent the success of the government loans. A great majority of those who entered into this scheme resided in the eastern states, particularly in Boston, which was the grand focus of the conspiracy.

For every measure, however atrocious, a plausible plea is always found to palliate or justify its enormity. This high-handed conspiracy to destroy the credit of the government of their country, which originated among the “moral and religious people” of Boston, was predicated upon two positions :

First, that England was, and had always been, willing to make a treaty with us on fair and honourable terms ; and that, so great was her magnanimity, she would take no advantage of any embarrassments or difficulties which might arise from the destruction of the public credit.

Secondly, that our administration was so obstinately determined to continue the war, that it would make no peace while possessed of the means of carrying on hostilities.

A corollary from these positions was, that if the conspirators prevented the success of the loans, and deprived the government of the means of prosecuting the war, we should in consequence have peace.*

These extravagant positions must excite the amazement of any calm observer. “ But as soon as he should be acquainted

* This paragraph was written in September, 1814. The result of the negotiations at Ghent fully established the folly as well as wickedness of these proceedings. The public mind has been since very considerably undeceived on these points. I have heard gentlemen rejoice at the success of the illustrious hero, Jackson, at New-Orleans, as leading to peace, who, one or two years since, were so miserably deluded as to believe that the road to a cessation of war lay through the defeat, disgrace, and disasters of the arms of their native country !

“with the nature and existence of prejudice, passion, obstinacy, wilfulness, wickedness, and, above all, with the character and influence of party spirit, the mystery would vanish at once: for he would then see that these, and not reason, decide. *Reason asks for facts and arguments. Prejudice, passion, and the rest, ask for names, sound, noise, and fury. By those they are impelled—by these they decide.*”*

Our government had given four strong and irresistible proofs of a disposition to conclude the war, which carried conviction to every candid mind.

First, on the 27th of June, 1812, it had offered the British government an armistice on the simple and reasonable conditions of suspending, during the negotiation, the outrageous injury of impressment, and surrendering the American seamen previously impressed. *The suspension of impressment at that period could not have occasioned Great Britain any possible disadvantage;* for, having nearly annihilated all the rival navies of Europe, her stock of sailors could not require to be replenished by impressment from our vessels. And, as she had at all times *professed* a willingness to surrender our seamen, there could have been no difficulty on the second point. She ought, therefore, to have met our amicable overtures with frankness. If she were fighting for her existence, as has been said a thousand times; and if it were jeopardized by our hostility; it was the quintessence of madness and folly, not to have withdrawn us from the number of her enemies, when she could have effected that grand object on such easy terms, without impairing her credit or character.

Secondly, It had promptly accepted the Russian mediation for the termination of hostilities.

Thirdly, To remove all difficulty on the important subject of impressment, congress passed an act on the 3d of March, 1813, making such provisions, to commence from the close of the war, as to secure Great Britain against the seduction or employment of her seamen on board our vessels, public or private.†

Fourthly, and most particularly, in the appointment of three ministers to negotiate, Mr. Bayard, a decided federalist, was chosen—a gentleman of high standing with his own party—of considerable talents—and strenuously opposed to the administration. This affords a full proof of the fairness and candour of our government.

In the appointment of ministers in England, or elsewhere, I believe no similar instance has occurred, of the choice of a per-

* The Examiner, by Barent Gardenier, vol. i. p. 57.

† Among the members who voted against this bill were Messrs. Josiah Quincy and John Randolph. Their motives must have been very extraordinary. It is hardly possible to fathom them.

son hostile to the administration who appointed him. It was a very great effort to remove suspicion and jealousy from the public mind: Nothing but the incurable folly and madness engendered by faction, could possibly resist the fair inference warranted by this appointment. But it was wholly unavailing. Faction is now, ever has been, and ever will be, deaf, and dumb, and blind, to reason and common sense.

These four facts notwithstanding, the persuasion was general among the "*Peace Party*," that the government was averse to terminating the war. The talents of the federalists in the eastern states and elsewhere, were put in requisition to impress this idea on the public mind. The most unceasing efforts were employed on this subject. The leaders of the party affected to be, and the others were, inflexible in the opinion.

In consequence, every possible exertion was made, particularly in Boston, to deter the citizens from subscribing to the loans, in order to disable the government from carrying on the war, and of course to compel it to make peace. Associations were entered into in the most solemn and public manner for this purpose. And those who could not be induced by mild means, were deterred by denunciations. A folio volume might be filled with the lucubrations that appeared on this subject.

The pulpit, as usual in Boston, afforded its utmost aid to the press, to insure success. Those who subscribed, were in direct terms declared participators in, and accessaries to, all the "*murders*," as they were termed, that might take place in the "*unholy, unrighteous, wicked, abominable, and accursed war!*"*

To enable us to judge of the wickedness and folly of these proceedings, let us examine what would have been the consequence of complete success. No diminution of the guilt of any act arises from its failure to produce its usual and intended effect.—The man who fires a pistol with intent to kill, is, in the eye of Heaven, as clearly a murderer, as he whose ball passes through the brains of his victim.

Had complete success crowned the efforts of the conspirators, these awful consequences would have taken place :

First, a national bankruptcy.† The public creditors, and those who depended on them, would have been ruined.

* See chapter LVI.

† After the above was written, this consequence was produced to a certain extent by this conspiracy. Its injurious effects on the credit of the country may be seen by an examination of the following *Boston Price current*, extracted

From the *United States Gazette*, February 7, 1815.

	BELOW	PAR.
All the banks in New York state, Hudson and Orange excepted,	19 and 20	p. c.
Hudson bank,	-	20
Orange bank,	-	24
Philadelphia city banks,	-	24
Baltimore banks,	-	30
Treasury notes,	24	& 25
United States six per cents,	-	40

Secondly, with the downfall of the public stocks, would have fallen the stocks of banks, insurance-companies,* &c.

Thirdly, private bankruptcy would have followed to an enormous extent: and wide-spread ruin would have pervaded the nation.†

Fourthly, the national armies must have been disbanded, and the frontiers exposed to the desolating effects of the hatchet and tomahawk. The aged matron—the chaste and tender wife—the blooming maiden—the decrepid grandsire—the manly father—and the helpless infant—all would have been involved in one wide, impartial, and undistinguishing destruction!

Fifthly, our seaport towns would have been exposed to the mercy of Pakenhams, and Cockburns, and Gordons. They would have been *beautied-and-bootied*, and have shared the fate of Alexandria, of Hampton, of Havre-de-Grace, and Frenchtown.

And sixthly, to close the awful catalogue, our government would have been laid at the mercy of Great Britain:—and, deprived of the means of resistance, must have submitted to whatever ignominious terms she might choose to impose.‡

These were the results that must have taken place, had complete success crowned the horrible project. Never was more unholy purpose attempted.

It is highly probable that many of the persons engaged in this conspiracy did not contemplate such extensive results. They may have looked no farther forward than to the restoration of peace. But the leaders in the scheme were too keen, too shrewd, too profound, and too hostile to the government of their country, to allow us to extend to them the same degree of charity. Their minds must have grasped all the stupendous and awful consequences; and they had reconciled themselves to the wide-spread devastation.

The success in the eastern states was considerable. Few men have the courage to stem the tide of popular delusion when it sets in very strong. There were some, however, who subscribed openly, in defiance of denunciations and threats. Others of less firm texture, loaned their money by stealth, and as clandestinely as if it were treasonable. What, alas! must be the awful state of society, when a free citizen is afraid of lending his money publicly, to support the government that protects him—the mildest government ever vouchsafed by Heaven to man—

* This consequence took place to a most alarming degree. See the preceding note.

† Strong traces of the pernicious effects of this conspiracy appear throughout the union. Some of the conspirators fell unlamented victims of their own machinations.

‡ The recent subjugation of France holds out a most solemn and horror-inspiring lesson, on the effects of internal divisions.

whose mildness enabled its enemies to jeopardize its very existence! Who, that has a soul to feel—who, that has a spark of patriotism or public spirit in his frame, but must be fired with a holy indignation at such a hideous, such a horrible state of the public mind!!!!!!

“Money is such a drug (the surest sign of the *former* prosperity, and *present* insecurity of trade) that men against their consciences, their honour, their duty, *their professions and PROMISES*; are willing to lend it *secretly*; to support the very measures which are both *intended* and calculated for their ruin.”

This paragraph, the production of John Lowell, establishes the existence of a combination to prevent the success of the loans, who had “*promised*” each other, or pledged themselves, not to subscribe—but, to avoid the reproaches and persecution of their associates, did it “*secretly*.” This conclusion irresistibly follows. These “*promises not to lend their money*,” must refer to the combination I have stated. It can have no other meaning. And the fair construction of their lending “*secretly*” can be no other than that they were liable to disgrace with, or persecution from, their party, if they were known to lend.

Of the species of denunciations held out to deter from subscriptions, some idea may be formed from the following paragraphs, taken from various Boston papers.

“*Let no man who wishes to continue the war by active means, by vote or lending money, DARE TO PROSTRATE HIMSELF AT THE ALTAR ON THE FAST DAY; for they are actually as much partakers in the war, as the soldier who thrusts his bayonet; and the JUDGMENT OF GOD WILL AWAIT THEM.*”

Money lent by federalists.

“Will federalists subscribe to the loan? will they lend money to our national rulers? it is impossible. First, because of the principle; and secondly, because of principal and interest. If they lend money now, they make themselves parties to the violation of the constitution, the cruelly oppressive measures in relation to commerce, and to all the crimes which have occurred in the field and in the cabinet. To what purpose have federalists exerted themselves to show the wickedness of this war, to rouse the public sentiment against it, and to show the authors of it not only to be unworthy of public confidence, but highly criminal, if now they contribute the sums of money, without which, these rulers must be *compelled to stop; must be compelled to return to the policy* and measures under which this country once was at peace, and in singular prosperity.

“By the magnanimous course pointed out by governor Strong, that is, by withholding all voluntary aid in prosecuting the war, and manfully expressing our opinion as to its injustice and ruinous tendency, we have arrested its progress; and *driven back its authors to abandon their nefarious schemes, and to look anxiously for peace.* What then, if we now lend them money? *They will not make peace; they will still hanker for Canada; they will still assemble forces, and shed blood on our western frontier. Mere pride, if nothing else, would make them do it. The motives which first brought on the war, will still continue it, if money can be had. But some say; will you let the country become bankrupt! no, the country will never become bankrupt. BUT PRAY DO NOT PREVENT THE ABUSERS OF THEIR BECOMING BANKRUPT!!!* Do not prevent them

* Language is powerless to express the contempt and disgust this miserable sophistry must excite in every correct mind. What a desperate plunge into

from becoming odious to the public, and replaced by better men. *Any federalist who lends money to government, must go and shake hands with James Madison, and claim fellowship with Felix Grundy. Let him no more call himself federalist and friend to his country!!! HE WILL BE CALLED BY OTHERS, INFAMOUS!!!!*

"But, secondly, federalists will not lend money, because *they will never get it again.* How, where, and when, are the government to get money to pay interest? And *who can tell whether future rulers may think the debt contracted under such circumstances, and by men who lend money to help out measures which they have loudly and constantly condemned, ought to be paid!* On the whole, then, there are two very strong reasons why federalists will not lend money; first, because it would be a base abandonment of political and moral principles; and secondly, because it is pretty certain they will never be paid again." Boston Gazette, April 14, 1814.

"Our merchants constitute an honourable, high-minded, independent, and intelligent class of citizens. They feel the oppression, injury, and mockery, with which they are treated by their government. They will lend them money to retrace their steps; but none to persevere in their present course. *Let every highwayman find his own pistols!!!*" Boston Gazette.

"We have only room this evening to say that we trust no true friend to his country will be found among the subscribers to the Gallatin loan." New York Evening Post.

"No peace will ever be made, till the people say there shall be no war. If the rich men continue to furnish money, *war will continue till the mountains are melted with blood; till every field in America is white with the bones of the people.*" Discourse delivered at Byfield, the seventh of April, 1814. By Elijah Parish, D. D.

"If this war is to be supported by loans, paper stock will breed as fast and faster than merinos. The fleeces, if your pastures are good, will yield the interest; but for your interest of paper stock, you must yield a fleece of loans annually from your own pockets. The admiral and the purser have informed the crew, that they have but few shot in the locker; they must be replenished, or the war laurels must wither. In our old war, when private men were public creditors, and became somewhat impatient of public delay, the administration would promise them one new dollar for two hundred old ones, and try their patience again. *My brother farmers, if you have money to let, let it lie. If the war continues, you will purchase your stock at four years old, cheaper than you can raise it; so unjust is this offensive war, in which our rulers have plunged us, in the sober consideration of millions, that they cannot conscientiously approach the God of armies for his blessing upon it.*" Boston Centinel, January 13, 1813.

"It is very grateful to find that the universal sentiment is, that **ANY MAN WHO LENDS HIS MONEY TO THE GOVERNMENT, AT THE PRESENT TIME, WILL FORFEIT ALL CLAIM TO COMMON HONESTY AND COMMON COURTESY AMONG ALL TRUE FRIENDS TO THE COUNTRY!!!!** God forbid that any federalist should ever hold up his hand to pay federalists for money lent to the present rulers; and federalists can judge whether democrats will tax their constituents to pay interest to federalists." Boston Gazette, April 14, 1814.

At these awful monuments of the horrible effects of that direst of human ills, remorseless faction, it is impossible to avoid heaving a deep and heartfelt sigh! Every effort is employed to prevent a peaceful nation, goaded to war by a succession of outrage, injustice, and depredation of the most flagitious, aggravating, and humiliating kind, from availing herself of her re-

the bathos of political error and folly a writer must make, to assert—and how deplorably stupid and deluded must his readers be, to believe—that a government can be a bankrupt, and the nation not partake in the bankruptcy!

sources to defend herself from an infuriate foe ! Those who aid the government which protects them from the ravages of that foe, are declared to be "INFAMOUS," and to have "FORFEITED ALL CLAIM TO COMMON HONESTY !" Tell it not in Gath—publish it not in Askalon !

The following advertisements contain volumes. They evince, beyond the power of doubt or denial, the frightful state to which a few factious, violent men, by their treasonable practices, had reduced the town of Boston, when those who were disposed to support their own government, were obliged to do it as clandestinely as if they were engaged in some dangerous conspiracy.

*From the Boston Chronicle, April 14, 1814.
The new loan.*

"From the advice of several respected friends, we are induced to announce to the public, that subscriptions to the *new loan* will be received by us as agents until the twenty-fifth instant from individuals, or incorporated bodies, in sums of five hundred dollars and upwards. The subscriptions to conform to the regulations announced by the secretary of the treasury, dated the fourth of April. Payments may be made in Boston money, or in any other of the United States, the subscribers paying the customary rate of discount. Applications will be received from any persons who wish to receive their interest in Boston, by letters post paid, or by written applications from individuals in Boston: AND THE NAMES OF ALL SUBSCRIBERS SHALL BE KNOWN ONLY TO THE UNDERSIGNED. According to the proposals of the secretary of the treasury (for more particulars see his advertisement) each applicant must name the highest rate he will give : and if the loan is granted lower than his proposal, it will of course be for his benefit ; but on the other hand, if higher, he will lose the benefit of being a subscriber. The certificates, and all the business relating to it, will be delivered free of charge.

GILBERT & DEAN, Brokers.

"*Exchange Coffee House, Boston, April 12.*"

*From the Boston Gazette, April 14, 1814.
THE LOAN.*

"Subscriptions will be received through the agency of the subscriber till the twenty-fifth instant inclusive.

"To avoid the *inconveniences of personal appearance to subscribe*, applications in writing will be received from any part of the state. Each applicant will name the highest rate he will give, and if the loan shall be granted lower than his proposal, he shall reap the benefit : but if higher than his offer, he will have no share in it. The amount, rate, and NAME OF ANY APPLICANT SHALL, AT HIS REQUEST, BE KNOWN ONLY TO THE SUBSCRIBER. All the business shall be transacted, and certificates delivered to the subscribers without expense."

JESSE PUTNAM.

On the above advertisements, and others of a similar character, the following comments were published in the Boston Gazette :—

"*How degraded must our government be, even in their own eyes, when they resort to such tricks to obtain money, which a common Jew broker would be ashamed of ! They must be well acquainted with the fabric of the men who are to loan them money, when they offer, that if they will have the goodness to do it, their names shall not be exposed to the world. They know right well, that the cause is so sneaking and vile, that nobody would be seen in the broad day light to lend them money. However, it is consistent with the system of deception and double dealing which they have always practised.*

"Capitalists may be induced to subscribe to the loan, because it will tend to shorten the war. But what pledge have they, when they have poured all their cash into the lap of government, that the war will end ?

"No one doubts of their rancour and ill-will towards England ; that they are willing to fight her as long as they can get money. Well then, if they can gull the rich men, and get as many loans as they ask for, *will they not fight till that is gone ?* yea, and until they can negotiate new loans upon the same terms ?

"Perhaps monied men may be bribed by the high interest that is offered. *But if they withhold their aid, and so force the government into a peace, will not their capital be better employed, if engaged in trade ? will they not have better security for its payment, and at their command when they ask for it ?*

"On the whole, we think it no way to get out of the war, *to give money to the government, when the very thing that prevents them from carrying it on, is the want of money.*" Boston Gazette, April 14, 1814.

After having intimidated the citizens from lending their money publicly, by the most inflammatory, seditious, and threatening publications, of which the preceding extracts afford a slight specimen, these writers revile and abuse the government, because *those who wish to lend, are invited by the brokers to do it secretly !* what transcendent wickedness and injustice !

Numberless similar paragraphs and essays were written with a view to dissuade and intimidate monied men from subscribing to the loans. Canting hypocrites, who were violating the fundamental laws of society, encouraging "smuggling," and "perjury,"—"acquiring ill-gotten wealth at the expense of public morals"—and endeavouring, though a small minority, to trample down the majority, had the wickedness to invoke "*the judgment of God,*" upon the supporters of a lawful and mild government !

In the middle states, the federalists did not enter into the project, or to a very limited extent. Many of them were subscribers—some on a very liberal scale. And thus the loans, in spite of the press, and the pulpit, and the efforts of the conspirators, succeeded, to their infinite mortification. New means were brought into operation, which were temporarily crowned with fatal success.

CHAPTER LIII.

Smuggling carried to a great excess in Boston. Specie abundant there. Oppressive drafts on New York. Arrangements between persons in Canada and in Boston.

How strong soever may be the general sense of the infamy of smuggling, it has always prevailed ; and never will be wholly suppressed, while it affords such great advantages, and while there are men to be found who worship gain as their God. It is not therefore surprising, that the non-importation, the embargo, &c. having been denounced as oppressive, unjust, and unconstitutional—and the war as wicked, unprovoked, and corrupt, smuggling should be carried on to a most prodigious extent, especially as the public papers in Boston repeatedly in

vited and urged the citizens to set the restrictive system at defiance. These circumstances conspired to supply that town with smuggled goods on a very large scale.

Of the extent to which smuggling, and fraud, and perjury have been carried in Boston, some idea may be formed from the following "precious confession," written by John Lowell. It describes a depraved state of society not exceeded in the most corrupt countries in Europe.

"Encouraged and protected from infamy by the just odium against the war, they engage in lawless speculations; sneer at the restraints of conscience; laugh at perjury; mock at legal restraints; and acquire an ill-gotten wealth at the expense of public morals, and of the more sober, conscientious part of the community."†*

It was worthy of the most serious reflection of the honourable and public-spirited federalists of the middle and southern states, how far they could, without disgrace and dishonour, "*follow the lead*" of a town where such a state of things existed—where "perjury" was a subject of "laughter"—where "*public morals*" were sacrificed to the acquisition of "*ill-gotten wealth*"—and where "*the restraints of conscience were sneered at.*"—What an awful consideration it is, that such a description of citizens should have had it in their power materially to affect the destinies of eight millions of people and their posterity! for it is a most frightful truth, that all the violent, lawless, jacobinical, and wicked measures, which nearly drove the country to perdition, had their origin in Boston, where "perjury and smuggling" were the roads to fortune—and where "conscience afforded no restraint."‡

Mr. Lowell, after drawing this frightful picture, endeavours to make the administration answerable for the whole, to "a just

* Road to Ruin, No. 6.

† Mr. Lowell denies that the above portrait was drawn for Boston. He says "the remarks were intended to apply to other states than Massachusetts;" but he does not specify which are the states. I have reconsidered the subject, and am not disposed to admit his defence. The depravation of morals, he described, was, he says, the result of "*smuggling*:" and this was protected from infamy by "the just odium against the war." Now it is well known that there was no part of the United States where smuggling was carried on so largely and so barefacedly as in Boston; and none where so much pains were taken to excite the public passions against the war, or with so much success. It is therefore not in Mr. Lowell's power to remove the fairness of the application.

‡ I wish here to avoid being misunderstood. The statement respecting Boston is to be received with due qualifications. I have numerous and most estimable acquaintances in Boston; equal in point of honour and integrity to any citizens in the United States. And such I consider the mass of the inhabitants. But in times of factious violence, the worst men always rise uppermost; gain the ascendancy; give the tone to public measures; and establish an arbitrary sway. And men who "laugh at perjury," and "sneer at the restraints of conscience," are precisely those who in such times of frenzy tyrannise over their fellow-citizens, and bear down or force with them the dispassionate and well-intentioned. At all events, the picture of Boston is not mine. If it be incorrect, I am not answerable. Let Mr. Lowell and his friends settle the account between them.

God," who "*knows how to trace the causes of human events.*" This is most sorry and contemptible canting. It can deceive no man beyond the rank of an idiot. This hideous derangement of morals was solely the production of faction, which consecrates every means, however wicked, to answer its vile purposes.

"Administration hirelings may revile the northern states, and the merchants generally, for this monstrous depravation of morals, this execrable course of smuggling and fraud. But there is a just God, who knows how to trace the causes of human events; and he will assuredly visit upon the authors of this war, all the iniquities of which it has been the occasion. If the guilty deserve our scorn or our pity, the tempters and seducers deserve our execration."*

It is very just and true, that the guilty deserve our scorn, and that the seducers merit execration. But who, let me ask, were the seducers? those, indubitably, who for so many years had been employed, by every means, however base and vile, in exciting the people to forcible opposition to the rulers of their choice—who had, in the public papers, openly invited those, who needed no such invitation, to violate laws fairly and constitutionally enacted, which they denounced as oppressive and "*unconstitutional.*" These were "*the seducers.*" These were the men on whom heaven in its righteous decrees, must "*visit all the iniquities,*" to which their ambition, their turbulence, and their factious spirit had given occasion.

Many valuable British prizes were sent into Boston, which greatly added to the stock of goods introduced there by smuggling. The middle and southern states, which refrained from this pestiferous practice, derived nearly all their supplies of foreign merchandise from that town. This course of events filled the vaults of the banks in Boston with incomparably more specie than they ever held before—and raised very heavy balances against the banks in New York. The Philadelphia banks were indebted to New York; those in Baltimore to Philadelphia; and so on to the southward.

It may not be unamusing to the reader to explain this process a little more in detail. New York purchased goods largely in Boston, partly for bank notes and partly on credit. For the latter portion, promissory notes were given, which were transmitted from Boston to the New York banks for collection. Very large purchases were likewise made in Boston by citizens of Philadelphia, Baltimore, Richmond, Petersburg, &c. Payments were made in bank notes of the middle and southern states, and in promissory notes. Both were sent on to New York; the first for transmission to the banks whence they were issued—and the second for collection.

This state of things suggested the detestable idea, at which the reader will stand aghast, of wielding the financial advan-

tages then enjoyed in Boston, to produce the effect which the press and pulpit had failed to accomplish—that is, *to stop the wheels of government by draining the banks in the middle and southern states of their specie, and thus producing an utter disability to fill the loans!!!* This scheme was projected in the winter of 1813-14,—and immediate arrangements were made to carry it into execution. It richly earned for the projectors the maledictions of the widows, and orphans, and other persons on whom it entailed so much distress and ruin.

Accordingly, the New York, Philadelphia, and southern bank notes held by the Boston banks, were transmitted with demands for their amount in specie—and drafts were likewise drawn on the New York banks for the balances on the face of the books, to enormous amounts. I am credibly informed that the sum thus drawn was seven or eight millions* of dollars from the time of commencing these operations till the 31st of August, 1814, when specie payments were suspended—a space of about eight months. To relieve themselves from this pressure, the New York banks drew as largely as the state of the accounts would admit, on those in Philadelphia—the latter on those in Baltimore—and those in the latter city on Washington, Alexandria, Richmond, &c.

A fearful alarm spread through the community. The issue was looked for with terror. Wagons were loading with specie at the doors of our banks almost every week. There have been three at one time loading in Philadelphia. The banks throughout the middle and southern states were obliged to curtail their discounts. Bankruptcies took place to a considerable extent.—Even wealthy men, who were wholly unprepared for such a crisis, suffered great inconvenience. Some who had subscribed to the loans, were unable to comply with their engagements: and others were withheld from subscribing, by the general pressure for money. In consequence, the loan, then pending, partially failed, to the very great embarrassment of the government and distress of the public. *This was the nefarious object in view.*

I have before me “A true abstract of the statements of the several bank corporations of Massachusetts, rendered January, 1814,” and published by the secretary of that commonwealth, from which I extract the amount of specie in their vaults, and of their notes in circulation.

* When I wrote this passage, I greatly underrated the amount thus withdrawn from the middle and southern states, which I estimated at only four millions of dollars. Subsequent inquiries have satisfied me that it was probably double that amount. The banks from New York to Norfolk inclusively, as well as most of those to the westward, were literally drained of their specie, and nearly reduced to bankruptcy. Two millions of dollars and more, have frequently been exported from Philadelphia alone for the East Indies in one season, without producing any sensible effect.

Jan. 1814.	<i>Specie.</i>	<i>Notes in circulation.</i>
Massachusetts Bank,	\$2,114,164	\$682,708
Union,	657,795	233,225
Boston,	1,182,572	369,903
State,	659,066	509,000
New England,	284,456	161,170
Mechanics,	47,391	44,595
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	4,945,444	2,000,601

Of course there could not be the least pretext of want of specie, to answer the utmost demand that could be reasonably calculated on. They possessed, for every hundred dollars of their notes in circulation, nearly 250 dollars in specie—a state of things probably unparalleled in the history of banking, from the days of the Lombards to the present time.

No man can pretend, that with the above enormous amount of specie, and the moderate amount of notes in circulation, these banks would have deemed it either advisable or necessary to make such very unusual and immoderate drafts, particularly at the season of the year when this project was commenced, unless there was some extraordinary object to be accomplished.

Notwithstanding the enormous sums of specie drawn into the town of Boston, from New York, Philadelphia, &c. so great was the drain to Canada and Nova Scotia, to pay for government bills and for smuggled goods, that but a very moderate sum remained in the banks there at the beginning of the year 1815.—I annex a statement of the amount in the vaults of the different banks, at two periods, subsequent to the preceding date, from which an idea may be formed of the pernicious extent to which these proceedings were carried.

	<i>July 1st, 1814.</i>	<i>Jan. 1st, 1815.</i>
Massachusetts Bank,	\$1,959,405	\$763,682
Union,	639,789	202,786
Boston,	1,270,731	691,729
State,	1,114,421	88,339
New England,	484,258	252,832
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	\$5,468,604	\$1,999,368

Thus, it appears, that in six months the amount of specie had been reduced the enormous sum of nearly three millions and a half of dollars, notwithstanding the continual supplies from New York for the months of July and August.

Attempts have been made to justify the extravagant drafts above stated, as merely the result of the balance of trade in favor of Boston. It has been asserted that it was no more than right and proper for the banks of that town to require the balan-

ces due them; and that the case daily occurs, of banks drawing on each other in a similar mode, when balances accrue.

These palliatives will not stand the test of sober examination. A large portion of the heaviest drafts, indeed those that first excited alarm, were made during the winter, when the freight was 20, 25, or 30 per cent. higher, in consequence of the wretched state of the roads, than it would have been, had they waited a few weeks. This is a conclusive circumstance, taken in conjunction with the fact, that there was a superabundance of specie in the Boston Banks, and likewise with the laborious, and unceasing, and profligate efforts that had been so long made, to destroy the public credit.

It is well known to every person in the slightest degree acquainted with banking, that when two banks in different cities carry on a large intercourse with each other, balances will arise in favour of one and against the other, often to a very large amount; which balances remain unclaimed, sometimes for months together, unless the specie be actually wanted. The banks do not choose unnecessarily to incur the expence of transportation—and wait in expectation of the balance being reduced by the regular operations of trade. I am safe in saying that at least two millions of dollars are constantly thus circumstanced, between New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, and Richmond. New York occasionally owes largely to Philadelphia—Philadelphia at other times to New York—and so of banks in other places.

To render the stroke at public credit more unerring—and to place the result wholly out of the reach of contingency, *there were arrangements made with agents of the government of Lower Canada, whereby an immense amount of British government bills,* drawn in Quebec, were transmitted for sale to New*

* These bills were openly advertised for sale in the Boston papers. I annex an advertisement taken

From the Boston Daily Advertiser, December 16, 1814.

" 1 Bill for	-	-	-	-	800l	} British government bills for sale, by CHARLES W. GREEN. No. 14, India wharf."
" 1 ditto	-	-	-	-	250l	
" 1 ditto	-	-	-	-	203l	

1,253l

Let the reader, after having considered the above ostentatious mode of managing the intercourse with the enemy, compare the spirit which dictated it with that of the revolutionary war, as displayed in the following resolutions and ordinances extracted from the journals of congress.

June 2, 1775. "Resolved that no bill of exchange, draft, or order, of any officer in the army or navy, their agents or contractors, be received or negotiated, or any money be supplied to them by any person in America. *Journals of congress, Vol. 1, 105.*

March 27, 1781. "It is hereby ordained that the citizens and inhabitants of these United States be, and they are strictly enjoined and required to abstain from all intercourse, correspondence, or dealings whatsoever with the subjects of the king of Great Britain, while at open war with these United States, *as they shall answer the same at their peril.* And the executives of the several states

York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore, and disposed of to monied men, on such advantageous terms as induced them to make large purchases. And thus was absorbed a very large portion of the capital of these three cities.

These bills were forwarded through the agency of trusty persons in Boston; and the proceeds being placed to their credit, added immensely to the command the Boston banks had acquired, by the extent of the smuggling trade, over those in the middle and southern states.

Let us here make a solemn pause. Let us strip these facts of the thin veil thrown over them. Let us consider them in all their nakedness, in all their deformity.

My heart sickens at the investigation. I turn with disgust, with horror, with affright. Boston, the cradle of the revolution, which claims so high a degree of pre-eminence for her "morality and religion," after having failed in her endeavours to prevent the success of the loans, draws away the specie from the middle and southern states, in order *to bankrupt the government*, regardless of the universal ruin with which it threatened indiscriminately, friends of war—friends of peace—federalists—democrats—young and old—men, women, and children! And, *to add a deeper dye to the transaction, the specie is transmitted to Canada, and enables the enemy to dispatch his red allies to swim in blood on the defenceless frontiers of their own country!** this is

are hereby called upon to take the most vigilant and effectual measures for detecting such intercourse, correspondence, or dealings, and *bringing the authors thereof, or those concerned therein, to condign punishment.*" *Idem*, Vol. VII. page 60.

"June 21, 1782. Whereas some of the inhabitants of the United States, prompted either by a sordid attachment to gain, or by a secret conspiracy with the enemies of their country, are wickedly engaged in carrying on an illicit traffic with their enemies, whereby *a market is provided for British merchandizes*, **THE CIRCULATING SPECIE IS EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES**, the payment of taxes rendered more difficult and burdensome to the people at large, and great discouragement occasioned to honest and lawful commerce :

"Resolved, that it be and hereby is recommended to the legislatures of the several states, to adopt the most efficacious measures for suppressing *all traffic and illicit intercourse between their respective citizens and the enemy.*

"Resolved, that the legislatures, or, in their recess, the executives of the several states, be earnestly requested to impress, by every means in their power, on their respective citizens at large, the baneful consequences apprehended by congress, from **A CONTINUANCE OF THIS ILLICIT AND INFAMOUS TRAFFIC**, and the necessity of their co-operating with the public measures by such united, patriotic, and vigilant exertions, as will detect and *bring to legal punishment those who shall in any manner have been concerned therein.*" *Idem*, page 301.

* Mr. Lowell has attempted to deny the existence of this arrangement. But it stands on too strong ground to admit of being disproved. That these bills, to an immoderate amount, were transmitted from Quebec; that they were drawn for the support of the armies employed in hostilities against this country; and that they were paid for in specie, devoted to the support of those armies; are facts too stubborn to be set aside. I hereby publicly dare him or any other person in the union to disprove any of them. They are abundantly sufficient to establish the iniquity of the case.

the work of faction, the heaviest scourge that ever issued from Pandora's box !

The consequences of these vile operations were long severely felt. Many estimable individuals were absolutely ruined. Bank paper became an object of brokerage, and was sold at various rates from three to twenty-five per cent. discount. A general stagnation was produced. The loss fell most heavily on the poor, as is usual in all such cases. The rich were enabled to make most extravagant profits; and many of them were literally preying upon the middle and poorer classes of society. The entire profits of business were swallowed up by the extravagant discounts paid on bank paper, a case hitherto unknown in this section of the union. And thus, in a season of distress and difficulty, the embarrassments of the citizens were doubled and trebled. And what is the most daring and profligate part of the business, the men who

" Played these pranks before high heaven,"

were impudent enough to charge the whole of the distress to the account of the administration !

" The offence is rank—it smells to heaven."

To render the affair more shocking, more gross, more hideous, those who perpetrated this wickedness, hypocritically refused to rejoice in the victories of their country—as "unbecoming a moral and religious people !!!"

There is no country in the world, but the United States, wherein such a crime could be perpetrated with impunity. Even by our mildest of all mild constitutions, it is treason. "Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, **GIVING THEM AID AND COMFORT.**" If supplying an enemy with specie to enable him to carry on the war against their native country, be not giving him "*aid and comfort*," and that of the most substantial kind, I am utterly ignorant of my native language, and know not what are "*aid and comfort*."

Every man concerned in the business of furnishing these aids to the enemy, *was ipso facto a traitor—his life was forfeited.* That he did not expiate his crime by paying the forfeit, he owed to the ill-requited lenity of an insulted government. Every person who knew of the commission of the crime, and did not reveal it, was guilty of misprision of treason.

Compare this offence with the rebellion of Massachusetts under Shays; with the whiskey insurrection, in the neighbourhood of Pittsburg; or with that of the poor, deluded, ignorant Fries ! You may as well compare the Andes to Mount Pleasant !

This crime in England would subject the perpetrator either to be hung and gibbeted, or to be hung, drawn, and quartered.

In the former case, his carcase would be exposed to be devoured by obscene birds of prey. In the latter, his head would be elevated as an ornament on the tower of London, or elsewhere, to deter other traitors from the perpetration of similar crimes.

Let us once more, though the sight turn us aghast, examine this hideous scene—which sinks the perpetrators into the lowest abyss of infamy.

Men in the “*moral and religious*” town of Boston, are *obliged to lend their money to their own government by stealth*. But in the face of day, within the knowledge of a whole community, *they send specie to the common enemy to support him in a vindictive warfare against their own country!* Can human nature sink lower? They are “too moral and too religious” to rejoice at the victories of their fellow-citizens—but they are neither “too moral nor too religious” to aid the enemy to victory! An age of penitence in sackcloth and ashes would not efface this foul blot from the escutcheon of Boston.

It is hardly possible to add a shade to the enormity of this crime. But one circumstance greatly enhances its atrocity. It was perpetrated while negotiations for peace were pending, the success whereof it had so direct a tendency to defeat, by placing the British in a situation to rise in their demands; although the guilty persons profess to belong to the “peace party.”

CHAPTER LIV.

Subject continued. Brief statement of Facts.

THE immense magnitude of the subject of the conspiracy, stated in the preceding chapters, induces me to resume it. And as I may have been led astray by the delusion which is felt by almost every man who forms an hypothesis, I shall therefore state anew the naked facts of the case, unaccompanied by my comments. Let the reader duly weigh the evidence, and acquit or condemn the accused town, as he may judge proper.

I. Engagements were entered into in Boston by individuals, pledging themselves not to subscribe to the government loans.

II. When some of them afterwards did subscribe, they found it necessary to do it “*secretly*” to avoid the odium and the persecution excited against all who lent their money to the government.

III. The utmost influence of that powerful instrument, the press, and likewise of the pulpit, was employed to discourage and denounce subscribers to the loans. They were proscribed as “*infamous*,” in the public papers most extensively patronized; and declared, in those papers, and from the pulpit, to be absolute “*murderers*.”

IV. During the winter, when the roads were in wretched order, and when freight was of course from twenty to thirty per-

cent. dearer than the common freight, the *Boston banks made immoderate, continued, oppressive, unprecedented, and hostile drafts for specie on the New York banks.*

V. At this period the former banks had in their vaults an unparalleled quantity of specie—one hundred and fifty per cent. more than their notes in circulation.

VI. These drafts were continued through the spring and summer, and obliged the banks in the middle and southern states so far to curtail their accommodations, as to bring the commercial world to the verge of bankruptcy. Large and ruinous bankruptcies did take place: twenty and upwards occurred in New York in one day.

VII. These drafts were carried to such a great extent, that on the 26th of August the banks in Baltimore—on the 29th those in Philadelphia—and on the 31st those in New York, were reduced to the painful necessity of suspending the payment of specie.

VIII. Contemporaneously with these immoderate drafts, a very large amount of bills drawn by the government of Lower Canada, were, through the medium of agents in Boston, distributed in New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore.

IX. These bills prodigiously increased the balances against the southern banks, and the power of drawing possessed by those in Boston.

X. *The specie received for these bills from New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore, was forwarded to Canada.*

XI. When subscriptions for loans were opened, large quantities of public stock were sold at public auction,* and also sent from Boston, to the markets in New York, and Philadelphia, and Baltimore, and sold at reduced rates, to tempt the monied men to invest their money therein, and thus to impede the success of the pending loans.

I submit all these strong facts to the reader. Let him examine them, and decide for himself. If he be an upright, candid, honourable man—if he have a spark of public spirit in his composition—if he have not renounced all pretensions to the name of a Washingtonian—he will pronounce sentence against this transaction, its agents, its emissaries, its accomplices, and against all who connived at it. If this be “*federalism of the Boston stamp*,” I trust the high-minded and honest federalists of

* *Extract of a letter from Boston, dated February 24, 1815.*

“This day twenty thousand dollars, six per cent stock, was put up at auction: five thousand dollars of which only was sold for want of bidders, and that at forty per cent. under par. As for the former new loan, it would be considered little short of an insult to offer it in the market, it being a very serious question who is to father the child in case of national difficulties.” *New York Evening Post, February 27, 1815.*

the middle and southern states, will renounce the odious connection, and disclaim all participation in such nefarious, such treasonable practices.

Mr. Oakley, a member of the house of representatives of the United States, in a violent and declamatory speech, alleged the strongest charges of gross mismanagement and incapacity against the administration, for disadvantageous contracts made for some of the loans, whereby millions of dollars were lost to the nation. All these losses and disadvantages are fairly chargeable to this conspiracy.

A few ambitious demagogues in Boston have been the guide of federalists throughout the union. They led them a devious course from the paths prescribed by Washington. They allured them to the brink of insurrection, rebellion, and civil war, which are synonymous with a dissolution of the union. Whether the latter will have magnanimity and fortitude enough to regain the honourable paths from which they have been seduced, remains to be seen. Their contemporaneous fame--their character with posterity--their peace, their happiness, their prosperity--the fate of their wives and children--the destiny of their country--the question whether we shall be united as a band of brothers, or involved in civil war, with its long train of horrors--are all at stake. The stake is immense. Pray Heaven they may form a just and enlightened decision.*

CHAPTER LV.

Massachusetts compared with Tennessee. The blind leading the blind. Profits of trade fifty per cent! Road to Ruin.

NEVER did faction more completely degrade and sink a people, than in Massachusetts. That once high-minded state was attacked by the British with a small force. They were allowed, without an effort, to dismember it. They established a regular government in their conquests. As no effort was made by this state, whose population amounts to about 700,000 free people, to prevent the conquest, so none was made to expel the enemy. Enslaved by faction, she whined, and scolded, and murmured, and winced, and threatened, and cursed the administration for not defending her, although she had made every possible exertion to enfeeble the government, and render it incapable of defence.

To sum up the whole. Massachusetts was energetic, firm, bold, daring, and decisive in the contest with the general government. She would not abate an inch. She dared it to a conflict. She seized it by the throat, determined to strangle it! She was untameable as a lion, or a tiger, or a panther, or a leopard. But

* Let it be observed this chapter was written in September, 1814. The note in the preceding page was added to the 7th Edition.

she was long-suffering, and mild, and patient, and harmless, and inoffensive, and gentle, and meek, as a lamb or a turtle-dove, when she came in contact with the enemy.

There is some mystery hangs about this affair, which time alone can develope. That the British should have attacked Massachusetts, where they had so many friends, and spared Pennsylvania, where the great majority were hostile to them, was so contrary to all the rules of true policy, as to be almost inexplicable. I dare not trust myself to hazard a conjecture on the subject. The tame acquiescence of such a powerful state, in so degrading a situation, must have had some extraordinary motive. None occurs to my mind that I would choose to commit to paper.

But mark the contrast! Heavens! What a contrast! Tennessee, with a territory of 43,000 square miles—a white population of only 217,727, and a formidable black one of 44,535, to guard against, was assailed by the most powerful combination of Indians, and those of the bravest character, that ever existed since the first settlement of this country. She neither winced—nor whined—nor cursed the government—nor shrunk from danger—nor threatened a separation. She arose in her strength. She girded on her armour. She called her sons from the counter and the plough—from the anvil and the loom—from the bench and the bar—from the senate house and the council chamber—and with a small degree of assistance from Georgia, she vanquished the hardy warriors whom a false reliance on British aid had allured to their ruin. Every successive effort on the part of the deluded assailants was equally pregnant with destruction. Completely vanquished, they bent their necks to the yoke. They cursed the seduction which tempted them from ease, and comfort, and happiness; and on the forehead of their nation imprinted the broad seal of perdition.

Since the above was written, Tennessee has earned tenfold fame by the heroism and public spirit her hardy sons have displayed at New Orleans, where they acquired not merely for themselves—and their own state—but for the entire nation, a wreath of imperishable glory. In this grand achievement Kentucky partook largely. Both these noble states poured forth their sons by thousands, some of them from a distance of nearly eight hundred miles, to repel the invaders of their native country. With what effect they performed this patriotic service, history will convey to posterity, countless ages hence. It will be a subject of laudable pride to belong to a nation, whose lawyers and doctors—whose farmers and shopkeepers—whose clerks and mechanics, hastily collected together, signally defeated an army of veterans, of very far superior force, as formidable as any equal number ever arrayed in arms.

The genius of Columbia hides her face with shame, and sorrow, and anguish, when she regards the ancient state of Massachusetts, degenerated from, and a disgrace to, her hardy ancestors. But she looks down with pride, and pleasure, and exultation, on the youthful, high-spirited, patriotic, and heroic Tennessee and Georgia.

It is hardly possible to find a stronger contrast—more disgraceful on the one side—more honourable on the other.

The blind leading the blind.

There is no man whose zeal in inflaming the public mind, has equalled that of the author of the *Road to Ruin*. He has published as many different sets of papers to excite the abhorrence and detestation of the eastern states against the administration, as would fill two or three large volumes. He is, in politics, as very an enraged as ever lived. So violent are his passions on this topic, that they lead him eternally astray. He commits himself by the most extravagant positions, which nothing but the epidemical madness of the times would have ever suffered to escape the keenest ridicule.

In “the *Road to Ruin*,” he most pathetically deplores the destruction of commerce, and the introduction of manufactures, both of which he regards as equal subjects of lamentation. And to make the stronger appeals to the passions of his readers—to enhance the misfortune of the loss of commerce—he very gravely states its profits at “*fifty per cent!!!*” It is even so, reader: “*fifty per cent!!!*” It is hard to conceive a higher grade of extravagance and folly. The average profits of successful commerce are not twelve per cent. And if the whole of the commercial capital employed in this country, during the last twenty years, be taken into view, including that of the merchants who have become bankrupts, it is probable that the profits do not exceed eight per cent. The failures among that class are very numerous, and out of all proportion greater than among any other. Of the merchants in New York and Philadelphia who were in eminence ten years ago, I think I am warranted in saying, that nearly two-thirds have been utterly ruined. It is well known, that the West India trade has been almost always a losing one. In fact, of the few fortunate merchants who escape shipwreck, it may be fairly said,

“*Apparent rari nantes in gurgite vasto.*”

This writer is either a deceiver—or he has deceived himself. In either case he is “*a blind leader of the blind:*” And it can never be sufficiently deplored, that a man in this situation should have so very pernicious an influence *on the destinies of eight millions of people* and their posterity. He has chosen a most

felicitous title—" *The Road to Ruin.*"—And verily he has so long been leading his deluded followers on "*the road to ruin,*" that he has brought them to the very verge of the precipice.

Lest the reader should suppose I have done him injustice, I submit his own words. If I have tortured his meaning, on my head be all the censure I have so freely bestowed upon him—

" *We take from trade a capital which produced FIFTY PER CENT, and we invest it in manufactures, PRECARIOUS IN THEIR NATURE, which may never produce twenty, and which may prove our ruin.*"†

This short paragraph is as fallacious as any equal number of lines ever published. Every position it lays down is deceptive. When the writer emphatically states, that manufactures are "*precarious in their nature,*" he must mean, by way of contradistinction, that commerce is blest with absolute security. Both are arrant errors. Commerce is proverbially insecure. No degree of prudence affords full security in that department. Manufactures, prudently managed, have as much certainty as any other human undertakings whatever.

One word more. What dependence can be placed upon the assertions, the insinuations, the allegations, on subjects abstruse or difficult to decide upon, of a man who makes such an egregious, such a momentous error in a case where detection treads so closely on his heels?

CHAPTER LVI.

Pulpit politics. Prostitution of the sacred functions. Massacre on board the Ocean. An anthology of sedition.

"Politics and the pulpit are terms that have little agreement. *No sound ought to be heard in the church but the voice of healing charity.*" [What a divine idea!] "The cause of civil liberty and civil government gains as little as that of religion, by this confusion of duties. Those who quit their proper character, to assume what does not belong to them, are, for the greater part, ignorant both of the character they leave, and of the character they assume. Wholly unacquainted with the world, in which they are so fond of meddling, and inexperienced in all its affairs, on which they pronounce with so much confidence, they have nothing of politics but the passions they excite. *Surely the church is a place where one day's truce ought to be allowed to the dissensions and animosities of mankind.*" Burke.

OF all the abominations that disgrace and dishonour this country in these portentous times, I know nothing more deserving of reprobation than the prostitution of the pulpit for party or political purposes. No man of correct mind can seriously reflect upon it without shuddering with horror.

A clergyman, whose functions pre-eminently require him to preach "*peace and good will among men,*" ascends the pulpit among a congregation assembled to unite in praising and adoring the Omnipotent Creator. *He holds in his hand the Testament of Jesus Christ, which breathes nothing but peace—he*

† See in the Examiner, vol. i. page 141, the Road to Ruin, No. VIII.

pronounces, and has for a text, the words of Jesus Christ, or of his apostles, of the most pacific tendency: and, as a suitable accompaniment, for an hour long he employs all his zeal, all his talents, all his influence, for the fanatical, the anti-christian, the satanical purpose of enkindling among his hearers the most baleful, the most furious passions—of preparing them for insurrection and revolution—for all the horrors of civil war.

“The alternative then is, that if you do not wish to become the slaves of those who own slaves, and who are themselves the slaves of French slaves, you must either, in the language of the day, CUT THE CONNEXION, or so far alter the national compact, as to insure yourselves a due share in the government:”

This elegant and sublime morceau, which breathes so much of the spirit of St. Paul, “*let every soul be subject to the higher powers,*” is taken from a sermon preached in Boston, by the Rev. Mr. Gardiner, July 23, 1812. The christian injunction of “*cutting the connexion,*” that is, *rebelling against their own government*, wonderfully accords with the declaration of the text, which, gentle reader, is—“*I am for peace.*” Psalm 120, v. 7. Never was there a more wonderful association—“*Cut the connexion*”—and “*I am for peace!*” From such apostles of peace, good Lord deliver us!

It is impossible much to aggravate the hideousness of this procedure. But when the preacher commits himself by falsehood, as sometimes happens, it caps the odious climax. A few years since, on the eve of a general election in Massachusetts, to answer the purposes of party, a fabulous story was circulated, that the French had massacred the crew of a vessel called the Ocean. It was one of a thousand falsehoods of the same kind. A clergyman, whose name I spare, seized the story with avidity—wove it into his sermon—and invoked the vengeance of heaven on the murderers. But mark the end of it. The holy zeal of the auditory had not time to cool, when, to cover the preacher with confusion, a resurrection of the murdered crew took place. They returned home, safe and sound, from the stilettoes and daggers of the blood-thirsty French—and held out a strong memento to the preacher against a repetition of such an anti-christian procedure.

The practice of preaching political sermons is utterly improper, even when a congregation are all united—all of one sentiment, if such a case ever occurred. But when they are divided, as must necessarily almost always happen, what a view does it present? That portion of the congregation differing from the preacher, are reduced to the alternative of either absenting themselves from divine worship, or sitting patiently silent under the undeserved reproaches, and abuse, and maledictions of a man who flies in the face of all his duties, and to whom they cannot offer a reply.

To enable the reader to form a correct estimate of the abomination which I have here denounced, as well as of the justice of the denunciation itself, I present him with an anthology, selected from the sermons of three clergymen, the Rev. Messrs. Parish, Osgood, and Gardiner, to whom no small portion of the seeds of insurrection, rebellion, and civil war, so plentifully sown in the eastern states, is justly chargeable. Never, since the first establishment of the clerical functions, were they more miserably employed—more contrary to the divine injunctions of the meek and mild Jesus, whose disciples these reverend gentlemen profess to be—whose doctrines they profess to teach—and whose example they profess to follow, and to hold out for imitation.

From the Rev. J. S. J. Gardiner, A. M. rector of Trinity Church, Boston.

“The British, after all, save for us by their convoys, infinitely more property than they deprive us of. WHERE THEY TAKE ONE SHIP, THEY PROTECT TWENTY. Where they commit one outrage, they do many acts of kindness.” *Discourse delivered April 9, 1812, page 15.*

“England is willing to sacrifice every thing to conciliate us, except her honour and independence.” *Idem, page 10.*

“It is a war *unexampled in the history of the world*: wantonly proclaimed on the *most frivolous and groundless pretences*, against a nation from whose friendship we might derive the most signal advantages, and from whose hostility we have reason to dread the most tremendous losses.” *Discourse delivered July 23, 1812, page 3.*

“So far from there being British partizans in this country, it is difficult to find an individual candid enough to do that nation common justice.” *Idem, page 10.*

“Every provocation has been offered to Great Britain on our part, and our resentment has risen in proportion as she has shown a conciliating spirit.” *Idem, page 12.*

“What consequence is it to you, if they be repealed or not, if you are sold to Napoleon, as you have reason to believe, by the slaves who have abused your confidence.” *Idem, page 11.*

“Let no considerations whatever, my brethren, deter you at all times, and in all places, from execrating the present war. It is a war unjust, foolish, and ruinous. It is unjust, because GREAT BRITAIN HAS OFFERED US EVERY CONCESSION SHORT OF WHAT SHE CONCEIVES WOULD BE HER RUIN.” *Idem, page 15.*

“As Mr. Madison has declared war, let Mr. Madison carry it on.” *Idem, page 17.*

“THE UNION HAS BEEN LONG SINCE VIRTUALLY DISSOLVED: AND IT IS FULL TIME THAT THIS PART OF THE DISUNITED STATES SHOULD TAKE CARE OF ITSELF!” *Idem, page 19.*

From the Rev. David Osgood, D. D. pastor of the church at Medford.

“The strong prepossessions of so great proportion of my fellow citizens in favour of a race of demons, and against a nation of more religion, virtue, good faith, generosity, and beneficence, than any that now is, or ever has been upon the

face of the earth, wring my soul with anguish, and fill my heart with apprehension and terror of the judgments of heaven upon this sinful people." *Discourse delivered April 8, 1810, page 40.*

"If at the command of weak or wicked rulers, they undertake an unjust war, each man who volunteers his services in such a cause, or loans his money for its support, or by his conversation, his writings, or any other mode of influence, encourages its prosecution, that man is an accomplice in the wickedness, loads his conscience with the blackest crimes, brings the guilt of blood upon his soul, and **IN THE SIGHT OF GOD AND HIS LAW IS A MURDERER.**" *Discourse delivered June 27, 1812, page 9.*

"Since the period of their pretended repeal, **SCORES, IF NOT HUNDREDS** of our vessels have been seized in French ports, or burnt at sea by French cruisers, while many of their unoffending crews were *manacled like slaves, confined in French prisons, or forced on board of French ships to fight against England.*" *Idem, page 11.*

"Our government, with a hardihood and effrontery, *at which demons might have blushed,* persisted in asserting the repeal." *Ibid.*

"My mind has been in a constant agony, not so much at the inevitable loss of our temporal prosperity and happiness, and the complicated miseries of war, as at its guilt, its outrage against heaven, *against all truth, honesty, justice, goodness; against all the principles of social happiness.*" *Idem, page 12.*

"Were not the authors of this war in character nearly akin to the deists and atheists of France; were they not men of *hardened hearts, seared consciences, reprobate minds, and desperate wickedness,* it seems utterly inconceivable that they should have made the declaration." *Idem, page 13.*

"One hope only remains, that this last stroke of perfidy may open the eyes of the besotted people; that they may awake, like a giant from his slumbers, and **WREAK THEIR VENGEANCE ON THEIR BETRAYERS,** by driving them from their stations, and placing at the helm more skilful and faithful hands." *Idem, page 17.*

"*If at the present moment, no symptoms of civil war appear, they certainly will soon; unless the courage of the war party should fail them!!!*" *Idem, page 14.**

"*A civil war becomes as certain as the events that happen according to the known laws and established course of nature!!!*" *Idem, page 15.**

From the Rev. Elisha Parish, D. D.

"The Israelites became weary of yielding the fruit of their labour to pamper their splendid tyrants. They left their political woes. **THEY SEPARATED. WHERE IS OUR MOSES!!!** *Where is the rod of his miracles!!! Where is our Aaron!!!* Alas! no voice from the burning bush has directed them here." *Discourse delivered at Byfield, April 7, 1814, page 18.*

"*There is a point; there is an hour; beyond which you will not bear!!!*" *Idem, page 12.*

"Such is the temper of American republicans, so called. *A new language must be invented before we attempt to express the baseness of their conduct, or describe the rottenness of their hearts.*" *Idem page 21.*

* These sentences are already quoted in a former part of this book. They are nevertheless repeated here, as peculiarly appropriate.

† After the reader has perused this detestable effusion of prejudice and virulence, let him compare it with the following declaration, made by this reverend gentleman, in a sermon preached at Cambridge, April 8, 1810: "God is my witness that I would not upon any consideration, willingly or unnecessarily wound the feelings of, or give offence to, an individual in this assembly."

"New England, if invaded, would be obliged to defend herself. Do you not then owe it to your children, and owe it to your God, *to make peace for yourselves?*" Idem, page 23.

"You may as well expect the cataract of Niagara to turn its current to the head of Superior, as a *wicked congress to make a pause in the work of destroying their country*, while the people will furnish the means." Idem, page 8.

"Alas! WE HAVE NO MOSES TO STRETCH HIS ROD OVER THE SEA!!! No Lebanon, nor Carmel, nor Zion to invite us across the deep!" Idem, page 14.

"The Republics of Rome, and Venice, and perhaps another, which alone exists, have been as oppressive as the despotism of Turkey, of Persia, or Japan." Idem, page 3.

Of the law of Pharaoh, which condemned to death the first-born of the Israelites, this reverend gentleman says—

"A thousand times as many sons of America have probably fallen victims of this ungodly war, as perished in Israel by the edict of Pharaoh. Still the war is only beginning. If ten thousand have fallen, *ten thousand times ten thousand may fall.*" Idem, page 7.

Those who take the trouble of multiplying, will find that ten thousand times ten thousand make 100,000,000, who were to perish out of a population of 8,000,000!!!!

"Should the English now be at liberty to send all their armies and all their ships to America, and *in one day burn every city from Maine to Georgia, your condescending rulers would play on their harps, while they gazed at the tremendous conflagration.*" Idem, page 8.

"*Tyrants are the same on the banks of the Nile and the Patowmac; at Memphis and at Washington; in a monarchy and a republic.*" Idem, page 9.

"Like the worshippers of Moloch, the supporters of a vile administration sacrifice their children and families on the altar of democracy. Like the widows of Hindostan, they consume themselves. Like the frantic votaries of Juggernaut, they throw themselves under the car of their political idol. They are crushed by its bloody wheels." Idem, page 21.

"The full vials of despotism are poured on your heads. And yet you may challenge the plodding Israelite, the stupid African, the feeble Chinese, the drowsy Turk, or the frozen exile of Siberia, to equal you in *total submission to the powers that be.*" Idem, page 12.

"*Here we must trample on the mandates of despotism!!!* or here we must remain slaves forever." Idem, page 13.

"You may envy the privilege of Israel, and mourn that *no land of Canaan has been promised to your ancestors.* You cannot separate from the mass of corruption, which would poison the atmosphere of paradise. You must, in obstinate despair, bow down your necks to the yoke, and with your African brethren drag the chains of Virginia despotism, *unless you discover some other mode of escape.*" Idem, page 15.

"Has not New England as much to apprehend as the sons of Jacob had? *But no child has been taken from the river to lead us through the sea.*" Idem, page 20.

"God will bring good from every evil. The furnaces of Egypt lighted Israel *to the land of Canaan.*" Idem, page 22.

"Which sooty slave, in all the ancient dominion, has more obsequiously watched the eye of his master, or flew to the indulgence of his desires more servilely, than the same masters have waited, and watched, and obeyed the orders of the great Napoleon?" *Discourse delivered at Bufield, April 8, 1813,* page 21.

"The legislators who yielded to this war, when assailed by the manifesto of their angry chief, *established iniquity and murder by law.*" Idem, page 9.

"In the first onset [of the war] moral principle was set at defiance. The laws of God, and hopes of man were utterly disdained. *Vice threw off her veil,*

and crimes were decked with highest honours. This war not only tolerates crimes, but calls for them, demands them. Crimes are the food of its life, the arms of its strength. This war is a monster, which every hour gormandises a thousand crimes, and yet cries, "give, give." In its birth, it demanded the violation of all good faith, perjury of office, the sacrifice of neutral impartiality. The first moment in which the dragon moved, piracy and murder were legalised. Havoc, death, and conflagration were the viands of her first repast." Idem, page 11.

"Those western states which have been violent for this abominable war of murder; those states which have thirsted for blood, *God has given them blood to drink. Their men have fallen. Their lamentations are deep and loud.*" Idem, page 16.

"Our government, if they may be called the government, and not the destroyers of the country, bear all these things as patiently as a colony of convicts sail into Botany Bay." Idem, page 5.

"Let every man who sanctions this war by his suffrage or influence, remember that he is labouring to cover himself and his country with blood. **THE BLOOD OF THE SLAIN WILL CRY FROM THE GROUND AGAINST HIM.**" Idem, page 23.

"How will the supporters of this anti-christian warfare endure their sentence; endure their own reflections; *endure the fire that forever burns; the worm which never dies; the hosannas of heaven; WHILE THE SMOKE OF THEIR TORMENTS ASCENDS FOREVER AND EVER.*" Idem, page 24.

"To raise army after army to be sacrificed, when the English do all which is possible, to soften the rigours of captivity, by kindness to the prisoners which they have taken **BY THOUSANDS AND THOUSANDS, restoring them to their families, WITHOUT A RANSOM, AND WITHOUT THEIR REQUEST;** to carry on such a war, after its only avowed cause has been removed, is it not the lawless attack of Goths and Vandals, the daring pillage of wild Arabs, a licentious outrage on all the principles of christianity, an impious abandonment of divine protection?" Idem, page 5.

I had begun to comment on these extracts. But I have changed my purpose. I resign them to the judgment of the reader. I shall merely say, if the preachers were really sincere, what transcendent infatuation! If not, what transcendent turpitude! In either case, what transcendent *profanation of the clerical functions!*—and of a religion breathing peace and good will among men! May the Lord grant that no American congregation may ever again dishonour or disgrace itself by patiently listening to such vile ribaldry.

Success of the war.

The enemies of the administration were lavish of their reproaches, in the early stages of the war, on its ill success, which to many of them was a subject of as much triumph, as if they belonged to a hostile nation—as if whatever dishonour and disgrace might arise from it, were to attach themselves wholly to the administration. The blindness and perversity of many of our citizens on this topic, were utterly astonishing. Whatever of glory was acquired, or of disgrace sustained in the war, its friends and enemies partook equally in the eyes of the world.*

* This all-important idea is placed in the strongest and most striking point of light by the editor of the *Analectic Magazine*, in the life of commodore Perry; of which most elegant performance, may be said with perfect truth, "the hero was worthy of such a biographer, and the biographer was worthy of such an illustrious hero." There is not extant a production of which I should be more gratified to have been the author,

It is likewise made a subject of reproach to the administration, and of rejoicing to some deluded people, whom party passions have led astray, and blinded to the interest and honour of their country, that the government has abandoned its ground on the subject of impressment! A most melancholy subject of rejoicing! Alas! it was not the power of England, nor the downfall of Bonaparte, that produced this abandonment of the claims of the poor, suffering, nautical hero! No. Internal discord, more fatal than tens of thousands of embattled enemies, has subjected to the risk of impressment countless numbers of future Hulls, Perrys, Porters, Lawrences, and M'Donoughs.

The war, to the mortification of the enemies of the country, has crowned the United States with naval glory. We have more impaired the naval standing of Great Britain, than all the enemies she has had for a century; and our Scotts, and our Browns, and our Ripleys, and our Gaineses, and our Macombs, and our Harrisons, and our Coffees, and our Carrols, and our Jacksons, have acquired by land, honour and glory equal to what has been acquired on the water by our Hulls, Decatur, Bainbridges, Perrys, Porters, Biddles, Joneses, and M'Donoughs.

But had the war been unsuccessful, it would not have been surprising. It would have more completely covered the nation with the proudest laurels, had Boston observed an impartial neutrality. But she persecuted the government with as much virulence, and malignity, and violence, as if it were administered by demons incarnate. She involved in the vortex of disaffection no small portion of the population of her own and sister states, and did *England more effective service than all her armies.**

Let those infuriated men, who caught the government by the throat, and almost strangled it, by the destruction of its credit, and by shackling all its efforts, only reflect for a few minutes calmly on the effect of their conduct. They desired peace. But they really prolonged the war. If, notwithstanding the immense disadvantages under which it was conducted, through the disaffection of such a large body of our citizens, we so harassed and crippled the trade of the enemy, what would have been the result, had the united energies of the nation been employed to avenge the national wrongs—had all the ports of the eastern

* Of the style and manner in which the government has been assailed on the subject of the loans, the reader will find in the fifty-second and fifty-sixth chapters, a few specimens. Many of the paragraphs on this and other topics display a degree of malice, and virulence, and ribaldry, that can only be equalled by the writers of the *Courier* and the *Times*. Adhesion to the enemy is visible in the elaborate defences of his conduct that so frequently appeared in a large proportion of the papers published to the eastward. And, strange to tell, there was a most elaborate set of essays published in Boston under the signature of *Pacificus*, defending the monstrous claim to one hundred and sixty-five millions of acres of our territory, as a *Sine-quanon* condition of peace. These essays were republished in most of the federal papers throughout the union without comment or censure.

states contributed their proportion towards the common cause? Great Britain would in that case have been weary of the war in twelve months. She would have given us an early and honourable peace. Millions of debts and taxes would have been saved—thousands of lives on both sides been preserved—the destruction of public and private credit been prevented—and the two nations would have been early restored to the relations of commerce and friendship. This is an awful view of the labours of the “*peace party*.”

CHAPTER LVII.

Parties change name and character. Jacobins. Definition. Unholy struggle for power, the cause of all our difficulties.

PARTIES sometimes change their names, though they retain their principles. But they more frequently change their character, and conduct, and principles, still retaining their names. On many occasions in England, whig administrations have enforced tory measures. And some of the most whiggish measures have been adopted by tory administrations. A very large number of the democrats in 1793, particularly in the western parts of Pennsylvania, were rank jacobins and disorganizers. They offered violence to the government, and raised an insurrection, to free themselves from a paltry excise on whiskey, one of the most rational and salutary taxes ever devised. Most of those men who then violated the laws in this respect, are now strenuous supporters of the government.

On the other hand, the federalists of 1793, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, were zealous “*friends of order and good government*.” This was with them a sort of watch-word. They were ardent supporters of the honour of the constituted authorities, which they identified with their own. A very large portion of them still adhere to the good old faith and practice. But there are too many who are arrant jacobins and disorganizers, and as ripe for tumult and commotion, as the most violent democrats of 1793. They may murmur and may curse me for this declaration as much as they please. I care not. They may exhaust Ernulphus’s whole collection of maledictions on my devoted head. But were these maledictions ten times reiterated, they would not efface from their escutcheon the foul blot of jacobinism. A jacobin is a man of violence in politics—an enemy to legal government—a man ripe for revolution. This definition is substantially correct. And every man, therefore, is a jacobin who was in favour of *sending to Elba, the President of the United States*, chosen by the unbiassed votes of a free nation. Every man is a *rank jacobin*, who was for *putting down the administration* by force. Every man is a *rank jacobin*, who, with Cyrus King, of Massachusetts, regardless of decency, decorum, propriety, or dignity of character, threatened the president in an innuendo with

a halter. Every man is a rank jacobin, who, with Mr. Coleman, editor of the New York Evening Post, preferred war with all its horrors, all its devastations, to a continuance of the present administration. Every man is a rank, furious, envenomed, and dangerous jacobin, who, with Mr. Blake, a quondam democrat, seized the advantage of a distressing war, to organize one portion of the nation in hostility against the rest.†*

In fine, every man who wishes the minority to trample down and rule the majority—who himself opposes, or who excites opposition to, the laws—who seeks to dissolve the union under any pretext whatever—who defends the enemies of his country, right or wrong, and slanders and degrades his own government, is an enragé—a disorganizer—a jacobin.

Struggle for office.

It is in vain to disguise the truth. Would to God, that I had a voice of thunder to proclaim it through the nation! The convulsions and dangers of our country arose from the lust of office and power. The safety, the welfare, the happiness of eight millions of people and their posterity, were jeopardized and exposed to ruin, in the unholy struggle. To embarrass, disgrace, and render odious and unpopular the men possessed of power, for the purpose of displacing them, and vaulting into the vacant seats, is a procedure, as ancient as government itself. And that it has been almost universally prevalent here, is incontrovertible. It is not wonderful that those whose grand and sole objects are power, and the emoluments of office, should pursue this plan. The depravity of human nature sufficiently accounts for it. But that a large portion of the community who neither have nor hope for places of honour or profit, should lend them-

* To the disgrace and dishonour of the house of representatives of the United States, this vile effusion of Billingsgate was allowed to pass without a call to order.

† Mr. Blake is likely to be a conspicuous character. Neither Marat, Danton, nor Robespierre began their career with more violence than he has already displayed. *Nemo repente turpissimus.* He will improve as he goes on. I stake my existence, that had a civil war taken place (as would have been the case, had Mr. Blake's counsels prevailed) and had his party not been crushed in the conflict, as they probably would; if they had acquired the ascendancy, there would have been as summary process with the democrats of that quarter as there was with the royalists under the guillotine government of Paris. *Men are monsters all the world over, when unrestrained by law and constitution.* I hope in the tender mercy of God, we shall never try the experiment. But if, in the vengeance of heaven, we are destined to do it, we shall add our example to that of France in proof of this theory. Mr. Blake transcended his friend Mr. Otis far. The latter gentleman was surely violent enough; but he was obliged to curb and restrain the converted democrat. Perhaps this was a *ruse de guerre*; perhaps the outrageous violence of Mr. Blake was intended to form a contrast with the mildness of the projet of Mr. Otis, who was thereby to gain the popular title of a "modéré." Old Lord Burleigh, or Machiavel himself, could not arrange the matter better. But, reader, I merely guess at these things. I am too far removed from the political chess board, to judge of the state of the game.

selves to such a scheme—should allow themselves to be made instruments to be wielded for the purpose—that they should, as the history of this young country has often verified, shut their eyes to the vital interests of the nation, in order to promote the aggrandizement of a few men, is really astonishing.

The following paragraph from the New York Evening Post, is as candid a confession of a most sinister object as ever was made. While we were exposed to all the horrors of war—our cities and towns liable to Copenhagenism—our wives and our daughters to violation—it was ingenuously avowed, that all these frightful evils *were of no account compared with the exclusion of Mr. Coleman's friends from office!!!* It is impossible to mistake the idea. It is capable of no other than this interpretation. However we reprobate its want of public spirit, its candour commands applause.

“What would be the value of a peace, if not attended with a change of those rulers who are driving the country headlong to ruin? A PEACE, *if such be its effects, WOULD BE THE HEAVIEST OF CURSES.* There is no event that could happen; no possible condition of things that could be imagined, which ought not to be deplored, and avoided, as the HEAVIEST OF CALAMITIES, if its tendency is to perpetuate power in the profligate hands that for sixteen years have governed this unhappy country.”

The man who can read these declarations without shuddering with horror, must have his moral feelings destroyed, or at least blunted to an extreme degree. These sentiments have appeared in other papers besides the New York Evening Post.

This paragraph affords a complete clue to all the convulsive struggles in congress—all the efforts to prevent the success of every measure calculated to meet the emergencies of the war. The possession of power on the one hand, or the perdition of the country on the other, were the alternatives. The parties, alas! had no hesitation about forcing the choice on their ill-starred country!

CHAPTER LVIII.

“Thou shalt not vex the stranger, nor oppress him; for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt.” Exodus, xxii. 21.

Illiberality of prejudices against foreigners. Ungrateful on the part of America. Irishmen and Frenchmen peculiar objects of dislike. Pennsylvania line. Extreme suffering. Tempting allurements. Unshaken virtue and heroism. Arnold. Silas Deane. Refugees.

“The real cause of the war must be traced to * * * * the influence of worthless foreigners over the press, and the deliberations of the government in all its branches.” *Reply of the house of representatives of Massachusetts to the speech of governor Strong, June, 1814.*

I HAVE long desired a fair opportunity of handling this topic. I have long felt indignant at the discriminate abuse hurled on

foreigners in general—and more particularly on the Irish, on whose devoted heads are incessantly “*poured out the vials of wrath.*”

There is no country that owes more to—there is no country has more need of—foreigners. There is perhaps no country in which they are more the objects of invective, of reproaches, of envy and jealousy.

A jealousy of foreigners prevails in England. But it is confined to the canaille, who, trundling their barrows—sweeping the streets—or pursuing their genteel offices of chimney sweeps and night men—hate and despise the *bag and tail parleyvous—the blundering Irishman—the simple sawney Scotchman—the leek-eating Welchman.* In fact, every man who wears a coat different from his own, or who displays any indication that proves him not to be a “true-born Englishman,” is an object of contempt to an English scavenger.

But it is not thus in high life in that country. A foreigner of genteel manners—decent address—and good character, is treated with the attention and politeness he deserves.

With a degree of magnanimity, deserving of praise, and worthy of being copied, England, who possesses abundance of artists of high standing, and sterling merits, appointed the American West, as president of her royal academy. France, with a constellation of native talents never exceeded, entrusted her armies to a Berwick, to a Saxe, to a Miranda, to a Kellerman. At a more recent period, a Swiss banker presided over her financial concerns. Russia has frequently placed over her fleets Scotch naval heroes. In fact, explore Christendom, and you will find there is no country so savage, so uncultivated, or so highly polished and refined, which does not cheerfully avail itself of the proffered talents of the foreigner who makes his permanent domicile there.

But in this “*most enlightened*” of all the enlightened nations of the earth, party spirit has excited a peculiar degree of malevolence against the Irish and the French—and for the same reason; because England is hostile to both. The urbanity, the mildness, the equanimity, the refinement, and the politeness of the Frenchman, avail him nothing. He is an object of jealousy and ill-will, in spite of all his own good and endearing qualities, and in spite too of the services his nation “*in the fiery hour of trial,*” rendered the United States. The poor, persecuted, proscribed, and oppressed Irishman, hunted out of his own country, and knowing the value of liberty here, from the privation of it there—finds the antipathies of his lords and masters transferred to many of those whose fellow citizen he intends to become. To some of these narrow, infatuated, bigotted and illiberal men, a Hottentot, or a Caffrarian, or a Japanese, would be more acceptable than an Irishman.

One circumstance—were there no other on record—ought to endear to Americans, the name, the country of an Irishman. It has a high claim, not cancelled, on the pen of the historian. It has not yet had justice done it. Let me grace my book with the narrative.

During the American revolution, a band of Irishmen were embodied to avenge, in the country of their adoption, the injuries of the country of their birth. They formed the major part of the celebrated Pennsylvania line. They bravely fought and bled for the United States. Many of them sealed their attachment with their lives. Their adopted country was shamefully ungrateful. The wealthy, the independent, and the luxurious, for whom they fought, were rioting in the superfluities of life, while their defenders were literally half starved, and half naked. Their shoeless feet marked with blood their tracks on the highway. They long bore their grievances patiently. They at length murmured. They remonstrated. They implored a supply of the necessaries of life; but in vain. A deaf ear was turned to their complaints.* They felt indignant at the cold neglect—at the ingratitude—of that country for which so many of their companions in arms had expired on the crimsoned field of battle. They held arms in their hands. They had reached the boundary line, beyond which forbearance and submission become meanness and pusillanimity. As all appeals to the gratitude, the justice, the generosity of the country, had proved unavailing, they determined to try another course. They appealed

* It is painful to state a much more recent case of this ingratitude, which is highly discreditable to the city of Philadelphia. In the summer of the year 1814, this city was struck with fear of a foe, who was believed to be preparing to attack us. Thousands of citizens, many of them hundreds of miles remote from us, volunteered their services in our defence. They left their homes, their firesides, their parents, their wives, their children, their business, and all their domestic enjoyments, to protect us. We made them a base return. They pined and languished in the hardships of a camp, neglected—grossly, shamefully neglected, by those for whom they were prepared to risk their precious lives. Contributions were requested by the committee of defence for the comfort of the soldiers, and for the support of their wives and children.—It is painful to state, but it must be stated, that in a city where there are probably one hundred persons worth above \$250,000—thirty or forty worth 3 or 400,000, and several supposed to be worth millions; the whole contribution did not exceed \$5,000; a sum which half a dozen individuals ought to have contributed themselves. The ingratitude and want of liberality of the citizens of Philadelphia, and the poverty of the government, which was unable to pay the militia their hard earned dues, *forced many of them to depend on charity for the means of reaching their distant homes!!!* Could the immortal PENN, the founder of the City of Brotherly love, look down from the regions of bliss, where he is at rest, he must have sighed over the disgraceful scene.

“The quality of mercy is not strained :
It droppeth as the gentle dew from Heaven
Upon the place beneath. It is twice bless’d.
It blesseth him that gives, and him that takes.”

to her fears. They mutinied. They demanded with energy that redress for which they had before supplicated. It was a noble procedure. I hope in all similar cases, similar measures will be pursued.

The intelligence was carried to the British camp. It there spread joy and gladness. Lord Howe hoped that a period had arrived to the "*rebellion*," as it would have been termed. There was a glorious opportunity of crushing the half-formed embryo of the republic. He counted largely on the indignation, and on the resentment of the natives of "*the emerald isle*." He knew the irascibility of their tempers. He calculated on the diminution of the strength of "*the rebels*," and accession to the numbers of the royal army. Messengers were despatched to the mutineers. They had *carte blanche*. They were to allure the poor Hibernians to return, like prodigal children, from feeding on husks, to the plentiful fold of their royal master. Liberality herself presided over Howe's offers. Abundant supplies of provisions—comfortable clothing to their heart's desire—all arrears of pay—bounties—and pardon for past offences, were offered. There was, however, no hesitation among these poor, neglected warriors. They refused to renounce poverty, nakedness, suffering, and ingratitude. The splendid temptations were held out in vain. There was no Judas, no Arnold there. They seized the tempters, and trampled on their shining ore. They sent them to their general's tent. The miserable wretches paid their forfeit lives for attempting to seduce a band of ragged, forlorn, and deserted, but illustrious heroes. We prate about Roman, about Grecian patriotism. One half of it is false. In the other half, there is nothing that excels this noble trait, which is worthy the pencil of a West or a Trumbull.

Let me reverse the scene. Let me introduce some characters of a different stamp. Who is that miscreant yonder—dark, designing, haggard—treachery on his countenance—a dagger in his hand? Is it not Arnold? It is. Was he an Irishman? No. He was not of the despised cast, the foreigners. He was an American. Neither Irish nor French blood flowed in his veins.

Behold, there is another. Who is he, that, Judas like, is pocketing the wages of corruption, for which he has sold his country? Is he an Irishman? No. He is a native American. His name is Silas Deane.

But surely that numerous band of ruffians, and plunderers, and murderers, who are marauding and robbing—who are shooting down poor farmers, and their wives, and their children, are "*foreigners*." It is impossible they can be natives. No native American would perpetrate such barbarities on his unoffending fellow citizens. It is an error. They are refugees and Tories—all native born.

I am an Irishman. With the *canaille* in superfine cloths and silks, as well as with the *canaille* in rags and tatters, this is a subject of reproach. Every man, woman, or child, base enough to attach disgrace to any person on account of his country, is worthy of the most sovereign, the most ineffable contempt. Let them move in what sphere they may, whether in coffee-houses, or ball-rooms, or palaces—in hovels, or garrets, or cellars—they are groveling, sordid, and contemptible.—To express the whole in two words—pity there were not words more forcible—they are **MERE CANAILLE**.

I glory, I feel a pride in the name of Irishman. There is not, under the canopy of Heaven, another nation, which, ground to the earth as Ireland has been, for six hundred years, under so vile a proconsular government—almost every viceroy a Verres—a government, whose fundamental maxim is, “divide and destroy”—whose existence depends on fomenting the hostility of the Protestant against the Presbyterian and Catholic, and that of the Catholic against the Protestant and Presbyterian—there is not, I say, another nation, which, under such circumstances, would have preserved the slightest ray of respectability of character.

A book now lies before me, which, in a few lines, with great naïveté, developes the horrible system pursued by England in the government of Ireland, to excite the jealousy of one part of the nation against the other. A schemer, of the name of Wood; had influence enough to procure a patent for supplying Ireland with copper coin in the year 1724, whereby he would have amassed an immense fortune by fleecing the nation of its gold and silver in return for his base copper. Dean Swift exposed the intended fraud with such zeal and ability, that he aroused the public indignation at the attempt, and thus the projector was fairly defeated, and his patent revoked. Primate Boulter, who was at that period prime minister of Ireland, in a letter to the Duke of Newcastle, deploras the consequences of this fraudulent attempt, in *uniting parties which, till then, had been embittered enemies*. This grand dignitary of the church regarded a cessation of discord and hostility among the oppressed Irish, as a most alarming event! pregnant with danger to the authority of England! But, reader, I will let him speak for himself:

“The people of every religion, country, and party here, are alike set against Wood’s half-pence: and, their agreement in this has had **A VERY UNHAPPY INFLUENCE ON THE AFFAIRS OF THE NATION**, by bringing on intimacies between Papists and Jacobites, and the Whigs, who before had no correspondence with them!!” See Boulter’s Letters, vol. 1, page 7. Dublin edition, 1770.

Notwithstanding all the grinding, the debasing circumstances that militate against Ireland and Irishmen, there is no country in Christendom, which has not witnessed the heroism, the gene-

rosity, the liberality of Irishmen—none, where, notwithstanding the atrocious calumnies propagated against them by their oppressors, they have not forced their way through the thorny and briery paths of prejudice and jealousy, to honour, to esteem, to respect.

It has been said, that they are in this country turbulent, and refractory, and disorderly, and factious. This charge is as base as those by whom it is advanced. There is more turbulence, more faction, more disaffection in Boston, whose population is only 33,000, and which has as few foreigners as, perhaps, any town in the world, than there are in the two states of Pennsylvania and New York, with a population of 1,700,000, and which contain probably two-thirds of all the native Irishmen in this country. While native-born citizens, some of whom pride themselves on Indian blood flowing in their veins, and others who boast of a holy descent from those "*sainted pilgrims*," whom British persecution drove to the howling wilderness, were sacrilegiously and wickedly attempting to destroy the glorious (would to Heaven I could say, the immortal) fabric of our unparalleled form of government; of the Irishmen in this country, high and low, ninety-nine of every hundred were strenuously labouring to ward off the stroke.

I said, there is no country that owes more to foreigners than the United States. I owe it to myself and to my reader, not to let a point of such importance rest on mere assertion. Of the men who acquired distinction in the cabinet, or in the field, during the revolutionary war, a very large proportion were foreigners. In "the times that tried men's souls," they were gladly received, and courteously treated. Their services were then acceptable. But now, like the squeezed orange, they are to be thrown aside, and trodden under foot.

The illustrious La Fayette, general Lee, general Gates, general Stewart, the inestimable general Montgomery, general Pulaski, general Kosciusko, baron Steuben, baron de Kalb, general M'Pherson, general St. Clair, general Hamilton, Robert Morris, the amiable Charles Thompson, judge Wilson, baron de Glau-
bec, Thomas Paine, Thomas Fitzsimons, William Findley, and hundreds of others, eminent during the revolution, were foreigners. Many of them were not excelled for services and merits by any native American, whether the blood of a dingy Pocahontas crawled through his veins, or whether he descended in a right line from any of "the Pilgrims" that waged war against the potent Massasoit.

Since the preceding pages were written, I have met with a pamphlet of great merit, written by one of the authors of "*Salmagundi*," from which I quote the following statement with pleasure: as affording an able vindication of the Irish, and

a fair sketch of the oppressions and wrongs they have endured. In the name of the nation I thank the writer for this generous effusion, of which the value is greatly enhanced, by the extreme rarity of such liberality towards Ireland or Irishmen on this side of the Atlantic. The work has, moreover, the merit of being an excellent defence of this country against the abuse of British critics. It is earnestly recommended to the perusal of every American who feels for the honour of his country.

"The history of Ireland's unhappy connexion with England, exhibits, from first to last, a detail of the most persevering, galling, grinding, insulting, and systematic oppression, to be found any where *except among the helots of Sparta*. There is not a national feeling that has not been insulted and trodden under foot; a national right that has not been withheld, until fear forced it from the grasp of England; or a dear, or ancient prejudice, that has not been violated in that abused country. As Christians, the people of Ireland have been denied, under penalties and disqualifications, the exercise of the rites of the Catholic religion, *venerable for its antiquity; admirable for its unity; and consecrated by the belief of some of the best men that ever breathed*. As men they have been deprived of the common rights of British subjects under the pretext that they were incapable of enjoying them: which pretext had no other foundation than their resistance of oppression, only the more severe by being sanctioned by the laws. ENGLAND FIRST DENIED THEM THE MEANS OF IMPROVEMENT; AND THEN INSULTED THEM WITH THE IMPUTATION OF BARBARISM."

While on the point of closing this page, I have been furnished with a noble effusion on this subject, from very high authority. Its sterling merits, and its justice towards the nation I have dared to vindicate, will warrant its insertion, and amply compensate the perusal.

"***** A dependency of Great Britain, *Ireland has long languished under oppression reprobated by humanity, and discountenanced by just policy*. It would argue penury of human feelings, and ignorance of human rights, to submit patiently to those oppressions. Centuries have witnessed the struggles of *Ireland*; but with only partial success. Rebellions and insurrections have continued with but short intervals of tranquillity. Many of the Irish, like the French, are the hereditary foes of Great Britain. *America has opened her arms to the oppressed of all nations*. No people have availed themselves of the asylum with more alacrity, or in greater numbers than the Irish. HIGH IS THE MEED OF PRAISE, RICH THE REWARD, WHICH IRISHMEN HAVE MERITED FROM THE GRATITUDE OF AMERICA. AS HEROES AND STATESMEN, THEY HONOUR THEIR ADOPTED COUNTRY."

The above sublime and correct tribute of praise, is extracted from the *Federal Republican*, of June 22, 1812, and forms part of an unanimous address agreed to by the *federal* members of the legislature of Maryland, to the people of that state.

I have been highly and very unexpectedly gratified to find another advocate and defender of the Irish nation, since the publication of my former edition. Mr. Coleman, the editor of the *New-York Evening Post*, bears this strong testimony in favour of that nation, in his paper of the seventh of March, 1815:

* See pamphlet entitled "The United States and England," page 99.

"No character is more estimable and respectable than that of the real Irish gentleman : and those who have come to reside among us, are distinguished by the urbanity of their manners, and the liberality of their minds."

CHAPTER LIX.

*Address to the Federalists of the United States.**

GENTLEMEN,

AN attentive perusal of the preceding pages, can, I hope, hardly have failed to place me beyond the suspicion of the despicable vice, flattery—and must give to my commendation at least the merit of sincerity.

After these introductory remarks, I make no scruple to declare my decided conviction, that in private life, I know of no party, in ancient or modern history, more entitled to respect, to esteem, to regard, than the American federalists in general, in all the social relations, of husbands, parents, brothers, children, and friends. There are exceptions. But they are as few as apply to any body equally numerous. Political prejudice, or the widest difference of opinions, has never so far obscured my visual ray, as to prevent me from discerning, or my reasoning faculty from acknowledging this strong, this honourable truth—the more decisive in its nature, from being pronounced by a political opponent.

But, fellow-citizens, after this frank declaration in your praise as to private life, and for private virtue, let me freely discuss your public conduct. Believe me, I mean not to offend. I trust I shall not. I address you the words of truth. The crisis forbids the use of ceremony. I hope you will give the subject a serious consideration—and receive with indulgence what emanates from candour and friendship.

I believe there is not to be found, in the widest range of history, another instance of a party so enlightened, so intelligent, so respectable, and in private life so virtuous, yielding themselves up so blindly, so submissively, and with so complete an abandonment of the plainest dictates of reason and common sense, into the hands of leaders so undeserving of their confidence. In and after the days of Washington, you stood on a proud eminence—on high and commanding ground. You were friends of order and good government. You were tremblingly alive to the honour of your country. You identified it with your own. But it is difficult to find a more lamentable change in the conduct of any body of men than has taken place with your leaders. The mind can hardly conceive a greater contrast

* This chapter was written, let it be observed, in November, 1814. I could not alter it so as to suit it to existing circumstances. I have therefore allowed it to remain as a testimony of the state of the nation at that period.

than between a genuine Washingtonian federalist of 1790, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, and the Bostonian, who, covered with the pretended mantle of Washingtonian federalism, destroys the credit of his own government, and collects the metallic medium of the nation, to foster the armies preparing to attack and lay it waste. Never were holy terms so prostituted. Washington from Heaven looks down with indignation at such a vile perversion of the authority of his name.

Let me request your attention to a few facts—and to reflections and queries, resulting from them—

I. Your proceedings and your views are eulogized in Montreal, Quebec, Halifax, London, and Liverpool. The Courier, and the Times, and all the other government papers are loud and uniform in your praise.—*This is an awful fact*, and ought to make you pause in your career.

II. *Your party rises as your country sinks. It sinks as your country rises.* This is another awful fact. It cannot fail to rend the heart of every public-spirited man among you. For the love of the God of Peace—by the shade of Washington—by that country which contains all you hold dear, I adjure you to weigh well this sentence—*you sink as your country rises.* Yes, it is indubitably so. It is a terrific and appalling truth. And *you rise as that desponding, lacerated, perishing, betrayed country sinks.* “I would rather be a dog, and bay the moon,” than stand in this odious predicament.

III. Had there been two or three surrenders like general Hull’s—had Copenhagenism befallen New York, or Philadelphia, or Baltimore, or Charleston—or had our Constitutions, and United States, and Presidents, and Constellations, been sunk or carried into Halifax—and our Porters, and Biddles, and Bainbridges, and Perrys, and Hulls, been killed or taken prisoners, your leaders would have been crowned with complete success. They would have been wafted on a spring tide to that power which is “the God of their idolatry.” *Every event that sheds lustre on the arms of America is to them a defeat.* It removes to a distance the prize to which their eyes and efforts are directed. *But every circumstance that entails disgrace or distress on the country, whether it be bankruptcy, defeat, treachery, or cowardice, is auspicious to their views.*

IV. *Never has the sun in his glorious course, beheld so estimable, so respectable, so enlightened a party as you are*, in the frightful situation, in which the ambition of your leaders, and your own tame, thoughtless, inexplicable acquiescence have placed you.

V. By fulminations from the pulpit—by denunciations from the press—*by a profuse use of British government bills*—by un-

usual, unnecessary, hostile, and oppressive drafts for specie on the New York banks; and by various other unholy, treasonable, and wicked means, the leaders of your party in Boston have reduced the government to temporary bankruptcy; have produced the same effect on the banks; have depreciated the stocks and almost every species of property 20 to 50 per cent.

VI. These treasonable operations have served the cause of England more effectually than lord Wellington could have done with 30,000 of his bravest veterans. They have produced incalculable, and, to many, remediless distress.

VII. *After having thus treasonably destroyed the credit of the government, one of their strongest accusations is its bankruptcy.**

VIII. A man who ties another, neck and heels, and gags him, might, with equal justice, blow out his brains for not singing Yankee doodle, or dancing a fandango, as those who produce bankruptcy inculcate the bankrupt with his forlorn and desperate circumstances.

IX. There is no other country in the world, where these proceedings would not be punished severely—in many they would be capitally. Their guilt is enormous, clear, and indisputable. They strike at the safety, and even the existence, of society.

X. By the sedition law,† enacted by some of these very men, and their followers, heavy fines, and tedious imprisonment, were awarded against offences incomparably inferior.

XI. While you submit to leaders, whose career is so iniquitous, were you in private life as pure as archangels, you partake largely of the guilt of those whom you uphold; whose power of destruction depends on your support; and who would sink into insignificance, but for your countenance.

XII. If the pretext, or even the strong belief, on the part of the minority, that a war, or any other measure, is unjust, can warrant such a jacobinical, seditious, and treasonable opposition as the present war has experienced, no government can exist. The minority in all countries, uniformly denounce all the measures they have opposed, as unjust, wicked, unholy, or unconstitutional—or all united.

XII. The most unerring characteristic of a deperate faction, *is an uniform opposition to all the measures proposed by its*

* It is impossible for language to convey the contempt and abhorrence that are due to the canting, whining speeches delivered in congress on the bankruptcy of the government, by the men who were deeply guilty of producing it; whose treasonable efforts have been crowned with success; who have largely contributed to blast the most cheering prospects that Heaven ever vouchsafed to accord to any of the human race. The tears thus shed, are exactly typified by those that so plentifully fall from the voracious crocodile over the prey he is going to devour.

† See chapter 3.

opponents, whether good or bad, and without offering substitutes. The more dangerous the crisis, and the more necessary the measures, the more infallible the criterion.

XIV. This characteristic exactly and most indisputably applies to your leaders. This country is on the brink of perdition. Yet they have opposed and defeated every measure devised for our salvation. They appear determined to deliver us tied hand and foot into the power of the enemy, unless they can seize the reins of government.

XV. You profess to be disciples of Washington. The title is a glorious one. Let us test the practice of your leaders by the holy maxims of Washington. He raised his voice against—warned you to shun—and pronounced the strongest condemnation upon

1. All obstructions of what kind soever, to the execution of the laws ;
2. All combinations to direct, controul, or awe the constituted authorities ;
3. All insidious efforts to *excite hostility between the different sections of the United States ;*
4. And, in the most emphatical manner, *all attempts to dissolve the union.*

XVI. But the leaders of your party, particularly in Boston, have

1. Openly obstructed the execution of the laws :
2. Combined to controul the constituted authorities :
3. Actually excited as dire hostility to the southern states, in the breasts of those under their influence in the eastern, as exists between France and England ; and
4. Been constantly endeavouring, by a series of the most inflammatory and violent publications, *to prepare the eastern people for a dissolution of the union.*

XVII. In fine, all the steps they take, and their whole course of proceedings, are in direct hostility with the creed, the advice, and the practice of Washington.

XVIII. While you follow such leaders, you may profess to be disciples of Washington : but an impartial world will reject your claim.

XIX. Suppose your leaders at Washington succeed in driving Mr. Madison, and the other public functionaries from office, and seize upon the reins of government themselves, what a melancholy disgraceful triumph would it not be, to raise your party on the ruins of your form of government.

XX. Such an usurpation could not fail to produce civil war.

XXI. If your party set the example of such atrocious violence, can you persuade yourselves that the "*poisoned chalice*"

will not, at no very distant period, be "returned to your own lips?"

XXII. You profess to desire peace. I firmly believe you do. But are divisions, and distractions, and envenomed factions, and threatened insurrections, the seed to sow for a harvest of peace?

XXIII. All the seditious and treasonable measures adopted in Boston and elsewhere, to harass, cripple, and embarrass your government, have, previous to the war, had an inevitable tendency to enable Great Britain to regulate, controul, and restrict your commerce—and to set at defiance all the attempts to procure redress—and, since the war, their tendency has been to prolong its ravages.

XXIV. Are you prepared—can you reconcile yourselves, to incur all the risk—to suffer all the ruin that a revolution will infallibly produce, to enable Rufus King, Timothy Pickering, Christopher Gore, Cyrus King, and Daniel Webster, to seize the reins of government, and exile "*to Elba*"—or execute with Cyrus King's celebrated "*halter*" your venerable first magistrate? Suppose they succeed, what will be the advantage to you individually?

I plead not, fellow citizens, for democracy; I plead not for federalism. Their differences have sunk into utter insignificance. Were the contest between *them*, I should not have stained a single sheet of paper. I plead against jacobinism; I plead against faction; I plead against attempts to "overawe and controul the constituted authorities." I plead the cause of order; of government; of civil and religious liberty. I plead for the best constitution the world ever saw; I plead for your honour as a party, which is ⁱⁿ the utmost jeopardy. I plead for your estates, which are going to ruin. I plead for your bleeding country, which lies prostrate and defenceless, pierced with a thousand wounds. I plead for your aged parents, for your tender children, for your beloved wives, for your posterity, whose fate depends upon your conduct at this momentous crisis. All, all, loudly implore you to withdraw your support from those who are leagued for their destruction, and who make you instruments to accomplish their unholy purposes. You are on the verge of a gaping vortex, ready to swallow up yourselves and your devoted country. To advance a single step may be inevitable perdition. To the right about. It is the path to honour, to safety, to glory. Aid in extricating your country from danger. And then if you select calm, and dispassionate, and moderate candidates for public office, there can be no doubt of your success. I am firmly persuaded that nothing but the intemperate and unholy violence of your leaders has prevented you from having that share of influence

in the councils of the nation to which your wealth, your numbers, your talents, and your services, give you so fair a claim.

The constitution may be imperfect. Every thing human partakes of human infirmity and human error. It has provided a proper mode of amendment. As soon as peace is restored, and the fermentation of public passions has subsided, let the real or supposed defects be brought fairly forward, and submitted to the state legislatures, or to a convention, as may be judged proper. But while the vessel of state is on rocks and quicksands, let us not madly spend the time, which ought to be devoted to secure her and our salvation, in the absurd and ill-timed attempt to amend, or, in other words, to destroy the charter party under which she sails.

May the Almighty Disposer of events inflame your hearts : enlighten your understanding ; and direct you to the proper course to steer at this momentous crisis ! And may he extend to our common country that gracious blessing which brought her safely through one revolution, without entailing on us the frightful curses inseparable from another !

Philad. Nov. 1814.

POSTSCRIPT.

January 9, 1815.

As the apprehensions on the subject of a dissolution of the union which are repeatedly expressed in this book, and which have led to its publication, are treated by many as chimerical; and as the result of the Hartford convention, just published, appears to countenance the idea, that the danger is overrated, the writer, in justification of his fears, simply states, that even admitting that the leading men to the eastward do not contemplate a dissolution of the union, it does not by any means follow that we are safe from such an event, while the public passions are so constantly excited, and kept in such a high state of fermentation. It is an easy process to raise commotions, and provoke seditions. But to allay them is always arduous; often impossible. Ten men may create an insurrection; which one hundred, of equal talents and influence, may be utterly unable to suppress. The weapon of popular discontent, easily wielded at the outset, becomes, after it has arrived at maturity, too potent for the feeble grasp of the agents by whom it has been called into existence. It hurls them and those against whom it was first employed, into the same profound abyss of misery and destruction.—Whoever requires illustration of this theory, has only to open any page of the history of France from the era of the national convention till the commencement of the reign of Bonaparte. If he be not convinced by the perusal, “he would not be convinced, though one were to rise from the dead.”

APPENDIX

TO THE SIXTH EDITION.

THE favourable reception this work has experienced, induces me to make a few additions to it, which I respectfully submit to my fellow-citizens.

They embrace topics mostly untouched, or at least slightly handled in the original work. Some of them are of vital importance to the dearest interests of the nation.

In this portion of the publication, as well as in what precedes it, I have endeavoured to divest myself of any undue bias. I have pursued truth undeviatingly, and regardless of consequences. How far I have succeeded, the reader must judge.

I request a candid and fair examination of the various subjects—and that my errors, whatever they be, may be ascribed to any other cause than an intention to mislead, of which I feel myself utterly incapable.

M. C.

SEPTEMBER, 1815.

CHAPTER LX.

Orders in Council. Restrictive system. Impolicy of the British ministry. Abstract of the examinations before the House of Commons. Ruinous effects of the policy of Great Britain on the vital interests of that nation.

THAT the violation of the rights of the United States by the orders in council, required to be resisted by our government, will not be denied by the most strenuous opposer of the administration. And that every peaceable means of obtaining redress, ought to be fully tried before a recourse to war, will be admitted.

Appeals to the honour and justice of the British government had been repeatedly made. Our ministers had in vain presented various remonstrances on the subject. No redress had been vouchsafed. Our injuries had increased in violence. Other means were necessary. Perhaps no nation, but our own, whose policy is eminently pacific, would have hesitated on the subject. War—horrible, destructive war, would early have been the resort. But with a most laudable regard for human life, and human happiness—with a view to prevent the carnage, the demoralization of war, our government had recourse to various pacific measures to enforce redress.

Great Britain is a manufacturing and commercial nation. Upon her manufactures depends in a great degree her commerce. Both are indispensable not merely towards her prosperity, but her security, her very existence. We furnished her with the most important market in the world. Our trade was immensely valuable. And as we asked but simple justice, it was believed, and on the strongest ground of reason and policy, that it could be rendered her interest to cease her gross violations of our rights. The effort was most meritorious. It is worthy of future imitation.

Our imports from Great Britain had risen to the enormous sum of above 50,000,000 of dollars* in a year. It had been

* By a report of Alexander Hamilton, esq. secretary of the treasury, dated December 23, 1793, it appears that at this very early period, in the infancy of our government, we had imported from the British dominions the preceding year

Whereas our exports were only	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	\$15,285,428
								9,363,416

Leaving in favour of Great Britain a balance of	-	-					\$5,922,012
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Our exports to the French dominions for the same year were							\$4,698,735
And the imports only	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,088,348

Leaving a balance in favour of the United States of	-						\$2,210,387
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steadily improving. The punctuality of our importers had exceeded that of the other customers of England. A considerable part of the trade had for some time been transacted for ready money.

As a large portion of the continent of Europe had been, as it were, hermetically sealed against British trade, it was rationally presumed, that if the alternative were held out to Great Britain, either to cease the violation of our rights, or to forfeit our trade, she would certainly adopt the former. Fatuity of the blindest character alone could have hesitated in the choice.

It is doubtful whether any administration of any age or nation, ever displayed a higher degree of outrageous folly and disregard of the vital interests of its own country. Every motive of prudence and policy dictated to England, as an imperious and paramount duty, to treat the United States with kindness, liberality and attention. Every fair means ought to have been employed to conciliate our citizens, and to induce them to bury the animosities of the revolution in utter oblivion. Such a liberal course of proceeding would have been productive of immense advantages to her dearest interests.

The trade of this country was the main buttress that propped up the tottering fabric of British paper credit, and furnished means to replenish the veins of the body commercial and financial, which had been so ruinously phlebotomized by the lancet of subsidies to foreign powers, and the enormous expenses of war, and which had suffered so much by the starvation of the continental system.

It requires but a cursory examination of the whole tenor of the conduct of England, towards this country, to be satisfied that it has been steadily and uniformly the reverse of what a wise statesman would have adopted. The predatory and lawless orders in council, so clandestinely issued against American commerce, "*preying upon the unprotected property of a friendly power,*"*—the wanton, cruel, barbarous, and unprecedented seizures of our citizens on the high seas—the countenanced, the flagitious forgery of our ships' papers, advertised in their Gazettes, and defended in parliament—the blockade of our ports, and capture of vessels bound in and out—the shameful violations of our rights of sovereignty within the limits declared sacred by the laws of nations—the murder of Pearce in one of our harbours—and the total neglect of all applications for redress of these grievances,† were as utterly impolitic as they were unjust

* See Boston memorial, signed by James Lloyd, jun. David Green, Arnold Welles, David Sears, John Coffin Jones, George Cabot, and Thomas H. Perkins, for and in behalf of the whole body of the mercantile citizens of that town, page 88.

† Redress of grievances was not only never afforded—but in almost every instance the officers who perpetrated the greatest outrages, were absolutely promoted.

and flagitious. It is impossible to conceive a course of conduct more completely marked by an utter destitution of reason, common sense, justice, regard to the law of nations, or a sound and enlarged view of the true and vital interests of the British nation. It requires no sagacity to foresee the sentence history will pronounce on this miserable, this harassing system. Unqualified reprobation awaits it, as well as its authors and abettors. It was calculated to sour and alienate the friends of England in this country, and to increase the hostility of her enemies—to treble the influence of the latter, and proportionably to diminish that of the former.

The conduct of France had been in many points so utterly indefensible, so great a violation of our rights, and of the plainest dictates of justice, that had Great Britain conducted towards us with even a moderate share of decency or propriety, she might have readily arrayed this nation in hostility against her grand enemy seven years ago. The sole reason that prevented an earlier declaration of war against one or other of the belligerents, was, that it would have been madness to have attacked both; and each had so atrociously outraged and injured us, that, in the strong, clear, and just language of Governor Griswold, “such had been the character of both, that *no circumstance could justify a preference to either.*” This important and irresistible declaration was, as already stated, made to the legislature of Connecticut, on the 12th of May, 1812.

The annals of commerce do not, I believe, furnish an instance of one nation enjoying so lucrative a trade with another, as England maintained with this country, as well for extent, as for immensity of advantage. We furnished her with the most valuable raw materials for her manufactures, and received in return for these materials, the manufactured articles, wrought up often at 10, 20, 30 or 40 fold advance of value. It is hardly possible to conceive a more gainful commerce. A Sully, or a Colbert, or a Ximenes, or a Chatham, would have cherished such a trade as “*the apple of his eye*”—and shunned with awe every thing in the least calculated to impair or destroy it.

For every valuable purpose, we were literally colonies of Great Britain. That is to say, she derived from us all the advantages that nations have ever derived from colonies, without the expense of fleets or armies for our protection. And so strong has been and is the partiality of a large proportion of our citizens for English habits, and English manners, and English fashions; and such is the devotion of a number of our presses, and our literary men, and our pulpits, to the defence and justification of England, that it required but little care to have maintained her influence here unimpaired. If, notwithstanding such an irritating, and insulting, and predatory system as she pursued, she

still retained so many warm, zealous, and influential partizans, what might she not have done, had she pursued a system of kindness and conciliation !

Her ministers abandoned the noble, lawful, immense, and rich trade with this country, for a miserable trade of smuggling, not one-tenth in amount or value, and resting upon the pestiferous and hateful basis of forgery and perjury ! Alas ! that the affairs of mighty nations should fall into such hands !

I cannot resist the temptation of enriching this page—of embalming it with the glowing eloquence of Henry Brougham, Esq. M. P. on this inexhaustible topic.

“ Good God ! the incurable perverseness of human folly ! always striving after things that are beyond their reach, of doubtful worth, and discreditable pursuit, and neglecting objects of immense value, because, in addition to their own importance, they have one recommendation which would make meaner things desirable—that they can be easily obtained, and honestly, as well as justly enjoyed ! It is this miserable, shifting, doubtful, hateful traffic, that we prefer, to the *sure, regular, increasing, honest gains of American commerce* ; to a trade which is placed beyond the enemy’s reach, which, besides enriching ourselves in peace and honour, only benefits those who are our natural friends, over whom he has no controul,” * * “ which supports at once all that remains of liberty beyond the seas, and gives life and vigour to its main pillar within the realm, the manufactures and commerce of England.” *

“ I have been drawn aside from the course of my statement respecting the importance of the commerce which we are sacrificing to those mere whimsies, I can call them nothing else, respecting our abstract rights. That commerce is the whole American market, *a branch of trade in comparison of which, whether you regard its extent, its certainty, or its progressive increase, every other sinks into insignificance.* It is a market which in ordinary times may take off about *thirteen millions† worth of our manufactures* ; and in steadiness and regularity it is unrivalled.‡

“ The returns indeed are as sure, and the bad debts as few, as they used to be even in the trade of Holland. These returns are also grown much more speedy. Of this you have ample proof before you, from the witnesses who have been examined, who have all said that the payment was now as quick as in any other line—and that the Americans often preferred making ready money bargains for sake of the discount.” §

To return to the course pursued here. The intercourse between England and this country was prohibited by an act passed on the 1st of March, 1809, commonly called the non-intercourse law, for the vital clauses of which I refer the reader to chap. 28. A repeal, or modification of the orders in council, so as to cease violating the rights of the United States, was to authorise the president to restore the intercourse.

This mild and laudable mode of procuring redress, which entitles its authors to the unqualified approbation of their fellow citizens and posterity—and to which history will do the justice that ungrateful cotemporaries have denied, was treated with ridicule and contempt in this country, as futile and imbecile, and utterly ineffectual in its operation upon England.

* Speech in parliament, June 16, 1812, Philadelphia edition, page 39.

† Nearly sixty millions of dollars.

‡ Speech, page 34.

§ Idem, page 35.

With a blindness, folly, and madness, of which there are few parallels, the British ministry persevered in their unjust system towards this country, notwithstanding its destructive effects on the vital interests of their own. Their most valuable and important manufactures were paralyzed—their manufacturers reduced to beggary and ruin—a regular trade, amounting to above 50,000,000 of dollars, annually, annihilated—and the sources dried up, from whence they principally derived the means of subsidizing foreign powers to fight their battles.

In vain did the wisest and best of the people of England enter their most solemn protest against the orders in council—that miserable system, on which egregious folly and rampant injustice were stamped in the most legible characters. In vain did the starving workmen—the impoverished manufacturers implore the administration for relief. They were deaf as the adder, whose ears are closed “to the voice of the charmer, charm he never so wisely.”

At length in the spring of 1812, the public sufferings had so far increased—and the clamour for redress was so universal, that the British ministry were impetuously driven to allow an enquiry to be instituted in parliament into the operation and effects of the orders in council. This measure was adopted with an ill grace, and not until the most serious and alarming riots and insurrections had occurred among the workmen and labourers in several parts of England.

The examination commenced on the 29th of April, 1812, and continued until the 13th of the following June. Witnesses were examined from most parts of England. The evidence uniformly and undeviatingly concurred to prove how transcendently important was the American trade to the manufacturers of Great Britain—how awfully calamitous the annihilation of that trade had been—and the miserable policy of an adherence to the orders in council. *All this was apparent and undeniable from the very first day of the examination, could there have been any previous doubt on the subject.*

The minutes of the examination, as published by order of parliament, form a ponderous folio volume of nearly 700 pages, and exhibit a frightful picture of the results of the sinister and absurd policy which dictated the orders in council.

To the United States this is a subject of immense importance. Our form of government—our dearest interests—the habits, and inclinations, and manners of our people, lead us to pursue a pacific policy. And if there be an effectual instrument, whereby, without war, we can extort justice from nations which violate our rights, or offer us outrage, it affords additional and invaluable security for the permanence of the blessed state of peace.—While we can make it pre-eminently the interest of those nations with which we have intercourse, to reciprocate kindness and jus-

tice, and refrain from injustice and depredation, we may reasonably calculate upon their pursuing that desirable course.

To evince, therefore, the efficacy of the so-much abused restrictive system, I subjoin a few extracts from the evidence given before the house of commons, of its effects on the dearest interests of Great Britain.

April 30, 1812.

Mr. THOMAS POTTS, merchant of *Birmingham*.—From 20,000 to 25,000 men in Birmingham, who have now only half work. *General state of the town extremely depressed, and the distress universal. Manufacturers have been keeping their men employed in creating stock nearly to the extent of their capital, and many of them are in consequence in extreme difficulties.* If no favourable change takes place, the manufacturers will be obliged within two months to dismiss two-thirds of their hands, and some of them the whole. Large quantities of Birmingham goods have been lying in Liverpool, waiting for shipment for 12 to 15 months past. *The American market, a steady and increasing one, and the payments, which have been regularly improving, now very good.* Since the prohibition in America, goods have been sent to Canada: but they have been sold there for less than their cost in the manufacturing towns. Has tried the South American market with very indifferent success: and has concluded never to make another shipment to that country, as he believes those shipments have not yielded 25 per cent. Manufactures in America have made an alarming progress within two years; but thinks that if the intercourse was speedily thrown open, they would be effectually checked. *Would ship his goods to America the moment the orders in council were rescinded,* having positive and specific instructions from his correspondent to that effect. Knows houses in Birmingham, who have goods ready to ship to America, which cost them 70,000*l.* 50,000*l.* 40,000*l.* 25,000*l.* 20,000*l.* and workmen have emigrated from Birmingham to America. *Has no doubt that if the American trade was opened, the distress in Birmingham would instantly cease.*

Mr. WILLIAM BLAKEWAY, Lamp Manufacturer of Birmingham.—Goods principally sent to America. Trade so much diminished that he would have stopped his business altogether, had it not been for regard for his workmen, by whom he has been gaining money for twenty years. Stock so much accumulated that nearly the whole of his capital is absorbed by it. *Unless the American market is opened, cannot keep on his hands at all.* Has hitherto borne the sufferings of his workmen himself, but will be compelled to discharge them, however reluctant to do so. *Has sought, but not found relief in any other market.* Recollects the scarcity in 1800, and 1801: but the distress was not at all equal to the present, because there was plenty of work.

Mr. JAMES RYLAND, of Birmingham, manufacturer of plated coach harness and saddle furniture.—*Principal part of his manufacture exported to the United States.* Previous to 1808, the export was very considerable and increasing, the returns prompt, and payment sure. Workmen who formerly earned 30 to 40*s.* per week, now get about 20*s.* and those who used to get 20*s.* now earn about 11 or 12*s.* *Shelves loaded with stock, and the greater part of his capital absorbed in it.* Two-thirds of the workmen employed in this business must be discharged, if no favourable change takes place. *Since the falling off of the American market, has opened a house in London; but has found so many persons flocking to the same market, that he has been able to carry it on with very little success.* Previous to the orders in council, the trade was in a very flourishing state: they were full of orders, and their men full of work. Has received no relief from the South American market; and knows no market equal to that of the United States, for the sale of this manufacture.

May 4, 1812.

Mr. JEREMIAH RIDOUT, merchant, of Birmingham.—Has goods to the value of 20,000*l.* prepared for the American market, which he would instantl

ship if the orders in council were removed, being so advised by his partner in America. The workmen very much distressed; "I have seen people shed tears; I have confined myself behind the door for fear of seeing those people, lest they should importune me to give them orders; they have told me they did not know what to do. One man said, 'what can I do? if I go to the magistrate, he will tell me to go for a soldier; I am a married man, and God knows what I must do unless I steal, and then I shall go to Botany Bay.' I do not like such words; I cannot bear it."

Mr. GEORGE ROOM, Jannper, of Birmingham, has manufactured principally for America, which is *the best market he ever knew, after trying every one.*—Workmen in general have not more than half work. Has tried the home trade; but the competition is so great, and prices so much reduced, that it was not worth going after. Has found very little relief from the trade to Sicily and Portugal, which is the only foreign European trade they have had, and which *does not bear any thing like a comparison to the American trade.* From 600 to 1000 hands employed in this business in Birmingham alone: and there are great manufactories in Bilston and Wolverhampton.

Mr. ROBERT FIDDIAN, manufacturer of brass candlesticks, &c. at Birmingham, chiefly for home consumption. Trade much diminished within the last 12 months, and earnings of workmen reduced one-fourth. Had a conversation with some of his men on the subject of dismissal; they entreated him not to dismiss them, saying, "you know we cannot get employment elsewhere," and begged that he would apportion the work among them, and let each bear a share of the burden. Stock very much increasing, and will be obliged to dismiss a number of his men, unless an alteration takes place speedily. *Has no doubt that his trade would be put into its former profitable situation, if the American trade was again opened.*

Mr. JOSEPH WEBSTER, wire manufacturer, of Birmingham.—*Half his manufacture for the American market, and half for the home trade.* The demand very much diminished, so that although his manufacture is reduced, his stock is much increased. *Has orders from America, which would exhaust all his great stock on hand, if the orders in council were repealed.* If no favourable change takes place, he shall feel himself compelled to discharge a great number of his men.

May 5, 1812.

Mr. JOSHUA SCHOLFIELD, American merchant, Birmingham.—Trade first began to fail in 1808. In 1809, rather better, but still very limited. In 1810, very large shipments for one season. The goods for 1811 now lying in Liverpool. *Has orders from America to ship as soon as the orders in council are removed, as soon as the trade is opened.* Has had frequent advices from his agent resident in America, that manufactures are very fast increasing there, and has reason to know it from particular circumstances. One particular article now in great demand is card wire, for the manufacture of cotton and wool cards, which are wanted for their machinery. Has had the article of nails countermanded on the ground that they can be manufactured cheaper in America than they can be imported. *Has had many painful opportunities of witnessing the distress which prevails among the lower orders of the people in Birmingham; believes it to be extreme.* Has a warehouse in Wolverhampton: *the lower orders in quite as great distress there; their goods may be bought at any price; there are many small manufacturers there, who are selling some of their stock at, he believes, a lower rate than it cost them.* *Attributes the distresses of the trade and manufactures principally to the orders in council, believing them to be the cause of the non-intercourse with America.* Has the most painful forebodings that the continuance of the restrictions upon the American trade will give great encouragement to the increase of manufactures in America.

Mr. JOHN BAILEY, merchant, of Sheffield. The manufactures of Sheffield, or the supply of the market of the United States, employ 6000 persons, besides others dependent on that trade. *The export to America is about one-third of the whole manufactures of Sheffield.* About one-tenth of the usual spring shipment

was made in 1811, and none since. Stock of goods have been increasing in Sheffield, to a considerable extent; but *there are orders for shipment to America, immediately on the rescinding of the orders in council.* Information from a large manufacturer, that *he now pays one-sixth part of the wages which he did when the American trade was open*; and that one-half of what he has manufactured for the last fifteen months, is now dead stock. Another of the principal manufacturers informed him, that *he now employs only half of his usual number of men, whom he employs only four days in a week*; that he retains them from a principle of humanity, as they have grown old in his service, and that he still holds in stock all his goods made in the last eighteen months. Believes this to be a fair specimen of the general state of manufactures in Sheffield. His orders for shipment, on the removal of the orders in council, amount to the whole twelve months shipments. *The amount of Sheffield goods ready for shipment to America 400,000*l.* and orders on hand to the same amount.* Poor rates of Sheffield, year ending 1807, 11,000*l.*: now 18,000*l.* Workmen's wages not reduced: but they are now only employed about three days in the week. Every man fully employed before the loss of the American trade. *Lower classes never so much distressed as at present.* Some articles which were formerly exported from Sheffield, are now manufactured in America.

May 13, 1812.

Mr. WILLIAM MIDGELY, woollen manufacturer, of Rochdale, Lancashire.—The parish contains about 36,000 inhabitants, of which about one half are employed in this manufacture. He formerly employed about 600 hands, now about 400. Began to turn off his hands when his stock became very large, about six months ago. Stock is still increasing, and larger than it was before: and the home trade has fallen off very much indeed. Has in a considerable degree exhausted his capital in trade, “and if there be not an opening, it is impossible to keep on my work people; and I am distressed about the poor people, for they have not, many of them, half victuals now.” If the market continues as it is now, must turn off 200 of his hands, and if they are turned off, does not see where they can get work any where else. Has lived in Rochdale most of his life time, and been in business thirty years, but *never knew the distress so great as at present.* “*The distress is to be seen in the people's countenances, every week getting thinner and looking worse; those that had a little money have had to take it, and they are almost run out of it; they have spent what little they had to buy bread.*” About two-fifths of this manufacture for the United States of America, and none for foreign Europe. Has very large orders for America, which should have gone off more than 12 months ago. Has found that market, a steady, sure, and increasing one. Workmen's wages reduced. Price of oatmeal twelve months ago 2*d.* per pound, now 3*d.* If the trade to America was opened, there would be fair employment for the manufacturers of Rochdale.

Mr. THOMAS SHORT, manufacturer of hosiery at Hinckley, in Leicester-shire.—The total number of persons employed in the manufacture at Hinckley, and the adjoining villages, nearly 3,000. About one-third to one-fourth of the manufacture is for the American market, and the value about 30,000*l.* per annum. In good times employs upwards of 200 hands, now employs about two-thirds of the number. *In consequence of the loss of the American market, the manufacturers in general state they must turn off one half of their hands, if the demand is not greater than at present.* Twelve to fourteen hundred persons now unemployed. The home trade is much injured by the competition of persons formerly in the foreign trade; and now affords no profit.

May 14, 1812.

Mr. WILLIAM THOMPSON, woollen manufacturer, of Rawden, near Leeds. Has been in business 30 years. In 1810 employed 650 hands, and manufactured 6,000 pieces of goods for the American market. *In the last year made 4,000 pieces, and has dismissed 200 hands.* His stock of goods, worth upwards of 90,000*l.* being much greater than at any former period. The remaining hands have not more than one-third work. In good times his men earned

from 16s. to 30s. a week, and now only one-third. *Never knew the poor in so distressed a state before*; not even when corn was dearer in 1800; they had plenty of work at that time. "The distress of the workmen is very evident by their countenance, and by the raggedness of their dress. They are evidently in a worse situation than I ever knew them before." If a favourable change does not take place, must dismiss the whole of his hands, as the heavy stock of goods renders it out of his power to continue them. Made a small shipment to South America about twelve months ago, but has not yet received any returns; and will not ship farther at present. Made a shipment to Canada, value 30,000*l.* about fourteen months ago, for which he has not yet received one-sixth; and those goods that did sell were to a considerable loss, say from 25 to 30 per cent. *If there was an open trade to America, all the distresses would be very shortly removed*; activity would be resumed, and the countenances of the poor would change very fast; if that were once effected, it would give a general spring to our neighbourhood. *Has orders from America for the whole of his goods, provided the orders in council were rescinded.*

Mr. CHRISTOPHER LAWSON, woollen merchant, of Leeds. In good times exported to America, to the value of 80,000*l.* annually. Present stock of goods 40,000*l.* Made a shipment to Amelia Island in 1811, under the idea that it might get into America, but it remains there at present. Conceives all the merchants trading to America are in the same state. *The common calculation is, that Yorkshire goods are exported to America, to the amount of two millions annually.* Great complaints have been made of the home market for the last six months. Has orders for goods to be shipped to America, on the repeal of the orders in council.

May 15, 1812.

Mr. DAVID SHEARD, blanket and flushing manufacturer, of the parish of Dewsbury. In good times employs about 800 hands: 100 of them are now quite out of employ, and the remainder have one-third, or one-fourth work. The average wages of men, women and children, in good times, were 11s. a week, and are now 3s. 9*d.* The manufacturers have given over accumulating stock; they do not wish to run into debt, and the money they had is all made up into goods. Weekly wages paid in the hamlet, in good times, used to be 469*l.* now 294*l.* Thinks the home trade as good as it was. Trade began to fall off in the beginning of 1811: and among the lower orders of people **THERE IS VERY GREAT DISTRESS INDEED.** If favourable circumstances do not turn up, will be obliged to turn off half the hands he now employs. Had a good trade before the intercourse with America was stopped.

Mr. FRANCIS PLATT, merchant and woollen manufacturer, of Saddleworth. The trade has fallen off very considerably since 1810, owing to the want of American trade. His own stock of goods larger than ever it was before, being nearly 30,000*l.* The district of Saddleworth contains a population of nearly 12,000 persons, most of whom are engaged in the woollen business, and they do not now get half the work they used to have. His capital absorbed in goods, and if there is not a market soon, must discharge his men in toto; which is the case with manufacturers in general in that district. *In 40 or 50 years he has never known the distress equal to the present.*—Great numbers of the people never taste animal food at all: their principal food is oatmeal boiled in water; and sometimes potatoes for dinner. Was informed, by a very honest man, that he, his wife, and all his children, had to go to bed, and had not even a morsel of that oatmeal and water to put into their mouths. Was also informed by another that he had got some little oatmeal, and boiled it in water; that he had to wet it in water instead of milk, or any other liquid, with his food. The people have been very peaceable in this parish; and is certain they will remain so, provided they could get employment, or any thing near full employment: they have no disposition at all to riot. Has enquired in some instances whether the poor have received parish relief; but believes that in the principal part of the manufacturing districts, the poor would nearly starve, probably not to death, but pretty close to it, before they went to the parish; for this reason—they have not been ac-

customed to it, and it is a kind of disgrace or something of that kind, and they will not go to it if they can get half work and half wages; they will take every means in their power to keep off the parish. Oatmeal is 3 1-2d to 4d the pound, or double the usual price. Potatoes are about the same proportion; never knew them any thing like so high as they are at present. Has no doubt that if goods could be shipped to America, there would be work. The poor are not well clothed.

May 20, 1812.

Mr. JOHN HOFFMAN, churchwarden of the parish of Spital Fields.—The looms employed in the manufactures of Spital Fields, about 17,000, to 20,000; and about 5,000 of them are in the parish of Spital Fields, *where at least one half of the weavers are out of employment, and the lower orders in a most deplorable state.* *More than one instance has occurred, where THEY HAD DIED LITERALLY FOR WANT.* Soup distributed is about 3,000 to 4,000 quarts a day. Has dismissed a considerable number of his hands, who were employed in the silk trade. The light silks of Spital Fields sell in America; of other sorts the French are cheaper than ours. If the American trade was open, there would be an opportunity of sending a considerable quantity of goods there; has in the course of some years, manufactured goods for the American market, principally of the slight quality. Within these two years there has been no trade to America; and therefore he was obliged to turn off his hands employed for that particular trade. If the trade was opened again, has no hesitation in saying those very articles would find sale there; and he would take back the hands he had dismissed, which he believes is the case with others in the same line as himself. In October last he purchased potatoes for the workhouse at 3l. 10s. per ton; within the last six weeks, they have been selling in Spital Fields market, at 12l. 13l. and 14l. a ton. *Persons who have died for want, have applied for, and obtained relief: but they were too far gone before they made application; has uniformly found that the industrious poor will never apply for relief till the very last extremity.* Believes that more than a fifth of the silk manufactured in Spital Fields went to America; and more than one third of his own manufacture, for seven years, was for the American market. The want of an adequate supply of raw silk, has been one great cause of the want of employ, and consequent distress of the manufacturers.

May 25, 1812.

Mr. SHAKSPEARE PHILLIPS, merchant, of Manchester,—was examined by the house four years ago upon the orders in council. Is an exporter of manufactured goods to the United States of America, when the trade is open. Has a great stock of goods on hand, which is the case of the manufacturers in general. *Has orders to a very large amount to be shipped in the event of the orders in council being rescinded.* Has no doubt that orders of this kind, which are now in Manchester, would, if executed, greatly relieve the distress of that place. *The state of the workmen in Manchester and the neighbourhood is very deplorable.* They are deficient in work, and are working at extremely low wages. If the American trade was open, would not fear the competition of the American manufactures in the market, as he conceives they are only forced into that measure. Several adventures, which he had made to South America, have left a considerable loss. Cannot state the proportion which the American market bears to the general manufactory of Manchester and its neighbourhood; but from his knowledge of its vast influence upon the manufacture in general, is convinced that the exports annually amount to an enormous sum. Has no doubt that if the American market was freely open, there would be full employment for the labouring manufacturers of Manchester. When the trade with America from France and this country were both open, did not experience the least competition in the cotton manufactures on the part of France, and has not the least apprehension of any. The present duty on raw cotton in France being about 3s. a pound, amounts to a prohibition; and any country imposing such a duty cannot seriously intend to establish any great manufacture.

I trust there is here superabundant testimony of the transcendent folly and madness, as well as of the flagrant injustice of

the system pursued by the British ministry, which inflicted so much misery and wretchedness on that interesting and valuable class of subjects, the manufacturers and artizans. The testimony is equally strong against the folly of such of our fellow citizens, as, by rendering nugatory the restrictive system, so fatally involved in the horrors of a wasting war, two great nations whom ten thousand motives arising from mutual interests—common descent—congenial manners—and sameness of language—ought to have impelled to cultivate the strictest ties of friendship.

During the progress of these examinations, on the 21st of May, the official repeal of the French decrees was communicated by Mr. Russel, the American minister, to the court of St. James. But notwithstanding the solemn pledge of the British ministry to proceed *pari passu* with the French government, in the business of repeal, there was no step taken respecting a repeal of the orders in council, till the 23d of June, that is, for nearly five weeks. Nothing was done till after the whole examination was completed, and until after an address had been moved in the house of commons, for the repeal, by Mr. Brougham, on the 17th of June, grounded on the result of the examinations, which was withdrawn by the mover, on a pledge by the ministers, that the orders would be repealed.

As a palliation for this delay, it is stated that the assassination of Mr. Percival, the British premier, on the 11th of May, distracted the attention of the ministry, and prevented the redemption of the pledge. This palliation will not bear a moment's reflection. The parliamentary examination was predicated on the injury the British trade suffered—and had hardly the slightest regard to any other consideration. And as I have stated, the revocation of the orders in council was not attempted till that examination was finished. Nearly five weeks [thirty-three days] had elapsed from the notification of the French repeal, and forty-three days from the death of Mr. Percival. And no man can pretend that one or two weeks would not have been abundantly sufficient.

To prove the charge I have adduced against the British ministry of gross impolicy, as well as injustice, in their treatment of this country, which led to the wasting war so injurious to both nations, I submit to the reader, part of a speech delivered in the British house of commons, by Mr. Whitbread, on the 13th of February, 1812, about four months previous to the declaration of hostilities, embracing a review of the diplomatic intercourse between the two countries.

“Of Mr. Pinkney he need say little: he was a man of sound sense and judgment, of an able and acute mind, and of the highest reputation. He was a man who had conducted himself during his residence in this country, in a manner most honourable to himself, and likely to benefit both nations. At all times, taking the most impartial view of the different interests concerned, his

conduct, though firm, had been most conciliatory. Without losing sight of the claims of his country, with which he was intrusted, he had at all times approached the ministers with whom he was in treaty, with respect, attention, and deference. Firm to his purpose, and able to elucidate the subjects under discussion, he had never failed in time, punctuality, or mode of procedure, in his mission. *He would he could say as much for those with whom Mr. Pinkney had intercourse.* But it was not so: and it was impossible to say, that gentleman had been treated with the proper and punctilious ceremony he merited by the marquis Wellesley. At the period when this correspondence commenced, a great soreness prevailed in America, on account of the rupture with Mr. Jackson. *The feelings of that country were in a state of extreme irritation;* and this topic was the subject of Mr. Pinkney's first letter to the noble marquis. One would have thought at such a time that a minister would have felt that no want of decorum or attention on his part, should be superadded to augment the unpleasant feeling already too prevalent; but it so happened, that to this very letter of Mr. Pinkney, of the 2d January, on the subject of another minister's being appointed in the room of Mr. Jackson, no answer was returned, *until the 14th of March.* Upwards of two months of precious time were wasted, during which Mr. Pinkney, aware that some time might be necessary, waited with the most patient respect and decorum.

"On the 15th of February, the American minister again wrote to the British secretary, on the subject of our blockade, one of the most important in discussion, and in all its bearings, between the two countries. To this no answer was returned till March 2. Again, on the 30th of April, Mr. Pinkney addressed a letter to lord Wellesley, relative to the Berlin and Milan decrees, which were considered as the chief source of all the existing differences, and therefore merited the most earnest and immediate attention; but to this letter no answer was ever returned.

"On the 4th of May following, another letter was sent to our foreign secretary, *complaining of the forging of ships' papers, carried on in London, by which British ships and property were made to appear as American.* This traffic was alleged to be openly and notoriously carried on: *and it was not possible to conceive one more infamous to the nation where practised, or injurious to the country against which it was directed.* Yet THIS CHARGE OF INFAMY AGAINST BRITAIN, THIS INJUSTICE AND INJURY TO AMERICA, WAS PASSED OVER IN UTTER SILENCE, AND NO ANSWER WHATEVER TO THE LETTER WAS RETURNED.

"On the 23d of June, Mr. Pinkney again wrote, referring to his letter of the 30th of April, on the subject of the Berlin and Milan decrees, and requesting an answer; but no answer was returned. On the 7th of July he wrote again relative to the appointment of a minister in the room of Mr. Jackson, (his first subject on the 2d of January) and even at this distance of time received no official answer, but merely a verbal assurance or private note, that a minister would be immediately sent out. On the 8th of August, Mr. Pinkney once more wrote, referring to his letters of the 23d June and 30th April; but could obtain no answer.

"On the 21st August, he again by letter pressed the subject of blockade; but could obtain no answer. On the 25th of the same month, he again wrote to state the revocation of the Berlin and Milan decrees; and to this communication our minister at length condescended to send a reply. The next part of the correspondence was another letter from Mr. Pinkney, relative to a misapprehension of Sir James Saumarez, on the nature of the blockade of Elsinour, and on the impressing of certain seamen from an American ship. To the former subject an answer was returned; *but of the latter no notice was taken.* He had indeed been much surprised at the whole course of this correspondence; but at this particular period his astonishment was greater than ever. *That a subject so keenly felt by America, as the impressing of her citizens, should be entirely passed over in silence, was beyond all former neglect and inattention.*

"All the world knew that this point was the one on which the greatest difficulty existed in negotiating an amicable adjustment between the two countries; and that *our conduct towards American seamen stood more in the way of con-*

ciliation than any other matter whatever. Surely then such an opportunity ought not to have been neglected; surely it was the duty of the British minister to show, by his speedy attention to the subject, that he was as anxious to evince the spirit of conciliation as to profess it; and that, knowing how fatal to the interest of this country a rupture with America would be, he would have eagerly embraced the opening presenting itself, to demonstrate our amicable intentions, and remove one of the sorest grievances complained of. But, no! reluctantly and coldly was the answer on this subject wrung forth—not from the noble secretary, not by letter from him, but practically by the discharge of these seamen, by Sir William Scott, in the court of admiralty, thereby acknowledging and declaring the right and justice of the claim urged on the part of America. This was the conciliation of the noble secretary, that he permitted the sentence of a court of justice, to give a practical answer to a foreign minister, whom he would not take the trouble of putting pen to paper to satisfy on so interesting a point.

“On the 21st of September, Mr. Pinkney found it necessary again to address the British government; and referring to his letters of the 30th April, 23d June, and 8th August, on the subject of the Berlin and Milan decrees, he urged an immediate answer, as his government had long been in expectation of a communication on that head. Again, on the 8th and 10th December, he wrote; and *with these letters concluded his correspondence, being unable to obtain any satisfactory information; and soon after he demanded his audience of leave of the Prince Regent.*”

The wretched and depredating system pursued by the British ministry, has in its consequences produced the most salutary effects on this country, and inflicted the most serious and vital injury on Great Britain. It has accelerated the progress of our manufactures more in five or six years, than in the common course of events would have taken place in thirty. It has, in a very great degree, emancipated us from our former slavish dependence on the looms and the anvils of Great Britain. And on the subject of naval affairs, it is impossible to estimate the injury Great Britain has received by it, or the glory the United States have acquired. The vaunted prowess of England, her towering pretensions to naval pre-eminence, that character which in former naval conflicts prepared her sailors for victory, and her enemies for defeat, are irretrievably tarnished in a contest with the youngest maritime power in the world.

CHAPTER LXI.

England said to be struggling for her existence. This no palliation of her outrages on neutral nations. Attack on Copenhagen.

AMONG the various errors lately prevalent, and pregnant with baneful consequences, a very important one was, that the European war on the part of England was a war for her existence—and this has been alleged not merely as a palliation, but as a justification of her outrages upon our citizens and upon our commerce. The outrages and depredations she perpetrated, were covered over with this mantle of oblivion, for the purpose of defaming the administration that resisted them.

I have already touched on this subject incidentally. It requires further elucidation. And at the hazard of repetition, I resume it.

The most important aggressions of England on the commerce of this country, may be referred to four epochs—

1. The lawless and predatory captures in 1793, during the administration of gen. Washington.

2. The application in 1805, of the rule of 1756, without any previous notice or warning, and, to aggravate the enormity, against her own exposition of the law of nations, and against the decisions of her courts of admiralty; whereby the seas were swept of the American vessels and commerce.

3. The paper blockade by Charles J. Fox's administration, of the coast from the Elbe to Brest, an extent of 800 miles.

4. The orders in council of Nov. 1807.

Of these in due course.

1. Lord Castlereagh himself, or the marquis of Wellesley, would not dare to assert that the depredations in 1793 could be palliated by the jeopardy of her existence. They were wanton, unprovoked, lawless, and predatory to the last degree. General Washington presided over the destinies of this country. He had resolved on and observed a fair and impartial neutrality. The manner, and time, and circumstances, were as monstrous as the measure itself.

2. On the subject of the predatory system of 1805, I shall merely refer the reader to the mercantile memorials of that period* written and signed by men who have since as ably defended and justified the conduct of England, as at that period they unqualifiedly reprobated and denounced it. This change in their opinions and conduct changes not the nature of the facts. For the proceedings of the British ministry at that period, every honourable Englishman must blush. They were unworthy of, and disgraceful to, a mighty and respectable nation.

3. Charles James Fox's blockade was a gross violation of the laws of nations.—It was in direct hostility with previous declarations made by that statesman himself—as well as with the honourable and indeed the only legal definition of a blockade, previously given to our government by Mr. Merry, the British minister here, as follows :—

“Admiralty Office, January 5, 1804.

“Sir,

“Having communicated to the lords of the admiralty, lord Hawkesbury's letter of the 23d ult. enclosing the copy of a dispatch which his lordship had received from Mr. Thornton, his majesty's charge d'affaires in America, on the subject of the blockade of the islands of Martinique and Gaudaloupe, together with the report of the advocate general thereupon, I have their lord-

* See chapters xiv, xv, and xvii

ships' command to acquaint you, for his lordship's information, that they have sent orders to commodore Hood, not to consider any blockade as existing, *unless in respect to particular ports which may be actually invested*; and then not to capture vessels bound to such ports, unless they shall previously have been warned not to enter them; and that they have also sent the necessary directions on the subject to the judges of the vice-admiralty courts in the West Indies and America.

"I am, &c.

George Hammond, Esq.

EVAN NEPEAN."

Here is the only fair, and honest, and honourable exposition of the law of nations on this subject, laid down by England herself. This letter stands on eternal record—and seals the irrevocable condemnation of that vile predatory system, whereby, according to George Cabot, James Lloyd, and the other Boston memorialists, she was, during the course of the French war, "PREYING UPON THE UNPROTECTED PROPERTY OF A FRIENDLY POWER."* If lord Castlereagh, the marquis of Wellesley, lord Cathcart, George Canning, Mr. Rose, or Mr. War-in-Disguise, should find this accusation somewhat indigestible, let them hurl the gauntlet at Mr. Lloyd and his friends.

4. The orders in council close the catalogue. They will form an eternal blot on the escutcheon of the administration by which they were enacted, and so long supported. For their impolicy the reader is referred to chapter LV. It was at least equal to their flagrant injustice.

From the 1st of March, 1809, they lost whatever plea or palliation might have previously existed for them. The non-intercourse act, passed on that day, put it in the power of Great Britain, at any hour she pleased, to open our ports to her trade and navigation—to shut them against the vessels and trade of France—and in effect to have ultimately produced war between that nation and the United States.

The refusal of this offer was a clear, convincing, and unanswerable proof, that her sole object was monopoly: and that, in the language of Mr. Bayard, retaliation was merely "a pretence." Her depredations were committed without intermission. Let any honest Englishman—any candid federalist, now that the reign of delusion has terminated, say, were these depredations, to pass over their immorality and injustice, such measures, as, on mere principles of policy, "*a nation struggling for her existence*," ought to have adopted? Was it just, or proper, or prudent, for "*a nation struggling for her existence*," to violate the rights, and to plunder the property, of an unoffending neutral, and risk a war with that neutral? Surely not.

In a word, let Timothy Pickering, Rufus King, George Cabot, or governor Strong, decide, whether the conduct of Great

* Let it be observed that the predatory system of 1805, denounced by the Boston memorialists, as "*preying upon the unprotected property of a friendly power*," was incomparably less unjust and more defensible than the subsequent outrages perpetrated on American commerce.

Britain on the ocean were not as unjust, as arbitrary, and as lawless, as that of Bonaparte on terra firma? Whether the clandestine orders of 1793, and those of 1805, were not as perfidious, as faithless, and as utterly indefensible, as any act of the French emperor? And finally, to sum up the whole, whether there be in the history of mankind any act much more atrocious than the attack upon Copenhagen, the capital of an innocent and respectable neutral, for the purpose of seizing her fleet? Whether this act, and the perfidious conduct of Bonaparte towards Spain, are not exactly of the same character?

“ Amidst all the convulsions which Europe had experienced in consequence of the revolution in France, the kingdom of Denmark had, by the wise and temperate policy of her ruler, been in a great measure preserved from the fatal consequences of those commotions which had overturned governments of much greater political consequence. This had been accomplished, not by humiliating himself to any of the belligerent powers; not by espousing the cause of such of them as appeared for the moment to be successful; but by maintaining a firm, dignified, and undeviating independence, neither influenced by intrigues nor intimidated by threats. Her naval and military establishments, though not great, were respectable; and, combined with the natural advantages of her situation, might justify her in the hopes of defending herself with success against any enemy that should attempt to infringe upon her neutrality. In order to defend this neutrality, the Danish government had, for a considerable time past, concentrated its army on its continental frontiers; and it has been stated, that this measure was adopted at the instance of Great Britain, as being favourable to the protection of her commerce. In this situation the British fleet, with a large military force, arrived on the coast of Zealand, where the Danish government saw no reason to recognize them in any other character than that of friends and protectors. They were there joined by the German legion from the isle of Rugen: and Mr. Jackson, the British resident at Copenhagen, according to the instructions received from his court, demanded from the *Danish government* THE SURRENDER OF ITS NAVY TO HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY, to be retained by him until the restoration of a general peace. This proposition was indignantly rejected; in consequence of which the troops were landed; and a proclamation was published by Lord Cathcart, the commander-in-chief, stating the motives and objects of such a proceeding, and threatening, that in case of resistance, *the city of Copenhagen* should be desolated BY EVERY POSSIBLE MEANS OF DEVASTATION. Unprepared as the city then was, the crown prince gave orders that it should be defended to the last extremity. Of the Danish navy, not a ship was rigged, and the crews were absent. On the second day of September, the British troops commenced the attack, on three sides of the city, which continued for several days without intermission; during which 6,500 shells were thrown into the town, which was soon on fire in upwards of thirty places. The timber-yards were consumed; the powder magazine blew up; the steeple of the cathedral church was in a blaze, and fell amidst the continual shouts of the British troops. From the mode of attack which had been adopted, *hostilities were not confined to the Danish soldiery and the armed burghers engaged in the defence of the city; but extended to the inhabitants of both sexes—the aged, the young, the infirm, the sick, and the helpless, for whose safety no opportunity was afforded of providing, and great numbers of whom perished by the bursting of shells, the fire of the artillery, and the innumerable accidents consequent on so dreadful and unexpected an attack.* It soon appeared that the city was unable to make an effectual resistance: the British forces having approached with their trenches so near, as to be enabled to set it on fire whenever they pleased. To prevent this consummation of misery, the Danish commander assented to terms of capitulation, by which he agreed to surrender up the fleet, upon condition that the British army should evacuate

the island of Zealand within six weeks, and that public and private property should in the mean time be respected.”*

Of these horrible scenes, worthy of Alaric, Attila, or Genghis Khan, it is impossible to read, without shuddering with horror. Every Englishman, who possesses a due sense of national honour, must deplore the stain they have impressed on the escutcheon of his native land—and must join in the execration to which the upright part of mankind have consigned and will eternally consign the ministers who planned and ordered the perpetration of such a scene of barbarous and merciless outrage.

Away then for ever with the miserable cant of “*a struggle for her existence*,” as not merely a palliative, but a justification of “**PREYING UPON THE UNPROTECTED PROPERTY OF A FRIENDLY POWER.**”† This high and damning accusation against Great Britain, of “*preying upon the unprotected property of a friendly power*” was advanced, as I have repeatedly had occasion to state, by George Cabot, James Lloyd, Thomas Perkins, Arnold Welles, and the other Boston merchants who signed the memorial to congress in 1805; but who have, from that period to the present, inconsistently been the advocates of the British, and the accusers of their own government.

Every nation at war may be said “*to struggle for her existence.*” But she is not *therefore* to “*struggle*” her unoffending neighbours out of their ships, their seamen, their property, or their dearest rights of sovereignty, to help to preserve herself in “*a struggle*,” created by lawless ambition.

Not many months have elapsed since the United States, contending single-handed against the most formidable naval power that ever existed, might be most emphatically and most correctly said to be “*struggling for their existence*,” which was really and truly jeopardized. What consummate folly and madness, as well as injustice, would it have been, to have commenced depredations on the commerce of Russia, France, Spain, or Holland, and to add one or more of those nations to the list of our enemies? At such a critical time, it becomes nations to “carry their faculties so meek” as to give no reasonable cause of offence. If, therefore, the idea be correct, that Great Britain was really “*struggling for her existence*,” so far from justifying or palliating her irritating and outrageous conduct towards the United States, which ultimately goaded us into war, it only more fully proves the dire insanity of those fatuitous and ruinous counsels by which her affairs were directed.

* “Roscoe’s view of the causes, objects, and consequences, of the present war—and on the expediency or the danger of a peace with France,” page 42.

† See Boston memorial, Chap. 11.

CHAPTER LXII.

*The loud clamour raised by the eastern states on the subject of representation wholly unfounded. The result of factious delusion. Statistics. Examination of the representation in the Senate.**

To reconcile the people of the eastern states to the parricidal project of a dissolution of the union, there has been a fearful outcry raised on the subject of its inequalities and disadvantages, and its oppressive operation on that portion of the nation, particularly in regard to the representation in the lower house of congress. The most extravagant errors are afloat on this topic. It is generally believed, that the southern states have an enormous and undue influence in that body, in consequence of taking the slaves into account in fixing the number of its members.

I waive, for a few minutes, the consideration how far this inequality and injustice exist. For sake of argument, I will admit them for the present. And I respectfully ask the reader, whether it be possible to form a partnership or connexion of any kind, without inequality? Take any species you choose. Examine the talents, the address, the capital, the means of promoting the joint interests of the concern; you will find that there is in some—perhaps in all these respects—a considerable inequality; that one party has an advantage in respect to understanding, or influence, and another in point of capital or skill—or in some of the various ways in which men differ from their fellow mortals. Go to the married state. And I aver, that it is almost absolutely impossible to form any connexion whatever with a perfect equality.

This being obviously and strikingly the case in those simple associations which I have considered, how could it be supposed that so delicate and complicated an association as that of thirteen independent sovereignties, more or less various in their habits, in their productions, in their climates, in their population, in their pursuits, could have been formed without a spirit of compromise—without a mutual balancing of advantages and disadvantages? To expect it, would be the quintessence of folly.

But the reader will doubtless be astonished, when he finds what is the real state of the case. He will be convinced, that the alleged grievances which have been made the instruments of exciting the angry passions of our eastern brethren, and preparing them for rebellion, have no existence. Let the two legislative bodies be combined together, and it will be obvious, that the eastern states have had, and still have, rather more than the share of influence to which their white population entitles them.

* This, and the two succeeding chapters, are extracted from a pamphlet, published Nov. 28, 1814, by the author of the Olive Branch, and entitled "A Calm Address to the people of the Eastern States."

I have taken some pains to make the calculations requisite, in order to lay the real state of the case before the public : and I submit the result in both branches of the legislature.

Examination of the representation of the eastern states in the Senate of the United States, on the ground of white population only, since the organization of the government.

Population of the United States, Anno 1790,	3,929,326
Deduct slaves, - - - - -	697,697
White population, - - - - -	3,231,629
Total population of the eastern states, -	1,009,522
Deduct slaves, - - - - -	3,886
White population, - - - - -	1,005,636

Total number of Senators, 28.

As 3,231,629 : 28 :: 1,005,636 : 8.713

Thus, their exact proportion, had the slaves been rejected, was 8.713 ; whereas they had ten senators.

Population of the United States, Anno 1800,	5,303,666
Deduct slaves, - - - - -	896,849
White population, - - - - -	4,406,817
Population of the eastern states - - - - -	1,233,011
Deduct slaves, - - - - -	1,339
White population, - - - - -	1,231,672

Total number of Senators, 34.

As 4,406,817 : 34 :: 1,231,672 : 9.502.

Here, again, they had more than their proportion, which was 9.502 ; whereas, they had ten.

Population of the United States, Anno 1810,	7,239,903
Deduct slaves, - - - - -	1,191,364
White population, - - - - -	6,048,539
White population of the eastern states, -	1,471,973

Total number of Senators, 36.

As 6,048,539 : 36 :: 1,471,973 : 8.760.

On this recent census, their proper proportion is 8.760 : whereas, they have, as before, ten.

Thus it is evident that the eastern states have had in the senate, more than their due proportion of influence from the commencement of the government—and that in the present senate they have actually 14 per cent. more than they are entitled to, *taking into consideration merely the white population of the nation, notwithstanding the introduction of new states.*

Who can forget the daring threat held out by Mr. Quincey, of resistance to the introduction of new states, "*amicably if they could, violently if they must ?*"

"Mr. Quincey repeated and justified a remark he had made ; which, to save all misapprehension, he committed to writing in the following words : — "If this bill passes, it is my deliberate opinion, that it is virtually A DISSOLUTION OF THE UNION ; that it will free the states from their moral obligation ; and as it will be *the right of all*, so it will be *the duty of some*, TO PREPARE FOR A SEPARATION, *amicably if they can—VIOLENTLY IF THEY MUST.*"*

Any person unacquainted with the subject, to have heard or read Mr. Quincey's speeches, would have concluded—and not unreasonably—that some lawless outrage had been perpetrated on the section of the union which he represented ; and that it was robbed of its due share of influence in the senate by that measure. How astonished must he be to find, that from the organization of the government, the fact has been directly the reverse ; that it has had more than its due share of influence ; and that the other sections of the union have had solid and substantial causes of complaint on this subject !

CHAPTER LXIII.

Statistics continued. Slave representation fairly stated. Result.

THE state of the representation in the lower house, to which the loud complaints of Francis Blake, Mr. Lowell, Mr. Harrison Gray Otis, and their friends, particularly refer, remains to be considered. They have been but too successful in persuading their fellow-citizens, that to the fatal source of slave representation may be ascribed all the manifold oppressions, and injustice, which, they allege, the eastern states have experienced.

There is probably not one man in a thousand who has a conception how very slight the inequality is here. I have asked a number of intelligent and well-informed men their opinions—and some surmised 100 per cent. beyond the truth—others were wide of it 200 per cent.

What must be your amazement, reader, to learn, that if all the slaves in the United States were discarded, in the apportionment of members of the house of representatives of the United States, it would make a difference of only three in the number of representatives of the eastern states ?

* National Intelligencer, Jan. 15, 1811, in the debate on the admission of Louisiana as a state.

The white population of the United States at the late census, was - - - - - 6,048,539
That of the eastern states, - - - - - 1,471,973

Total number of members, 182.

Actual representatives of the five eastern states 41.

As 6,048,539 : 182 :: 1,471,973 :: 44,0048.

Thus it appears, that were the representation graduated by the white population alone, the eastern states would be entitled to but 44 representatives. Therefore, the injury they suffer by the admission of the slaves, is only a reduction of three members, in a body of 182—whereas they have one and a quarter more than they are entitled to in the senate, a body of 36 members. That is to say, and let it be borne in remembrance, in one branch they are not two per cent. below their proportion—and in the other branch, which is by far the more influential and powerful, they have about 14 per cent. more than they are fairly entitled to by their white population.

A view of the slave representation in the House of Representatives of U. S. Census of 1810.

Ratio, one representative for 35,000 inhabitants.

<i>Maryland.</i>		Remainder	10,950
Total population	380,546	Add 3-5ths of 80,561 slaves	48,336
Deduct slaves	111,503		
		Divide by 35,000	59,286(1
Divide by the ratio 35000	269,044(7	Fraction rejected	24,286
Remainder	24,044	Ten representatives—nine for whites	
Add three-fifths of 111,502		—one for slaves.	
slaves	66,900	<i>North-Carolina.</i>	
		Total population	555,500
Divide by 35,000	90,944(2	Deduct slaves	168,824
Fraction rejected	20,944	Divide by 35,000	386,676(11
Nine representatives—7 for whites—			
2 for slaves		Remainder	1,676
<i>Virginia.</i>		Add three-fifths of 168,824	
Total population	974,622	slaves	101,292
Deduct slaves	392,518		
		Divide by 35,000	102,968(2
Divide by 35,000	582,104(16	Fraction rejected	32,968
Remainder	22,104	Thirteen representatives—eleven for	
Add three-fifths of 392,518		whites—two for slaves.	
slaves	235,504	<i>South-Carolina.</i>	
		Total population	415,115
Divide by 35,000	257,608(7	Deduct slaves	196,365
Fraction rejected	12,608	Divide by 35,000	218,750(6
Twenty-three representatives—16 for			
whites, 7 for slaves.		Remainder	8,750
<i>Kentucky.</i>		Add three-fifths of 196,365	
Total population	406,511	slaves	117,819
Deduct slaves	80,561		
		Divide by 35,000	126,562(3
Divide by 35,000	325,950(9		
O. B.	46		

Fraction rejected	21,569	Fraction rejected	345
Nine representatives—six for whites— three for slaves		Six representatives—four for whites— two for slaves	
<i>Georgia.</i>		<i>Tennessee.</i>	
Total population	252,433	Total population	261,727
Deduct slaves	105,218	Deduct slaves	44,535
Divide by 35,000	147,215(4)	Divide by 35,000	217,192(6)
Remainder	7,215	Remainder	7,192
Add three-fifths of 105,218 slaves	63,130	Add 3-5ths of 44,535 slaves	26,661
Divide by 35,000	70,345(2)	Fraction rejected	33,853
		No representative of the slaves.	

A few facts on the subject of the slave representation in the lower house.

New-York, by the first and last census, has had for ten years, and will have for ten more, one slave representative.

Total population of New-York,
Anno 1790 340,120
Deduct slaves 21,324

Divide by the ratio of 33,000 318,796(9)

Remainder 21,796
Add 3-5ths of 21,324 slaves 12,794

Divide by 33,000 34,590(1)

Fraction rejected 1,590

Total population of New-York,
Anno 1810 959,069
Deduct slaves 15,071

Divide by 35,000 943,998(26)

Remainder 33,998
Add 3-5ths of 15,071 slaves 9,009

Divide by 35,000 43,007(1)

Fraction rejected 8,007

Delaware has a slave representative.

Total population of Delaware
in 1810 72,674
Deduct slaves 4,177

Divide by 35,000 68,497(1)

Remainder 33,497
Add 3-5ths of 4,177 slaves 2,505

Divide by 35,000 36,002(1)

Fraction rejected 1,002

Massachusetts, to her great honour, has no slaves. But it is a curious fact, that she has a representative of her black population.

Her white population is 693,039
Black 7,706

700,745

This, divided by 35,000, just allows her twenty members. Deduct the blacks, and she would have but nineteen.

Representatives of slaves.

	1790	1800	1810
New-York	1	0	1
Delaware	0	0	1
Maryland	2	2	2
Virginia	6	6	7
North Carolina	2	2	2
South Carolina	2	2	2
Georgia	1	1	2
Tennessee	0	1	1
Kentucky	0	1	1
	14	15	19

The following views display the very extraordinary inequalities that exist in the representation in the senate. They fully establish the mutual forbearance and the laudable spirit of compromise that prevailed in the federal convention.

VIEW I.

Free persons. Senators.			Free persons. Senators.		
Massachusetts	700,745	2	New-York	944,002	2
N. Hampshire	214,460	2	Pennsylvania	809,296	2
Vermont	217,895	2	Virginia	582,104	2
Connecticut	261,632	2	N. Carolina	386,676	2
Rhode Island	76,823	2	Kentucky	325,950	2
<hr/>			<hr/>		
	1,471,555	10		3,048,058	10
<hr/>			<hr/>		

Thus it appears that the eastern states with only 1,471,555, have as much influence in the senate of the United States, as the above five middle and southern states with 3,048,058

VIEW II.

Free persons. Senators.			Free persons. Senators.		
N. Hampshire	214,460	2	New-York	944,032	2
Vermont	217,895	2	Pennsylvania	809,296	2
Connecticut	261,632	2	Virginia	582,104	2
Rhode Island	76,823	2	N. Carolina	386,676	2
<hr/>			<hr/>		
	770,810	8		2,722,108	8
<hr/>			<hr/>		

Thus four of the eastern states, with 775,810 free persons, have as much influence as four middle and southern states with 2,722,108—and four times as much as Pennsylvania with 809,296.

VIEW III.

Free persons. Senators.			Free persons. Senators.		
Massachusetts	700,745	2	Maryland	269,044	2
N. Hampshire	214,460	2	Virginia	582,104	2
Vermont	217,895	2	N. Carolina	386,676	2
Connecticut	261,632	2	Ohio	230,760	2
Rhode Island	76,823	2	Kentucky	325,950	2
<hr/>			Tennessee	217,192	2
	1,471,555	10	S. Carolina	218,750	2
<hr/>			Georgia	147,215	2
			<hr/>		
				2,377,691	16
<hr/>			<hr/>		

The result of this comparison was utterly unexpected. It will no doubt surprize the reader. It is a fair and overwhelming view of the comparative influence in the senate, of the murmuring, discontented, and oppressed "nation of New England" with that of the whole of the ancient "slave states," as they are called. It appears that the former have one representative in senate for every 147,155 free persons, and that the latter have one for every 148,605.

The addition of Louisiana has somewhat altered the state of the representation. It makes the ratio for the slave states about 136,000.

VIEW IV.

	Free persons.	Senators.		Free persons.	Senators.
Rhode Island	76,823	2	New-York	944,032	2
Delaware	68,497	2	Pennsylvania	809,296	2
	<hr/>			<hr/>	
	145,320	4		1,753,328	2
	<hr/>			<hr/>	

Thus, one free person in Rhode Island, it is obvious from the above view, possesses as much influence in the senate of the United States as twelve in New York or ten in Pennsylvania. And one in Delaware possesses nearly as much as fourteen in New York or twelve in Pennsylvania. One in Rhode Island has more than seven in Virginia.

VIEW V.

	Free persons.	Senators.		Free persons.	Senators.
N. Hampshire	214,460	2	Virginia	582,104	2
Connecticut	261,632	2			
Rhode Island	76,823	2			
	<hr/>			<hr/>	
	552,915	6		582,104	2
	<hr/>			<hr/>	

Thus, three eastern states, with 552,915 free persons, have six senators; and Virginia, with 582,104, has but two.

If the wisest and best of the citizens of the United States assembled in convention, with General Washington and Dr. Franklin at their head, found it necessary for the peace, and happiness, and respectability of the country, to agree to the constitution, with such prodigious inequalities as are stated above, it is not difficult to form an opinion on the folly and wickedness of the loud complaints of injustice and inequality, on points to the last degree insignificant, whereby the spirit of sedition has been excited in the eastern states.

The war question, it has been said, was carried by the slave representatives. This is an egregious error. The majority in

the lower house was 30. And the whole number of slave representatives is only 19. So that had they been totally rejected, the question of war would have been carried. I pass over the slave representatives from New York and Delaware, both of whom voted against the war. I likewise waive the consideration of the fact, that eleven members from the southern states also voted against the measure.

A fair view of all the preceding tables and facts, will satisfy any man not wholly destitute of truth and candour, that the interests of the eastern states have been carefully guarded in both branches of the legislature of the union. Their complaints are to the last degree groundless and factious. It will further prove, that Pennsylvania has a stronger ground of complaint by far in the senatorial branch, than the eastern states in the other. With a population of 809,296 free persons, she has but two senators; whereas New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island, and Connecticut, with 770,810, have eight. The difference is enormous and immense.

Statement of the number of members in the house of representatives, after each different census.

	First.	Second.	Third.
New Hampshire, - - - -	4	5	6
Vermont, - - - -	2	4	6
Massachusetts, - - - -	14	17	20
Connecticut, - - - -	7	7	7
Rhode Island, - - - -	2	2	2
New York, - - - -	10	17	27
New Jersey, - - - -	5	6	6
Pennsylvania, - - - -	13	18	23
Delaware, - - - -	1	1	2
Maryland, - - - -	8	9	9
Virginia, - - - -	19	22	23
North Carolina, - - - -	10	12	13
South Carolina, - - - -	6	8	9
Georgia, - - - -	2	4	6
Kentucky, - - - -	0	6	10
Tennessee, - - - -	0	3	6
Ohio, - - - -	0	0	6
Louisiana, - - - -	0	0	1
	<hr/> 103	<hr/> 141	<hr/> 182

CHAPTER LXIV.

Enquiry into the allegation against the southern states, of destroying commerce, to promote manufactures. Utterly unfounded. The eastern states deeply interested in manufactures. The southern the reverse.

Let me, reader, still further trespass on your attention. There is one point of considerable importance, on which our eastern fellow citizens have been egregiously deceived, and on which it is desirable they should form correct opinions.

That the administration and the southern members of congress are actuated by an inveterate hostility to commerce, and that their measures have been dictated by a desire to destroy it for the purpose of injuring the so-styled commercial states, has been assumed as an incontrovertible fact, which could neither be disputed nor denied. It has been, as I have stated, echoed by governors and legislatures—by inflammatory writers in newspapers—and by equally inflammatory clergymen in their pulpits, until any doubt of it is believed to be as wicked and heterodoxical, as a doubt of the miracles of the Koran is regarded by the mufti at Constantinople.

It was necessary to find some motive for this hostility. It would have been too monstrous to assert that the *southerners*, as some of the eastern writers have styled the people of the southern states, destroyed commerce to promote agriculture, and of course to advance their own interests. This would not stand examination, and was therefore abandoned. It was, however necessary to devise some pretext. And, it has a thousand times been asserted, that *the hostility to commerce arose from a desire to promote manufactures. And this sorry tale has been believed by the "most enlightened" portion of "the most enlightened nation in the world."*

The following facts will shew the transcendent folly and imposture of this allegation.

1. *The eastern states have numerous and important manufactures, established on a large and extensive scale.*

2. *The extreme sterility of a large portion of their soil, and the comparative density of their population, render manufacturing establishments indispensibly necessary to them.*

3. *They are therefore deeply and vitally interested in the promotion of manufactures, without which they would be in a great measure depopulated by the attractions of the western, middle, and southern states.*

4. *The manufactures of the southern states are principally in private families.*

5. *These states have no redundant population. Their people find full employment in agriculture.*

6. *They have therefore little or no interest in the promotion of manufactures.*

7. But the reduction, or restriction, or injury of commerce, cannot fail vitally to injure them, by lessening the demand for, and lowering the price of, their productions. *We have seen that it has produced this effect to a most ruinous extent.*

8. It irresistibly follows, that if the southern states wantonly destroyed or restrained commerce, to promote manufactures, *it would be inflicting the most serious and vital injury on themselves, for the mere purpose of serving those states to which they are said to bear an inveterate and deadly hostility !!!*

9. Whoever, possessing any mind, can disseminate those opinions, must mean to deceive: for he cannot possibly believe them himself.

10. Whoever can believe in these absurdities, may believe that rivers occasionally travel to their sources—that lambs devour wolves—that heat produces ice—that “thorns produce figs”—or, what is almost as absurd, that the soil of Massachusetts is as fertile, and the climate as mild, as the climate and soil of South Carolina or Georgia.

CHAPTER LXV.

Militia defence. System of Classification proposed in Congress. Rejected. Awful outcry.

TOWARDS the close of the late war with Great Britain, an attempt was made in Congress to employ in the defence of the nation a portion of the militia, in a mode the most simple, the most practicable, the most efficient—and at the same time, the least burdensome, that was ever adopted in any country. Those persons throughout the United States, who are subject to militia duty, were to be divided into classes, each of twenty-five. Every class was to furnish one of its members, who was to serve for one year, or during the war, and whose bounty was to be contributed by the rest of the class in certain proportions. Or, if one of the class thought proper to serve, a recruit was to be enlisted at their joint expense.*

Against this noble system of defence, so equitable, so just, so unexceptionable—so adequate to its end—so easy and free from burden to our citizens—so likely to bring the war to a close, by convincing the enemy of the impossibility of making any impression on us, there was a most hideous outcry raised in and

* These were the grand important features of various plans submitted to Congress, and to the Legislature of Pennsylvania, which were absurdly rejected to the disgrace and dishonour of both parties. There were some unessential differences between them, not worth attention in this discussion. To the honour of the enlightened and patriotic Legislature of New-York, it was not deterred by the wretched and factious clamour that prevailed on this subject. It passed an act to raise 10,000 men on the classification plan.

out of congress—an outcry highly disgraceful and factious. It was branded with the odious name of “*Conscription*,” and identified with the French system, whereby the whole male population of France was subject to the despotic will and pleasure of the executive.

To the passions of the people the most inflammatory appeals were made. A most lamentable delusion prevailed on the subject. The attempt was of course defeated. Many of our citizens were, by unceasing efforts, led to believe, that the plan was wholly unprecedented in this country; that it was utterly unconstitutional and pernicious; and that it was intended as the basis of a military despotism. And to such an awful extent was the frenzy carried, that open resistance was publicly threatened. Sexagenarian veterans, shaking their hoary locks, and burnishing their rusty, revolutionary arms, were disposed to punish, at the point of the bayonet, those whom they were taught to regard as violators of the constitution.

It is hardly possible to conceive of a more awful, or more disgraceful delusion. Never were the public cullibility and credulity more miserably played upon; for, as I have already observed, it is hardly possible to contrive a plan of public defence more just, more rational, more unexceptionable, or more efficient.

Let us calmly examine the matter. Recruits for a year, or for the war, could have been readily procured at any time for about two hundred dollars. Of course, the tax on each individual, of twenty-five persons bound to furnish a recruit, would be only eight dollars, for which he would be exempt from all the dangers, and hardships, and privations of a military life!

The British ministry would probably have made immense sacrifices to prevent the establishment of such a system. It was the measure most really formidable and efficient against their veteran armies, that had been devised. But surely this ought to have been no reason why American legislators should oppose it—or why the factious or tumultuous meetings, held to denounce the system, should be eulogized as displays of “*the spirit of seventy-six*.”* Had such a wretched spirit prevailed in '76, this glorious country would never have emerged from its colonial and dependent state.

From the extreme abhorrence of wars and fightings, manifested by some of the members of congress—from the wailings, and whinings, and lamentations, and strong sensibilities, at the possible loss of a single life, a stranger might suppose they were quakers or menonists, who were not merely conscientiously scrupulous against carrying arms themselves, but principled

* In several parts of the union, factious and seditious meetings were held to denounce this plan, whose proceedings were detailed in many of our papers, headed in large letters with the words, “*SPIRIT of '76*.”

against warfare altogether. And from the delicacy of their constitutional exceptions and objections, it might be reasonably presumed, if the constitution were not at war with such presumption, that there was no power given, or intended to be conveyed, to the general government, to command or coerce the military service of any individual citizen. It would appear, that the citizens of the United States had obtained letters patent from Heaven for enjoying all the benefits of society and of self-government, without risking either life or limb—or shedding a drop of blood in their defence.

While the public delusion on this topic lasted, argument was useless. Prejudice, and passion, and irrationality, almost universally predominated. But every species of folly and madness has its day. When the spell is dissolved, it becomes harmless and inoffensive. It is then a fair subject of inquiry and investigation. The understanding of the public may be addressed with a tolerable chance of success.

I therefore venture to discuss the subject, and solicit the calm attention of the reader. In case of future wars, from which we cannot hope to be exempt, it may be of considerable importance to establish correct opinions on a subject of such immense magnitude,—I mean the most eligible mode of public defence.

I undertake to prove these seven points :—

1. That there is no principle more clearly recognized and established in the constitutions and laws of the several states, than THE RIGHT OF SOCIETY TO REQUIRE AND COERCE, AS WELL AS THE DUTY OF THE CITIZEN TO AFFORD, MILITARY SERVICE FOR THE GENERAL DEFENCE.

2. That the power of congress to call forth, and order the employment of, the militia, in cases of *invasion*, rebellion, or insurrection, is as clearly established as any other power vested in that body.

3. That the mode of drafting, generally prescribed by the militia laws of the several states, is oppressive, unequal, and unjust.

4. That the force so drafted is generally inefficient, and enormously expensive.

5. That the system of classification is the most impartial—the most efficacious—and the least oppressive mode of calling into operation the militia, of any of the plans that have ever been devised.

6. That the proposed system of classification prevailed during the revolution—and of course, instead of having been borrowed from France, by our present rulers, was, if borrowed at all, borrowed by her from this country.

7. That the classification or conscription system, elaborately matured by general Knox, and stamped with the seal of general Washington's approbation, was more strict and extensive in its provisions, than any of the recent plans.

CHAPTER LXVI.

Right of society to coerce, and duty of the citizens to afford, military service, recognized by the constitutions and laws of the several states. Mode of drafting militia unjust and oppressive.

To establish my first point, that "there is no principle more clearly recognized, and established, in the constitutions and laws of the several states, than the right of society to require and coerce, as well as the duty of the citizen to afford, military service for the general defence," I submit to the reader, the most satisfactory extracts from the constitutions of New-Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Kentucky; and from the militia laws of Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Georgia, and Kentucky. These are all the states whose statute books I have been able to procure.

The declaration of rights of the state of New-Hampshire, expressly provides, that

"Every member of the community has a right to be protected by it, in the enjoyment of his life, liberty and property: he is therefore bound to contribute his share to the expense of such protection; and **TO YIELD HIS PERSONAL SERVICE WHEN NECESSARY, or an equivalent.**"

It gives the governor for the time being, complete and plenary power, "by himself or any chief commander or officers,"

"To train, instruct, exercise, and govern the militia and navy; and for the special defence and safety of the state, to assemble in martial array, and *put in warlike posture the inhabitants thereof*; and to lead and conduct them; and with them encounter, repulse, resist, and pursue by force of arms, as well by sea as by land, *within and without the limits of the state*, every such person or persons as shall at any future time attempt the destruction, invasion, detriment, or annoyance of the state."

It further invests the governor with the mighty and tremendous power,

"To use and exercise over the army and navy, and *over the militia in actual service*, **THE LAW MARTIAL IN TIME OF WAR, INVASION, AND ALSO IN REBELLION**, declared by the legislature to exist, as occasion shall necessarily require."

Nothing can be more clear and explicit than these provisions. They level in the dust the volumes of rant and declamation, which have been uttered in congress, and with which the press has teemed on this important topic.

The constitution of the state of Massachusetts contains the same provisions, couched in the very same words, as that of New-Hampshire. One has been obviously copied from the other. It is therefore unnecessary for me to make any extract from that of the former state. I refer the reader to the volume of the Constitutions of the United States.

The constitution of New York explicitly declares, that

“Whereas it is of the utmost importance to the safety of every state, that it should always be in a condition of defence, and **IT IS THE DUTY OF EVERY MAN WHO ENJOYS THE PROTECTION OF SOCIETY, TO BE PREPARED AND WILLING TO DEFEND IT** : Therefore this convention, in the name and by the authority of the good people of this state, doth ordain, determine, and declare, that the militia of this state, at all times hereafter, as well in peace as in war, shall be *armed and disciplined*, and **IN READINESS FOR SERVICE.**”

The declaration of rights of the constitution of Vermont, states that

“Every member of society hath a right to be protected in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property ; and therefore is bound to contribute his proportion towards the expenses of that protection, and **YIELD HIS PERSONAL SERVICE**, when necessary, or an equivalent thereto.*.*. *Nor can any man who is conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms, be justly compelled thereto, IF HE WILL PAY SUCH EQUIVALENT.*”

The old constitution of Pennsylvania is in unison with those already quoted—viz.

“Every member of society hath a right to be protected in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property ; and therefore *is bound to contribute his proportion towards the expense of that protection, or an equivalent thereto* ; but no part of a man's property can be justly taken from him, and applied to public uses, without his consent, or that of his legal representatives ; nor can any man who is conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms, be justly compelled thereto, *if he will pay such an equivalent.*”

The existing constitution of Pennsylvania is equally clear :

“The freemen of this commonwealth *shall be armed and disciplined for its defence*. Those who conscientiously scruple to bear arms, shall not be compelled to do so ; but *shall pay an equivalent for personal service.*”

Kentucky holds the same language—

“The freemen of this commonwealth (negroes, mulattoes, and Indians excepted) *shall be armed and disciplined for its defence*. Those who conscientiously scruple to bear arms, shall not be compelled to do so ; but *shall pay an equivalent for personal service.*”

The old constitution of Delaware has a clause nearly verbatim with some of the preceding—

“Every member of society hath a right to be protected in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property ; and is therefore bound to contribute his proportion towards the expense of that protection, and **YIELD HIS PERSONAL SERVICE**, when necessary, *or an equivalent thereto.*”

I presume I might here dismiss the subject. It is impossible to resist the conviction the foregoing clauses flash on the mind. They strike cavilling and casuistry, declamation and sophistry, dead, as with the forked lightning. The wisest and best men of seven states, engaged in the all-important duty of framing forms of government for their fellow-citizens, solemnly recognize the paramount right of society to coerce, and the imperious duty of the citizen to afford, personal service, or an equivalent, for the general defence. And the intelligent and respectable men who framed the constitutions of New-Hampshire and Massachusetts, invested the governors with the power to lead the militia in pur-

suit of an enemy, "within and *without the state*," and to exercise **MARTIAL LAW** *on the militia*, as well as on the regular army.

I now proceed to detail the legal provisions on this point.—They will be found equally clear and conclusive. I begin with Massachusetts.

"Whenever the governor, or commander in chief, shall order a detachment from the militia aforesaid, and any person who shall be detached in obedience to such orders, being duly notified thereof, and ordered to march to the place of rendezvous, shall neglect or refuse to obey such order; or shall not, *within twenty-four hours after he shall have been notified as aforesaid*, pay a fine of ten pounds to the captain or commanding officer of the company to which he shall belong, or procure an able-bodied man in his stead, **SUCH PERSON SHALL BE CONSIDERED AS A SOLDIER IN SUCH DETACHMENT, AND BE DEALT WITH ACCORDINGLY**; and in all cases where the said fine shall be paid, the same shall be applied to hiring men for any service which shall be required of the company under the command of the captain or officer who shall receive the same."*

Should any commissioned officer of the militia refuse to make a detachment from the corps under his command, for the purpose of repelling invasion, suppressing insurrection, &c. then

"In addition to the punishment which may be inflicted by virtue of any act for regulating the militia, if convicted thereof before the justices of the supreme judicial court, he shall be subject to be fined in a sum not exceeding fifty pounds, and to be adjudged incapable of sustaining any office in the commonwealth for a term not exceeding ten years; to either or both of the said penalties according to the aggravation of the offence and circumstances of the offender, as to the justices of the said court shall seem meet.

"And be it further enacted, That if any person, whether non-commissioned officer or private, and belonging either to the train band or alarm list, who shall be detached or ordered to march for the support of the civil authority, or suppression of any insurrection, *existing or apprehended, as aforesaid*, shall refuse or neglect to march, armed and equipped, in the manner and at the time which the officer by whom he shall be detached shall direct, or shall desert or leave the service before he shall be regularly discharged, if convicted thereof before the justices of the supreme judicial court, *he shall be subject to be fined at the discretion of the said court, in a sum not exceeding ten pounds*.

"And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That if any person, in public or private conversation, or by any ways or means, *shall dissuade or endeavour to prevent any military officer from performing the duty required of him by this act*, or any person or persons, detached or ordered to march for the purpose aforesaid, from marching to the place of rendezvous, or from continuing in the service until regularly discharged, each person so offending, being convicted thereof, as aforesaid, shall pay a fine to the use of the commonwealth, *not exceeding FIFTY POUNDS*, and shall recognize for his good behaviour for a term *not exceeding three years*."†

I hope the reader will compare these sections with the most rigorous of those contained in Mr. Monroe's or Mr. Giles's plans. Candour will compel him to acknowledge, that the latter are incomparably less burdensome and oppressive than the former.

The statute of Connecticut respecting the militia, adopts the regulation of the act of congress, whereby every free able-bodied white man, between the ages of 18 and 45, is declared subject

* Permanent laws of Massachusetts, vol. I. page 314.

† Idem, page 339.

to militia duty. It further exempts quakers from that duty, on the payment of three dollars and thirty cents per annum. It then invests the captain general with power, in certain specified cases, to order out even the *whole of the militia or military force of the state*. I submit the very strong and expressive clause to the reader :

“ The captain general, or, in his absence, the next commanding officer of state, is hereby authorised and empowered, *as he may judge necessary, upon the occasion of an alarm, invasion, or notice of the appearance of an enemy, either by sea or by land, to order out the WHOLE or any part of the military force of this state ; to assemble and put the same in warlike order ; and the same to lead, order, and employ, for the assistance or relieving any of the inhabitants of this state, attacked by an enemy, or in danger thereof ; and generally to issue and publish, by proper staff or orderly officer, such orders as he shall judge expedient, to carry into execution the intent and design of this act.*”*

The militia law of New York is equally clear and explicit—

“ The commander in chief of this state may, *in case of invasion or other emergency, when he shall judge it necessary, order out ANY PROPORTION OF THE MILITIA OF THIS STATE TO MARCH TO ANY PART THEREOF, and continue as long as he may think necessary ; and likewise may, in consequence of an application of the executive of any of the United States, on an invasion or insurrection, or an apprehension of an invasion of such state, AT HIS DISCRETION order ANY NUMBER OF THE MILITIA, not exceeding one third part thereof, TO SUCH STATE :* Provided, That they be not compelled to continue on duty out of this state more than forty days at one time ; that while in actual service, in consequence of being so called out, they shall receive the same pay and rations, and be subject to the same rules and regulations as the troops of the United States of America.”†

New-Jersey has not been deficient in making similar provision for the public safety. Her militia law declares,

“ That the commander in chief of this state, for the time being, may, *in case of invasion or other emergency, WHEN HE SHALL JUDGE IT NECESSARY, order out any proportion of the militia of this state, to march to any part thereof, and continue as long as he may think it necessary, not exceeding two months.*”‡

She imposes a heavy and burdensome fine on delinquents—a fine which the poorer classes cannot pay, and which, of course, inevitably compels them to the service.

“ Any person refusing or neglecting to perform his tour of duty, or to procure a substitute, shall pay a *fine of twenty dollars* for every such neglect or refusal.§

“ If any militia man shall desert while he is on a tour of duty, he shall be fined *in any sum not exceeding twenty dollars* for every such offence ; or may be imprisoned for any time not exceeding two months, at the discretion of a court martial ; and, if a non-commissioned officer, he shall also be degraded and placed in the ranks.”||

I next proceed to state the law in Pennsylvania.—The same good sense that presided over the decision on this subject in the other states, is discernible here :

* Statute laws of Connecticut, page 310.

† Laws of the state of New-York, vol. I. page 512.

‡ Patterson's laws of New-Jersey, page 441.

§ Idem, page 442.

|| Idem, page 443.

"Whenever it may be necessary to call into actual service any part of the militia, in case of rebellion, or of actual or *threatened invasion*, of this or any of the neighbouring states, then it shall and may be lawful for the governor to order into actual service, SUCH PART OF THE MILITIA, BY CLASSES, AS THE EXIGENCY MAY REQUIRE; provided that the part so called, doth not exceed four classes of the militia of any brigade."*

"If any militiaman shall desert while he is on a tour of duty, he shall be fined thirty-two dollars for every such offence, and be obliged to march on the next tour of duty, under the same penalties as at first. If a non-commissioned officer shall so desert, he shall be degraded and placed in the ranks; shall pay a fine of thirty six dollars; and be obliged to serve another tour as a private."†

"The militia of the state, while in the actual service thereof, or of the United States, shall be subject to the same rules and regulations as the federal army."‡

The little state of Delaware recognises the same principles--the same rights--the same duties--of which I have shewn the recognition in so many other states.

"The governor shall have full power and authority, in case of an invasion, rebellion, or insurrection within the state, or any of the neighbouring states, to call into service such part of the militia by classes, as to him shall seem necessary; and in case of the absence of the governor of this state, on any insurrection, rebellion, or invasion, the commanding officer of each brigade is hereby authorised and directed to issue his orders to call out such part of the militia as he may judge immediately necessary."§

The provisions of the militia law of Maryland are equally strong and unequivocal.

"In all cases where a militiaman may be drafted to perform a tour of duty under the laws of this state, he shall be considered as a soldier, and liable to all the duties as such, unless he shall furnish a substitute: and the lieutenant colonel of the regiment, or commanding officer of the extra battalion, as the case may be, to which he may belong, shall be the sole judges of the qualification of said substitute; and may receive him or reject him at their discretion."||

"If a sudden invasion shall be made into any county in this state, or in case of an insurrection in any county, the commanding officer in such county is hereby AUTHORISED AND REQUIRED to order out THE WHOLE or such part of his militia as he may think necessary, and in such manner as he may think best, for repelling such invasion, or suppressing such insurrection; and shall call on the commanding officers of regiments in the adjacent counties, for such aid as he may think necessary; who shall forthwith in like manner furnish the same."¶

By the militia law of the state of Georgia, every male citizen who has resided within the state for *ten days*, if of the proper age, is subject to perform military duty.** This carries the right of society to coerce the citizen to military duty in public defence, to the utmost extent.

The duty of the governor, in the case of insurrection or invasion, is as explicitly and unequivocally stated in the militia law of Georgia, as in those already quoted:—

* Purdon's Abridgment of the laws of Pennsylvania, page 381.

† Idem, page 384.

‡ Idem, page 386.

§ Laws of Delaware (Wilmington, 1793,) page 213.

|| Kelty's Laws of Maryland, vol. II. 1798, chap. c.

¶ Ibid.

** Digest of Laws of Georgia, page 460.

“ His excellency the governor is hereby empowered to assemble and embody such part of the militia of the state as he may from time to time think necessary, to repel any invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, which may happen within the same, and to order such officers to command the said militia as he may see fit.”*

Kentucky has been equally mindful with her sister states, of the great duty of making adequate provision for the public safety.

“ Every able-bodied male citizen, of this or any of the United States, residing in this state, who is of the age of eighteen and under forty-five, shall be enrolled by the commanding officer of the company within whose bounds he may reside.”†

“ The governor shall have power to call forth such parts of the militia as he may judge necessary, in time of war, invasion, or insurrection, or when the danger may be such that the public safety shall require it.”

“ The militia, when in the service of this state, shall be governed by the articles of war, which shall be in force in the continental army.”‡

By the law of Rhode Island, like the others I have quoted, the militia, when in actual service, are regarded as soldiers, and subject to martial law—

“ Whenever the military force of this state, or any part thereof, shall be called into actual service, *it shall be subject to the articles of war*, prescribed by congress for the government of the troops of the United States.”§

These are, as I have already observed, all the states whose statute laws I have been able to procure. They are, I presume, adequate to the purpose. It is not to be doubted, that similar provisions exist in all the others.

CHAPTER LXVII.

Power of Congress to call out the Militia. The usual mode of drafting oppressive, unequal, and unjust.

My second position is, “ that the power of congress to call forth, and order the employment of, the militia, is as clearly established as any other power vested in that body.”

The general defence of the nation is confided to congress. This is their incumbent duty. The means and power to perform this duty are vested in them by the constitution. They are authorised and empowered—

“ To raise and support armies.”

The exercise of this power has not been, nor can it be, called in question. They are further authorised and empowered—

“ To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union ; suppress insurrection ; and REPEL INVASIONS.”

I beg the reader will carefully examine this clause over and over. It requires the most serious and sober reflection. Here

* Idem, page 465.

† Toulmin's Laws of Kentucky, page 78.

‡ Idem, page 80.

§ Public Laws of the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Providence, 1798. Page 440.

is a clear, explicit, and most unequivocal power given to the general government by the constitution of the United States, to call forth the militia in three specified cases. One is "*to repel invasion.*" The country was "*invaded,*" during the last war. And yet every attempt to carry this power into operation, in the mode most efficient and least burdensome, was opposed and defeated by men of high standing, great talents, and professing a sacred regard to the honour and interests of their country!!! And the whole of the opposition rested on the absurd, the untenable ground of the measure being "*unconstitutional.*" And this wretched pretext was blindly admitted and defended by a large portion of our citizens! It will be difficult for posterity to give credence to the existence of such miserable folly on the part of their ancestors, who had nearly put on record the modest declaration, that they were "the most enlightened nation on the surface of the globe."

As a specimen of the declamation used on this subject, I annex a short extract from a speech delivered by Cyrus King, member of the house of representatives of the United States, from the state of Massachusetts.

"If what I have urged, will not induce you to arrest the progress of this bill, I appeal to you, I beseech you, as friends to humanity, to spare the tears which the passage of this bill will cause to flow! I appeal to you as fathers, by every endearing tie which binds you to your children, not to deprive the aged parent of the child of his youth! the support and solace of his declining years! lest you bring his grey hairs with sorrow to the grave! I entreat you to make the case your own! suppose a darling child! an only son snatched from you by the scourge of war! in the language of grief and nature, you would exclaim: "would to God I had died for thee, O Absalom, my son! my son!"

This was the miserable rant by which our fathers and our mothers—our wives and our children—our towns and our cities—were deprived of protection, and, but for the peace, would have been delivered defenceless to the enemy!

Mr. Miller, of New York, was equally *eloquent* in his denunciation of this system. I lay before the reader a specimen of the *cogent* and *convincing* arguments he used:—

"I object, sir, to the whole system of force and coercion; and contend that under this constitution you have no right to raise armies except by voluntary enlistment; and further, that if you had the right, it would not be discreet to exercise it.

"The plan which gentlemen wish adopted is conscription! They call it *classification and penalty*—*classification and draft*—sir, there is *poison in the dish*; garnish it as you please, there is *poison still*. You call it *classification*! I stickle not for names—"a rose by any other name would smell as sweet." Is this *classification*? Disguise thyself as thou wilt, slavery, still thou art a bitter draught." The times demand that things should be called by their right names. *This is conscription, and with features, more hideous, than are to be found in the exploded system of our unfortunate cousin of Elba!!!**

* Perhaps a more extravagant, groundless, and absurd assertion was never hazarded before. It is very difficult to compare the two systems together, there is such an immense difference between them. I shall state but one sin-

"By this system the people of these United States, will be instantly and *forcibly* transformed into soldiers—the ordinary course of life must be abandoned, for the perils and vexations of a camp! Our peaceful occupations must be forsaken. The merchant must quit his counting house; the farmer his plough; the mechanic his work shop; the professional man his pursuits—all, all must become soldiers!—Our sons and our brothers, those who are to be the "future men" of this country, instead of laying the foundation for future usefulness, must be subjected to the moral and physical evils of a camp. All the habits of domestic life must be annihilated, and all its endearments outraged or disregarded. The husband must be torn from his wife and children, and the child forcibly separated from the society and protection of his parents. I beseech gentlemen to pause before they venture upon a system like this.

"This plan *violates the constitution of your country*. It invades the rights of the state governments; it is a direct infringement of their sovereignty. It concentrates all power in the general government, and deprives the states of their "necessary security." It does away all claim to personal freedom. It is a daring attempt upon the rights and liberties of this people.

"*Armies are the forces of the United States*, with which they are to carry on their wars; and are subject to their exclusive jurisdiction and controul. *But the militia are the state troops, which congress have no power to raise*. They are a force existing, known, and acknowledged at the time of the adoption of this constitution; existing without the aid or concurrence of the general government. *The general power over the militia resides in the states; a particular authority* for objects defined, was carved out of that general power, and granted to the United States."

When the reader has attentively perused all this rhapsody, and is almost terrified to death by reflection on the frightful despotism which was preparing to swallow up our freedom and happiness, he has, in order to calm the ebullitions of his indignation—to restore his tranquillity—only to read two lines of the constitution, granting the power, and dictating the duty of the general government, "*to call forth the militia, to repel invasion.*" Let him then ascertain the fact, that the country was actually *invaded* at the very time when Mr. Miller so confidently, in the face of the constitution, dared to assert, that "the militia are the state troops, which *congress have no power to raise*." When he has proceeded thus far, he will soon be convinced that all the long, declamatory, and inflammatory speeches on this subject, which occupied so many weeks of the time of congress, were mere "*sound and fury.*"

To return. The constitution further authorizes the general government—

"To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia; and, *for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States.*"

This last power is merely limited and qualified by the reservation, to the several states, of the appointment of officers, and training the men. The limitation is in these words:

gle feature of that difference. In France it was hardly possible to induce government to accept of substitutes, and never without great interest and immense pecuniary sacrifices; and of course those persons conscripted were almost universally obliged to serve, in spite of their utmost opposition; whereas, by the American act, express provision was made for substitutes, and no man need serve, who could raise eight or ten dollars!!

“Reserving to the states respectively the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline proposed by congress.”

A calm and candid review of these clear delegations of power, cannot fail to result in a conviction, that in all cases of obstructions to the laws—of insurrection—or *invasion*—the right, the power, and duty of congress, to order out the militia, are as clear a right, power, and duty, as ever were conveyed or ordained by any instrument, public or private. It follows, that the attempt to defeat this grant of power, was antifederal and factious, and had a tendency to destroy the government.

I SHALL now proceed to prove, “that the existing mode of drafting the militia, is oppressive, unequal, and unjust.”

In nearly all the states, as we have seen, the governor is authorised, in certain specified cases, to call the militia into service, in such numbers and proportions as he may judge proper. He possesses plenary discretionary powers. He may raise the whole in three or four counties, or he may divide them equally among all the counties in the state.

This discretionary power is highly exceptionable on the ground of favouritism; and is in direct hostility with the general spirit of all our institutions, which universally define duties and limit powers with great precision. It will not, it cannot, be denied, that it is liable to considerable abuse.

But I shall not consider the danger of its abuse. The discussion of this objection, great and powerful as it is, does not come within my present plan. I shall suppose the power exercised with sound judgment and strict impartiality, so far as the latter requisite is compatible with the present system. It is still liable to the most serious and solid objections. It is radically and incurably defective. Its operation is unjust, unequal, and oppressive. Let us examine how it is carried into operation.

Suppose there are ten counties in a state, each containing 10,000 militia—and that the presence of an invading foe induces the president to make a call upon the governor for a draft of 5,000 men. It is obvious, that the most equitable and impartial mode of drafting them, according to the present miserable system, will be, to make a requisition of 500 out of each county. But it is generally made on two or three neighbourhoods, as near to the place of danger as possible, while the remainder of the state is wholly exempt from the duty. The extreme oppression and injustice of this mode are too palpable to require enforcement.

And it is impossible to remove its radical injustice; for in whatever way they are drawn, the burden, the risk of health, and life, the sacrifice of business, the expenses of a camp, and all the other disadvantages of military duty, which ought to be borne, or paid for, equally, by 100,000 persons, fall exclusively on 5,000. It is impossible for the human mind to conceive of any

system much more unequal, unjust, absurd, or contemptible. Five thousand citizens bear all the burden of military service, for the protection of 93,000, who neither run risk, incur expense, nor suffer any inconvenience !

It is an arduous task to impress the public mind with a correct sense of the folly or absurdity of laws or customs, which have "*grown with the growth*" of society. This renders it difficult, in all countries, to gain a fair or patient hearing for arguments against the established order of things, however contrary to reason, common sense, or common justice. But let us, in order to display the injustice of this wretched principle, extend it to the affair of taxation. This will render it more palpable and striking. Suppose a law were passed to oblige 5,000 men to pay all the taxes of 95,000 others, who were themselves to be totally exempt from taxation ! What an uproar would it not excite ! The clamour would be loud and general with the parties that suffered the oppression, who would by force resist the operation of it. Yet the injustice of such a law is far inferior to that of the existing militia system, to which we submit without murmur—and not merely submit without murmur, but were of late senselessly ready to rise in insurrection, to prevent any melioration of such vile oppression ! I say inferior ; because the burden of military service is far more onerous than that of taxation. If this do not prove the propriety, truth, and justice of our claim to the title of "the most enlightened nation in the world," I am afraid it will never be established.

CHAPTER LXVIII.

Inefficiency of Militia generally. Extravagantly expensive. General Washington's testimony on the subject full and complete.

MY fourth position is, that "the force thus drafted is generally inefficient, and ruinously expensive."

At present, the militia are collected together in a disorderly and irregular manner. The materials are as discordant and incoherent as the mind can conceive. The men are unaccustomed to discipline—they have very loose ideas on the subject of subordination. They have little experience—less military skill*—

* "To place any dependence on militia, is assuredly resting upon a broken staff—men just dragged from the tender scenes of domestic life—unaccustomed to the din of arms—totally unacquainted with every kind of military skill ; which being followed by a want of confidence in themselves, when opposed to troops regularly trained, disciplined, and appointed, superior in knowledge and superior in arms, makes them timid and ready to fly from their own shadows. Besides, the sudden change in their manner of living, (particularly in the lodging) brings on sickness in many, impatience in all, and such an unconquerable desire of returning to their respective homes, that it not only produces shameful and scandalous desertions among themselves, but infuses the like spirit into others." General Washington's letters, London edition, vol. I. page 270.

little confidence in themselves—little in their officers—and their officers are not so void of justice as to lavish any large portion of confidence on them.

Suppose them, thus assembled, thus officered, thus qualified—to encounter a disciplined foe of half their numbers, *in the open field*. And we must take *the open field* into our calculation. Lamentable would be the issue. On the one side would be a band of hardened desperadoes, inured to slaughter—reposing full reliance in their officers—and marching forward with that confidence in themselves, which is the harbinger and presage of victory. On the other, men utterly undisciplined—distrusting each other, and distrusting themselves—and under officers chosen, in most cases, not for their military talents and endowments, but for companionable qualities, which, however agreeable in the social circle, are of no avail in the tented field.

The mind sickens at the contemplation of the result. Nothing short of a miracle, can render it prosperous to the militia. The chances are immensely against them. They may be said to be literally led to slaughter—the result being too generally a most frightful carnage.

There is a further consideration, which greatly enhances the horror of this contemplation. The materials of the two hostile bodies are as different as can be conceived. On one side are to be seen in the ranks, some of the most invaluable of our citizens, men with large families, whose whole future happiness depends on their preservation—future Washingtons, or Franklins, or Livingstons, or Dickinsons. On the other, a congeries of the refuse of society from all parts of Europe. What a contrast! It is in fact a game of hazard, at which guineas are staked against cents—and at which it is impossible ever to equalize the stakes.

That some of the best men in the world are destitute of personal courage—and that some of the worst are abundantly supplied with it, is well known to every man who has even but superficially reflected on human nature. Courage is a constitutional quality, which, when not imparted by nature, can hardly ever be acquired. And it therefore follows, that in these compulsory embodyings of militia, there will be often found men, who, however useful they may be in civil life, are wholly unsuitable for the camp. Inability to pay for a substitute, or a false shame, may lead many of these men to obey the summons to the field. But when the clangor of arms sounds, nature, whose voice has been disregarded, asserts her sway. Ten men of this description may, by spreading a panic, cause the defeat of an entire army.

In political economy, as in all other sciences, it may be laid down as an incontrovertible maxim, that wherever there is a

strong and striking opposition between fact and theory, the latter is a fallacious guide, which cannot fail to lead its votaries astray. But when theories are supported by facts, they rarely mislead.

The American revolution is fraught with strong and decisive facts on the subject of the militia, which hold out the most unerring admonitions.

The letters of General Washington to congress are replete with complaints of the inefficiency, and of the ruinous results, of the militia system of the United States. They fully prove, moreover, that the cost of militia service is extravagantly high—and that a dependence on militia for regular and continued service, is attended with the utmost danger.

There is no authority on any subject whatever, more commanding, or more decisive, than that of General Washington, upon militia defence. In no nation was it ever, probably, more fully and completely essayed, than in the United States, during the war that eventuated in the acknowledgment of their independence. No man, therefore, ever had a fairer opportunity of judging on this topic—and there is no man on whose judgment more reliance could be placed.

As this is a subject of vital importance to the nation—as our happiness, and that of our posterity, as well as the safety and independence of our country, may, and probably will, depend upon a correct system of defence, I have judged it proper to produce the most ample display of the general's experience on the subject.

An examination of the dates will shew that the evils commenced with the very dawn of the revolution; for the first complaint of the general is contained in a letter, dated July 10, 1775, not two months after the battle of Lexington.

July 10th, 1775.

"All the general officers agree, that *no dependence can be put on the militia, for a continuance in camp, or regularity and discipline during the short time they may stay.*"*

July 14th, 1775.

"From some authentic and late advices of the state of the ministerial troops, and the great inconvenience of calling in the militia in the midst of harvest, I have been induced for the present to waive it."†

February 9th, 1776.

"Though I am sensible that we never have, since that period, been able to act upon the offensive, and been at times not in a condition to defend, yet the *cost of marching home one set of men—bringing in another—the havoc and waste occasioned by the first—the repairs necessary for the second—with a thousand incidental charges and inconveniences which have arisen, and which it is scarcely possible either to recollect or describe—amount to near as much as the keeping up a respectable body of troops the whole time, ready for any emergency, would have done.* To bring men well acquainted with the duties of a soldier, requires time. To

* Official letters to the honourable the American Congress, written during the war between the United States and Great Britain, by his excellency General Washington. London, 1795: vol. I. p. 7.

† Idem, page 9.

bring them under proper discipline and subordination, not only requires time, but is a work of great difficulty ; and in this army, where there is so little distinction between the officers and soldiers, requires an uncommon degree of attention.”*

“ Again, men of a day’s standing will not look forward : and from experience we find, that, *as the time approaches for their discharge, they grow careless of their arms, ammunition, camp utensils, &c.* Nay, even the barracks themselves have felt uncommon marks of wanton depredation, and lay us under fresh trouble and additional expense in providing for every fresh set, when we find it next to impossible to procure such articles as are absolutely necessary in the first instance. To this may be added the seasoning which new recruits must have to a camp, and the loss consequent thereupon. But this is not all—*men, engaged for a short limited time only, have the officers too much in their power ; for to obtain a degree of popularity, in order to induce a second enlistment, a kind of familiarity takes place, which brings on a relaxation of discipline, unlicensed furloughs, and other indulgences, incompatible with order and good government.*”†

“ There are yet but few companies of the militia come in. *This delay will, I am much afraid, frustrate the intention of their being called upon, as the season is slipping fast away when they may be of service.*”‡

April 4th, 1776.

“ I heartily wish the money had arrived sooner, that the militia might have been paid as soon as their term of service expired. The disappointment has given them great uneasiness, and *they are gone home much dissatisfied.*”§

“ I would also mention to congress, that the militia regiments which were last called upon, in making up their abstracts, charged pay—the officers, from the time they received orders to raise companies—and the privates, from the time they respectively engaged to come or were called upon, though they did not march for a considerable time after—some not within three, four, to twenty days, during all which they remained at home about their own private affairs, without doing any thing else than “ preparing for the march,” as they say, by way of plea.”||

July 17th, 1776.

“ The Connecticut light-horse, mentioned in my letter of the 11th, notwithstanding their then promise to continue here for the defence of this place, are now discharged, and are about to return home—*having peremptorily refused all kinds of fatigue duty, or even to mount guard, claiming exemption as troopers.* Though their assistance is much needed, and might be of essential service in case of an attack, yet I judged it advisable, on their application and claim of such indulgence, to discharge them ; as granting them would set an example to others, and might produce many ill consequences. The number of men included in the last return, by this is lessened about five hundred.”¶

August 18th, 1776.

“ They, [the British] mean to procrastinate their operations for some time, trusting that the militia which have come to our succour will soon become tired, and return home, as is but too usual with them ”***

August 19th, 1776.

“ Governor Trumbull, in a letter of the 13th, advises me that Ward’s regiment in the service of the states, was on the march to this army, and that he and his council of safety had in the whole ordered fourteen militia regiments to reinforce us. Three of them have arrived, and amount to about a thousand and twenty men. When the whole come in, we shall be on a much more respectable footing than we have been ; but I greatly fear, if the enemy defer their attempt for any considerable time, *they will be extremely impatient to return home ; and if they should, we shall be reduced to distress again.*”††

* Idem, page 87.

† Idem, page 88.

‡ Idem, page 91.

§ Idem, page 118.

|| Idem, page 120.

¶ Idem, page 19

** Idem, page 232.

†† Idem, page 233

The militia, instead of calling forth their utmost efforts to a brave and manly opposition, in order to repair our losses, are *dismayed, intractable, and impatient to return.* Great numbers of them have gone off—in some instances, almost by whole regiments, by half ones, and by companies at a time. This circumstance, of itself, independent of others, when fronted by a well-appointed enemy, superior in number to our whole collected force, would be sufficiently disagreeable—but, when their example has infected another part of the army—when their want of discipline, and refusal of almost every kind of restraint and government, have produced a like conduct but too common to the whole, and an entire disregard of that order and subordination necessary to the well doing of an army, and which had been inculcated before, as well as the nature of our military establishments would admit of—our condition is still more alarming; and with the deepest concern I am obliged to confess my want of confidence in the generality of the troops.

“All these circumstances fully confirm the opinion I ever entertained, and which I more than once in my letters took the liberty of mentioning to congress, that *no dependence can be put on the militia, or other troops* than those enlisted and embodied for a longer period than our regulations heretofore have prescribed. I am persuaded, and as fully confirmed as I am of any one fact that has happened, that our liberties must of necessity be greatly hazarded, if not entirely lost, if their defence is left to any but a permanent standing army—I mean one to exist during the war. Nor would the expense incident to the support of such a body of troops as would be competent to almost every exigency, far exceed that which is daily incurred by calling in succour, and new enlistments, which, when effected, are not attended with any good consequences. Men who have been free, and subject to no controul, cannot be reduced to order in an instant: and the privileges and exemptions they claim and will have, influence the conduct of others; and the aid derived from them is nearly counterbalanced by the disorder, irregularity and confusion, they occasion.”*

September 4th, 1776.

“The militia, under various pretences, of sickness, &c. are daily diminishing; and in a little time, I am persuaded, *their number will be very inconsiderable.*”†

“The militia from Connecticut is reduced from 6000 to 2000, and in a few days will be merely nominal. The arrival of some Maryland troops, &c. from the flying camp, has in a great degree supplied the loss of men; but the ammunition they have carried away will be a loss severely felt. *The impulse for going home was so irresistible, it answered no purpose to oppose it.* Though I would not discharge, I have been obliged to acquiesce; and it affords one more melancholy proof, how delusive all such dependencies are.”‡

September 20th, 1776.

“It is a melancholy and painful consideration to those who are concerned in the work, and have the command, to be forming armies constantly, and to be left by troops just when they begin to deserve the name, or perhaps at a moment when an important blow is expected.”§

September 24th, 1776.

“The thirteen militia regiments from Connecticut being reduced to a little more than 700 men, rank and file, fit for duty, *I have thought proper to discharge the whole, to save the states the immense charge that would arise from officers' pay.* There are many militia, too, that have just come in, or are on their way from that state, none of whom are provided with a tent, or a single camp utensil. This distresses me beyond measure.”||

September 24th, 1776.

“Again: men accustomed to unbounded freedom and no controul, cannot brook the restraint which is indispensibly necessary to the good order and government of an army; without which licentiousness and every kind of disorder reign. To bring men to a proper degree of subordination is not the work of a

* Idem, page 244.

† Idem, page 246.

‡ Idem, page 255.

§ Idem, page 265.

|| Idem, page 267.

day, a month, or even a year : and unhappily for us and the cause we are engaged in, the little discipline I have been labouring to establish in the army under my immediate command, is in a manner done away by having such a mixture of troops as have been called together within these few months.”*

“Relaxed and unfit as our rules and regulations of war are for the government of the army, *the militia*, (those properly so called, for of these we have two sorts—the six months’ men, and those sent in for temporary aid) do not think themselves subject to them, and therefore take liberties the soldier is punished for. This creates jealousy ; jealousy begets dissatisfactions ; and these by degrees ripen into mutiny, keeping the whole army in a confused and disordered state—rendering the time of those who wish to see regularity and good order prevail, more unhappy than words can describe. Besides this, such repeated changes take place, that all arrangement is set at nought, and the constant fluctuation of things deranges every plan as fast as adopted. These, sir, congress may be assured, are but a small part of the inconveniences which might be enumerated, and attributed to militia ; but there is one that merits particular attention, and that is, *the expense*. CERTAIN I AM, THAT IT WOULD BE CHEAPER TO KEEP FIFTY OR A HUNDRED THOUSAND IN CONSTANT PAY, THAN TO DEPEND UPON HALF THE NUMBER, AND SUPPLY THE OTHER HALF OCCASIONALLY BY MILITIA. The time the latter are in pay before and after they are in camp, assembling and marching—the waste of ammunition, the consumption of stores, which in spite of every resolution or requisition in congress, they must be furnished with or sent home, added to other incidental expenses consequent upon their coming to, and conduct in, camp—surpasses all idea, and destroys every kind of regularity and economy which you could establish among fixed and regular troops, and will, in my opinion, prove (if the scheme is adhered to) **THE RUIN OF OUR CAUSE.**”†

“The jealousies of a standing army, and the evils to be apprehended from one, are remote ; and, in my judgment, situated and circumstanced as we are, not at all to be dreaded : but the consequence of wanting one, according to my ideas, formed from the present view of things, is *certain and inevitable ruin*. For if I was called upon to declare upon oath, whether the militia have been most serviceable or hurtful, upon the whole, I should subscribe to the latter. I do not mean by this, however, to arraign the conduct of congress : in so doing, I should equally condemn my own measures, if I did not my judgment : but experience, which is the best criterion to work by, so fully, clearly, and decisively reprobates the practice of trusting to militia, that NO MAN WHO REGARDS ORDER, REGULARITY, AND ECONOMY, OR WHO HAS ANY REGARD FOR HIS HONOUR, CHARACTER, OR PEACE OF MIND, WILL RISK THEM UPON THIS ISSUE. An army formed by good officers moves like clock work : but there is no situation on earth less enviable, nor more distressing, than that of a person who is at the head of troops who are regardless of order and discipline, and who are unprovided with almost every necessary. In a word, the difficulties which have for ever surrounded me since I have been in the service, and kept my mind constantly upon the stretch—the wounds which my feelings (as an officer) have received by a thousand things which have happened contrary to my expectations and wishes, added to a consciousness of *inability to govern an army composed of such discordant parts*, and under such a variety of intricate and perplexing circumstances, induce not only a belief, but a thorough conviction in my mind, that it will be impossible (unless there is a thorough change in our military system) for me to conduct matters in such a manner as to give satisfaction to the public, which is all the recompense I aim at, or ever wished for.”‡

September 30, 1776.

“By a letter received from the committee of safety in the state of New Hampshire, I find a thousand of their militia were about to march the 24th ultimo, to reinforce this army, in consequence of the requisition of congress. Previous to their march, general Ward writes me, he was obliged to furnish them with five hundred pounds of powder, and a thousand pounds of musket

* Idem, page 271.

† Idem, page 272.

‡ Idem, page 273.

ball; and I have little reason to expect that they are better provided with other articles than they were with ammunition. In this case, they will only add to our present distress, which is already far too great, and become disgusted with the service, **THOUGH THE TIME THEY WERE ENGAGED FOR IS ONLY TILL THE FIRST OF DECEMBER**—this will injure their enlisting for a longer time, if not wholly prevent it.”*

October 4th, 1776.

“Upon the present plan, I plainly foresee an intervention of time between the old and new army, which must be filled up with militia (if to be had) **WITH WHOM NO-MAN WHO HAS ANY REGARD FOR HIS REPUTATION, CAN UNDERTAKE TO BE ANSWERABLE FOR CONSEQUENCES.**”†

October 31st, 1776.

“Our army is decreasing fast. Several gentlemen, who have come to camp within a few days, have observed large numbers of militia returning home on the different roads.”‡

November 9th, 1776.

“I have little or no reason to expect that the militia now here, will remain a day longer than the time they first engaged for. I have recommended their stay, and requested it in general orders. General Lincoln and the Massachusetts commissioners are using their interest with those from that state. But as far as I can judge, we cannot rely on their staying.

“I have no assurances that more than a very few of the troops composing the flying camp will remain after the time of their engagement is out: so far from it, I am told, that some of general Ewing’s brigade who stand engaged to the first of January, are now going away.”§

December 1st, 1776.

“The enemy are fast approaching—some of them are now in sight. All the men of the Jersey flying camp under general Heard, being applied to, have refused to continue longer in service.”||

Trenton, December 3d, 1776.

“I look out earnestly for the reinforcements from Philadelphia. I am in hopes that if we can draw a good head of men together, it will give spirits to the militia of this state, who have as yet afforded me little or no assistance; nor can I find they are likely to do much.”¶

Trenton, December 5th, 1776.

“Sorry I am to observe, however, that the frequent calls upon the militia of this state, the want of exertion in the principal gentlemen of the country, or a fatal supineness and insensibility of danger till it is too late to prevent an evil that was not only foreseen, but foretold, have been the causes of our late disgraces.

“If the militia of this state had stepped forth in season, (and timely notice they had) we might have prevented the enemy’s crossing the Hackinsac, although without some previous notice of the time and place, it was impossible to have done this at the North river.

“At Hackinsac our force was insufficient, because a part was at Elizabethtown, Amboy, and Brunswick, guarding a coast which I thought most exposed to danger; and at Brunswick, because I was disappointed in my expectations of militia, and because on the day of the enemy’s approach (and probably the occasion of it) the time of the Jersey and Maryland brigades’ service expired; **NEITHER OF WHICH WOULD CONSENT TO STAY AN HOUR LONGER.**

“These, among ten thousand other instances, might be adduced to shew the disadvantages of short enlistments, and the little dependence upon militia in times of real danger.

“My first wish is, that congress may be convinced of the impropriety of relying upon the militia, and the necessity of raising a larger standing army than they have voted. The saving in the articles of stores, provisions, and in a thousand other things, by having nothing to do with militia, unless in cases of extraordinary exigency, and such as could not be expected in the common

* Idem, page 279.

† Idem, page 282.

‡ Idem, page 301.

§ Idem, page 324.

|| Idem, page 328.

¶ Idem, page 330.

course of events, would amply supply a large army, which, well officered, would be daily improving, instead of CONTINUING A DESTRUCTIVE, EXPENSIVE, AND DISORDERLY MOB. I am clear in opinion, that if 40,000 men had been kept in constant pay since the first commencement of hostilities, and the militia had been excused doing duty during that period, the continent would have saved money. When I reflect on the losses we have sustained for want of good troops, the certainty of this is placed beyond a doubt in my mind. In such case, the militia, who have been harassed and tired by repeated calls upon them (and farming and manufactures in a manner suspended) would, upon any pressing emergency, have run with alacrity to arms; whereas the cry now is, "*they may as well be ruined in one way as another,*" and *with difficulty they are obtained.* I mention these things, to shew, that, in my opinion, *if any dependence is placed upon militia another year, congress will be deceived.* When danger is a little removed from them, they will not turn out at all. When it comes home to them, the well affected, instead of flying to arms to defend themselves, are busily employed in removing their families and effects—whilst the disaffected are concerting measures to make their submission, and spread terror and dismay all around, to induce others to follow the example.—Daily experience and abundant proofs warrant this information.*

December 16th, 1776.

"*That the militia are not to be depended on, or aid expected from them but in cases of the most pressing emergency, is not to be doubted.* The first of these propositions is unquestionable: and fatal experience has given her sanction to the truth of the latter. Indeed their lethargy of late, and backwardness to turn out at this alarming crisis, seem to justify an apprehension that nothing can bring them from their homes. For want of their assistance, a large part of Jersey has been exposed to ravage and to plunder; nor do I know that Pennsylvania would share a better fate, could general Howe effect a passage across the Delaware with a respectable force. These considerations have induced me to wish that *no reliance, except such as may arise from necessity, should ever be had on them again;* and to make further mention to congress of the expediency of increasing their army. I trust this measure will meet their earliest attention."†

December 20th, 1776.

"Short enlistments, and a mistaken dependence upon militia, have been the origin of all our misfortunes, and the great accumulation of our debt."‡

"We find, sir, that the enemy are daily gaining strength from the disaffected. This strength, like a snow-ball, by rolling, will increase, unless some means can be devised to check effectually the progress of the enemy's arms. Militia may possibly do it for a little while: but in a little while also, *the militia of those states which have been frequently called upon, will not turn out at all, or if they do, it will be with so much reluctance and sloth, as to amount to the same thing—instance New Jersey! witness Pennsylvania!—could any thing but the river Delaware have saved Philadelphia!* Can any thing (the exigency of the case indeed may justify it) be more destructive to the recruiting service, THAN GIVING TEN DOLLARS BOUNTY FOR SIX WEEKS' SERVICE OF THE MILITIA, WHO COME IN YOU CANNOT TELL HOW—GO YOU CANNOT TELL WHERE—CONSUME YOUR PROVISIONS—EXHAUST YOUR STORES, AND LEAVE YOU AT LAST AT A CRITICAL MOMENT."

"These, sir, are the men I am to depend upon, ten days hence; this is the basis on which your cause must and will forever depend, till you get a large standing army sufficient of itself to oppose the enemy."§

January 1st, 1776.

"After much persuasion, and the exertions of their officers, half or a greater proportion of those from the eastward have consented to stay six weeks on a bounty of ten dollars. I feel the inconveniency of this advance, and I know the consequences that will result from it—but what could be done? Pennsylvania had allowed the same to her militia—the troops felt their importance, and would have their price."¶

* Idem, page 333.

§ Ibid.

† Idem, page 346.

‡ Idem, vol. II. page 2.

§ Idem, page 350

January 5th, 1777.

"Their large picquets advanced towards Trenton—their great preparations, and some intelligence I had received, added to their knowledge that *the first of January brought on a dissolution of the best part of the army*—gave me the strongest reasons to conclude that an attack upon us was meditating."*

January 7th, 1777.

"The severity of the season has made our troops, especially the militia, extremely impatient, and has reduced the number very considerably. Every day more or less leave us."†

January 19th, 1777.

"*The fluctuating state of an army composed chiefly of militia, bids fair to reduce us to the situation in which we were some little time ago*—that is, of scarce having an army at all—except reinforcements speedily arrive. One of the battalions from the city of Philadelphia, goes home to day, and the other two only remain a few days longer upon courtesy. The time for which a country brigade under general Mifflin came out is expired; and they stay from day to day by dint of solicitation—their numbers much reduced by desertions"§

"As militia must be our dependence till we can get the new army raised and properly arranged, I must entreat you to continue your endeavours with the states of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia, to turn out every man they possibly can, and for some time longer than they generally have stipulated for. **IF THEY AGREE FOR A MONTH**, or any limited time, it should commence from the time they actually join the army, and not from the time they leave their homes: otherwise the marching backwards and forwards consumes the term of engagement."¶

January 22d, 1777.

"The necessity that we have been and are now under, of calling in and arming the militia, scatters our armory all over the world in a manner. Their officers are so irregular, that they generally suffer their men to carry home every thing that is put into their hands, which is forever lost to the public."***

February 20th, 1777.

"At this time we are only about four thousand strong—a force you will suppose, unequal to a successful opposition, if they were not militia, and far too small for the exigencies of our affairs. It is impossible to obtain exact returns, though they are daily called for—owing to the frequent and almost constant departure of some of the corps."††

February 28th, 1777.

"I was in hopes, that, by the time the militia who are now in service would be discharged, we should have had a considerable number of the new levies in the field: but, though I have reports from all quarters of the great success of the recruiting, I cannot get a man into the service. General Jackson's militia all go the 5th of March (many are gone already:) and general Lincoln's on the 15th. These two bodies form so considerable a part of our force, that, unless they are replaced, *I shall be in a manner destitute.*"‡‡

Morristown, March 14th, 1777.

"What prospect there may be of immediate succours from other quarters, I know not: but *from the militia of this state I cannot expect to derive much more aid.* Those who are well affected have been so frequently called from their homes, that they are tired out, and almost profess an abhorrence of the service."§§

"By the paymaster's report, the commissary here requires an immediate draft for a hundred thousand: and the militia returning and about to leave camp a hundred and twenty thousand more. *The expense of culling on them so frequently is almost incredible.*"¶¶

* Idem, page 3.

¶ Idem, page 11.

‡ Idem, page 42.

† Idem, page 6.

** Idem, page 24.

¶¶ Idem, page 44.

§ Idem, page 10.

†† Idem, page 36.

Morristown, March 26th, 1777.

"I urged governor Trumbull, in a letter of the 6th inst. to send two thousand of his militia to the same place. But sorry am I to observe, *the militia have got tired.*"*

"For want of proper coercive powers, from disaffection and other causes—*the militia of this state [New Jersey] are not to be depended upon.—They are drawn out with difficulty, and at a most enormous expense, as their accounts will shew.—THEY COME, YOU CAN SCARCE TELL HOW: THEY GO, YOU HARDLY KNOW WHEN. IN THE SAME PREDICAMENT ARE THOSE OF PENNSYLVANIA.*"†

"Small as our present force is, it will be reduced in a few days, by the going off of the Jersey three-months-men, the Cecil county militia, and the Virginia volunteers, all of whom claim discharges next month."‡

April 28th, 1777.

"So early as the 6th of March I wrote to governor Trumbull, earnestly requesting two thousand militia to be sent to general Mc Dougal, to be employed at Peekskill, and on the communication in West-Chester county, *for six weeks.* With this requisition he most readily complied, so far as his orders were necessary, and (I am certain) his influence would extend. This I have repeated, and this supply he has exerted himself to furnish; yet so ineffectual have his endeavours been, that not more than eight hundred had come out by general Mc Dougal's return on the 17th instant."§

May 12th, 1777.

"I would observe, if the militia are called out, it should be for a fixed determinate time; for though they will certainly return when that expires, yet that is more tolerable than for them to go off in parties every day as their whim and caprice suggest—which has always been the case when the time is not stated. I would also observe, if it is possible, they should be engaged to march out of their states, if ordered. If their service is located, they will move with great reluctance, if they move at all."||

June 2d, 1777.

"The shameful deficiency in all our armies affords but too just grounds for disagreeable apprehensions: if the quotas assigned the different states are not immediately filled, we shall have every thing to fear. *We shall never be able to resist their force, if the militia are to be relied on: nor do I know whether their aid, feeble and inefficient as it is, is much to be expected.*"¶

September 7th, 1777.

"In respect to the militia requested, (of Jersey) his excellency is doubtful whether they can be obtained: for gov. Livingston, by a late letter, informs, that he had no expectation that more than three hundred of the thousand called for to garrison the posts of the highlands, would march, notwithstanding he had issued orders for that purpose; and that three weeks would probably elapse before that number went."**

October 7th, 1777.

"Since the action, *gen. Furman's brigade of Jersey militia has quitted us.* The men began to be uneasy at their situation, and desirous to return home: and as, by some intelligence from general Dickinson, there was reason to imagine there might be a call for their services in the Jerseys, it was thought expedient to gratify their desire."††

October 13th, 1777.

"I will only observe, that *the consequences of calling the militia into the field in the course of the war, have been so severely and ruinously felt, that I trust our views will never be turned to them but in cases of the greatest extremity.*"‡‡

November 1st, 1777.

"*The militia from Virginia and Maryland are no longer to be counted on: all the former, except about two hundred, are already gone; and a few days, I expect, will produce the departure of the whole or chief part of the latter, from the importunate applications which some of them have made.*"§§

* Idem, page 46.

† Idem, page 47.

‡ Idem, page 48.

§ Idem, page 64.

|| Idem, page 75.

¶ Idem, page 86.

** Idem, page 163. †† Idem, page 180. ‡‡ Idem, p. 189. §§ Idem, p. 197.

"Agreeable to my expectations, the [*Virginia*] militia are gone; so that we have none now in aid of the continental troops but those of this state [*Pennsylvania*] mentioned in the return, and a few from Maryland."

"The militia of this state, supposing they should be tolerably vigorous in their exertions, will not be equal to the task: at least it will be difficult, if not impracticable, for them to do it. *It is to be wished that such as can be drawn out, may be engaged to serve THREE MONTHS, or TWO AT LEAST, (if it can be effected) after their arrival in camp; and that a mode could be adopted to supply their places with others at the expiration of their term, should the exigency of our affairs require it. A time for their continuance should be fixed, or they will always be uneasy and pushing off; and the longer circumstances will admit it to be, the better: for, after the period occurs, for which they came, it will be impossible to detain them a moment.*†

A perusal of the preceding extracts cannot fail to shake the faith of the most strenuous advocates for reliance on militia as a general defence. Never was a point more ably or convincingly enforced. The immense importance of the subject—the mighty errors that prevail on it—and the ruinous consequences those errors may entail on us—will, I trust, fully justify such long details.

The following positions are clearly and irresistibly established:

1. That the expense of militia is exorbitantly great.
2. That they cannot be reduced to that strictness of discipline which is indispensibly necessary in all armies.
3. That the period of service is so short, that it expires before they can acquire military skill.
4. That whatever be the emergency, when the period of service has expired, the militia cannot be retained in service, without solicitation, utterly destructive of subordination.

I am well aware, that there are illustrious exceptions to these observations. The militia have, in many instances, made a grand and glorious display of all the military virtues, in as high a degree as the bravest veterans. They have defeated equal and superior numbers of troops of the latter description: witness Plattsburg, New Orleans, &c. But these cases do not form the rule. They are the exceptions. And whatever instances may be produced to invalidate my positions, can be outnumbered ten-fold. But I studiously draw a veil over the subject. To any man of reason and common sense, who reflects on the mode of selection, or who inspects a body of drafted militia, it must be obvious that the system is radically wrong.

CHAPTER LXIX.

Conscription or classification of the militia to fill up the army, the most impartial and efficacious mode. A measure of the American revolution. Plan borrowed by France. General Knox's plan.

I NOW undertake to establish my fifth position, "that the system of classification is the most impartial, the most efficacious,

† Idem, page 200.

† Idem, page 201.

and the least oppressive mode of calling the militia into service, of any of the plans that have ever been devised."

This mode of calling the militia into service, applies to, and bears equally upon, the whole body throughout the nation, without exception. This is a characteristic of impartiality and justice, peculiar to this system; and, had it no other advantage, would entitle it to a decided preference over every other.

That it is most efficacious is equally clear. The service is entirely voluntary. No man is obliged to serve who does not find himself qualified, and who has any aversion whatever to the service, because there is not an individual in the country who cannot pay his proportion of the expense of hiring a substitute. It is needless to prove, as it must be self-evident to the most superficial observer, that there is an incalculable difference in point of efficiency between any number of men, who, being drafted by lot, are forced to serve, whether they choose or not, and the same number of men who enter the service of their own free will.

That this system is the least oppressive, is equally indisputable. According to the prevailing militia systems, every man drafted must either serve, or send a substitute at his own individual expense. In all the states, heavy, and, to the poor, ruinous fines, are imposed on delinquents. Thirty-three dollars, which is the fine in Massachusetts, is an enormous sum to a poor person, which forces him into the service, however reluctant or unfit for duty. Whereas, according to the classification plan, all the persons liable to military service throughout the state, or states, as the case may be, would contribute their respective quotas towards paying those who might offer their services, or who might be enlisted, if enlistment were necessary, which it rarely would be. This contribution would, in no case operate oppressively.

My sixth proposition is "that the classification system prevailed during the revolution."

All that is necessary to prove this, is to refer the reader to the following extracts from the laws of Pennsylvania and New-Jersey, which were similar in substance to those enacted in the other states.

"And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That the commissioners of the city and several counties of this state respectively, or any two of them, shall direct the assessors of the several townships, wards, and districts, in the said city and counties respectively, to meet on or before the first day of February next, at the usual place of holding courts in the said city and counties respectively, or at such other place or places where the said commissioners shall think most convenient; and shall then and there, in conjunction with the said assessors, *proceed to class the taxable persons and property* within the said city and counties respectively, in such manner that the said property, together with a proportionable sum on all taxable single freemen, shall be divided into as many equal parts as the quota of men, which the said city and counties respectively are by this act required to enlist, shall consist of, paying due regard

to the ease and convenience of the inhabitants, by including those who reside near each other within the same class; and shall transmit to the several classes, by persons by them to be appointed for that service, *an order in writing, under the hands of the said commissioners, or any two of them, with a duplicate annexed, containing the names of each and every person composing the same, requiring each of the said classes TO ENLIST DURING THE WAR, AND DELIVER TO THE PROPER OFFICER, ONE ABLE BODIED RECRUIT WITHIN FIFTEEN DAYS THEREAFTER.*"*

"And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That the commissioners of the city and several counties of this state respectively, or any two of them, shall forthwith transmit to the several classes, classed by virtue of an act of the assembly of this state, entitled, "An act to complete the quota of the federal army assigned to this state," passed the twenty-third of December, one thousand seven hundred and eighty, by persons to be by them appointed for that service, an order in writing under their hands, with a duplicate annexed, containing the names of each and every person composing such class, *requiring each of the said classes to enlist for the term of eighteen months as aforesaid, and DELIVER TO THE PROPER OFFICER, ONE ABLE BODIED RECRUIT WITHIN FIFTEEN DAYS.*

"And be it enacted by the authority aforesaid, That *if any class or classes shall neglect or refuse to enlist one able bodied recruit as aforesaid, within the time limited and directed, or to make return thereof to the assessors of the proper township, ward, or district, it shall and may be lawful for the said commissioners, or township, ward, or district assessors, or any of them, and they are hereby authorized and required, to enlist for the term aforesaid, and deliver to the proper officer, one able bodied recruit, in behalf of such class or classes, respectively; and that it shall and may be lawful for the said commissioners, township, ward, or district assessors, or either of them, where such neglect or refusal shall happen, to proceed and levy, in the manner directed by the laws now in force for levying and collecting other public taxes, on the class or classes so neglecting or refusing, the sum agreed to be paid by the said commissioners, township, ward, or district assessors, or any of them, to the said recruit, and the reasonable expenses accruing thereupon, in proper proportions, according to the last public tax levied therein; which they are hereby enjoined and directed to do within two days after such recruit shall be enlisted.*

"Be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That the commissioners of the several counties respectively, shall provide and keep a book, into which they shall enter in numerical order the several delinquent classes, as they shall be returned to them, and shall enlist recruits for the said delinquent classes, according to their respective numbers; and in like manner levy and collect the sums imposed on them respectively by this act."†

"The several colonels or commanding officers of regiments and battalions of this state, shall cause the several companies of militia in their respective regiments or battalions, to be divided into eight parts, to be called classes, as nearly equal as may be, and numbered, from one to eight, in numerical order: and the captains shall cause the names and surnames of the persons in the respective companies, with the classes to which each belongeth, to be returned to the colonels or commanding officers respectively, at such time as they shall appoint within six days after such division shall be made.

"Sect. 5. That the captain general, or commander in chief for the time being, in case of invasion or rebellion within this state, or in case any part of the militia of this state shall be requested by congress, to assist the continental army, in this or any of the adjoining states, *may and is hereby empowered to call into actual service, any part of the militia, not exceeding one half, by classes, as aforesaid, as to him shall seem necessary; the first draft to be composed of number one of each company: and in case that shall not be sufficient for the emergency, then number two shall be drawn; and so on, by classes, from time to time, as occasion may require.*"‡

* Laws of Pennsylvania, 1780, chap. cxc. page 428.

† Idem, page 501.

‡ Laws of New Jersey, March 15, and September 23, 1777.

In the cases of persons refusing or declining to serve, or to furnish a substitute, the sixth section provides for the seizure and sale of their goods, for the purpose of hiring substitutes.

By these laws, each class was obliged to furnish an able bodied recruit—either one of its own number, or a person to be enlisted by it, and at the joint expense of the members—which is precisely the idea of the secretary of state and of Mr. Giles.

This is, I presume, conclusive. This relieves the system of classification from the odium attached to it as a discovery of the French republic, which has had more credit in this respect than it deserves. It took the plan at second hand from the sages and heroes of the American revolution.

My next point is to prove, “that the classification or conscription system, most elaborately matured by General Knox, and stamped with the seal of General Washington’s approbation, was more strict in its provisions than any of the recent plans.”

General Knox addressed his system to President Washington. It bears date, January 18, 1790—and the letter which prefaces it, has the following introduction:

“Having submitted to your consideration, a plan for the arrangement of the militia of the United States, which I had presented to the late congress of the United States, and you having approved of the general principles thereof, *with certain exceptions*, I now respectfully lay the same before you, *modified according to the alterations you were pleased to suggest.*”

From this plan, approved, as we see, and submitted to congress by General Washington, I annex an extract, amply adequate to prove, that it bore the essential features which belong to the system of defence which was hunted down by the folly and madness of faction and sedition. In fact, it was much more strict and severe in its details, than either of those digested by the secretary at war or Mr. Giles—that enacted in New York—or the one rejected by the sapient legislature of Pennsylvania. None of the recent plans contemplated service beyond 45 years—whereas, Gen. Knox carried his views to a third class, to be composed of citizens between 46 and 60 years. His plan likewise contemplated compulsory service of the mariners, who, as we shall see, were to be subject to conscription.

Extracts from General Knox’s plan for the general arrangement of the militia of the United States, submitted to congress by General Washington, January 1790, and published by order of the house of representatives of the United States.

“An energetic national militia is to be regarded as the capital security of a free republic, and not a standing army, forming a distinct class in the community.

“The period of life in which military service shall be required of the citizens of the United States, to commence at 18, and terminate at the age of 60 years.

“The men comprehended by this description, exclusive of such exceptions as the legislatures of the respective states may think proper to make, and all

actual mariners, shall be enrolled for different degrees of military duty, and divided into distinct classes.

"The 1st class shall comprehend the youth of 18, 19, and 20 years of age, to be denominated the advanced corps.

"The 2d class shall include the men from 21 to 45 years of age, to be denominated the main corps.

"The 3d class shall comprehend inclusively the men from 46 to 60 years of age, to be denominated the reserved corps.

"All the militia of the United States shall assume the form of the legion, which shall be the permanent establishment thereof.

"A legion shall consist of 153 commissioned officers, and 2880 non-commissioned officers and privates.

"The companies of all the corps shall be divided into sections of 12 each. It is proposed by this division, to establish one uniform vital principle, which in peace and war shall pervade the militia of the United States.

"All requisitions for men to *form an army*, either for state or federal purposes, shall be furnished by the advanced and main corps, by means of the *sections*.

"The executive government, or commander in chief of the militia of each state, will assess the numbers required on the respective legions of these corps.

"The legionary general will direct the proportions to be furnished by each part of his command. *Should the demand be so great as to require one man from each section, then the operations hereby directed shall be performed by single sections.* But if a less number should be required, they will be furnished by an association of sections or companies, according to the demand. In any case, it is probable that mutual convenience may dictate an agreement with an individual to perform the service required. If, however, no agreement can be made, one must be detached by an indiscriminate draft, and the others shall pay him a sum of money equal to the averaged sum which shall be paid in the same legion for the voluntary performance of the services required.

"In case any section or company of a legion, after having furnished its own quota, should have more men willing to engage for the service required, other companies of the same legion shall have permission to engage them—the same rule to extend to the different legions of the state.

"The legionary general must be responsible to the commander in chief of the military of the state, that the men furnished are according to the description, and that they are equipped in the manner, and marched to the rendezvous, conformably to the orders for that purpose.

"*The men who may be drafted, shall not serve more than three years at one time.*

"*All the actual mariners or seamen in the respective states shall be registered in districts, and divided into two classes—the first class to consist of all the seamen from the age of 16 to 30 years inclusively—the second class to consist of all those from the age of 31 to 45 inclusively.*

"*The first class shall be responsible to serve three years on board of some public armed vessel or ship of war, as a commissioned officer, or private marine, for which they shall receive the customary wages and emoluments.*

"*The 2d class shall be responsible for a portion of service in those cases to which the first class shall be unequal—the number required shall be furnished by sections, in the same manner as is prescribed for the sections of the militia.*"

"The advanced legions, in all cases of invasion or rebellion, shall, on requisition of the lawful authority, be obliged to march to any place within the United States, to remain embodied for such time as shall be directed, not to exceed one year, to be computed from the time of marching from the regimental parade; during the period of their being on such service, to be placed on the continental establishment of pay, subsistence, clothing, forage, tents, camp equipage, and all such other allowances as are made to *federal troops*, at the same time and under the same circumstances.

"The common mode of recruiting is attended with too great destruction of morals to be tolerated; and is too *uncertain* to be the principal resource of a wise nation in time of danger. The public faith is frequently wounded by unworthy individuals who hold out delusive promises which can never be realized. By such means an unprincipled banditti are often collected, for the purpose of defending every thing that should be dear to freemen. The consequences are natural. Such men either desert in time of danger, or are ever ready, on the slightest disgust, to turn their arms against their country. By the establishment of the sections, an ample and permanent source is opened, whence the state in every exigency may be supplied with men whose all depends on the prosperity of their country."

I request the reader will duly weigh these extracts, and will examine the admirable plan, at large, which ought to immortalize the memory of General Knox. It is to be hoped, that the day is not far distant, when the adoption of such a system will place a rampart around our firesides and our families, which might bid defiance to all the hosts of Europe combined, were they to attempt our subjugation. This would far excel the famous Chinese wall, built to guard against the incursions of the Tartars—or the Pictish wall of the Roman general Agricola.

I cannot pass over one incident connected with this affair, which shews, in a striking point of light, the delusion which the spirit of faction excites. After the noble, efficient systems of the secretary at war and Mr. Giles fell sacrifices to the convulsive struggles in congress for power—and after, of course, the country was thus left in a manner defenceless and exposed to the inroads of a powerful enemy, the house of delegates of the state of Maryland published an address to Rufus King, Esq. lavishing compliments on him for his services in defeating those plans of defence, and thereby subjecting their houses, their wives, their children, their parents, and themselves, to the mercy of Cockburns and Gordons !!!

"Resolved, that the thanks of this house, in behalf of the freemen of Maryland, be, and they are hereby presented to the honourable Rufus King, of the senate of the United States, for the seasonable and successful interposition of his experienced wisdom and influence of character, in *averting the meditated operation of a measure, hostile to the immunities of constitutional freedom, offensive to the pure genius of independence, and fraught with consequences baleful and appalling to the social order, tranquillity, and well being of this united republic.*

"And the house would accompany the respectful tribute, which is thus specially offered, with a general expression of the grateful sense which it also entertains of the distinguished merit of the other members of the minority, who so stedfastly and ably co-operated, at every revival of the struggle, in both branches of congress, in combating against the insidious introduction of an authoritative conscript establishment, more specious in the form of its approach, but not essentially different from that, whose intense oppression has just vanished from the continent of Europe, with its guilty author, the blood-stained usurper of France."

Mr. King's Reply.

Washington, Jan. 8, 1815.

SIR—I have had the honour to receive your letter of the 6th inst. transmitting to me a copy of the resolution of the house of delegates of the state of Maryland, of the same date. Permit me, sir, through you, to express to the house of delegates the high sense I entertain of the honour of their approbation of

my conduct as a member of the senate, in opposing the bill which required of the militia of the several states, to furnish recruits for the regular army, under the penalty of being themselves drafted to serve in the prosecution of the war.

At the time that I offer my acknowledgments to the house of delegates, I am bound in justice to others, to disclaim any particular merit on this occasion; the failure of the bill must be ascribed to the strenuous and able opposition which it received in both houses of congress, sustained, as the opposition has been, by the voice of the country.

I ask for indulgence to add, that while I have resisted the progress of a bill, professing to have for its object to provide for the common defence, by means, which the constitution does not in my judgment authorise; I have thought myself obliged, by a faithful regard for the general safety, at a period of great public difficulty, without reference to the past, to vote for supplies of men and money, and for other important measures within the pale of the constitution, which are thought necessary to revive the public credit; to protect the several states against invasion, and to defend and save from dismemberment the territory and sovereignty of the nation; objects to the attainment of which no effort that can be made by freemen will be deemed too great.

With distinguished consideration, I have the honour to be, sir, your obedient servant,

RUFUS KING.

Hon. Henry H. Chapman, speaker of the house of delegates of Maryland.

CHAPTER LXX.

Gerrymanderism. Derivation of this queer name. Political Legerdemain. A grand discovery how to enable a minority to rule the majority. Joint and concurrent votes. General ticket.

It is a painful truth, discreditable to human nature, that politicians, even those who in private life are honest and upright, display considerable laxity of principle, in cases wherein the interest, or the power, or the influence of the party to which they are attached, is in question. From this strong and pointed censure, few parties, in any age or country, have been free. It is not therefore wonderful, that both federalists and democrats have been liable to it. Their history affords many decisive illustrations of the soundness of the maxim.

The subject to which I have devoted this chapter, is an unanswerable corroboration of the accusation. It involves a gross violation of justice and political morality—and, virtually disfranchising one portion of the community, imparts to the other an undue share of political influence. This is assuredly a high crime and misdemeanor, deserving of the most pointed reprobation of good men of all parties.

It has reference to the representation in the senates of the individual states.

As this book may be perused by persons unacquainted with our systems of government, it may not be improper to state, that our legislatures are generally composed of a senate and house of representatives, or delegates. To the latter branch each county in the state to which it belongs, sends one or more representatives. In fourteen of the states, the representation is in proportion

to the population. But in Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina, it is regulated merely by counties, no regard being paid to the population.

The senates, in almost every case, are composed of members chosen by districts, formed of two or more counties, which districts elect a number of senators in proportion to their population, except in the four states specified.

The above arrangement and the adjustment of these districts open a door to a considerable degree of intrigue and management, and invite to chicane and fraud—in one word, to the political sin, which I have styled *Gerrymanderism*. Of this heinous political sin, both federalists and democrats, as I have said, have been guilty.

The injustice lies in so arranging the counties, in the formation of districts, as to produce the effect stated in the second paragraph.

To accomplish this sinister purpose, counties are frequently united, to form a senatorial district, which have no territorial connection, being separated from each other by an intervening county, sometimes by two or three.

The state of Massachusetts was depicted, four or five years since, as a sort of monstrous figure, with the counties forming the senatorial districts, displayed on this unprincipled plan. It was called a *Gerrymander*,* in allusion to the name of the late vice-president of the United States, then governor of that state. Hence I derive the term *Gerrymanderism*. To those who gave the title *Gerrymander*, it might not unaptly be said—“*men of glass, throw no stones.*”

To enable the reader to form a correct idea of the extreme and flagrant injustice that may be perpetrated in this mode, without any apparent violation of law or constitution, I will explain how a minority may be enabled to rule a large majority, so far as respects the senatorial branch of the legislature.

I suppose a case. Six counties, each containing 1,000 voters, are to be formed into three senatorial districts, each to elect four senators. These districts may be so contrived, that the party predominant in the legislature at the time of arranging them, whether federal or democratic, with 2,320 voters, shall have eight senators; and the other, with 3,680, shall have only four, and, nevertheless, every elector of the whole 6,000 shall exercise the right of suffrage.

* The federalists, who have always been very adroit in *political christenings*, endeavoured, by the use of this name, to cast the odium exclusively on their antagonists, as if they themselves were immaculate on this subject. The idea is unsound.

The Boston folks are said to be full of *notions*. They have been pretty notional on the subject of the English language, which they have amplified, I will not say improved, with many such queer words.

You may well be amazed, reader. But it is so. Such is the political juggle and hocus pocus, that our public men, of both parties, too frequently perform, to acquire or to perpetuate an undue share of power.

I now state the number of voters in each of the six counties, to which I give the following names :

<i>Counties.</i>	<i>Federalists.</i>	<i>Democrats.</i>
Jackson,	120	880
Erie,	280	720
Champlain,	340	660
M'Donough,	680	320
Perry,	150	850
Porter,	750	250
	<hr/> 2320	<hr/> 3680

I might have styled the parties *big-endians*, or *little-endians*. The name is of no importance.

Now for a display of political legerdemain—in order to enable the minority to rule the majority :

DISTRICT NO. 1. <i>Formed of Erie and Porter counties.</i>			DISTRICT NO. 2. <i>Formed of Champlain and M'Donough counties.</i>			DISTRICT NO. 3. <i>Formed of Jackson and Perry counties.</i>		
	Fed.	Dem.		Fed.	Dem.		Fed.	Dem.
Erie,	280	720	Champlain,	340	660	Jackson,	120	880
Porter,	750	250	M'Donough,	680	320	Perry,	150	850
	<hr/> 1030	<hr/> 970		<hr/> 1020	<hr/> 980		<hr/> 270	<hr/> 1730

Thus, as I have stated, a minority of 2,320 inhabitants, may have twice as many senators as the majority of 3,680—their candidates having been successful in the two first districts. In the first district, the democratic minority is 970—in the second 980, which are wholly lost. And the majority in the third district is 1730, whereas 1010 would have equally secured the election. It therefore follows, that by this arrangement, there are 970, 980, and 620 democratic votes absolutely thrown away.

This is an extreme case. Injustice carried to such a flagrant extent, does not often occur. The instances, however, of this kind, but of an inferior degree, are by no means unfrequent. It thence happens, that a senate is sometimes democratic, while the house of representatives, in the same state, is decidedly federal; and *vice versa*.

This political arithmetic, like every other science, has its arcanæ. The grand and unerring rule is, to make your own minorities and majorities as small, and those of your adversaries as large, as possible. In other words, to throw away as few votes on your own side, and as many on the other, as in your power.

This fraudulent practice admits but of one effectual remedy. Senatorial districts ought to be formed of counties and parts of counties, quite contiguous to each other, so that all those who vote for each senator shall be residents of the same neighbourhood.

There is another political fraud, of which both parties have been occasionally guilty, and which deserves the severest reprobation. It has respect to the choice of members of the house of representatives of the United States, and electors of the president and vice-president.

For these very important operations, there is not, although reason and justice loudly call for it, a fixed and permanent rule. The legislatures of the individual states have the power of deciding upon the mode, and, as it respects the representatives, upon the time of the election. Hence, flagrant injustice is frequently perpetrated.

These elections are sometimes by districts, in the same manner as the state senators are elected; at others, by a general ticket.

The last mode is extremely unfair and incorrect. It deprives the minority altogether of any share in the representation.

A short statement will fully evince the extreme injustice and inequality of a general ticket for members of congress, or electors of president.

Massachusetts is entitled to members of the house of	} 20
representatives of the United States,	
New-York, - - - - - -	- 27
Pennsylvania, - - - - - -	- 23
Virginia, - - - - - -	- 23
	—
	93

Suppose either of the parties, federal or democratic, to have a very small majority in each of these states, say one thousand votes—suppose, also, the whole number of votes in the four states to be 300,000. The result will be, that if the elections be by general tickets, 152,000 voters may secure the entire representation of these four states, which is more than half of the whole number of members of congress—and that the remaining 148,000 will have no representative. This idea might be pursued to a great extent. But I leave it to the pen or pencil of the reader.

Instances have frequently occurred in the different states, of the mode of election being changed on the spur of the occasion, to suit the momentary purposes of party or faction. The most recent case that has occurred, was in the state of New-Jersey in 1812. From the organization of the general government till the year 1800, the members of the house of representatives of the United States, had been elected in that state by districts. In that year, the federalists had a majority in the legislature, and calculated on a majority of votes in the whole state. In order, therefore, to engross the whole representation to themselves, on the eve of the election, they repealed the district law, and passed an act for electing the representatives in congress by a general

ticket. Contrary to their calculations, the democratic ticket prevailed then, and in every subsequent election till the year 1812. In the latter year, the federalists having a temporary ascendancy in the state legislature, one of their first acts was to repeal the general election law, which they had themselves enacted, and to restore the election by districts, which they had formerly repealed. And by Gerrymandering the state to suit their views, they gained four out of the six representatives; whereas by a general ticket they would not have obtained one.

Another reprehensible procedure, emanating from the same laxity of principle, respects elections by our legislative bodies. When the politics of the two branches of a legislature are different, there is frequently a struggle about the mode of election—whether by a joint, or a concurrent vote. The senate being the less numerous body, are, in the case of a joint vote, merged and lost in the greater number of the house of representatives. They are, therefore, strenuous supporters of a concurrent vote, in which their influence is equal to that of the co-ordinate branch. The other house, confiding in its numbers, is equally zealous for a joint vote, wherein it will have the ascendancy. The state of Pennsylvania was, many years since, for a considerable time unrepresented in the senate of the United States, in consequence of a struggle of this kind—neither party being disposed to concede the point to the other.

It is a grand desideratum to have all these points clearly and explicitly defined by the constitutions. There should be as little temptation to fraud, and as little safety in the perpetration of it, as possible.

CHAPTER LXXI.

State of representation in Massachusetts. Wretched system of representation in Maryland and Virginia. Rotten boroughs.

It may not be improper here to introduce an analogous subject, respecting the representation in the state of Massachusetts. The men who framed the constitution of that state, were probably as highly enlightened and respectable, as any equal number of men ever convened for such a purpose. But they, nevertheless, committed some very egregious errors, which are really astonishing. The most conspicuous was, neglecting precisely to fix the number of representatives in the more numerous branch of the legislature. The consequence is, that the numbers have fluctuated in the most extraordinary and incredible degree. There have been as many as 700—at other times not half the number. And the town of Boston has had a small army of representatives, no less than forty-four—being a greater number than the whole senate and house of representatives of the

state of Delaware—than the entire senate of South Carolina, or Pennsylvania—and than the assembly of New Jersey.

This defect in their representative system arises from a flaw in the constitution, respecting the choice of members of the house of representatives—instead of, the imperative, “*they shall elect*,” the phrase is, “*they may elect*.”

“Every corporate town containing one hundred and fifty rateable polls, *may* elect one representative :—every corporate town containing three hundred and seventy-five rateable polls, *may* elect two representatives :—every corporate town containing six hundred rateable polls, *may* elect three representatives :—and proceeding in that manner, making two hundred and twenty-five rateable polls the mean encreasing number of every additional representative.”

Every town has heretofore paid (and I believe still pays) its own representatives : and, from a sordid, miserable, huckstering, and contemptible spirit of economy, some of them send no representatives—others, regardless of expense, send full as many as they are entitled to—and some, it is presumable, when party spirit runs high, send more than their quota.

It is difficult to conceive how Boston can be entitled to 44 representatives. The city of Philadelphia, with a population of 57,000 inhabitants, has never polled more than 6,000 votes. The right of suffrage here is as latitudinarian as any where ; much more than in Massachusetts, where a citizen must be worth 60*l.* to qualify him to vote. According to the Massachusetts principle, we should be entitled only to about 27. Boston has but 33,000 inhabitants, and yet has had 44 representatives !!

Representation, which is the key-stone of free government, is arranged very incorrectly in several other states. The *Gerry-mander* principle, is, alas ! too prevalent. The lust of power induces parties to hold tenaciously whatever political advantages they possess, however unjust their operation.

This subject, alone, would require a volume. But I shall merely glance at a few enormous traits of injustice.

Each of the counties of Maryland has four representatives in the house of delegates. There is, nevertheless, a most enormous difference in the population.

	<i>Inhabitants.</i>	<i>Representatives.</i>
Frederick county	34,477	4
Anne Arundel	26,668	4
Baltimore	29,255	4
Harford	21,258	4
Baltimore city	46,555	2
	<hr/> 158,213	<hr/> 18

The above four counties, and the city of Baltimore, have only 18 representatives.

<i>Counties.</i>	<i>Inhabitants.</i>	<i>Representatives.</i>
Allegany	6,909	4
Calvert	8,005	4
Caroline	9,453	4
Kent	11,450	4
St. Mary's	12,794	4
	<hr/> 48,611	<hr/> 20

These five counties have twenty representatives. Thus 48,611 persons in one part of the state, have 10 per cent. more influence than 158,213 in another. If this be not *Gerrymandering*, pray what is?

Kent county, in Delaware, has but 20,495 inhabitants—Sussex, 27,750. But each elects an equal number of representatives and senators.

The same wretched and unjust system prevails in Virginia. Each county has two representatives. And there is, in many cases, a more enormous disproportion, in the population, and more flagrant injustice, than in Maryland.

I annex a view of the population of sixteen counties in Virginia, which have thirty-two representatives in the house of delegates. Eight of them, it will be seen, have 163,000 inhabitants, and the other eight only 27,000. Thus six men in the first list have no more influence in the making of laws, than one in the second!

<i>Counties.</i>	<i>Inhabitants.</i>	<i>Represent.</i>	<i>Counties.</i>	<i>Inhabitants.</i>	<i>Represent.</i>
Caroline	17,544	2	Warwick	1,835	2
Buckingham	20,059	2	Fluvanna	4,775	2
Albemarle	18,268	2	Middlesex	4,414	2
Fauquier	22,689	2	Patrick	4,695	2
Frederic	22,574	2	Mason	1,991	2
Halifax	22,131	2	Tazewell	3,007	2
Loudon	21,338	2	Brooke	2,717	2
Mecklenberg	18,453	2	Giles	3,745	2
	<hr/> 163,056	<hr/> 16		<hr/> 27,179	<hr/> 16

Same subject once more, in a still more striking point of view.

<i>Counties.</i>	<i>Inhabitants.</i>	<i>Represent.</i>	<i>Counties.</i>	<i>Inhabitants.</i>	<i>Represent.</i>
Fauquier	22,689	2	Warwick	1,835	2
Frederic	22,574	2	Mason	1,991	2
	<hr/> 45,263	<hr/> 4		<hr/> 3,826	<hr/> 4

Thus, eleven inhabitants of the former counties have not as much weight as one in the latter.

Let no Virginian, after this statement, dare to censure the rotten boroughs of England. This state of representation is in the true spirit of that borough system.

When we take fully into consideration the youth of this country—the era at which the American constitutions were formed

--the general diffusion of political knowledge--the illumination of, and advantages possessed by, the conventions that framed these constitutions ; and when we likewise reflect on the borough system in England, and the natural tendency of all political institutions towards corruption, unless frequent recurrence is had to first principles--palliations may more readily be found for that system in England, wretched and corrupt as it is, than for the county representation in Virginia and Maryland.

The knavish tricks, which I have glanced at in this chapter, cannot be too highly despised, whether perpetrated by federalists or democrats. It is to be regretted, that there is no court of justice to punish such political frauds, how heinous soever they may be. A man shall be sentenced for years to saw marble, for a depredation on the property of his neighbour, to the amount of a few dollars. But a large portion of a state may be virtually disfranchised by its representatives, without a possibility of redress, and the culprits wholly escape punishment.

To the calm and dispassionate consideration of the public, these views are respectfully submitted. That enormous evils exist, and loudly call for a remedy, cannot be doubted or denied. That those whose political influence rests on the basis of these evils, will submit to have them redressed, I fondly hope and pray—but, reasoning from the general course of human affairs, I am not very sanguine on the subject. For in the whole history of mankind, from the earliest records to the present time, there are hardly any instances to be found, of that glorious spirit of justice and self-denial, which induces nations or public bodies voluntarily to renounce any important advantages they possess, however unjustly they may have been acquired—or however oppressive or iniquitous their operation. And he must be a fool or a madman, who, after reflecting on the pages of the “*abstract and brief chronicle*” of our times, is very sanguine in the expectation that we shall prove ourselves much wiser or better than our ancestors—or that we shall avail ourselves much more of the light of history, to guide our paths, than the nations that have preceded us. Every stage of our progress, fraught with folly and error, forbids the flattering expectation.

CHAPTER LXXII.

A wonderful contrast. “Let every soul be subject to the higher powers.”—Rev. Dr. Morse--Rev. Dr. Parish--Rev. Dr. Os-good. Invocation to war. Governor Gilman.

OF the seditious and treasonable opposition to the government, which for years past has prevailed in the eastern states, I have given copious specimens in chapters 54 and 56.

It is difficult to decide which is the greater, the disgrace of the government in its pusillanimous and feeble submission to such lawless outrages, or that of the parties who perpetrated them. Never before did such treasonable conduct experience the same impunity. And never again, I hope, will the same experiment be made of the imbecility of the government of the United States, be it in whose hands it may, whether democratic or federal. The result, it is true, has not been unfavourable. The tornado has spent its fury without destroying the majestic edifice of our government, which it threatened with perdition—and without provoking civil war. But the guilt of those who raised the storm, and the guilt of those who shamefully neglected the necessary measures to ward off its terrific consequences, is precisely the same as if it had produced those awful results, from which the finger of Heaven alone saved this favoured nation.

It may not be amiss to contrast with those horrible violations of law and constitution, the maxims and conduct of the federal leaders and their advocates when they held the reins of government. It will afford an interesting example of the facility with which our views and our sentiments can be moulded and changed to suit the purposes of the moment.

And, to commence, I beg the reader will carefully peruse the sedition law, passed Anno 1798, of which he will find the principal features in chapter 2. By this law,

“If any persons shall combine or conspire together, to oppose any measure or measures of the government of the United States which shall be directed by the proper authority, they shall be subject to a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars—and to be imprisoned not less than six months, nor more than five years.”

Reader, ponder well on these few lines. And reflect what would have become of the Chittendens, the Otises, the Pickerings, the Blakes, the Websters, the Kings, the Russels, *cum multis aliis*, had this law been carried into operation against them. There is not a man of them that would not have taken his abode in a prison, and paid a fine of perhaps five thousand dollars. There are some, I mean the printers of newspapers, who, had this law remained in existence, would have incurred its penalties a thousand times.

In the month of October, 1808, a rumour prevailed, that Bonaparte had declared war against this country. The federal papers then threatened “*the partizans of France*” with the vengeance of the law—aye, and with vengeance beyond the law, if they dared to make the least opposition to the government, or display their regards for France, even in conversation. They were ordered “*to lower their tone*”—or threatened with being “*sent to their master.*” Of the style of these denunciations and threats, I annex a fair and full specimen, from the Gazette of the United States, October 22, 1808.

"If the news this day received, of an actual declaration of war by Bonaparte, should prove true, the *traitorous emissaries of Napoleon, who every where abound in the country, will find it necessary to lower their tone.* What can be tolerated in time of peace, **THE PEOPLE WILL NOT BEAR IN TIME OF WAR.** The advocates of French despotism *must either go to their masters, or be more cautious in their language.* It is true, that France has, to all intents and purposes, been making war upon us these twelve months. But as it has not been declared in form, and as our government have not thought proper to make any opposition, the papers of Napoleon, and his agents of every description, have hitherto been suffered to carry on their intrigues, and to promote the cause of their master by every means which they chose to adopt. **WE MUST NOW CORRECT THE PROCEDURE.**"

One other newspaper specimen of an earlier period, from the *Baltimore Federal Gazette*, July 5, 1798—

"I believe that some of the old *French leaven* still remains among us; and that some vile and degenerate wretches, whom I call *French partisans, or American jacobins*, will not join any *military associations, or patriotic loan*, but discourage them as far as they dare; these men should be carefully **WATCHED**: and if they should *artfully attempt to form any military corps*, (and they will be known by the character of their officers and privates) notice should be given to our federal and state **GOVERNMENTS**, to prevent commissions issuing for want of information."

These specimens are, I presume, enough of this description.

I now proceed to detail the sentiments of three clergymen, who have rendered themselves conspicuous by their rancorous hostility to the administrations of Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Madison—the Rev. Jedidiah Morse, the Rev. David Osgood, and the Rev. Elijah Parish. I have no recent sermon of Dr. Morse's: but of the anti-Christian spirit that predominates in the late sermons of the two latter gentlemen, I have given abundant proofs and specimens in the 56th chapter of this work. Let us examine what were their sentiments when the administration was in the hands of their own party. Never was there a stronger contrast.

And first, of Dr. Parish. This reverend gentleman delivered an address, on the 4th of July, 1799, which breathes in every page the most devoted submission to rulers, the most decided support of their measures, and the most virulent fulminations against the opposers of the government. Its spirit may be readily conceived from the following short specimen:—

"It is a time of day that requires cautious jealousy; not jealousy of your magistrates, *for you have given them your confidence*; but of those who slander their administration. To be jealous of your rulers would be, as if a person were to choose a bride from all the beauties of the world, and then instantly without cause, be jealous of her alone. *Your public characters are your own choice.* Watch those ungrateful souls who murmur about taxation and oppression, the burdens of government and religion. *They have fellowship with our enemies—they are traitors to God and Christianity.* Be jealous of those who declaim against alien and sedition laws. They probably have a hankering for lying and rebellion themselves. In a word, let honest men, let the friends of God and humanity, spurn from their embrace every man who trifles with his father's religion, the hope and salvation of the world; who alarms weak minds with the designs of government; who discourages the most formidable means of defence. *It was the sword which gave courage to declare independence.* Such is the present

state of human nature, that **NOTHING BUT THE SWORD CAN DEFEND OUR INDEPENDENCE.** Never, never while there is a crimson drop in your hearts will you suffer an armed foe to breathe your native air.—**CURSED BE HE THAT KEEPETH BACK HIS SWORD FROM BLOOD. LET HIM THAT HATH NONE, SELL HIS COAT AND BUY ONE. THE CONTEST IS DESIRABLE."**

How shall we account for this ravenous thirst for blood—this invocation of the sword—this elaborate defence of the constituted authorities—how reconcile it with the pacific spirit, the denunciations of war, and the malignant abuse of the administration, which are to be found in chapter 56? There is only one conceivable clue—and that is, when blood was called for, it was **French blood—French blood—French blood** that was to flow.

Next I exhibit the Rev. Dr. Osgood. A convention of congregational ministers agreed to an address to president Adams, in May, 1798, which was signed by that gentleman among others. I annex a short extract :

"We remember Christ's command to forgive and love our most injurious enemies. But neither the law of Christianity or of reason requires us to *prostrate our national independence, freedom, property, and honour, at the feet of proud, insatiable oppressors.* Such a prostration would be *treason against that Being* who gave us our inestimable privileges, civil and religious, as a sacred deposit, to be *defended and transmitted to posterity.* It would be criminal unfaithfulness and treachery to our country, our children, and the whole human race.

"The intimate connexion between our civil and Christian blessings is alone sufficient to justify the *decided part which the clergy of America have uniformly taken* **IN SUPPORTING THE CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES** and *political interests of their country."*

Next follows the Rev. Jedidiah Morse, whose eloquence and sound reasoning "*in olden time,*" cannot fail to excite the approbation of the reader. The following extracts are from a sermon delivered by this reverend gentleman, May 9, 1798.

"Our newspapers teem with slander and personal invective and abuse. Our rulers, grown grey, many of them, in the service of their country ; who, in the various dignified and responsible offices they have filled, have discharged their duties with great ability and incorruptible integrity, are yet stigmatized continually, as unfriendly to the rights and liberties of the people, and to the true interests of their country. Our government itself, the most perfect, the best administered, the least burdensome, and most happyfying to the people, of any on earth, is yet steadily opposed in all its important measures ; and regular and continual efforts are made to "stop its wheels."

"*As citizens we ought with one heart cleave to, and support, our own government. It is a government of our own forming, and administered by men of our own choice ; and therefore claims our confidence and support. We ought to repel, with indignation, every suggestion and slanderous insinuation, calculated to weaken a just confidence in the rectitude of the intentions of our constituted authorities. All such insinuations, at this critical period, proceed from an influence hostile to our peace ; and if permitted to have their intended effect, MAY ACCOMPLISH THE PURPOSES OF OUR ENEMIES, IN OUR DIVISION, AND THE OVERTHROW OF OUR GOVERNMENT.* While, on the one hand, we would avoid passive obedience and non-resistance, let us not vibrate into the other extreme, and believe it a duty to be jealous and suspicious of every thing which is done by our rulers. We thought them honest men, and friends to their country, when we elected them into office : and what have they since done to forfeit our good opinion ? Let their measures be examined with candour, and we shall assured-

ly say, they *deserve well of their country*. In this moment of our political danger, let us be impressed with this truth—that—"United we stand—divided we fall." The increasing union among us, and the revival and expression of the true American spirit, are tokens for good, and augur well in regard to our political interests.

"To the unfriendly disposition and conduct of a foreign power, we may ascribe the unhappy divisions that have existed among us, which have so greatly disturbed our peace, and threatened the overthrow of our government. Their maxim, to which they have strictly and steadily adhered, has been, "*Divide, and govern.*" Their too great influence among us has been exerted vigorously, and in conformity to a deep-laid plan, in cherishing party spirit, in vilifying the men we have, by our free suffrages, elected to administer our constitution: and they have thus endeavoured to destroy the confidence of the people in the constituted authorities, and divide them from the government."

A comparison of these doctrines with the doctrines and practice of the Rev. Messrs. Osgood and Parish, in 1812, 1813, and 1814, as exhibited in chap. 56, must excite the most painful sensations in the mind of every man who feels for the honour of his species. It is impossible for the human mind to conceive of a more striking contrast—a more deplorable instance of infatuation and delusion—or a more awful memorial of, and memento against, human weakness.

From the pulpit, I descend to the civil walk—and submit the opinion of Governor Gilman in 1798, from an address to the legislature, with the echo from both houses.

From Governor Gilman's speech to the legislature of New-Hampshire.

"Perfection in human affairs is not to be expected: to satisfy every citizen is next to impossible. But if our system of national government is generally good; if it is free; if we have the choice as frequently as we wish, of persons to administer it; if one of the fundamental and irreversible principles in a republican government, is, that a majority shall govern; is it not proper to give a firm support to the laws and administration of such a government, and for every citizen duly to consider how far clamour and opposition thereto has invited or procured, or may invite or procure, injuries from any foreign nation?"

Extract from the answer of the senate to the above address.

"Convinced that our national government is formed on the surest basis of liberty; that the majority ought to rule; that we have an opportunity as often as we can rationally wish, to change and elect our rulers, we view it as the palladium of our rights, and entitled to our firmest support.

"Although jealousy is a laudable trait in a political character, yet when very scrupulously exercised towards the administrators of government, it may tend to lessen the confidence of a people in their rulers—and we view with regret and indignation the faction that clamours for the destruction of our peace and government, and conceive its only source to be the dregs of successive foreign anarchy, operating on the weak and vicious."

Extract from the answer of the house.

"As the constitution of the government was framed by the wisest and best men; was adopted after a candid discussion, and upon mature deliberation, without violence or tumult; it belongs to us to repose proper confidence in the officers of our own choice, and willingly afford effective aid to that government which we have instituted for the common good. The beneficial effects of the constitution of the United States have been generally felt, and acknowledged to be far greater than were at first expected. A spirit of inquiry into the principles of a government, and the mode of its administration, pertains to a free people. But when that spirit becomes intemperate, and its designs are TO PROMOTE OPPOSITION, TO DIVIDE AND WEAKEN THE GOVERNMENT,

IT MAY EMBOLDEN FOREIGN POWERS TO INVADE OUR RIGHTS, *and embarrass the measures necessary to obtain redress.* Wherever such a restless, uneasy temper appears, we will lend our firmest aid to discourage and correct it."

Extract from an address of a meeting of federalists at Elizabeth-town, Sept. 1798.

"United we are able to protect ourselves without any foreign aid, against all attacks from abroad. But agitated by factious opposition to our government, which is our only rallying point against danger, and weakened by internal dissensions, we invite the invasion of foreign powers, expose ourselves to fall an easy prey, or to form unequal alliances for our safety. Let us seriously ask ourselves who is it that do most towards increasing our expenses and our taxes, inviting the invasion of foreign powers, weakening our means of defence, and driving us to form European alliances:—whether *they* who are active to promote union, to support government, to prepare to repel hostility; or those who *busily engender divisions; revile our own government; indiscriminately censure, and (as far as they dare) oppose all its acts; refuse to repair to its standard; endeavour to paralyze all its efforts, and encourage every disposition to sedition.*"

This is a handsome piece of composition, and reflects credit on its author. It contains important and instructive lessons on political economy. It is one proof among millions to be found in the history of mankind, how much easier it is to preach than to practice. Had the opposers of the late war borne these doctrines in mind, and regulated their conduct by them, they would be able to cast a retrospective eye on their past proceedings with more comfort and satisfaction than they can at present.—"*United, we are able to protect ourselves against all attacks from abroad,*" is a sacred truth, worthy of being borne in eternal remembrance.—"*Agitated by factious opposition to our government,* which is our only rallying point against danger, and weakened by internal dissensions, *we invite the invasion of foreign powers, and expose ourselves to fall an easy prey.*" How lamentable it is, that the proposers, patrons, and members of the Hartford convention, who, "*agitated the country by a factious opposition to the government,*" did not reflect that they were, in tones of thunder, by every step they took, "*inviting the invasion of a foreign enemy,*" exposing their native country "*to fall an easy prey,*" and "*paralyzing all its efforts,*" as well as "*encouraging every disposition to sedition!*" Let us hear a few more admonitory lines from the same quarter:—

"The time is at length come, when all inferior disputes are to be laid aside, or to be offered a sacrifice for the general good.—Whatever the objections, if any, we have had, against any part of the acts of our administration, ought to be entirely suppressed, or at least suspended, *till the dangers which threaten us from without are overcome or vanquished.* In this great object of general concern and safety, we have one common and *inseparable interest,* and should therefore unite in one common language and exertion."

This is a fertile topic, and might be commented on to a great extent.* But I trust I have "*made out my case*" completely, and

* Some of the extracts in this chapter and in the 56th, are taken from an excellent little pamphlet, published in New-Hampshire, and entitled "An address to the clergy of New England, on their opposition to the rulers of the United States. By a Layman."

that it would be extreme supererogation to enter into any further detail.

CHAPTER LXXIII.

View of the prosperity of the United States, during the various administrations. Mighty errors prevalent on this topic.

A VERY large portion of our citizens have imbibed a deep and rooted impression, that from the period when the administration of the general government was withdrawn from the hands of the federalists, and placed in those of their political opponents, the prosperity of the nation began rapidly to decay. They believe that during the presidency of General Washington and that of Mr. Adams, particularly the former, our political and commercial sun had ascended to its meridian height; that even previous to the embargo and restrictive system generally, it had, under the administration of Mr. Jefferson descended towards the horizon; that those measures sunk it far below, whence it is never to rise, till the powers of the general government, legislative and executive, are restored to the "*genuine sons of Washington*"—nurtured in his bosom—formed in his school—imbued with his maxims—and determined to tread in his footsteps, and to follow his illustrious example.

The universal prevalence of these opinions among the federalists of this country, will hardly be controverted. I doubt whether there is a man among them, from the highest grade of intellect down to the opposite extreme, who does not regard it as impertinence and presumption to call them in question. And the prevalence of the impression is not wonderful. The assertions have been so often repeated, with so much confidence, and in so many shapes and forms, that it was not in human nature for the federalists to withhold assent. It is well known that mankind lend an easy credence to those opinions that flatter their vanity, offer incense to their pride, tend to promote their interest, or to gratify their ambition.

The prevalence of these opinions has produced most deleterious consequences. It has embittered fellow-citizens against each other with the most virulent animosity. The federalists, persuaded that their antagonists have impaired the honour, and happiness, and prosperity of our common country, have regarded them with sentiments of rancour, and hatred, and disgust. And if their views of the case were correct, their opponents would be fit objects of those hostile feelings. It would be laudable to strain every nerve to expel from power men whose whole course had proved them unworthy of it. The angry passions raging on one side, enkindle their likeness in the breasts of their opponents, who are deeply exasperated at the injustice they believe them-

selves to have experienced from their adversaries. This is perfectly natural. And time, which in all common cases possesses the property of diminishing the force of passion, is unfortunately deprived of this salutary power, by the zeal and activity of those who find an interest in fomenting public discord. And that there are many of our citizens of this description, possessed of great talents, great industry, and great influence, cannot be denied.

If the allegations against the democratic administrations were true, I should most heartily and cordially pray for a change of our rulers. I am not in love with ruin or disgrace. And far from being willing to sacrifice the honour, or happiness, or interest of a great nation for the advantage of a president, vice-president, and a few secretaries, &c. &c. there are no ten thousand men of either party who, for a single second, ought to be put into the scale against a tenth part, not to say the whole of the nation.

I believe that such are the sentiments of the democrats generally. I am convinced that if they could be persuaded that Mr. Jefferson or Mr. Madison had sacrificed the interests or the honour of their country, they would unhesitatingly prefer Rufus King, Timothy Pickering, George Cabot, or De Witt Clinton. Perish the man, whoever he be, who would offer up the happiness of millions to promote the interests or the views of a few!

This subject well deserves the most serious consideration. It will amply repay the time bestowed on it by the reader. If the opinions, which I have stated, be correct, they ought to be as generally promulgated as possible; no pains nor exertions ought to be spared in order to illuminate the minds of those who disbelieve them. If they be erroneous, the sooner and more completely they are detected, exposed, and “consigned to the tomb of the Capulets,” the better. And I trust there is no upright, candid federalist, that would wish the elevation or the influence of his party to be promoted, or regained, or perpetuated by the prevalence of error. He would scorn to be wafted to power by the unhallowed means of delusion.

The chief criteria, whereby to decide upon the decay or prosperity of nations, may be reduced to six heads.

1. Domestic industry and improvements in all their various branches.

2. Foreign commerce.

3. Increase or decrease of revenue.

4. Discharge or accumulation of debts.

5. Navigation.

6. Population—whether stationary, increasing, or decreasing.

I shall slightly touch on each of these.

O. B.

SECT. I. *Domestic industry and improvements.*

The first item, which is the most important, and embraces by far the greatest sum of human happiness, does not afford those marked and decisive documents or data, that the custom houses and other public offices furnish for the remaining five. The progress of national industry sheds its beneficent influence around, without glare or ostentation. Hamlets become villages—villages become towns—towns become cities—and cities double their population—almost unobserved. There are few or no documents to establish the facts. They are yet, on due investigation, tangible and strikingly visible. Nevertheless, from the extreme scarcity of data or documents, I was almost wholly discouraged from entering on this part of the subject, and disposed to appeal to the reader's personal observations for the rapid advances of domestic industry, and the general improvement of the country. But I have judged it better to avail myself of the few I possess, which are gleaned from Blodget's *Economica*, than pass the subject over in silence. They are principally estimates, and cannot therefore be supposed to be entirely correct. But they are sufficient to answer the purposes of comparison, which is all the object I have in view.

1. In tillage—		1807	\$ 18,000,000
Anno 1797	Acres 9,600,00	8. Metallic medium—	
1801	10,500,00	1797	\$ 16,000,000
1805	11,400,000	1801	17,000,000
2. Meadows and fallow grounds—		1804	17,500,000
1797	9,500,000	1806	18,500,000
1801	9,900,000	1807	20,000,000
1805	10,350,000	9. Valuation of real and personal estate—	
3. Total improved lands—		1797	\$ 2,190,500,000
1797	35,600,000	1801	2,430,500,000
1801	37,400,000	1804	2,502,000,000
1805	39,400,000	1807	2,518,000,000
1807	39,990,000	10. Toll Bridges—	
4. Value of cultivated lands per acre—		No. Capital Stock	
1801	\$ 5.60	1797	15 \$ 1,100,000
1805	6.25	1801	25 1,860,000
5. Horses—		1804	30 2,000,000
1797	990,000	1807	48
1801	1,070,000	11. Turnpikes and Canals—	
1805	1,200,000	1797	25 \$ 2,300,000
1807	1,300,000	1801	33 3,050,000
6. Horned Cattle—		1805	48 4,900,000
1797	3,220,000	1807	82
1801	2,500,000	12. Insurance Companies—	
1805	2,950,000	1797	9 \$ 3,300,000
1807	3,200,000	1801	22 6,000,000
7. Bank notes in circulation—		1804	40 10,000,000
1797	\$ 10,000,000	1807	17,000,000
1801	11,000,000		
1804	14,000,000		

13 Banks.		
No.		Capital Stock.
1797	25	\$19,200,000
1801	31	22,400,000
1805	39	39,500,000
1807	86	50,000,000
14. Cash in treasury—		
1797		\$888,998
1801		3,295,391
1803		4,824,821
1806		4,538,105
1807		9,643,842
15. Custom house bonds.		
1797		\$10,405,091
1801		15,237,527

1803	\$12,317,449	
1806	19,553,890	
Anno 1801.	1810	
16. No. of post offices—	957—	2403
Length of roads travelled by mails—	21,840	37,035
Weekly transportation in stages	24,490	46,380
Weekly transportation in sulkies or on horseback—	34,380	61,171
Amount of weekly transportation—	58,870	133,551
Yearly transportation—	3,057,964	5,592,652

Of the above items, the nine first are, as I have stated, merely estimates. From the nature of the case, they could not be otherwise. But they afford tolerable data for calculations and comparisons of the advancement of the prosperity of the country. The next six items, the toll bridges, turnpikes, and canals, insurance companies, banks, cash in the treasury, and custom house bonds, were derived from actual documents, procured by the unwearied exertions of the author of the *Economica*. The last item is extracted from a recent post office publication.

Section II. *Foreign commerce.*

I proceed to the second criterion of national prosperity. And here the documents are full, complete, and irresistible. They deserve, and I hope will receive the most particular attention.

The federal government was organized and went into operation in 1789. No tables of exports were, however, published for that or the succeeding year. They began in 1791. I am, therefore, limited to six years of General Washington's administration.

Let it be observed, that from 1791 till 1802 inclusively, there was no discrimination, in the official tables of exports, between American productions and manufactures, and those foreign articles which were re-exported from the country. This renders the comparison less complete than it would otherwise have been.

Exports from the United States, domestic and foreign.

President Washington.		1800	70,971,000
1791	\$19,012,000		—268,013,000
1792	20,753,000		
	—39,765,000		
1793	26,109,000		
1794	33,626,000		
1795	47,989,000		
1796	67,064,000		
	—174,138,000		
President Adams.		1805	95,566,000
1797	\$56,850,000	1806	101,536,300
1798	61,527,000	1807	108,343,000
1799	78,665,000	1808	22,430,000
			—327,875,000

President Madison.		1812	38,527,000	
1809	52,203,000	1813	27,855,000	
1810	66,757,000			
1811	61,376,000			
				246,718,000

Exportation of American productions and manufactures.

President Jefferson.		President Madison.		
1803	42,205,000	1809	31,405,000	
1804	41,467,000	1810	42,366,000	
1805	42,387,000	1811	45,294,000	
1806	41,253,000	1812	32,658,000	
1807	48,699,000	1813	25,008,000	
1808	9,433,000			
				176,731,000
				225,444,000

Annual average of American exports, foreign and domestic.

- | | |
|---|--------------|
| 1. During presidency of General Washington, | \$35,500,000 |
| 2. During that of Mr. Adams, | 67,000,000 |
| 3. For the whole of General Washington's and Mr. Adams's presidency, | 51,250,000 |
| 4. During Mr. Jefferson's first period, | 75,000,030 |
| 5. During his second, including a year of embargo, | 81,900,000 |
| 6. For his whole term, | 78,460,000 |
| 7. During Mr. Madison's first five years, including a year and a half of war, | 49,000,000 |
| 8. For Mr. Jefferson's and Mr. Madison's | 67,200,000 |

Average of domestic exports.

- | | |
|---|------------|
| 1. During six years of Mr. Jefferson's presidency, from 1803 till 1808 inclusive, | 37,500,000 |
| 2. During five years of Mr. Madison's, | 35,300,000 |
| 3. For eleven years from 1803 to 1813, inclusive, | 36,500,000 |

To the candid reader, desirous to form correct estimates of the affairs of his country, and to divest his mind of pernicious errors, I venture earnestly to recommend a careful consideration of these tables. He will thereby be convinced, that from the year 1801 till 1807, inclusive, and until France and England commenced their disgraceful and unparalleled course of rapine and devastation, "preying on the unprotected commerce of a friendly power," the United States made as rapid progress in the career of prosperity and happiness, so far as respects foreign commerce, as any nation in the world has ever done.

Section III. Revenue.

The third criterion whereby to test the progress of the prosperity of the United States, is the situation of its revenues. Decay and decrepitude are incompatible with their increase or advancement. I shall therefore state the net amount of the impost of the United States, from 1791 to 1812, inclusive, taken from the official documents submitted to Congress by Joseph Nourse, Esq. Register General, in pursuance of the order of

the house of representatives. Of the direct taxes I have not a statement—but they are unessential in the formation of a comparison.

President Washington.		President Jefferson.	
1791	6,534,263	1801	13,362,702
1792	4,614,924	1802	8,327,260
	<hr/> 11,149,187	1803	11,322,427
1793	6,073,512	1804	14,996,965
1794	6,683,313		<hr/> 48,009,354
1795	7,959,409	1805	14,978,880
1796	7,368,120	1806	16,015,317
	<hr/> 28,084,354	1807	16,492,889
President Adams.		1808	7,176,985
1797	8,258,111		<hr/> 54,664,071
1798	6,192,447	President Madison.	
1799	9,035,348	1809	7,138,676
1800	9,351,346	1810	12,756,831
	<hr/> 32,837,252	1811	7,888,863
		1812	13,059,855
			<hr/> 40,844,225

This table requires but little examination. It is decisive and overwhelming—and of itself would fully suffice to settle this great question. I subjoin the result :

Average duties on imports.

1. General Washington's presidency, six years, \$ 6,500,000
2. Mr. Adams's four years 8,200,000
3. General Washington's and Mr. Adams's ten } 7,200,000
years,
4. Mr. Jefferson's first period of service, four years, 12,000,000
5. do. second period, four years, 13,000,000
6. Mr. Madison's first period, 10,210,000
7. Mr. Jefferson's and Mr. Madison's, twelve years, 11,956,000

It were needless to add comments. The most superficial reader cannot mistake—the most prejudiced dare not reject—the strong and irresistible evidence here laid before the public.

Section IV. *National Debts.*

The next criterion of the decay or prosperity of a nation, is its debts. It is self-evident, that a nation or an individual, whose debts are rapidly discharging, cannot be in a state of decay or depreciation. In order, therefore, to enable the reader to decide the question at issue by this criterion, I subjoin a statement of the national debt of the United States, on the first day of every year, from 1791 till 1812.

<i>Debt of the United States.</i>		<i>Debt of the United States.</i>	
President Washington.		President Adams.	
1791	\$ 75,463,476	1797	\$ 82,064,479
1792	77,227,924	1798	79,228,529
1793	80,352,634	1799	78,408,669
1794	78,427,404	1800	82,976,304
1795	80,747,587		
1796	83,762,172		

President Jefferson.	1807	69,218,398
1801 83,038,050	1808	65,196,317
1802 80,712,632		
1803 77,054,686	President Madison.	
1804 86,427,120	1809	57,023,192
	1810	53,172,302
1805 82,312,150	1811	47,913,756
1806 75,723,270	1812	45,120,150

This affords a most exhilarating view of the situation of the United States, and proves the utter fallacy of the prevailing opinions on this topic. It appears incontestibly, that in twelve years of democratic administration, from 1801 to 1812, inclusive, the debt was reduced from - \$ 83,038,050
to - - - - - 45,120,150

notwithstanding the purchase of } 37,917,900
Louisiana for } 15,000,000

which is an actual reduction of 52,918,900

And to increase our surprise and our rapturous joy at such a glorious view of the immense resources of our blessed country, one of the early measures of Mr. Jefferson's administration was the repeal of a catalogue of burdensome taxes.*

Among the wonderful and inexplicable complaints and libels against the democratic administration was the repeal of these taxes. It is the first time in the history of the world, that the repeal of grinding, harassing, and degrading taxes was considered as matter of accusation, or as an unpopular measure.

The taxes repealed, were—1. The excise on stills and domestic distilled spirits. 2. On refined sugar. 3. On licences to retailers. 4. Duties on pleasurable carriages. 5. Stamps.

In some of the late very elaborate publications of Mr. Pickering, in which he employed his utmost talents and influence to dissuade his fellow citizens from subscribing to the government loans, a principal argument was deduced from the wickedness of the repeal of these taxes. And the Hartford convention, after drawing the most alarming picture of the hideous state of public affairs, in enumerating the means whereby

“A high state of public prosperity has undergone a miserable and afflicting reverse through the prevalence of a weak and profligate policy,”

expressly state, as the fourth cause—

“The abolition of existing taxes, requisite to prepare the country for those changes to which nations are always exposed, with a view to the acquisition of popular favour.”

* As a farther proof how extravagantly erroneous the public opinion has been on this subject, the reader will observe, that the debt of the United States, at the commencement of 1801, when the federalists ceased to rule this country, was above 7,000,000 of dollars more than it had been in 1791.

I shall not attempt to decide—I leave that task to the members of the Hartford convention—with what propriety in December, 1814, the distress, or difficulty, or embarrassment, or decay of the United States, real or supposed, could be ascribed to the repeal, in 1802, of taxes, some of them most odious, when such in the interim had been the overflowing state of the treasury, that the public debt had been reduced 37,918,900 dollars, exclusive of the purchase of Louisiana. This is a most extraordinary paradox.

Section V. *Navigation.*

The increase or decrease of the tonnage of a commercial nation, is an important criterion of the retrogradation or the advancement of its prosperity. Let us calmly enquire into the indications deducible from this source.

I lay before the reader a table of the tonnage of the United States from 1793 till 1812, inclusive.

President Washington.		Tons.	
1793	491,789	1803	949,171
1794	628,415	1804	1,042,402
1795	747,961		3,915,891
1796	831,897	1805	1,140,366
	2,700,062	1806	1,208,733
President Adams.		1807	1,268,545
1797	876,910	1808	1,242,443
1798	888,326		4,860,087
1799	946,407	President Madison.	
1800	973,489	1809	1,350,178
	3,685,132	1810	1,442,781
President Jefferson.		1811	1,414,770
1801	1,032,216	1812	1,232,502
1802	892,102		5,440,231

Average tonnage of last four years of General } Washington's presidency,	Tons. 675,000
of Mr. Adams's	921,000
of General Washington's and Mr. Adams's	795,000
of Mr. Jefferson's eight years,	1,097,000
of Mr. Madison's first period,	1,355,000
of Mr. Jefferson's and Mr. Madison's,	1,257,000

I trust that these statements cannot fail to prove the utter want of foundation of the idea that the prosperity of the United States, so far as respects navigation, has decayed, since the change of rulers. Notwithstanding the unprecedented depletions perpetrated on us by both belligerents, the tonnage of the nation has increased with a steady pace. The increase during the first period of Mr. Madison's administration, is really astonishing.

Section VI. *Population.*

The statements I shall give on this point are extracted from the census of 1800, the last year of the administration of the

federal party, and that of 1810, when their successors had held the reins of government for ten years, during which the pernicious effects so generally ascribed to their system, must have had ample time to develope themselves.

	1800.	1810.
Population of Maine,	151,719	228,705
Vermont,	154,465	217,895
New Hampshire,	183,858	214,460
Massachusetts,	422,845	472,040
Connecticut,	251,002	261,942
New York,	586,050	959,049
New Jersey,	211,149	245,562
Pennsylvania,	602,835	810,091
Virginia,	886,149	974,622
North Carolina,	478,105	555,500
South Carolina,	345,591	415,115
Georgia,	162,686	252,433
Kentucky,	220,959	406,511
Tennessee,	105,602	261,727
Ohio,	230,760	455,365
City of New York,	60,529	96,373
City of Philadelphia and } Liberties,	67,811	88,987
City of Baltimore,	26,614	35,588
Town of Boston and rest } of Suffolk county	28,614	34,381
Newport,	6,739	7,907
Providence,	7,614	10,071
Nantucket,	5,617	6,807
Portsmouth, N. H.	5,339	6,934
New Haven,	4,049	6,967
Pittsburg,	1,565	4,768

Here are most incontrovertible proofs of the advancement of the United States in the road of happiness and prosperity. Every part of the union which did not labour under disadvantages from its crowded population, or its sterility, or the migration of its citizens, has made rapid strides in this glorious course. What a stupendous increase in the states of New-York, Pennsylvania, Georgia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio! With what ineffable delight must every friend of his species contemplate these glorious scenes of expanding population, civilization, and happiness! Agriculture, arts, manufactures, commerce, and science, spreading their holy empire where a few years past the wild Savage prowled in quest of prey!

I dare flatter myself with the hope that I have presented the reader with sufficient materials to satisfy him that the glowing

statements of the extraordinary prosperity of this country during the predominance of federalism, and of its utter decay from a change of rulers, are gross errors, utterly void of foundation, and pregnant with as pernicious consequences, as most that have ever prevailed in this or perhaps in any other country. This nation, previous to the operation of the federal government, was in a most prostrate and abject state. Arts, trades, and commerce languished. Industry had little or no encouragement. Tender laws and other measures, impolitic and unjust, had banished confidence between man and man. An unfavorable balance of trade had exhausted the country of its metallic medium. The states were hostile to, and jealous of, each other. In a word, the prospects of the nation, for want of a general controlling government, had been so extremely gloomy, that good men began to doubt whether in its consequences the revolution would deserve to be styled a blessing.

But the establishment of our most noble and most excellent form of government, produced a rapid and astonishing change. Confidence was completely restored. Arts, trade, and commerce revived. State jealousy was disarmed of all its powers to retard or destroy public prosperity. In a word, the happiness and prosperity of the nation were fixed on foundations as durable, I hope, as the rock of Gibraltar.

But it is equally and undeniably true, that the country was incomparably more prosperous for seven entire years of Mr. Jefferson's administration, than during the administration of his predecessors. This is a truth, a strong truth, deny it who may, which, if I courted popularity, I should not dare to promulgate. To many it will appear little short of blasphemy. But whatever may be its appearance, and however unpopular it may be, I have fully proved, that during those seven years, the population, the exports, the revenue, the tonnage, and the domestic industry of the nation, had made more progress, than they had done during the administration of General Washington; and that the public debt, which, during the administration of the two first presidents, had been increased, was, under their successor, reduced with unparalleled rapidity. And it therefore incontrovertibly appears, that the country was more prosperous during that period, than under the general's administration, although it had been then highly prosperous.

I entertain a due sense of the transcendent merits of General Washington. He was indisputably a truly great and most illustrious character. His conduct during the revolution earned him a conspicuous niche among the small but glorious band of heroes who saved their country, or who sacrificed their lives in the glorious struggle to save her. He ranks with Leonidas of Sparta, Epaminondas of Thebes, Cimon of Athens, Alfred of England.

Wallace of Scotland, Henry IV. of France, Brian Boiromhe of Ireland, Maurice Prince of Orange, Gustavus Vasa of Sweden, Andrew Doria of Genoa, and others of this description, who hold the first rank among the benefactors of the human race. And to those who read the statements of the wretched materials with which he had to form his armies, as may be seen chap. 68, his merits will be vastly enhanced. The miserable system pursued by the early congresses, of trusting the fate of the country to short enlistments and to militia, trebled his difficulties, and trebled his merits in struggling against and overcoming them.

Independent of General Washington's services during the war, he was eminently useful to his country afterwards. But for the influence of his name, the federal convention would hardly have agreed upon a constitution. Of this, it is true, there is no complete proof—nor is it fully susceptible of proof. It must eternally rest on mere opinion. But any man who attentively reads Luther Martin's statement of the proceedings of the convention, (the only published record) and who duly considers the difficulty they experienced to agree upon a form of government—and how nearly all their efforts escaped being blasted, even with the advantage of General Washington's influence and exertions, will not regard this opinion as very extravagant. But I force it on no man. I further believe, that even after the constitution was promulgated, the influence of his name and support was absolutely necessary to ensure its success. It was in jeopardy. The minorities in several of the state conventions were numerous, active, and influential. There was, therefore, considerable difficulty in setting the machinery of the government in motion. It was a truly arduous task. But when once the vessel was fairly launched, the duties of the pilot were quite easy.

With this immense and solid stock of indisputable claim on the gratitude of his country, and on the esteem and admiration of the great and good of our era and of all future ages, he needs not any addition to his fame, of which the title is not as clear as the noon-day sun. And to ascribe to him, or his councils exclusively, the flood of prosperity that succeeded the establishment of a solid form of government, would be a radical error against the truth of history. As well might we ascribe the fertility of the soil, when both seasons and climate are favourable, to the vigilance of the steward who superintended the plantation, as ascribe the beneficent effects of unshackled and protected industry, to presidents, governors, or kings. All that mankind require, in order to be industrious and happy, is to have their property secure. And this is the natural effect of wise laws.

If the nations of Europe, oppressed by wasteful and destroying governments—at war forty or fifty years out of every century

—curbed and constrained and controlled in their industry by monopolies, and restrictions, and grinding taxes—if, I say, under all these, and numberless other disadvantages, the European nations make advances in prosperity, as is undeniably the case, would it not be inexpressibly wonderful, if we did not run rapidly in the same career—if we did not outstrip them as far as the hale, hearty, vigorous, full-blooded racer outstrips the stage horse, worn out by hard service, and merciless usage?

To suppose a parallel case. A ship is, in the technical sense, *well found* in every respect. She has a noble crew. She is on the open sea with the winds perfectly favourable. She runs rapidly before them, and makes nine, ten, or eleven knots an hour. She reaches her destined port in perfect safety. Would it not be ignorance or folly to ascribe to the skill of the captain the rapidity of her movements or the success of her voyage? It is chiefly when the sky is overcast with clouds and darkness—when the furious hurricanes howl around the ship—when the waves, opening wide their devouring jaws, seem ready to swallow her up, that there is a demand for the energy, the talents, and the fortitude of the master of the vessel.

Without any disrespect to presidents, and governors, and kings, this is a pretty analogous case to theirs. In times of tranquillity, there is little room for a display of the talents of an executive magistrate. In a well-ordered state, the laws may be said to execute themselves. The long train of judges, jurors, attorney generals, marshals, constables, &c. are eternally on the alert, to prevent infraction.

It may and will seem a paradox (I shall be charged with dealing in paradoxes) to assert, as I do, that at least as much talents are actually necessary for a legislator as, almost in every case, for a governor, and, in ordinary cases, for a president.

In a free representative government like ours, the grand, controlling, and supereminent power is in the legislature. They ordain, direct, command. Their will, fairly expressed, enforces obedience equally from the governor or president, as from the lowest mendicant. If the governor or president, as the case may be, dare to violate their commands, he is impeachable.

I return to Mr. Jefferson. “But,” it will be said, “the prosperity of the United States was arrested during the last years of his administration.” This I do not, I cannot deny. It appears fully evident from all the documents I have given. Whence arose this stagnation? This is an important enquiry.

The application in 1805 of the rule of the war of 1756, had made great havoc on the trade, commerce, and resources of the country. But they readily recovered from the stroke. At the close of 1807, the French decrees and British orders in council

went into full operation. And they were met by our embargo. I have already stated, and I hope there is not a man of candour in Europe or America who will doubt or deny, that these measures of France and England reduced the United States to the alternative—of war with one or both—or else an embargo. We were literally hunted off the ocean.

That an embargo was less pernicious than war—and that it was highly meritorious to try every other means previous to the horrible recourse to arms, no “friend of peace” can deny.

But be this as it may, as the arrestation of our prosperity arose from the measures of France and England—and as it has never been pretended that the American administration advised or encouraged those powers to adopt their orders and decrees, it conclusively follows that the outcry against the restrictive system of Mr. Jefferson, which these predatory and outrageous measures rendered indispensable, is utterly unjust and unfounded.

There is another mode of deciding this question. If the democratic administrators of the general government really exercised hostility against commerce, they had no mode of displaying that hostility but by the enactment of anti-commercial laws, or the repeal of pre-existing laws favourable to commerce. This is self-evident. Except in this shape, they are as perfectly powerless over commerce as a council of Indians held in a wig-wam. And if there were any anti-commercial laws enacted, they must be still extant. The statute books are every where to be found. And I now in the face of the United States and of Christendom, deny that a single law can be produced, enacted during the administration of Mr. Jefferson, which can by any man of character be ascribed to hostility to commerce. There is not one. Nor was any law favourable to commerce repealed. Let the statute books be carefully examined, and the laws brought to the severest scrutiny.

It would be most extravagant folly to ascribe the law of 1806, prohibiting the importation of certain articles of British manufacture, to the hostility of the government to commerce. This law was enacted in consequence of the clamours and remonstrances of the commercial men themselves, in order to induce England to cease her unjust and injurious depredations upon their commerce.

We now draw towards a close. We have seen, I repeat, that the population, the exports, the tonnage, the domestic industry, and the revenue of the nation, made rapid progress for seven years of Mr. Jefferson’s administration; and that during the same period its debts had most rapidly decreased—and it appears that no law hostile to commerce was enacted—no law favourable to commerce repealed—and that our prosperity continued till it was

cut up by the roots by foreign powers. How, then, can a candid federalist lose sight of justice, or propriety, or the holy rule, "do as you would be done by," so far as to charge to the past or present administration, the consequences of measures over which they had no controul? The federalists would complain most grievously, were they made responsible for those of Mr. Jefferson or Mr. Madison. And where is their justice in making Mr. Jefferson or Mr. Madison responsible for the measures, or the consequences of the measures, of Mr. Percival or Napoleon Bonaparte?

If I have succeeded, to the extent of my wishes, and indeed of my calculations, to establish the positions I have laid down in this chapter, I cannot fail to have rendered a great and lasting service to my fellow-citizens of both descriptions, federalists and democrats.

The former I shall have convinced of the unsoundness of their towering pretensions to an exclusive promotion of the prosperity of this nation, as well as of the extreme injustice of the strong and damning accusations they have preferred against, and the deadly hostility they have borne towards, their fellow-citizens, who are wholly guiltless of the crimes laid to their charge. These are important truths deserving of their most serious consideration. To retract error is magnanimous. To pursue a course of error, merely because it has been unfortunately commenced through inadvertence, is worse than folly. These considerations ought to induce them to lower their tone, and to regard their brethren with more kindness and charity than they have heretofore extended to them.

There is one point which cannot be too much or too frequently enforced. The federalists have been divested of the powers of the general government for above sixteen years. That entire period they have spent in an unceasing struggle to regain the power they had lost. They have spared neither pains nor expense. They possess large numbers of men of powerful talents, which are in constant requisition for the purpose. They have greatly the superiority of newspapers in perhaps all the seaport towns, owing to mercantile influence.* They have struggled in peace—they have struggled in war—they have struggled when the nation might be said to be almost wholly free from taxation—and when under the pressure of taxes of the most oppressive kind—they have struggled while we were covered with disgrace and overwhelmed by disaster—and they have struggled when a halo of glory surrounded the United States. They have struggled under every possible variety of circumstances. They have left nothing unessayed. In this struggle their beloved country

* In Philadelphia, there are six federal and four democratic papers. The proportion is about the same in other cities.

was brought to the jaws of perdition. In this struggle, they were placed in the mortifying predicament, that their views were likely to prosper by the defeat and disgrace—and to be utterly disappointed by the success, of their beloved country. And in this struggle, some of their leaders committed acts in aiding and abetting the enemy, which, under any other government, or in any other nation, would have forfeited their lives. After all these struggles and efforts, they are as far as ever from the attainment of the prize which they have for above sixteen years been devouring with their longing eyes.

And what has been the result of these efforts? To engender and disseminate a spirit of faction, the direst scourge that ever cursed a country—to divide man from man—to demoralize the nation—to prepare us of late for civil war and all its horrors—to deprive themselves of all the influence their numbers, their talents, and their virtues, would have insured them—and to place them in the frightful situation of opposing almost all the measures of the administration, however wise or salutary—however well calculated to promote the happiness and glory of their country.

It is time to pause—to cast a retrospective eye on the past—to look forward for the result. A very little reflection will suffice to convince them, that if they regard their honour as a party—their character in history—their duty as citizens—and the welfare of their country—a change, a radical change is necessary. No man of common sense, who pays attention to the existing circumstances of the United States, can persuade himself that they have any chance of regaining power, unless by a convulsion, in which they would be the earliest and greatest sufferers, and which they would have every reason to curse most bitterly. And surely with the wounds of bleeding, gasping France before their eyes—with her groans in their ears—they would not be so mad, so blind, so lost to reason, to common sense, to religion, to public spirit, to all regard for themselves and their country, as to pursue power through such a desperate road as a convulsion. If they have failed to gain ground in the great states of New-York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and North Carolina, when war, stagnation of business, and depreciation of property of every kind, aided their efforts to render their adversaries unpopular, is it not “hoping against hope,” to calculate on producing this effect when smiling Peace with her cornucopia has once more revisited our favoured land?

Let them take the advice of a real friend, although a political opponent. Let them not render a government, whose only important defect is its feebleness, still more feeble, and thus endanger its destruction, by a blind and indiscriminate opposition, forbidden by every principle of common sense and patriotism.

Let them with their utmost energy oppose all impolitic, injurious, or unjust measures—but let them yield a cordial and hearty support to every one calculated to promote the public good. This is what constitutes a noble and dignified opposition party. Let them, if they choose, use all their efforts to regain the power they have lost, by fair and honourable means. Let them charitably regard their political adversaries, as intending to promote the public good, even when they believe them in error. Let them make allowance for human imperfection, from which they are no more exempt than their antagonists. By this course they will make more progress in one year than they have in sixteen by intemperate violence. This has recoiled, and will continue to recoil on themselves.

If I have in this chapter, done a kindness to the federalists, I have performed an equal service to the democrats, by clearing up satisfactorily, various points of considerable importance to their character. I hope I have fully and completely disproved the heinous charge adduced against them, of destroying the prosperity of their country—a charge which has gained credence, even across the Atlantic, from its incessant reiteration here.

CHAPTER LXXIV.

Miscellaneous facts and observations.

IN this chapter I shall collect a number of unconnected facts and observations, which I have not been able to introduce elsewhere.

I.

A very moderate degree of knowledge of history, or human affairs, furnishes numberless instances of the discordance between very plausible anticipations and the actual results on which they are predicated. I offer one. The best friends of this country were always distressed at the probable consequences of a war upon the southern states. It was presumed that such a state of things would afford a favourable opportunity, which would be eagerly embraced by the slaves, to rise upon their masters, and act over again the horrors of St. Domingo. It was not taken into consideration, that a state of war requiring martial preparations and arrangements, would greatly add to the facility of crushing insurrection, without in the least adding to the means of its organization. It was also anticipated that the hardy and enterprising state of Massachusetts would shew such a bold front towards an invading enemy, as to totally forbid, or at least compel him to abandon, the attempt. Events have falsified both calculations. No insurrection was attempted, or perhaps thought of by the slaves to the southward. Georgia, a

feeble southern state, acquired a high degree of honour by the war. It covered Massachusetts with disgrace.

II.

The attempt to impress men from on board the Chesapeake, was not the first outrage perpetrated by the British on an American national ship. During the administration of Mr. Adams, several sailors were, in the West Indies, pressed from on board the *Baltimore*, a public vessel of the United States.

III.

Violent partizans have in all ages believed the monstrous doctrine, that the end sanctifies the means; a doctrine the fruitful parent of numberless crimes. This frequently leads parties to adopt measures at which each individual member would have shuddered. Our country has witnessed various instances of this kind. Among the rest, unceasing efforts have been made by some of the most zealous and violent opposers of the administration, to persuade the public that the late war was a measure concerted between Bonaparte and our administration, and for which the former had paid the latter liberally. The following letter which first appeared in the *Boston Centinel*, was one of the innumerable means employed for this purpose. And had the British agents in Paris entered into the project, and afforded any countenance to the accusation, it would have gained universal credence among the enemies of the administration in this country, and might have produced alarming consequences. Very much to their credit and for our happiness, they allowed it to die a natural death.

"IMPORTANT LETTER.

"The original of a letter from an American gentleman in Paris, of which the following is an extract, has been seen by the editor, who vouches for its having been faithfully copied therefrom:—

Paris, May 26, 1814.

"The treaty is nearly concluded, and we shall once more see all the world in peace, excepting our own country—thanks to the wisdom of the democrats and the partizans of Bonaparte! Since the war has been declared, he has not exercised one single act of amity or friendship, either toward the nation or any individual. It is very well known by every one here who has connexion with the government, that it was by bribery that the vote for the war was obtained. A gentleman employed in the office of the department of foreign affairs, told me, that he saw on the books the names of the senators bribed, and the sums paid each of them by Serrurier!!! I hope in a short time to be able to procure a copy of it, to send to you. The country was sold by Armstrong before he left Paris, and the war was decided upon; and in consequence he was made secretary of war, the better to accomplish the diabolical system!!! I hope the events which have taken place in Europe will enlighten the American people, and shew them their true interest; and that they will have resolution and patriotism enough to dismiss from their councils men who have so basely betrayed their country and the confidence that was reposed in them by their fellow citizens. This is the first step towards making an honourable and durable peace, which must be the desire of every true American."

Boston Centinel.

This letter was re-copied, as "*a most important document,*" into a large portion of the federal papers.

IV.

French and English influence.

The United States have resounded with the charge of French influence, which I have incidentally touched upon in some of the preceding pages. Of its existence a large portion of our citizens are as thoroughly satisfied as of any of the demonstrations of Euclid. On the subject of British influence there is an almost total silence, although from sameness of language, mercantile intercourse, and the powerful operation in our cities of British capital and British agents, it is plain and palpable. On the 12th of January, 1814, governor Strong delivered an address to the legislature of Massachusetts, in which he laid considerable emphasis on a—

“Proposal made by the French emperor that the congress at Prague should be composed of plenipotentiaries from France, the United States, Denmark, and the *other* allied princes on the one hand, and the plenipotentiaries of England, Prussia, and their allies on the other.”

From this proposal the worthy governor implied “a connexion with France in the war”—in other words, the hideous hydra of “French influence.”

While he thus sagaciously discovered *French influence*, or French connexions, in a circumstance so utterly unimportant, is it not astonishing that he wholly overlooked the extent of *British influence* in Boston, the town wherein he wrote his address—and that he was as silent as the grave about the enormous supplies of specie at that very time furnished to the British nation then at war with his native country—and about the open, undisguised intercourse carried on with the enemy, and the public sales of his government bills? This is most assuredly “straining at gnats, and swallowing camels.”

V.

Forgery of ships' papers.

In the enumeration of the grievances whereby the United States were driven to war with England, little has been said on the subject of the forgery of our naval papers, whereby our flag was discredited, the British commerce protected, and extended at our expense, and our vessels exposed to the indignation of the other belligerents, who must, in numberless instances, have found it impossible to discriminate between vessels fitted out in England with simulated documents, and vessels fitted out *bona fide* in the United States. It is impossible to find an upright man in the world, who will not loudly and unhesitatingly condemn and execrate such an odious, such a detestable practice.

Of the existence of this practice, no man doubts. But of the extent to which it was carried, I believe very few are aware. I submit a few documents which will throw light on the subject—and shall leave it then to the reader's reflections.

Mr. Brougham, member of parliament for Liverpool, in a speech on the subject of the orders in council, read the following circular from a house in that city, established to carry on the manufacture of simulated papers.

“*Liverpool, ———,*

“Gentlemen—We take the liberty herewith to inform you that we have established ourselves in this town, FOR THE PURPOSE OF MAKING SIMULATED PAPERS, which we are enabled to do in a way which will give ample satisfaction to our employers, not only being in possession of the original documents of the ships’ papers, and clearances to various ports, a list of which we annex; but our Mr. G—— B—— having worked with his brother, Mr. J—— B——, in the same line, for the last two years, and understanding all the necessary languages.

“Of any changes that may occur in the different places on the continent, we are careful to have the earliest information, not only from our own connexions, but from Mr. J—— B——, who has proffered his assistance in every way, and who has for some time past made simulated papers for Messrs. B—— & P——, of this town, to whom we beg leave to refer you for further information. We remain, &c.”

Then follows a list of about twenty places, from and to which they can forge papers, having all the clearances ready by them from the different public agents the moment they receive intelligence that any merchant may need their assistance in this scheme of fabrication.*

From the London Morning Chronicle, June 12, 1812.

“To ship brokers, custom house agents, notaries public, merchants, &c.—Simulated papers and seals, capital counting-house fixtures, twenty very excellent and expensive charts and maps, &c.—By Mr. *Sampson*, at his warehouse, 16 Size lane, Bucklersbury, on Thursday next, at 11, by direction of the assignees.

“The valuable fixtures and fittings up of the counting-houses, thirty-four boxes containing *simulated ships’ papers and seals for foreign countries*, various coloured inks; foreign writing paper, &c. of Mr. Peter Vander A. A. merchant, a bankrupt, (removed from his offices, No. 9, Water lane, Tower-street) comprising seven mahogany one flap and two flap counting house desks, book case, two capital library and writing tables, with drawers, stamping and sealing presses, a patent instantaneous light machine, an excellent mahogany portable writing desk with secret drawers, two patent polygraphs, several capital charts, amongst which are the Northern Sea, the Cattegat, the Azores, the Atlantic Ocean, the Baltic Pilot, West Indies, British Channel, coast of England and Holland, Mediterranean, Europe, Asia, and America; Mercator’s World; Laurie and Whittle’s new map of the British isles, on spring rollers and boxes; Cary’s Universal Atlas; a new ledger, journal and waste book, five volumes of the Beauties of England and Wales, and ninety-five numbers of ditto, six morocco leather cases, &c. To be viewed two days preceding the sale, at the bro-

* In noticing this matter in the house of commons, Mr. Stephens, author of “*War in Disguise*,” said, “he would ask gentlemen *sincerely*, were they prepared to abandon all trade to the continent of Europe on account of those objections, *in point of morality*, which had been stated by the honourable mover? [Mr. Brougham.] He felt himself perfectly ready to meet any gentleman upon this ground: and he really believed he would find few who had *weakness enough to think, or hypocrisy enough to assert*, that the whole trade of Europe ought to be abandoned on account of the immorality of the frauds necessarily practised in the carrying it on. As to the *forging* papers of the French consuls’ certificates of origin, he was convinced that neither this, nor shewing *false colours* to the enemy, would be supposed so serious an immorality as to make us consent to abandon all our trade.” *Weekly Register.*

ker's warehouses; catalogues may be had of Messrs. Sweet and Stokes, solicitors, Basinghall-street, and of Mr. Sampson, 16, Size lane, Bucklersbury."

Extract from the speech of Mr. Spooner, at a meeting in Birmingham, March 31, 1812.

"The evil that presses stronger upon my mind, as respects the license system, is the great degradation it produces in the national character. It is lamentable that a nation hitherto-standing high in moral estimation, anxious to promote true knowledge, and zealous to spread the principles of pure religion, should thus lay itself open to the imputation of forcing a trade by fraud and perjury, and that, too, under the sanction of government. It must seriously afflict every one zealous for the true honour and real interests of his country, that **IT HAS BEEN ADMITTED IN THE COURTS OF ADMIRALTY, THAT UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES IT WAS NECESSARY TO WINK AT SIMULATED PAPERS!!!** In carrying on this trade, the captain of the vessel must be furnished with *two sets of papers diametrically opposite to each other, both of which he must swear to be true.* He must also swear at one place that the property is *British*, in another that it is *neutral!*"

In Liverpool, in the fall of 1811, the price of forged papers was as follows :

	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
American Register, - - - - -	8	8	0
Sea Letter, - - - - -	2	2	0
Clearance, - - - - -	2	2	0
Bills of Lading, with notary's certificate of property, 3 sets, - - -	3	3	0

I shall close the subject with the following judicious and liberal remarks from a London paper, upon, and just reprobation of, this vile system, which goes the full length of demoralizing the mass of the persons engaged in commerce in any nation where it is countenanced.

From a London paper.

"When we hear the accusation of treacherous neutrals daily made against the American nation, we ought at least to inquire whether it is just before we give it any credence. If, however, we assist her in obtaining this character, and reap the advantages of the prostitution of her flag, we ought to be silent. It is an undoubted fact, and well known to all concerned in the Baltic trade, that most of the English ships which have gone to the north of Europe for two years past, have assumed the American flag, and taken simulated papers, by which they have been permitted to an entry. The general prevalence of this practice produced a seizure of all the ships under American colours, so that, in many instances, the neutral American merchants suffered. It was a subject of remonstrance by Russia, Denmark, and Sweden, to the American consuls there, that their neutral flag was thus unfairly assumed by one of the belligerents. In these instances, therefore, we have no right to charge the Americans with bad faith, as the adventures were commenced and concluded by English merchants in England."

VI.

Upstart pride.

Among the blots and blemishes of this country, "*upstart pride*" ranks very high, and produces very ruinous consequences.

A man comes to the United States as a redemptioner. By his labour for three or four years in a state of servitude, he defrays the expense of his passage. He afterwards, by "saving cheese-parings and ends of candles," and stinting himself of ne-

cessaries, makes a little money. He marries a wife, a personage equally exalted with himself. They rake and scrape together a few thousand dollars, and their ideas expand with their *enormous wealth*. They have four, five, or six sons. And it would be too degrading to stoop to make any of them tradesmen or mechanics. No. They must all be *marchants*—or doctors—or lawyers. Hence we are overrun with broken merchants, and hungry doctors and lawyers : and hence arises a most serious and alarming evil, the removal of which demands the efforts of all the friends of their country. There are, alas ! thousands of estimable men scattered through the United States, whose talents and fortunes would have qualified them for useful members of society as farmers, artists, or mechanics—but who are actually thrown away to themselves and the public, by being devoted to the mercantile, or legal, or medical profession.

The mercantile profession being extravagantly crowded, the competition in our markets for the productions of the country for exportation, enhances the price here. And the great competition of sellers in the foreign markets sinks the price there. The operation, therefore, of the pernicious prejudice, whereby this class of our citizens is overstocked, is two-fold—its injurious effects are felt at home and abroad. To this source, in a great measure, may be ascribed the extravagant proportion of bankruptcies that have taken place among the merchants in this country, for many years. The great number of sea-ports in the United States, wherein foreign commerce is carried on, creates such a competition in the markets abroad, as must at all times subject American commerce to immense disadvantage. It is therefore the height of madness to extend or increase the difficulty under which our commerce must thus constantly and inevitably labour.

VII.

Manufactures.

Many of our citizens have been led into egregious errors on the vital subject of the promotion and encouragement of domestic manufactures, by an outcry that has been raised against the manufacturers, that in all cases wherein legal protection is afforded them, they take an unjust and ungenerous advantage of the public, and enormously enhance the price of their goods, whereby their fellow-citizens are unjustly laid under heavy contribution. And therefore many of our members of congress sagaciously determine to let this useful class of men, who do more to establish the true independence of their country, than any other, struggle against the multifarious disadvantages under which our infant manufactures labour, in a competition with the matured and long-established manufactures of Europe.

It is not easy to conceive of any more miserable error than this, or that comes with a worse grace from those who propagate

it. Who are they? Merchants, agriculturists, house owners, money lenders, &c. &c.

Let us examine each of these classes separately. I begin with the merchant. When he imports a cargo of any kind whatever, does he regulate the price by the cost?—does he display the disinterestedness and self-denial which he so eloquently preaches up to the manufacturer? Suppose he brings into market an article whose cost is one dollar, but which, from its scarcity and demand, will sell for fifty. Does he hesitate to require and insist on fifty? Not an instant. And he would have no scruple to demand one hundred, or one thousand, if the market would warrant it. Let the merchant, then, never rail against the extortion of the manufacturer. Let him impose an eternal silence on his tongue, upon this topic, so pregnant with materials for his own condemnation.

Next in order comes the agriculturist. And as a large portion of the members of our legislative bodies is composed of gentlemen of this class, the appeal has been strongly and too successfully made to their passions and prejudices. And they freely re-echo the cry begun by the merchants against the predatory spirit of the manufacturers. They forget the strong parable of “the mote and the beam.” Suppose a farmer to bring 1000 barrels of flour to a city whose inhabitants are perishing with famine. Where are then his bowels of compassion? Where his tenderness for his suffering fellow men? Where his abhorrence of extortion and depredation? Will he sell his flour for the customary price? No. No. No. He takes the gauge and measure of the general distress. And in proportion to the degree of misery, and suffering, and starvation that prevails, he fixes his price.

The owner of houses and lands comes next in turn. And he is in the same predicament with the merchant and agriculturist. He uniformly regulates the rent of his houses and lands by the demand, not by the cost. I have paid for the use of a house for three months, during the prevalence of yellow fever, at least as much rent as would have been required for a year at any other period. A very small, narrow house in Market street, Philadelphia, which could not have cost above two thousand dollars, rents for one thousand dollars per annum.

On the subject of the generosity of the money lender, it is needless to descant. His tenderness, and mercy, and benevolence, have so long been the subject of celebration and panegyric by moral and dramatic writers, and by sermonists, that they cannot have escaped the observation of the most superficial.

If therefore, the manufacturers really increased their profits with the increase of demand, it would not be a just subject of complaint, with any of the other classes of society, who exactly

pursue this plan themselves. But it does not follow, that a rise in the price of a manufactured article produces an increase of the profits of the manufacturer. By no means. Three items regulate the price of manufactures—the cost of the material—the price of labour—and the profit of the manufacturer. Now it is obvious, that an increase of demand always increases the price of the first—and very frequently of the second. Let us then suppose, that, of a yard of broadcloth, which sells for six dollars, the raw material costs two—the labour two—and that the manufacturer has a profit of the other two. If the demand be by any means greatly increased, the price of the wool may rise half a dollar—and of the labour as much more. Thus the article may be sold at seven dollars—and the manufacturer not make more per yard—and less per cent. than when he sold at six dollars. This is a random case—but sufficient to elucidate the point.

Against extortion on the part of manufacturers, the public have two good safeguards. One is, the competition among themselves, which is at all times sufficient to prevent imposition to any very material extent. The other is, the danger of encouraging the European articles, which are always ready to be poured into the country in extravagant quantities.

VIII.

Excise.

The most odious and oppressive form in which public contributions can be levied, is, excise. However free the constitution or laws of a country may generally be, those citizens or subjects on whom an excise system operates, are, so far as respects the support of government, in a state of as much oppression as the subjects of the veriest despotism. Their houses are liable to domiciliary visits—the whole of their business open to the inspection of tax-gatherers—they are subject to the necessity of keeping their accounts according to rules and orders, with which it is almost impossible for many of them to comply—and in many cases they are liable to pains and penalties for perjury, when their intentions are perfectly fair and honourable. And, so far as respects property, despotism does not, I believe, exhibit itself under a more frightful aspect than this, in any part of Europe.

That there are cases, nevertheless, in which it is perfectly right and proper for governments to impose excises, and in which it is the duty of the citizens to submit to them cheerfully, cannot be doubted. And that the situation of this country, during the late session of congress,* when the excise system was adopted, was such as loudly called for and justified it, is, I think, equally clear. The people ought to have borne a tax on births,

* This was written in 1815

on funerals, on the light of heaven, or on the air they breathe, rather than submit to an invading enemy. And I think it was creditable to the nation, that congress relied so far on its patriotism as to risk their popularity on a system so obnoxious, which nothing but dire necessity could justify.

But when peace was restored—when the merest sciolist in political economy must have been perfectly satisfied, that the impost would be amply adequate to meet all the regular demands of the government—it was a most unpardonable sin of the democratic majority not to repeal this most odious of all the odious forms of taxation. To continue the domiciliary visits of excisemen—and all the revolting detail of this system, when there was so obviously no necessity for it, and when it could have been repealed without any possible disadvantage, was a gross dereliction of duty on the part of the thirteenth congress—a disregard of the feelings and just claims of a large portion of their fellow citizens, that cannot fail to insure them the most unqualified censure of their constituents. And there is no doubt that they had political sins enough to answer for, without this addition to the catalogue.

IX.

French Decrees—English Orders in Council.

I have already, several times, incidentally touched on these measures in the course of this work. But I cannot resist the temptation once more to raise my feeble voice against them in these few concluding observations.

The whole history of the world may be ransacked in vain to find any parallel to these barefaced violations of the law of nations. Alone they would be sufficient to stamp the era through which we have passed with disgrace and dishonour.

Two great nations—or rather the governments of two great nations—strain every nerve for mutual destruction. For the attainment of this object, there is a most wanton and prodigal sacrifice made of human life and human happiness. Yet in the midst of this frightful devastation, they most perfectly accord on one point, which is, to depredate on the property of unoffending and unprotected neutrals—or, in terms of the Boston merchants—"TO PREY"—yes it is, "*to prey upon the unprotected property of a friendly power.*"

This, as I have already stated five or six times, is the language of the merchants of Boston, signed by their committee, James Lloyd, George Cabot, David Green, Arnold Welles, John Coffin Jones, and T. H. Perkins. If it be offensive, let these gentlemen answer for the offence.

What is the meaning of "*to prey?*" Dr. Johnson, who is indisputable lexicographical authority—tells the world—that—"to prey," is neither more nor less than "*to plunder—to rob.*"

Thus it appears, that the whole body of merchants of the town of Boston, in 1806, publicly accused the British government of "*plundering and robbing*" "the unprotected property of a friendly power." And no man will pretend to deny that the "decrees" were of an equally "*preying*" character.

And what was the palliation of this *preying* system? France constantly and earnestly protested, that England had begun the trade of "*preying*," and that she had *only followed her example*. England, with equal vehemence, asseverated that the "*preying*" had begun on the other side of the channel. And on this miserable, contemptible pretence, they "*preyed*" upon American property between them, to the amount of probably thirty millions of dollars. In a word, it appears that both parties regarded us as unable to protect ourselves, and therefore that our commerce was lawful "*prey*," to avail myself once more of the phraseology of Mr. Lloyd and his friends.

It might be thought impossible to add a shade to this odious system. But this is an error. The last stroke of the pencil is wanted. While each of these nations "*preyed*" upon the lawful commerce of the United States with her enemy, they carried on, in the midst of a raging and devouring war, a traffic with each other, erected on the basis of fraud and perjury, a considerable portion of the materials of which traffic arose from the American property "*preyed*" upon by their cruisers!!!!

The New-York merchants prefer an accusation against the orders in council, full as strong in substance—but not quite so explicit in style as their Boston brethren. They state that "*having totally suppressed the external commerce of her enemies, Great Britain is counselled to appropriate to herself that of her friends.*" The term "*appropriate*," is rather more Chesterfieldian, than "*prey*." But it is, after all, the same dish, a little more nicely garnished. The privateersman who "*preyed*" upon the "*unprotected property of a friendly power*" merely "*appropriated*" that property to himself.

That in the whole world a single man, who did not profit by this system, should be found to justify, or even palliate it, is amazing beyond expression. But that American merchants, whose vital interests and whose country's dearest rights it cut up root and branch, should have taken this ground, as we know they have done, will to our posterity appear as fabulous and as romantic as the celebrated story of Don Bellianis of Greece—the renowned history of Parismus, Parismenos, and Parismenides—or the delectable tales of Aladdin's wonderful lamp, and Sinbad the Sailor.

It will be asked, why discuss this subject now? What purpose can it answer, but to anger and to irritate—to prevent the

wounds received and given from cicatrizing? Ought not these topics to be buried in eternal oblivion? Can this be a proper time for such enquiries? I answer, this is the time—the only time. What purpose would the discussion have answered, during the violence and turbulence of war? A period of peace is precisely the time to investigate the question, all important to the United States, whether the rights of neutral nations are to be held by the tenure of the forbearance, the moderation, the justice, the generosity of belligerents—a tenure, of the precariousness whereof we have had so many admonitory examples—or whether the rights, the sovereignty, the trade, the commerce of neutral nations shall be treated by belligerents with the respect to which they are entitled. This is a glorious theme for enlightened men on both sides of the Atlantic—worthy of a Milton, a Grotius, a Puffendorff—of a Henry, a Dickinson, or a Franklin.

CHAPTER LXXV.

Separation of the States. Civil War. Cromwelism.

THROUGHOUT this work, I have repeatedly expressed a belief, that we were of late in danger of a civil war. In fact, to that idea the work owes its existence. Such a stimulus as the apprehension of that hideous result was necessary to force me on the undertaking.

In this opinion I stand almost alone. Both federalists and democrats utterly disbelieve it. Many scout it as utterly romantic, and regard it as almost a sufficient proof of insanity.

I shall attempt to convince every dispassionate reader that this opinion, although entertained by a very small minority, stands upon impregnable ground.

I shall take the liberty to assume, as a datum on which to reason, that during external warfare, and in the inflamed state of the public mind that lately existed, a separation of the states, or a forcible expulsion of the public functionaries from their official stations, would have produced civil war. Those who are not disposed to concede me this point, may pass over this chapter; as it is not intended for their perusal.

I shall, I trust, accomplish my object, by establishing beyond the possibility of doubt or denial, that there was a fixed determination among a considerable number of the leading men in the eastern states, and some elsewhere, who were blindly followed by a great portion of the community in that quarter, and by many in the other states, to dissolve the union—and that there was likewise as fixed a determination in the middle states, to coerce the executive officers to resign their stations.

The necessity and the advantages of a dissolution of the union were as openly and as explicitly advocated in the Centinel, the

Repertory, and the Boston Gazette, and in the sermons of the reverend Messrs. Gardiner, Osgood, and Parish, more particularly the latter, as if the measure were not merely perfectly harmless, but legal and laudable.

To reconcile the public mind to that most nefarious of projects, the existing evils were exaggerated by every possible means. The persons who planned a separation, had treasonably destroyed the public credit; as far as in their power prevented the raising of troops; threw every difficulty in the way of the prosecution of the war; and then grounded their plea of the necessity of a separation, on the incapacity and imbecility of an executive, whose every effort they had thwarted and trammelled. It is difficult to conceive of a course of conduct more unfair or disingenuous.

While they were thus unceasing in their efforts to accomplish the grand object of a separation, they hypocritically affected deep regret at the cruel necessity that was imposed on them.

"Those who startle at the danger of a SEPARATION, tell us, that the soil of New England is hard and sterile; that, deprived of the productions of the south, we should soon become a wretched race of cowherds and fishermen; that our narrow territory and diminished population would make us an easy prey to foreign powers.

"Do these men forget what national energy can do for a people? Have they not read of Holland? Do they not remember that it grew in wealth and power amidst contest and alarm? That it threw off the yoke of Spain (our Virginia) and its chapels became churches, and its poor men's cottages princes' palaces." Boston Centinel, Dec. 10, 1814.

"It is said, that to make a treaty of commerce with the enemy is to violate the constitution, and to sever the union. ARE THEY NOT BOTH ALREADY VIRTUALLY DESTROYED? Or in what stage of existence would they be, should we declare a neutrality, or even withhold taxes or men?" *Idem*, Dec. 17, 1814.

"By a commercial treaty with England, which shall provide for the admission of such states as may wish to come into it, and which shall prohibit England from making a treaty with the south and west, which does not grant us at least equal privileges with herself, our commerce will be secured to us; our standing in the nation raised to its proper level; and New England feelings will no longer be sported with, or her interests violated." *Ibid.*

"If we submit quietly, our destruction is certain. If we oppose them with a high-minded and steady conduct, who will say that WE SHALL NOT BEAT THEM BACK? No one can suppose that a conflict with a tyranny at home, would be as easy as with an enemy from abroad. But firmness will anticipate and prevent it. Cowardice dreads it—and will surely bring it on at last. Why then delay? Why leave that to chance which firmness should command? Will our wavering frighten government into compliance?" *Ibid.*

"We must do it deliberately—and not from irritation at our wrongs or sufferings. And when we have once entered on the high course of honour and INDEPENDENCE, let no difficulties stay our course, nor dangers drive us back." *Ibid.*

"We are convinced that the time is arrived, when Massachusetts must make a resolute stand, and "*recurring to first principles*," view men and things as they are. The sophisticated government which these states have witnessed for thirteen years past, has almost completed their ruin—and every day still adds to their distressed condition." Ipswich memorial, Sept. 1813.

"The sentiment is hourly extending, and, in these northern states, will soon be universal, that we are in no better condition with respect to the south, than that of a *conquered people*." Boston Centinel, Jan. 13, 1813.

"We have no more interest in waging this sort of war at present, at the command of Virginia, than Holland in accelerating her ruin by uniting her destiny with France." *Idem*.

"The land is literally taken from its old possessors, and given to strangers." *Idem*.

"Either the southern states must drag us further into the war—or we must drag them out of it—OR THE CHAIN WILL BREAK." *Idem*.

"We must be no longer deafened by senseless clamours about A SEPARATION OF THE STATES." *Idem*.

"Should the present administration, with their adherents in the southern states, still persist in the prosecution of this wicked and ruinous war—in unconstitutionally creating new states *in the mud of Louisiana* (the inhabitants of which country are as ignorant of republicanism as the alligators of their swamps) and in opposition to the commercial rights and privileges of New England, *much as we deprecate a separation of the union, we deem it an evil much less to be dreaded than a co-operation with them in these nefarious projects.*"

This wretched piece of ribaldry, observe, reader, is not taken from an anonymous essay or paragraph in a newspaper. It is extracted from a petition deliberately debated, and adopted by the *enlightened and patriotic* citizens of Deerfield in Massachusetts, on the 10th of January, 1814, and presented to the legislature of that state, with a host of similar ribald petitions and memorials, which were very kindly received by that body.

"We must put away all childish fears of *resistance*." Crisis, No. 3.

"What shall we do to be saved? One thing only. THE PEOPLE MUST RISE IN THEIR MAJESTY—protect themselves—and compel their unworthy servants to obey their will." Boston Centinel, Sept. 10, 1814.

"*The union is already dissolved practically.*" *Idem*.

"You ask my opinion on a subject which is much talked of—a *Dissolution of the Union*. On this subject I differ from my fellow-citizens generally, and therefore I ought to speak and write with diffidence. I have, for many years, considered the union of the northern and southern states as not essential to the safety, and very much opposed to the interest, of both sections. The extent of territory is too large to be harmoniously governed by the same representative body. A despotic prince, like the emperor of Russia, may govern a wide extent of territory, and numerous distinct nations; for his will controuls their jealousies and discordant interests. But when states, having different interests, are permitted to decide on those interests themselves, no harmony can be expected. The commercial and non-commercial states have views and interests so different, that I conceive it to be impossible that they ever can be satisfied with the same laws and the same system of measures. I firmly believe, that each section would be better satisfied to govern itself: and each is large and populous enough for its own protection, especially as we have no powerful nations in our neighbourhood. These observations are equally applicable to the western states, a large body and a distinct portion of the country, which would govern themselves better than the Atlantic states can govern them. That the Atlantic states do not want the aid of the strength nor the councils of the western states, is certain. And I believe the public welfare would be better consulted, and more promoted, in a separate than in a federal condition. The mountains form a natural line of division: and moral and commercial habits would unite the western people. In like manner, the moral and commercial habits of the northern and middle states would link them together; as would the like ha-

bits of the slave-holding states. Indeed, *the attempt to unite this vast territory under one head has long appeared to me absurd. I believe a peaceable separation would be for the happiness of all sections.*" Boston Centinel, July 18th, 1812.

After this insidious and seditious address, the writer, in order to shelter himself from the public detestation, adds the following feeble salvo :

"But, as the citizens of this country have generally been of a different opinion, it is best not to urge for a separation, till they are convinced of their error."

"We will ask the infatuated men of property, beguiled by the arts of Albert Gallatin, by what fund, and by whom, they will be repaid the advances made on exchequer bills and the loans, in the event of A DISSOLUTION OF THE UNION? We ask them further, whether from present appearances, and under existing circumstances, there is the least foundation to build a hope that THE UNION WILL LAST TWELVE MONTHS? We look to Russia to save us from the horrors of anarchy. If a reverse of fortune is in reserve for Alexander, and the war continues, THE UNION IS INEVITABLY GONE."

Federal Republican.

Extract from an address to the Hartford Convention.

"The once venerable constitution has expired by dissolution in the hands of those wicked men who were sworn to protect it. Its spirit, with the precious souls of its first founders, has fled for ever. Its remains, with theirs, rest in the silent tomb. At your hands, therefore, WE DEMAND DELIVERANCE. New England is unanimous. And we announce our irrevocable decree, that the tyrannical oppression of those who at present *usurp the powers of the constitution*, is beyond endurance. AND WE WILL RESIST IT." Boston Centinel, Dec. 28, 1814.

"Long enough have we grasped at shadows and illusions, and been compelled to recoil upon ourselves, and feel the stings of real, substantial, hopeless woe, sharpened by disappointment. Long enough have we *paid the tares and fought the battles of the southern states*. Long enough have we been scouted, abused and oppressed, by men who claim a right to rule and despise us. *Long enough have we been the submissive slaves of the senseless representatives of the equally senseless natives of Africa*, and of the semi-barbarous huntsmen of the western wilderness. Realities alone can work our deliverance. And *deliverance we deliberately, solemnly, and irrevocably decree to be our right*. AND WE WILL OBTAIN IT." Idem, Dec. 24, 1814.

"The sufferings which have multiplied so thick about us, have at length aroused New England. She will now meet every danger, and go through every difficulty, until her rights are restored to the full—and settled too strongly to be shaken. *She will put aside all half-way measures*. She will look with: eye of doubt on those who propose them. She will tell such men, that *they hope to lead in the cause of NEW ENGLAND INDEPENDENCE*, they must do it in the spirit of New England men." Idem, Dec. 7, 1814.

"Throwing off all connection with this wasteful war—making peace with the enemy—and opening once more our commerce, would be a wise and manly course." Idem, Dec. 17, 1814.

"My plan is to withhold our money, and make a separate peace with England." Boston Daily Advertiser.

"That there will be a revolution, if the war continues many months, no man can doubt, who is acquainted with human nature, and is accustomed to study cause and effect. *The eastern states are marching steadily and straight forward up to the object*. In times past, there was much talk, and loud menaces, but little action, among the friends of reform in New England. Now we shall hear

little said and much done. *The new constitution is to go into operation as soon as two or three states shall have adopted it.*" Federal Republican.

On the 5th of January, 1815, a seditious, I might say a treasonable, meeting, was held at Reading, in Massachusetts, at which a number of inflammatory resolutions were passed, of which the climax was capped by the following :

"Resolved, That we place the fullest confidence in the governor and legislature of Massachusetts, and in the state authorities of New England ; and that to them under God, the chief governor of the universe, we look for aid and direction ; and that for the present, until the public opinion shall be known, *we will not enter our carriages, PAY OUR CONTINENTAL TAXES, or aid, inform, or assist any officer in their collection.*"

Extracts from a memorial of the citizens of Newburyport, Jan. 31, 1814, addressed to the legislature of Massachusetts.

"In this alarming state of things, we can no longer be silent. When our unquestionable rights are invaded, we will not sit down and coolly calculate what it may cost us to defend them. We will not barter the liberties of our children for slavish repose—nor surrender our birthright but with our lives.

"We remember the resistance of our fathers to oppressions, which dwindle into insignificance, when compared with those we are called upon to endure. The rights "which we have received from God, we will never yield to man." We call upon our state legislature to protect us in the enjoyment of those privileges, to assert which our fathers died ; and to defend which we profess ourselves **READY TO RESIST UNTO BLOOD.** We pray your honourable body to adopt measures immediately to secure to us especially our undoubted right to trade within our own state.

"We are ourselves ready to aid you in securing it to us, to the utmost of our power, "peaceably if we can—forcibly if we must." And we pledge to you *the sacrifice of our lives and property* in support of whatever measures the dignity and liberties of this free, sovereign, and independent state may seem to your wisdom to demand."

To what a most awful extent must the violence and delusion of faction have been carried, when "*resistance unto blood,*" was regularly voted in a town meeting, in an enlightened state—and among people of high standing and respectability ! It is impossible for any man of clear head and sound heart to peruse these profligate paragraphs without the utmost abhorrence.

I trust that no man possessed of reason or common sense, who attentively reads the preceding extracts, and the sacrilegious calls upon "Moses and Aaron," in chapter 56, will for a moment doubt that there was a deep, a dangerous, an audacious, and a treasonable conspiracy to dissolve the union. We can never be sufficiently grateful to Heaven for our preservation from this horrible catastrophe,

There are three circumstances connected with this affair, which are entitled to a most serious consideration. Without bearing them duly in mind, it is impossible to estimate accurately the extent of our obligations to Heaven, or the depth of the gulph of perdition that yawned to swallow us up.

The first is, that the sermons from which I have given the hideous extracts, in chapter 56, were preached to large and res-

pectable congregations—met with their decided approbation—and were generally published at their request.

The second is, that the Boston Centinel, from which I have made most of the seditious and treasonable extracts in the preceding pages, enjoys as great a share of public patronage, and possesses as decided an influence, probably, as any newspaper in the United States. I have been assured, and I am inclined to believe the assurance, that it has 6000 subscribers. From these two facts some idea may be formed of the lamentable extent to which the contamination of the political leprosy of disaffection and treason had spread throughout the eastern states.

The third circumstance that I wish impressed on the mind of the reader who considers this subject, is, that during the time when a large portion of this seditious and jacobinical matter was publishing, negotiations for peace were pending.

I now undertake to prove that there was another project formed by persons who did not probably wish to dissolve the union, but whose object was to Cromwelize the public functionaries. The “Elba toast”—and “the halter” of Mr. Cyrus King, throw some light on this scheme.

To facilitate this object, there was a decided effort made by many of the editors of newspapers, to persuade the federalists, that the war having been declared by the democrats, they ought not to call upon their opponents for aid—who, on their side, ought to afford none. And this abominable doctrine was preached when the enemy was at the door, and when, but for the intervention of Heaven, he would have had us almost entirely at his mercy. But, at such a crisis, so violent was the lust of power—and so utter the disregard of the public welfare, that the perdition of the country would have been preferred to a failure of the object in view.

“Our whole maritime frontier is threatened by a force which the democrats themselves say, we are utterly incompetent to resist. In this situation we now find ourselves, with an administration acknowledged by its own friends to be incapable of prosecuting the war with any chance of success, and with the scattered remnant of an army, which has lost all confidence in the ability of its commanders. *And in this situation we are called upon to unite, to bring forth all the resources of the nation—and to place them at the disposal of those very men who have already uselessly squandered so large a portion of the strength and resources of the country; and have derived from them nothing but the scorn of their enemies, and the contempt of their friends. Can any thing be more preposterous! The war has hitherto been the war of a party. Let it so continue—and so be terminated.*

“The disgrace will then continue to be the disgrace of the party, and not of the nation—“a consummation devoutly to be wished.” *Let those who have hitherto abstained from supporting the war, still abstain—and thereby preserve the honour, and, so far as they still remain, the resources of the country, FOR THE EVENTS WHICH ARE TO FOLLOW.*” Gazette of the United States, July 1, 1814.

These paragraphs afford sufficient text for a folio volume. But I shall limit my remarks to a few lines. They appeared in the

city of Philadelphia, about seven weeks before the Vandalic destruction of the public buildings at Washington—at a period when the enemy was collecting a force which might have Copenhagenized the city wherein the editor lived. And at such a time, when every honourable motive, public and private, imperiously called for a general union of all parties in the holy cause of defending a blessed country, goaded into war by nineteen years of unceasing outrage and depredation, in defence of its honour—its independence—in defence of its citizens stolen on the highway of nations—and scourged to fight, and slaughtered in fighting, the battles of their enslavers—in the midst of this state of things, with all the horrors of subjugation staring us in the face, a respectable party is called upon “*to continue to abstain from supporting such a war*”—and for what? Why, “*to preserve the honour of the nation ! ! ! !*” Never, never, never, in all the hideous annals of mankind, was there a greater instance of delusion.

“*To preserve the honour of the nation,*”—by enabling an infuriated enemy to spread devastation in every direction—to Hamptonize our wives, our sisters, and our daughters !—and to dictate the terms of submission, of colonization, if they should judge proper, at the point of the bayonet—to *beauty-and-booty* our proud cities—our New-Yorks, our Philadelphias, and our Baltimores !! I can no more. I must quit the contemplation. Let the reader pass the awful sentence of condemnation.

“The war is purely democratic. It was undertaken for democratic and not for national purposes; and has been prosecuted with democratic success. *Let the democrats, therefore, terminate it in the best manner they can.* We have no partnership in the matter. If they can make a good and honourable peace, let them have the credit of it. And if they sacrifice the interest and honour of the country, as we have always believed they would, the country must take up the cause as a national and not a party concern: and should a war become necessary, in vindication of national rights, it will be another kind of war than this has been.” *Gazette of the United States, June 25, 1814.*

“We say again, *let the democrats terminate their ridiculous war in the best way they can*; and if, in doing so, they surrender any of our essential rights, the nation will employ competent men for the recovery of them. *It would be worse than useless, after the experience we have had, to enter into partnership with the present conductors of affairs, in supporting any rights whatever* BY FORCE OF ARMS.” *Ibid.*

“THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION MUST BE GOT RID OF, or the nation is inevitably ruined. *To talk of united efforts, as some good men have done, while they continue in power, is to talk of what cannot possibly happen.* The men of virtue, wisdom, and talents, are ready to unite; and always were, and always will be ready to unite their efforts in the cause of their country, and to yield up their purses and persons for its service—provided they can be placed at the disposal of men in whose integrity and ability they can place reliance.” *Idem, Oct. 14, 1814.*

“No alternative is left us but to resist with energy, or to submit with disgrace. As the latter is not possible to Americans, we must prepare our minds for an extremely long, arduous, and sanguinary war. One part of the prepa-

ration must be, *the expulsion, by some modification of our constitutional means, of the faction that has brought the nation to this at best perilous condition.*" *Idem.*

"New England must require that those men who have degraded the country they have so long misruled, *should be dismissed, OR FORCED TO RESIGN.*" *Boston Centinel*, Dec. 10, 1814.

"If James Madison is to command the force destined to subjugate the eastern states, we would suggest to his excellency a most salutary caution—it is, that he should provide himself with a horse swifter footed by far, than that which carried him so gallantly from the invaders of Washington. He must be able to escape at a greater rate than forty miles a day, *or the swift vengeance of New England will overtake THE WRETCHED MISCREANT IN HIS FLIGHT!!!!*"

This last abominable paragraph was published in the *Merri-mack Intelligencer*, and transferred from thence into the *Boston Gazette*, of Jan. 5, 1815, published by Russel and Cutler, and enjoying a very high degree of public patronage. It is hardly possible to produce a greater outrage upon decency, decorum, or propriety.

While these laboured efforts were employed to excite the citizens to Cromwelize the administration, by displacing the public functionaries, the same language was held in the London papers, under the patronage of the British government—and it was even announced in parliament, that all that remained to be done, Bonaparte being banished, was to put down James Madison. And all the menaces of this kind were copied without the least disapprobation into the most violent federal papers. Of this I annex a specimen—

"In England every thing was festivity, exultation, and prosperity, as regarded their European prospects. But with respect to America, the language of all ranks appeared angry, bitter, and threatening. The papers asserted, that large reinforcements would be sent out, and the war continued with the utmost energy. But the papers which use this language say, their late cry of "*Peace with France, but down with the Bonapartists,*" must be kept up with the alteration, "*Peace with America, but down with the Madisons.*" *It is the opinion of well-informed Americans in England, that the government would not dare to make peace with the American administration, for fear of the resentment of the people. We think the administration have advices to this effect in Washington.*" *Boston Centinel*, June, 8, 1814.

To such a deplorable length had faction and treason proceeded, that had the Prince Regent declared that he would make no peace with this country unless it changed its highest public functionaries, there were, we see, native Americans to be found, prepared to submit to the dictation of a foreign prince! And in fact, many of the paragraphs published on this side of the Atlantic, appeared to invite this dictation; and, as I have already stated, to hold out the idea that the British government would disgrace itself, if it made a treaty with the United States without a change of our rulers.

"If the American people were not the most tame, amiable, good-natured race of men that ever lived, *the president would have been hissed out of office, if*

not PELTED OUT WITH STONES, the first day congress assembled after the flight and conflagration." Federal Republican, Jan. 31, 1815.

"These men must be set aside—must be got rid of, or there can be, in the nature of things, no lasting benefits resulting from the abandonment of their ruinous courses, which is intended to be only temporary. Like the North administration, they must be put down, to rise no more.* * * Down, down, with these detested, exposed, self-confessed. No matter who succeeds them. In the nature of things, we cannot err—we cannot be worsted in the choice of successors.* * * A change of dynasty is as necessary to our prosperity as it may now be to the repose and security of France. Down with the Deists, the Modern Philosophers, and Empirics!" Federal Republican, April 9, 1814.

I shall terminate this subject with introducing to the reader, a personage who has played a conspicuous part in the eastern drama of disaffection and sedition. James Lloyd was one of the committee of merchants who, in 1806, loudly called on the government to resist the depredations of Great Britain, which he and they publicly charged with "*robbery*," i. e. with "*preying* upon the commerce of a friendly neutral power." With them he pledged himself to support the government in the attempt. And with them he never redeemed that pledge; for he concurred with them to embarrass and defeat every measure adopted for the purpose of procuring redress. To this gentleman, as a conspicuous eastern character, Mr. John Randolph, of Roanoke, addressed a long, expostulatory letter, on the seditious proceedings of the eastern section of the union. To this letter Mr. Lloyd made a prolix reply, the jet of which was (a very modest proposition, to serve as the basis of conciliating this gentleman and his friends) to "*coerce Mr. Madison and his immediate dependants to retire from office*, and to elect Mr. King or Judge Marshall in his stead." These were the exact words of this admirer of Gen. Washington, whose immortal legacy denounced, in the strongest language, all "attempts to overawe or controul the constituted authorities."

I think no candid man will now deny that our danger was very considerable. Lest, however, there should remain any thing to hang a doubt upon, I shall state two analogous cases, to prove my position.

France, under the princes of the house of Valois, was for about thirty years a scene of the most horrible devastation. Civil war pervaded the whole nation. Myriads of human beings were immolated. Rivers of blood were shed. Towns and cities were sacked and conflagrated. The aged matron equally with the pure, immaculate virgin, fell a prey to the lust of a ferocious and brutal soldiery. The new-born infant—the manly father—the hoary-headed grandsire—were slaughtered with a demoniac fury. In a word, that earthly paradise was made a suitable habitation for demons incarnate.

These horrible scenes, at which the furies exult, and over which humanity sheds the scalding tear, arose from a circum-

stance apparently trivial, and which, had not the public mind been highly excited, would have passed over without the shedding of a drop of blood.

A deadly, rancorous hostility had been excited between the two parties, the Bourbons and the Guises—precisely such as existed in various parts of the United States lately, and as was daily fanned by inflammatory newspapers. The duke of Guise was on his journey to Paris, and stopped at a small town, called Vassy, on a Sunday morning. The Hugonots were assembled at church. The duke's retinue went to their place of worship, and offered some insult to the congregation. The latter picked up stones, and threw at them. They, in return, had recourse to their arms—fired on the crowd—killed above sixty, and wounded a number of others.*

From this single spark proceeded the conflagration which, as I have stated, raged for thirty years with such destructive fury.

This example, strong and striking, and highly applicable to our situation, ought to make a lasting impression upon all good men. It evinces the depth of the yawning vortex into which we were precipitously falling.

I shall trespass on the reader with one more example of a bloody civil war, excited by a still more trivial circumstance. A Florentine lady was betrothed to a nobleman of distinction, who, a short time previous to the marriage, was captivated with the beauty of another lady, whom he married. The relations and friends of the slighted lady, in order to be avenged of the affront, assassinated the bridegroom. His friends took up arms to be avenged for his death. And hence Florence was torn in pieces for a long series of years by the hostile factions of the Guelphs and Gibbelines, who butchered each other as they respectively acquired the ascendancy.†

History is replete with instances of an analogous character.

CHAPTER LXXVI.

Abuse of the freedom of the press. Attacks on monarchs and nations of Europe.

THE press is a formidable instrument—capable of producing the very best as well as the very worst effects on society. When employed to illuminate a nation—to guard its rights—to aid the cause of virtue—it is of inestimable value—and cannot be too highly prized. But when employed to delude—to deceive—to excite a demoniacal spirit of hostility in a community—to

* Davila's History of the Civil Wars of France, London Edition, 1769, vol. I p. 96—7.

† Machiavel's History of Florence, book 2. page 7.

prepare the way for treason, rebellion, and civil war, as we have recently witnessed, it is among the greatest scourges of mankind.

It is a melancholy truth, that the most fatal errors prevail on this vital subject; and numberless instances are on record, of jurors violating every dictate of justice and honour, as well as their solemn oaths, in order to shelter offenders, who, under the cloke of the liberty, have exercised the utmost licentiousness of the press.

It is a fertile topic, and demands the investigation of enlightened men, zealous to promote the public good. To them I shall leave the various details, and shall respectfully offer a few remarks on one particular point.

The style which our newspaper writers use in their lucubrations on the conduct and character of the crowned heads of Europe, is too frequently gross and offensive,—equally repugnant to good taste and decency. They are not unfrequently styled “crowned ruffians;” and other terms, equally indecent, are applied to them. This is highly impolitic. It has a tendency to embroil us with the whole class of monarchs, and may, in its consequences, involve us in destructive wars.

There are already ample causes of jealousy towards us among the monarchs of Europe, in the example our nation affords, of the glorious results of self-government. It is a standing reproach to monarchy, and many of the sceptered race must regard themselves as unsafe while our liberties exist. What madness then must it be to search for additional causes of irritation and hostility!

Suppose all the monarchs and the royal families in Europe were worthless—suppose the males profligate and abandoned, and the females prostitute—is that any concern of ours? Let us leave them to themselves. We are not answerable for their guilt or their folly. We have folly and guilt enough of our own to answer for. It was a wise admonition—“Let him that is without sin, throw the first stone.” And if a little attention were paid to this sacred rule, the monarchs of Europe would have escaped a large portion of the abuse that has been lavished upon them.

But many of our newspaper editors not satisfied with their unceasing revilings of the monarchs, display their virulence against entire nations, which are frequently overwhelmed with scurrility and abuse.

The vials of wrath and indignation are poured forth on the French, and the English, and sometimes on the Spaniards. Many of the federal printers are unceasing in their ribald abuse of the French. And the democratic printers, in order to balance the account, equally villify the English.

The injustice and folly of stigmatizing whole nations indiscriminately, are evident on a moment's reflection. It is hardly possible to find a more complete proof of a shallow mind, or a rancorous heart. Every nation has its bright as well as its dark side. It is the law of our nature. And to humble and mortify American vanity and pride, there is not a civilized nation perhaps in the world that is not superior to us in some point of view. Will any man, not deserving of a straight waistcoat, pretend for a moment to compare the American people with the French, in point of politeness, urbanity, and mildness, or a delicate regard for the feelings of those with whom they have intercourse—qualities, which, more than any other, soften and remove so much of the asperities and discomforts of life? * or will he pretend to compare us, as a people, for solid, substantial charity, for munificence, or public spirit with the English? † or, as a people for sobriety, industry, and economy, with the Scotch? ‡ or for strong feeling, and ardent, zealous attachment with the Irish? § I believe not.

That on "a view of the whole ground," we will stand a comparison with any or all of these nations, I freely admit. But we are really far indeed from perfection. And considering the

* A man of keen sensibility who has any defect in his person, his address, his manners, or his language, will have his feelings more frequently outraged in one week in Philadelphia, New York, or Baltimore, than in seven years in Paris.

† I need not tell the reader that I am no admirer of the British government. He has long since made the discovery. Its tyranny over the country of my birth, and its outrages upon the country of my adoption, sufficiently justify my strong and extreme dislike to it. But the British nation maintains, in some points of view, a proud pre-eminence over most of the other nations of the globe. And in none does it stand higher than in munificence or public spirit. For any great public object, for the relief of extraordinary distress, or for the remuneration of great public services, London is, I believe, the first city in the world. It will be said, as it has frequently been, that there is an extreme difference between the wealth of London, and that of Philadelphia, New York, Boston, or Baltimore. This is a shallow defence, and will not bear examination. There are in those four cities hundreds of persons, each of whose fortunes exceeds half a million of dollars, some without a child to inherit their property, and not one of whom has ever performed a signal act of munificence—ever laid claim to the praises of his cotemporaries or posterity for liberality. Many of them are as hard, as gripping, and as unfeeling, as they were when they originally laid the foundation, on a small beginning, of the immense fortunes with which, had they public spirit, they might immortalize themselves. The bane of this country is a sordid thirst of wealth. This vile passion, when it once gains full possession, never loses its grasp. It swallows up all that renders man estimable.

A great number of the hospitals and other public charities in London, were founded by individuals, whose names they bear. We are most lamentably deficient in such instances of munificence.

‡ There is more dissipation and idleness in some of our small towns, which shall be nameless, than in a whole Scotch shire.

§ I might offer some strong comparisons here, but I forbear. The reader will cogitate on the subject, and supply them himself.

immense advantages we enjoy, and the opportunity we have had of rendering our institutions as nearly perfect as is attainable in this sublunary sphere, we have reason to feel ashamed that so much imperfection remains in our political systems, in our jurisprudence, and in our regulations of property.

A respectable newspaper, edited by men of talents, and in general of sound judgment, lately sullied its reputation by a gross statement of the tragical end of the illustrious Porlier, worthy of a nobler fate. It was stated that "*the beastly Spaniards*" had trailed him through the streets to be pelted by the mob; thus stigmatizing a whole nation for the brutality of a ferocious few. What immense injustice!

Every one who reflects for a moment must admit that it frequently happens that a small portion of the inhabitants of a town or city are guilty of enormities at which the residue shudder, and which they abhor and detest. The horrible scenes of the Septembrization in Paris, over which outraged humanity sighs and laments, were perpetrated by less than a sixtieth part of the population of that city; and the mass of the remainder were as innocent of the guilt as the people of Pekin or Canton, New-York or Philadelphia. It would therefore be rampant injustice to charge these horrors to the account of the whole of the citizens of Paris. What then must be the disregard of all the rules of equity, to brand with infamy the whole French nation, for the wickedness of a detestable fragment of the scum of Paris?

Thus it is with the expression "*the beastly Spaniards*." One, or two, or three hundred of the off-scourings of Corunna, earned for themselves immortal infamy by their ferocity towards the hero who would have delivered their nation from the most galling shackles: and this enormity is to attach disgrace to a nation which cherished the sacred flame of liberty when it was almost utterly extinguished throughout the rest of Europe—a nation which has been long pressed down by the most galling yoke of tyranny, and is entitled to our sincere commiseration!

Besides these three nations, we have contrived to exasperate most of the others, by scurrilous attacks on their kings. Except among a people divided by faction and party rage, each individual generally identifies the honour of his rulers with his own. He regards insults and outrages offered to them as attaching disgrace to himself.

There is no mode of testing the correctness of our conduct to others, so unerring, as to place ourselves in their situation, and judge of the effect it would produce on us. Most of the errors and wickedness of mankind arise from a disregard of this rule.

What, then, would be our feelings, if the newspapers of any foreign nation were filled with gross and billingsgate abuse of us?

If for any of the excesses that take place here, we were to be styled "*the beastly Americans*?" If our president, our congress, and our governors were overwhelmed with scurrility? We would feel a just indignation at such indecency and vulgarity. What then must be the feelings of the English, the French, and the Spaniards, on reading, (and we may rely upon it that they do read,) the vile billingsgate with which our papers teem against them?

I have heard it said, that there is a wide difference between the two cases; that we do not deserve such abuse; that so great are the corruptions and depravity of the higher orders in Europe, that they really deserve even worse than the abuse that is lavished upon them; and much more in the same style.

I could refer to high authority for a parable on the "beam and the mote," and for the folly of self-righteousness. But I waive this as superfluous. I will suppose for a moment that all the allegations are well-founded, and ask, Does that materially alter the case? Does that confer on us a right to assume the rank of censors, and deal forth condemnation on persons at three thousand miles distance?

If the abuse be well founded, this only renders it more galling and irritating. Mankind can in general treat with scorn, unmerited calumny: but where truth points the dart, it wounds severely, and rankles and festers.

We might find ourselves in a very uncomfortable situation, if the personages against whom this billingsgate is levelled, were to appeal to our courts for redress, and the decision were to be regulated by common law. I shall, to elucidate the matter, state two cases strongly in point.

Thirty years since, her imperial majesty, the empress Catharine of Russia, was introduced to the notice of the world, in the London papers, in no very pleasing point of view. Some of the extraordinary and unprecedented arcana of her private life were stated without any veil or covering. Her minister applied for redress to the court of King's Bench. Prosecutions were undertaken against all the editors of the papers wherein the libel had appeared. They were all found guilty, and condemned to fine and imprisonment. The case of one of the parties was peculiarly hard. He was an old man who held a share of a newspaper, but had not the least concern in the editorship. It was proved to the satisfaction of the court and jury, that he took no other part in the paper, than merely to receive or pay his quota of profit or loss, and even never went to the printing office where the paper was published. These pleas, strong and decisive as they were, availed him not. He underwent the severity of his sentence.

The other is more recent, and is much better known. After the treaty of Amiens, Peletier, a French journalist in London, made very free with the character of Bonaparte, who, with a degree of littleness, unworthy of the character and station he bore, complained of the libel to the British government. A prosecution was ordered, which closed with the conviction of Peletier, who escaped punishment by the renewal of the war.

It is most devoutly to be wished that our newspaper printers will, in their future lucubrations on foreign affairs, consult true taste and sound policy, when they arraign at the bar of the public the nations or the sovereigns of Europe.

CHAPTER LXXVII.

Shall we soon have another war? The vulnerable part of Great Britain. The late war. Defective legislation. American seamen.

AN idea prevails among many of our citizens, that the peace with England will not be of long duration—that her jealousy of, and hostility towards, this country, will impel her once more, and not at a very distant day, to hurl the gauntlet in our teeth, and to open wide again the temple of Janus.

I fondly hope these anticipations are unfounded. I fondly hope that England will understand her true interests better—that she will allow us to spread the mantle of oblivion over the injuries we have received; and that she will cultivate our friendship by kindness and a reciprocation of the good offices and charities of a liberal intercourse, dictated by sound policy, and her vital interests. The hideous wounds that our national pride, our honour, our independence, and our dearest rights have received, deep and festering as they are, may be made to cicatrize in time. We may, and I hope will, forget that we once were foes. But this depends on herself entirely. This country may again be provoked to war. But I feel a proud and confident hope it will not afford just provocation for entering into “the unprofitable contest who shall do the other most harm.”

In effect, were the affairs of nations conducted with even a moderate degree of prudence and common sense, there would be little reason for apprehension. But a very cursory glance at the history of the world, will satisfy an enquirer, that no Bedlamite, confined in a cell, and curbed by a strait waistcoat, displays more insanity or folly than frequently appears in the management of public affairs. However lamentable, therefore, it might be, it would not be very astonishing, if the evil genius of Great Britain would impel her once more to hostilities. Should that event take place, it will be the most dire insanity.

There are strong inducements for Great Britain to cultivate peace with this country, independent of the immensely lucrative commerce she carries on with us, I shall glance at a few.

Should this book ever find its way to any man who has a voice in the councils of Great Britain—should my countrymen, lord Castlereagh or marquis Wellesley, condescend to cast an eye on these pages, I hope it will be strongly and indelibly impressed on their minds, that so surely as war takes place between the two countries, British commerce will suffer as much destruction in one year, as it formerly suffered in half a century. One consequence of the late war into which she fatuitously goaded us, was, that we found the spot where she is vulnerable—and we have also made the all-important discovery of the most unerring means of annoyance. Achilles had a tender heel. He was every where else invulnerable. Ten Hector, ten Sarpedon, and ten Troilus, uniting their forces, could not with their javelins affect the apple of his eye. But a woman or a child could inflict a mortal wound in the heel.

Great Britain, in like manner, has her tender heel. That heel is her commerce. While this is uninterrupted, she laughs to scorn the efforts of her enemies. She is elsewhere invulnerable. Commerce furnishes her with means to subsidize one half of the *civilized* Europeans to oppress the other.

Rome, in her proudest day of triumph and glory, had hardly a greater number of vassal monarchs in her train, than the world lately saw arrayed in arms, led by the address, or bought by the wealth of Great Britain. But cut off her commerce, and she is powerless. Her resources are dried up.

In all future wars—(should we be driven into any—and I feel confident they will not be of our seeking)—the energies of this nation will not be wasted on the land. They will be spread over the ocean. Our Constitutions, and our United States, and our Peacocks, and our Wasps, and our Hornets, and our Arguses, and our Enterprizes, and our Essexes, and our Comets, and our Armstrongs, will penetrate her bays and harbours, and sink, burn, and destroy her vessels in all quarters of the globe. Let her regard, with serious concern, the terrible devastations of Hull, of Decatur, of Stewart, of Bainbridge, of Rodgers, of Perry, of Macdonough, of Porter, of Biddle, of Lawrence, of Allen, of Blakely, of Warrington, of Jones, of Read, of Boyle, of Barney, of Champlin. And let her be assured—the solemn truth ought to make a lasting and indelible impression—that every port in the union will have its Porter, or its Perry, or its Macdonough, or its Biddle—each emulating the glory acquired in the late war—each straining every nerve to excel his rival in the race of avenging his country's wrongs. Insurance will again be as high from England to Ireland as in a French war it would be from England to the East Indies.

England has been in the habit of commencing war without declaring it—and thus, taking her adversary unawares, she crip-

ples him completely. In this manner, in 1756, she issued letters of marque against France, which were acted upon in all quarters of the world at the same time, whereby she possessed herself of many hundred vessels, and 10,000 seamen, before a hostile act was committed by France.

She commenced war against Spain by an attack upon her frigates freighted with dollars. And for her commencement of hostilities with innocent, unoffending and respectable Denmark, I refer the reader to chapter 61, where he will see a hideous portrait, drawn by the masterly pen of Roscoe.

To a nation, like the United States, whose commerce is spread over every sea and every ocean, and which, in a period of peace, has probably at all times above a hundred millions afloat—this is a subject of the most serious and solemn consideration. Perhaps a general law, for the arrestation of the persons, and sequestration of the property of the subjects of any power commencing hostilities, without a formal declaration of war, might be considered as no improper precautionary measure.

The late war.

Among the infinite variety of circumstances, which enable us to look back on the late war with gratitude to Heaven, and with just exultation, there is one peculiarly important, to which sufficient attention has not been paid, and which highly interests the whole family of mankind.

When the war began, men of sound minds, great public spirit, and deep reflection, were somewhat appalled at the fearful odds against us. This did not appear more manifest in any point than in that of commanders. Those of our enemy had all the advantages that long experience and great skill could afford. Some of them had been crowned with laurels acquired in the bloody fields of France, Spain, and Portugal. And in the eyes of the world, they appeared like so many Goliaths ready to crush our little Davids.

Most of those worthies who had signalized themselves during the American revolution, had been mowed down by the sickle of Time, as the ripe wheat falls before the sickle of the reaper. And the hopes of the nation mainly rested on men who had hardly acquired the rudiments of the art of war.

Blessed, thrice blessed, be the God of our fathers! Public spirit, innate bravery, and the thirst of avenging their country's wrongs, supplied the place of experience and knowledge. It is a most delightful truth, that three-fourths of all our triumphs, by sea and land, have been achieved by heroes who were far below the meridian of life—some of them 24, 25, 26 or 27 years of age. It is impossible to appreciate this circumstance too

highly, as it respects not merely ourselves, but our fellow men generally. It shows what glorious exploits may be performed by hardy, though inexperienced freemen, fighting *pro aris et focis*—for their fathers—their mothers—their sisters—their brothers—their wives and their children—and, in a word, for their beloved country.

Defective legislation.

There is one point in which the general government and most of the state governments are highly censurable. Amidst the immense number and variety of laws which are annually enacted, and under which our shelves groan, there are few whose direct object is to foster and promote public spirit—or to make our citizens wiser or better!

To excite emulation by rewarding merit, and thus to foster and encourage virtue and talents, is equally dictated by justice and policy. And therefore it is difficult to express the censure which is due to congress for its neglect of the duty of substantially rewarding the eminent services which so many of our citizens have rendered their country. It has been our great good fortune to have a very numerous list of such claimants—and therefore a considerable expense would be incurred to perform this act of justice in a style worthy of a great nation. But is it any reason why a debtor should not pay his debts, merely because his creditors are numerous? Surely not. And there are, it is to be hoped, few men in the country so base as to grudge to pay their quota of this debt of gratitude.

American seamen.

Among the reasons why the claims of American seamen to be shielded by their country from the horrors of impressment should be attended to, there is one of considerable weight, which appears to have escaped notice. I believe our seamen, man for man, possess worth superior to their fellow-citizens on shore. In other words, that there is more sterling virtue, and less worthlessness among them, in proportion to their numbers, than is to be found on shore.

This is high praise. It is, however, coolly and calmly penned. I have, with all the impartiality and candour I can command, weighed the opinion over and over. And my mind is unalterably made up on the subject. Let us compare the commodores and captains, and lieutenants, and midshipmen, with the upper and middle classes of society on shore—and is there a man whose heart beats high for the honour, the glory of our nautical citizens, that will shrink from the severest scrutiny.

Of the sedition, the treason, the disaffection to their country.

and adhesion to its enemies, which lately pervaded entire sections of the union, there was not a single instance to be found in our glorious navy. Blake's maxim, "to defend the country, let who would rule," pervaded the whole, and animated them as with one soul. Let an American traverse the globe, and his cheek will never be suffused with a blush for any act of his naval countrymen. The most daring and intrepid courage—the most sublime heroism—the most exalted generosity and liberality towards their captives—have elevated them to the highest pinnacle of glory.

And if the officers stand thus high, are not the sailors as conspicuous in their sphere? Are they not far, very far, superior to men of the same grade on land? Most undoubtedly. I hope, then, that their country will never again leave them to the merciless gripe of a British lieutenant, or to the ignominious and bloody stripes of a British boatswain.

It reflects discredit on the government that there is no public hospital or asylum provided for the common sailors, maimed or grown decrepid in their country's service. I am delighted to be able to put on record, that since I began this chapter, a public-spirited citizen who has no concern in commerce, and who desires his name to be concealed, has authorised a friend to head a subscription for the excellent purpose of establishing such an asylum, with one thousand dollars. It is hoped our Girards, and our Clapiers, and our Willings, and our Pratts, and our Ralstons, and our Kochs, will imitate this laudable example.

CHAPTER LXXVIII.

Congressional Caucuses for President and Vice-President.

THIS is a delicate subject to discuss at any time. It is peculiarly so at the present moment,* as nominations for these offices must be shortly made. And it may be supposed that I write with a view to this individual case. I shall therefore probably give offence to many whose opinions I prize, and would be very reluctant to forfeit. To this consequence, however, I submit. No man, who has not fortitude to dare such an issue, ought ever to take the pen on cotemporaneous politics.

I have no view to any particular candidate, nor to any particular election. My remarks shall be general. They will apply to all congressional nominations of presidents and vice-presidents, as well past as future.

That the elective principle is the key-stone of the arch of representative or republican government, is a maxim in which all

* Written January, 1816.

political writers are agreed. And that its purity ought therefore to be guarded with the utmost vigilance, is beyond all doubt or controversy.—Every measure calculated to vitiate it—to subject it to the influence of intrigue or sinister management, ought to excite the alarm of all the friends of rational liberty, and produce the most decisive exertions to remedy the evil.

These ideas, so intrinsically just, as, I hope, to command universal assent, apply to every grade of public officers elected by the people. But the higher the office, and the more extensive its powers, the more cogent becomes the reasoning, and the more decided the call for care and circumspection.

It does not require any argument to prove, that the most important elections in the United States, are those of president and vice-president. This stands confessed. The high degree of solicitude they excite, not merely in this country, but sometimes in foreign nations, is a full proof of the public sentiment on this subject.

It will therefore be time well employed to examine whether the system pursued in the important operation of nominating candidates for these exalted stations, be pure and correct, or whether it be radically unsound and vicious. If the former, it is entitled to a cordial support. If otherwise, our best and most influential citizens ought to devise and apply a remedy.

In order to decide whether a system be correct, or the reverse, it is necessary to state precisely what it is. My information as to the plan pursued by the federal party is so imperfect, that I must confine myself to that of their political opponents.

During the session of congress previous to the close of the presidential term of office, a convention, or caucus, as it is termed, is held of the senators and members of the house of representatives of the United States, belonging to this party. They take a silent vote by ballot on the candidates proposed. Those gentlemen on whom they finally agree, are recommended to the citizens of the United States as the candidates of the party for the two offices.

In every instance hitherto, this nomination has been acquiesced in by the great body of the party. Hence it results, that this nomination is virtually and substantially equivalent to an election. This is a most serious and solemn consideration.

The party considers itself bound to support the candidate thus proposed. And any state, however powerful, or any individual, however high his standing, or important his services, that does not submit to this dictation, is denounced. The opposition is regarded as apostasy from the party.

It thus appears, that “the most enlightened nation in the world” elects its first magistrate through the agency of a few men, who

are themselves merely elected for the purpose of legislation. It is true, we persuade ourselves, that we elect the president and vice-president. We have eighteen boards of electors, who, with much parade and solemnity, ballot for those officers. But it is in fact little more than mere form. The business, as hitherto conducted, is precisely to confirm the high behests of the caucus, who have really and truly dictated the candidate—to register their edicts, as, under the arbitrary monarchs of France, the parliaments of that country were obliged to register the royal edicts.

It is easy to perceive how great a departure this is from our political principles—how directly in the teeth of freedom of election.

But before I attempt to reason on the subject, I shall submit to the reader some historical sketches of past arrangements. I have tried to procure data or documents respecting the nominations in 1800 and 1804. But my researches have been fruitless.* With those of 1808 and 1812, I have been more successful. I can furnish a tolerably circumstantial account of both, which will enable the reader to decide with accuracy on the justice or unsoundness of the views I shall give.

Mr. Jefferson, the third president of the United States, had determined to retire from public life, on the close of the second period of his official duties. His intentions were announced to congress on the 10th December, 1807, nearly twelve months previous to the election of his successor.

About six weeks afterwards, that is, on the 23d January, 1808, a convention of the democratic members of both houses of congress, at Washington, was summoned by a circular from Stephen Roe Bradley, one of the senators from the state of Vermont. This important prerogative was assumed, or pretended to be derived from the circumstance of his having been chairman of a similar caucus, held for the same purpose, in 1804!![†] His circular letter follows :

“In pursuance of the powers vested in me as president of the late convention of the republican members of both houses of congress, I deem it expedient, for the purpose of nominating suitable characters for the president and vice-president of the United States, for the next presidential election, to call a convention of the said republican members, to meet at the senate chamber, on Saturday, the 23d instant, at six o’clock, P. M. at which time and place your personal attendance is requested, to aid the meeting with your influence, information, and talents. Dated at Washington, this 19th day of January, 1808.

“STEPHEN R. BRADLEY.”[†]

This assumption of power excited the indignation of several of the members, who did not merely absent themselves from the

* The failure is of no importance, as in these elections there was little or no opposition in the party.

† American Register, vol. v. page 80.

meeting, but denounced it in the most pointed terms. Some idea may be formed of their sentiments, from the following reply of Edwin Gray, esq. one of the members of the house of representatives from Virginia.

"SIR,

"Your proclamation, dated the 19th instant, and addressed to me, I have just received; and I take the earliest moment to declare my abhorrence of the usurpation of power declared to be vested in you—of your mandatory style, and the object contemplated. I deny that you possess any right to call upon the republican members of congress, or other persons, at this time and place, to attend a caucus for the presidential election. You must permit me to remind you that it was for a far different purpose for which my constituents reposed their confidence in me. I cannot consent, either in an individual or representative capacity, to countenance, by my presence, the midnight intrigues of any set of men who may arrogate to themselves the right (which belongs only to the people) of selecting proper persons to fill the important offices of president and vice-president; nor do I suppose that the honest people of the United States can much longer suffer, in silence, so direct and palpable an invasion upon the most important and sacred right belonging exclusively to them.*

"STEPHEN ROE BRADLEY, Esq.

EDWIN GRAY."

Josiah Masters, one of the representatives from the state of New York, affixed a placard in a conspicuous place in Congress Hall, in the following words:

"In pursuance of a similar power, vested in me, with that assumed by Stephen R. Bradley, one of the senate, contrary to the true principles of the constitution, I deem it expedient, for the purpose of not nominating any characters for president or vice-president of the United States at the next presidential election, not to call a convention, alias *caucus*, to meet in the senate chamber, on Saturday, the 23d instant, at six o'clock, P. M.; at which time and place the personal attendance of the said republican members is not requested, to aid the unconstitutional meeting, solicited by the said Stephen R. Bradley; and at which time and place I hereby request they will not attend to aid and sanction an infringement of one of the most important features and principles of the constitution of the United States.

"JOSIAH MASTERS."

"Washington, Jan. 21, 1808."

Nevertheless, ninety-four members attended the caucus, Five of the number refused to take any part in the proceedings—and of course the business was decided by eighty-nine.

It must be satisfactory to the reader to know how the several states were represented in the caucus, and the proportion that the votes in that body bore to the weight they enjoyed in congress.

	In Caucus.		In Congress.	
	Senators.	Repres.	Senators.	Repres.
New Hampshire	1	5	2	5
Massachusetts	1	10	2	17
Vermont	2	2	2	4
Connecticut	0	0	2	7
Rhode Island	2	2	2	2
New York	0	1	2	17
New Jersey	2	4	2	6
	8	24	14	58

* Ibid.

Brought forward	8	24	14	58
Pennsylvania	1	8	2	18
Delaware	0	0	2	1
Maryland	1	4	2	9
Virginia	2	13	2	22
Ohio	1	1	2	1
Kentucky	2	4	2	6
North Carolina	1	7	2	12
South Carolina	1	5	2	8
Georgia	2	4	2	4
Tennessee	2	2	2	3
Indiana Territory	0	1	0	1
	<hr/> 21	<hr/> 73	<hr/> 34	<hr/> 143

The votes were—

<i>President.</i>		<i>Vice-President.</i>	
For James Madison,	83	For George Clinton,	79
George Clinton,	3	John Langdon,	5
James Monroe,	3	Henry Dearborn,	3
		John Quincy Adams,	1
	<hr/> 89		<hr/> 88

Against the proceedings of this caucus, there was a strong protest published by seventeen members of both houses of congress.

The reasons assigned for the protest were two-fold—one was the utter impropriety of the measure itself—and the other, objections to the presidential candidate. It cannot be amiss to state some of those reasons.*

“ Our alarm is equally excited, whether we advert to the mode in which the meeting was summoned, or to the proceedings after it was convened. The senator who assumed the power of calling together the members of congress, did it under the pretext of that power being vested in him, by a former convention ; this pretext, whether it be true or not, implies an assertion of a right in the congress of 1804, to direct their successors in the mode of choosing the chief magistrate ; an assertion which no man has ever before had the hardihood to advance. The notices were private ; not general to all the members of the two houses ; nor confined to the republican party ; a delegate from one of the territories was invited and attended ; a man who in elections has no suffrage, and in legislation no vote. The persons, who met in pursuance of this unprecedented summons, proceeded without discussion or debate, to determine by ballot the candidates for the highest offices in the union. The characters of different men, and their pretensions to the public favour, were not suffered to be canvassed, and all responsibility was avoided by the mode of selection. The determination of this conclave has been published as the act of the republican party ; and with as much exultation as the result of a solemn election by the nation. Attempts are making to impress upon the public mind, that these proceedings ought to be binding upon all the republicans : and those who refused to attend, or disapprove of the meeting, are denounced as enemies of liberty, and as apostates from the cause of the people. In this state of things, we think it our duty to address you, and we deem ourselves called upon to enter our most solemn protest against these proceedings.

“ It is true that at former periods, when the election of a president and vice-president approached, it was customary to hold meetings of the members of congress, for the purpose of recommending candidates to the public. But

* Idem, page 81.

these meetings, if not justified, were palliated by the necessity of union. The federalists presented a formidable phalanx ; and either to succeed at all, or to prevent them from placing the candidate for the vice-presidency in the presidential chair, it was necessary to exert the combined efforts of the whole republican party. But it is equally true, that in those cases, the nominations for the presidency were matters of course. In the first and second elections under the constitution, the eyes of all were turned upon General Washington : and since the expiration of those periods, during which he filled the supreme executive office, there has not till now been any difference of opinion among the republicans, as to the candidates for the first magistracy. The real object of all former meetings was to produce such a co-operation as would secure the election of a republican vice-president.

"The circumstances, which might be urged in extenuation of such a measure heretofore, do not now exist. The federalists are comparatively few in number, and form but a feeble party. They cannot give to any one candidate, more than sixteen or seventeen votes out of one hundred and seventy-six ; no federalist can therefore be elected by the electors ; and should no person have a majority of all the electoral votes, the choice of the president will devolve on the members of the present house of representatives, in which the federalists have the votes of only two states, Connecticut and Delaware. The alteration of the constitution prevents the danger of any intrigue, by which the intended vice-president might be elected president. No good reason can therefore now be assigned, why a union of the republicans in favour of any particular person, should be attempted by a measure in itself so exceptionable, as a nomination by the senators and representatives in congress.

"So conscious were the members who attended the late meeting, of the weight of objections which might be urged against their proceedings, that they have thought it proper to publish an exculpatory resolution, proposed by Mr. Giles, of Virginia, and unanimously adopted. They have declared, that in "making the nominations, they have acted only in their individual characters as citizens." This is very true, because they could act in no other, without a breach of their oaths, and a direct violation of the letter of the constitution. But was it not intended that those nominations should be enforced by the sanction of congressional names ?—They proceed to assert "that they have been induced to adopt this measure, from the necessity of the case, from a deep conviction of the importance of a union of the republicans throughout all parts of the United States, in the present crisis of both our external and internal affairs." We trust we have shown that no such necessity exists, and that a union among the republicans, in favour of an individual, is not important.

"We do therefore, in the most solemn manner, protest against the proceedings of the meeting, held in the senate chamber, on the twenty-third day of January last, because we consider them—

"As being in direct hostility to the principles of the constitution :

"As a gross assumption of power not delegated by the people, and not justified or extenuated by any actual necessity.

"As an attempt to produce an unjust bias in the ensuing election of president and vice-president, and virtually to transfer the appointment of those officers from the people, to a majority of the two houses of congress.

"And we do in the same manner, protest against the nomination of James Madison, as we believe him to be unfit to fill the office of president in the present juncture of our affairs.

"JOSEPH CLAY,
ABRAHAM TRIGG,
JOHN RUSSELL,
JOSIAH MASTERS,
GEORGE CLINTON, jun.
GURDON S. MUMFORD,
JOHN THOMPSON,
PETER SWART,
EDWIN GRAY,

W. HOGG,
SAMUEL SMITH,
DAN. MONTGOMERY,
JOHN HARRIS,
SAMUEL MACLAY,
D. R. WILLIAMS,
JAS. M. GARNETT,
JOHN RANDOLPH."

"City of Washington, Feb. 27, 1808."

The caucus nomination met with violent opposition in various parts of the United States. The same ground was taken as by the protestors. George Clinton possessed the regard, the esteem and the gratitude of his fellow citizens, in a very high degree. The members of congress from the state of New York were most decidedly attached to him ; and, except one, absented themselves from the caucus.

There was, moreover, in the state of Virginia, a strong party in favour of Mr. Monroe, who appointed a most respectable committee to promote his election. But all opposition was vain. The paramount influence of the congressional caucus overpowered all competition; and the votes of the presidential electors were

<i>President.</i>		<i>Vice-President.</i>	
James Madison	122	George Clinton	113
C. C. Pinckney	48	Rufus King	48
George Clinton	6	John Langdon	9
		James Madison	3
		James Monroe	3
	<hr/>		<hr/>
	176		176
	<hr/>		<hr/>

It is therefore obvious that 83 members of congress did effectually dictate a president, and 79 a vice-president, for the United States. And it is equally clear that they took the nation completely by surprise ; and by their precipitation did not allow the chance of a fair expression of public opinion. The occasion by no means required such haste. They might have waited till the close of the session without any conceivable disadvantage : whereas, as I have already stated, in six weeks from the declaration of Mr. Jefferson's determination, and above ten months previous to the election, they wrested the choice from the hands of the nation.

In the whole of this statement, I studiously waive all comparison between the three respectable citizens who alone were contemplated for president by the party—James Madison, James Monroe, and George Clinton. Their merits, or demerits, do not at all affect the question : and it cannot be denied, that there was a degree of indecorum and impropriety in the measure that cannot be justified.

I shall now give a view of the caucus in 1812, considerably more in detail, as more recent.

It was held on the 18th of May, and attended by 17 senators, and 65 members of the house of representatives. To enable the reader to investigate the subject with more accuracy, I annex a list of their names—the states they represented—and the stations they filled.

New Hampshire.
 Senator.
 Richard Cutts.
 Representatives.
 Josiah Bartlet,
 Obed Hall,
 John A. Harper.
Massachusetts.
 Senator.
 John B. Varnum.
 Representatives.
 Isaiah L. Green,
 Ebenezer Seaver,
 Charles Turner, jun.
 Wm. M. Richardson.
Vermont.
 Senator.
 Jonathan Robinson.
 Representatives.
 James Fisk,
 Samuel Shaw.
Rhode Island.
 Senator.
 Jeremiah B. Howell.
New York.
 Senator.
 John Smith.
 Representatives.
 Samuel L. Mitchell,
 Ebenezer Sage,
 Thomas Sammons.
New Jersey.
 Senator.
 John Condit.
 Representatives.
 Lewis Condit,
 James Morgan,
 Adam Boyd.
Pennsylvania.
 Senators.
 Andrew Gregg,
 Michael Leib.

Representatives.
 William Anderson,
 David Bard,
 Robert Brown,
 William Crawford,
 Roger Davis,
 William Findlay,
 John M. Hyneman,
 Abner Lacock,
 Aaron Lyle,
 William Piper,
 William Smilie,
 George Smith.
Maryland.
 Representatives.
 Samuel Ringgold,
 Robert Wright.
Virginia.
 Senator.
 Richard Brent.
 Representatives.
 Burwell Basset,
 Matthew Clay,
 Wm. A. Burwell,
 John Dawson,
 Thomas Gholson,
 Peterson Goodwyn,
 A. M. Hawes,
 ———Taliaferro,
 William McCoy,
 Hugh Nelson,
 Thomas Newton,
 James Pleasants, jun.
North Carolina.
 Senator.
 James Turner.
 Representatives.
 Willis Alston,
 James Cochran,
 William R. King,
 Israel Pickens.

Indiana Territory—Jonathan Jennings.

South Carolina.
 Senator.
 John Taylor.
 Representatives.
 William Butler,
 John C. Calhoun,
 Elias Earle,
 Thomas Moore,
 Richard Winn.
Georgia.
 Senators.
 William H. Crawford,
 Charles Tait.
 Representatives.
 William H. Bibb,
 Bolling Hall,
 George M. Troup.
Kentucky.
 Senator.
 John Pope,
 Representatives.
 Henry Clay,
 Joseph Desha,
 Richard M. Johnson,
 Samuel M'Kee,
 Stephen Ormsby,
 Anthony New.
Tennessee.
 Senators.
 Joseph Anderson,
 G. W. Campbell.
 Representatives.
 Felix Grundy,
 John Rhea,
 John Sevier.
Ohio.
 Senator.
 Thomas Worthington.
 Representative.
 ———Morrow.
Mississippi Territory.
 George Poindexter.

				<i>In Caucus.</i>		<i>In Caucus.</i>	
				Sen.	Rep.	Sen.	Rep.
New Hampshire,	-	-	-	1	3	2	5
Vermont,	-	-	-	1	2	2	4
Massachusetts,	-	-	-	1	4	2	17
Connecticut,	-	-	-	0	0	2	7
Rhode Island,	-	-	-	1	0	2	2
New-York,	-	-	-	1	3	2	17
New-Jersey,	-	-	-	1	3	2	6
Pennsylvania,	-	-	-	2	12	2	18
Delaware,	-	-	-	0	0	2	1
Maryland,	-	-	-	0	2	2	9
Virginia,	-	-	-	1	12	2	22
North Carolina,	-	-	-	1	4	2	12
South Carolina,	-	-	-	1	5	2	8
Georgia,	-	-	-	2	3	2	4
Kentucky,	-	-	-	1	6	2	6
Tennessee,	-	-	-	2	3	2	3
Ohio,	-	-	-	1	1	2	1
Indiana territory,	-	-	-	0	1	0	1
Mississippi territory,	-	-	-	0	1	0	1
				17	65	34	144

Still further to facilitate a decision on the justice or injustice of this procedure, I submit four different views of its results :—

First View.

		<i>Votes in Caucus. In both Houses.</i>	
Connecticut and Delaware,	-	0	12
Five eastern states,	-	13	45
New-York,	-	4	19
Pennsylvania and New-Jersey,	-	18	28
Maryland,	-	2	11
Virginia,	-	13	24
North Carolina,	-	5	14
South Carolina and Georgia,	-	12	16
Kentucky, Tennessee, Ohio, Mississippi and } Indiana territories,		15	16

Second View.

New-York and Massachusetts,	-	9	38
South Carolina, Georgia, Kentucky, Tennessee, } Ohio, Mississippi and Indiana territories,		27	32.2
Pennsylvania, New-Jersey, and Connecticut,	-	18	37
New Hampshire, Maryland, and North Carolina,	-	11	32

Third View.

Massachusetts,	-	5	19
New-York,	-	4	19
Pennsylvania,	-	14	20
Virginia,	-	13	24

Fourth View.

Five eastern states,	-	13	45
Middle—New-York, Pennsylvania, New-Jersey } and Delaware,		22	50
Southern—Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, } South Carolina, and Georgia,		31	65
Western states,	-	15	16.2

New-York and Massachusetts, with 38 members in congress, had but nine votes in caucus ; whereas South Carolina, with ten members, had seven votes.

The western states and territories, with sixteen votes in congress, and two members without votes, had no less than fifteen votes in caucus ; being within one as many as Massachusetts, Connecticut, New-York, Maryland, North Carolina, and Delaware, which, with 75 votes in congress, had only 16 in caucus.

It is impossible to review these tables without being most forcibly struck with the manifest injustice of the operation of this anomalous proceeding. It is in every point of view indefensible.

The only palliation that I have ever heard, or seen in print, of a congressional nomination of president and vice-president, is, that in any other mode it would be difficult, if not impossible, to concentrate the exertions and energies of the democratic party in any one candidate ; and that therefore unless this system were adopted, they would be liable to a defeat.

This is a flimsy covering, to justify a measure not merely unwarranted by the constitution, but, as I shall show, in direct hostility with as wise and as sound a provision as any in that most noble instrument.

For every departure from constitutional principles that ever has taken place, or ever will, an equally plausible reason may be found. The British house of commons was chosen triennially from the reign of William III. till anno 1716, under the reign of George I. During 1715, a rebellion had taken place--and been suppressed. And the then existing parliament, under pretence that the Jacobites would, in a new parliament, acquire a dangerous ascendancy, and that the nation would be under French influence, passed an act directing the elections to be septennial. It may not be irrelevant to state a few of the principal reasons given in favour of the septennial bill. In the house of lords,

“ The duke of Devonshire made a speech on the inconveniences that attend triennial elections ; suggesting, in particular, that they keep up party divisions ; raise and ferment feuds and animosities in private families ; occasion ruinous expenses ; and give occasion to the cabals and intrigues of foreign princes. It therefore became the wisdom of that august assembly to apply a proper remedy to an evil, which might be attended with the most dangerous consequences, especially in the present temper of the nation. For, though the rebellion was happily suppressed, yet the spirit of it remained unconquered, and seemed only to wait for an opportunity to shew itself with more violence ; and that the election of a new parliament, which by the triennial act was not far off, being the most favourable juncture which the unaffected could expect, he thought it absolutely necessary to deprive them of it.”*

The reasoning in the house of commons was equally frivolous and deceptive :

* Rapin's England, vol. xix. p. 5

“Mr. Lyddall made a long speech for the bill, and, among other things, said, “If this opportunity be lost, you may possibly never have another, or at least so good a one, not only to conquer but even to eradicate that spirit of Jacobitism, which has dwelt long among us, and has more than once brought this nation to the very brink of ruin and destruction. Since, therefore, with much danger and difficulty, we have at last secured our religion, laws, and liberties, when all was at stake from the treachery of the late ministry, and the unaccountable proceedings of the last triennial parliament, why should you run the risk of having a new one so soon, first chosen by French money, and then voting by French directions? Since the king and his parliament exert their united power for the good of the public, and to retrieve the honour of the nation, why should they not continue longer together, that they may finish what they have so unanimously and happily begun? Upon the whole, the electors and people of all the boroughs in England having, for several years past, been bribed and preached into the pretender’s interest, and a dislike of the protestant succession, it becomes rather necessity than choice, to apply an extraordinary remedy to an extraordinary disease.”*

The danger, if real, subsided—if pretended, as appears probable, lost all its plausibility. But power was too sweet to be abandoned. The septennial act remains. It has been in operation above a century. The best men in the British dominions have used their utmost endeavours, in vain, to have the original system restored. Those who alone have the power of correcting the evil, would thereby diminish their own influence. It is therefore utterly hopeless to expect a reformation. And the best political writers of Great Britain ascribe to this single source a large proportion of the abuses that have arisen since the important change took place; as the effect of the alteration is to render the representative almost wholly independent of, and irresponsible to, his constituents.

After having given a concise, but I hope a satisfactory historical sketch of the two most important congressional caucusses that have occurred, I proceed to point out, in brief, a few of the radical and powerful objections, to which they are incurably liable.

1. The first objection is, that they are manifestly unequal, and of course unjust.

We have seen that some of the states have had in caucus nearly the whole number of their representatives in congress—some two-thirds—some one-half—and some were wholly unrepresented. And this is an inevitable result of the present system of caucussing. The states of New-York and Pennsylvania, with 1,700,000 free inhabitants, if represented by federalists, would not have as much influence in a democratic caucus, as the Indiana territory, if represented by a democrat. I trust there is not a candid man in the nation who will deny, that this is an overwhelming and unanswerable objection to the system.

2. They make the seat of government a scene of intrigue, and pave the way for the inroads of corruption.

* *Idem*, page 16.

While the *nomination*, (that is to say, arguing from past experience, *the election*) of president and vice president, resides in a body of men, collected in one spot for months together, it presents a focus for intrigue, and management, and, let me add, for corruption, not merely to ambitious men in our own country, but to the ministers of foreign powers, who may feel, as some of them undoubtedly do, a desire to acquire an undue influence in our councils.*

The office of president holds out lures to two of the strongest passions of human nature—ambition and avarice. Almost every page of history affords the most admonitory warnings against their deleterious effects. A man of powerful influence, actuated by ambition or by avarice, and desirous of filling the presidential chair, can very readily offer sufficient temptations, by the numerous offices of profit and honour in the gift of the president, to a few of the leading members of congress, to secure their influence, which will give the command of a majority of the votes in caucus.

Against this pernicious consequence, the constitution very wisely provides. It directs that the electors of president and vice-president shall assemble on one day, in their respective states, thus rendering it impossible, from their numbers, and their distance, to tamper with them effectually.

3. A third objection deserves consideration. When a president is desirous of a re-election, he will, as the important period of the caucus approaches, find it necessary to consult the views and wishes of the leading members of congress, to a degree hardly compatible with the independence which his official station requires. A political leader in congress, possessed of great influence and address, feels his own importance, and it would not be extraordinary if he were, on certain occasions, to make it likewise felt, and oppressively too, by the president.

4. The fourth objection is of itself abundantly sufficient. It is simply, that a congressional caucus for president or vice-president is absolutely unconstitutional.

There are only three classes of persons who are expressly prohibited from being electors of either of those officers. 1. Members of the senate. 2. Members of the house of representatives of the United States—and, 3. Persons holding offices under the United States. The constitution expressly declares, that—"no senator, or representative, or person holding an office under the United States, shall be appointed an elector."

Is it not wonderful—would it not be incredible, if the fact did not thus stare us in the face—that two of the three classes

* The objection here stated, may be found detailed more fully and more satisfactorily in the address of the New-York committee, appointed at the last presidential election.

of men, who are expressly excluded by the constitution, from any agency in this important operation, should have dared to assume the whole power of election, and that the usurpation should have been tamely submitted to by their fellow-citizens ?

The provision of the constitution is singularly wise and profound. It is intended to prevent an undue influence upon the election—to erect a barrier between the legislative body and the first executive magistrate. And is there a man in the nation who will venture to say, that the effects proposed to be produced by this provision, are not utterly destroyed by the members of the legislature daring to propose candidates, who must be supported under the penalty of a political anathema ?

Disproportionate and objectionable as were the caucuses of 1808 and 1812, a caucus, merely congressional, for the ensuing presidential election, would now (1816) be far more incorrect. The eastern states being almost wholly represented in congress by federalists, the voice of these states would be very nearly lost in a democratic caucus. They would have little more influence in the affair, than the inhabitants of Jamaica or Calcutta. The state of Ohio or Tennessee would have more weight in the arrangement, than New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Vermont, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Delaware, and perhaps Maryland. It is impossible for any man, of fairness and candour, not to be struck with, or not to acknowledge, the gross, palpable, and monstrous impropriety of such a system.

That a constitutional provision might be devised, I feel confident. I will venture respectfully to suggest one. Should it be regarded as improper or inadequate, others may be proposed.

In two of the states, Connecticut* and New Jersey, the people vote for candidates to be put in nomination for members of congress. If, then, applying this plan to the office of president, at

* *Extract from an Act for regulating the election of Senators and Representatives, for the Congress of the United States, for the State of Connecticut.*

“ 2. *And be it further enacted*, That the freemen of the several towns in this state, at the freemen's meeting in April, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and ninety-six, and once in two years thereafter, at the freemen's meeting in April, immediately after giving in their votes for the officers of government, shall each give in his vote or suffrage for fourteen persons, such as he judges qualified, to stand in nomination, for election in the month of October, then next following, as representatives of the people of this state, in the congress of the United States, their names being fairly written on a piece of paper, to the person who by law presides in said meeting ; who shall in the presence of the freemen, make entry of all such persons as the freemen shall vote for, and the number of votes for each ; and lodge the same in the town-clerk's office, of the town to which he belongs, and transmit a copy under his hand and seal of office, sealed up, to the general assembly, in May then next following, by one of the representatives of such town ; at which assembly, the votes of the freemen shall be counted in manner and form as is hereafter in this act directed. And the fourteen persons who have the greatest number of votes, shall be the persons whose names shall be returned to the several towns, to stand in the nomination aforesaid.”

the general election in each state, next previous to the election for president and vice-president, the electors were to vote for candidates to be put in nomination for these offices, the sense of the nation would be fairly taken : and from the candidates thus designated, the electors might finally fill the offices.

But this, or any other constitutional provision is a remote object, and even if adopted, will be too late for the ensuing election. A remedy for some of the evils of the Washington caucus may be suggested. Let those states that are wholly represented by federalists, appoint a number of delegates to proceed to attend the caucus at Washington, equal to the whole number of members of congress belonging to these states ; and those that are in part represented by federalists, a number equal to the number of federalists. Thus, in the decision of this important operation, every state will have its due share of influence.*

These delegates may be appointed either by the people in their districts, or by the democratic members of the several legislatures, as the case may be.

It is obvious, that, although this plan does not remove the constitutional objection, it obviates some of the other most solid ones.

If the federalists manage this affair by congressional caucus, every line of this chapter applies to them as well as to the democrats.

Just as this sheet was going to press, I met with a plan proposed by a writer in a Louisville paper, which deserves serious consideration. It is, for the state legislatures to appoint committees of correspondence to ascertain the public sentiment respecting the various persons among whom it might be proper to make a choice. If in this mode a concentration of the energies and exertions of the party could be obtained, as seems not improbable, it would be by far the best mode that has hitherto been suggested. It would, at all events, obviate all the strong and solid objections to which the system that has heretofore prevailed, is liable.

* This idea was suggested by Mr. John Binns, editor of the Democratic Press, several months since—and is merely carrying into operation a system already acted upon in the state of Pennsylvania, in elections for governor. It is not therefore wholly an untried scheme.

APPENDIX

TO THE EIGHTH EDITION.*

CHAPTER LXXIX.

Western Insurrection. Views of the war. John Henry.

Among the sins of the democratic party, the western insurrection claims a proud pre-eminence. Had it not been met with the energy and decision which General Washington displayed on the occasion, its obvious tendency was, and the probable result would have been, to destroy the recently raised fabric of the federal government—the pride of the new, the admiration of the old, world. The wise and the good of this country, and of Europe, regarded the crisis with the deepest awe and solicitude. The prospect was calculated to appal persons of no mean degree of fortitude. The fate of unborn millions hung for a season in suspense and doubt. Heaven smiled propitiously on us. It interposed for our salvation. Our executive magistrate wisely called forth an overwhelming force, which frowned down treason and rebellion. They shrunk, shuddering with terror, into their dens, and called on the mountains to cover them.

This heinous sin, hideous enough under any possible form, is greatly aggravated by a consideration of the subject that led to it. It was the excise on spirituous liquors.† Never can the ministers of taxation appear in a less exceptionable form, than when they derive means of defraying the expenses of government, by limiting the horrible ravages of the destroyer, drunkenness, which, by profound observers, is believed to devour more human victims than the sword.

The deluded men, whose crimes forfeited their lives, to the offended justice of their country, and some of whom actually lost them in the insurrection,‡ were guilty of most atrocious out-

* Published July 4, 1817.

† In chapter 74, there are some severe strictures against the continuance of the excise system, which to superficial readers will appear inconsistent with these remarks. But this will be the case with that class of readers only. The excise there reprobated extended to various objects of useful industry, and on some of them had a most oppressive effect.

‡ There were a few of the rioters killed in the attack upon the inspector's house in Pittsburg.

rages. They seized a person of the name of Wilson, whom they presumed to be, but who really was not, a collector of the revenue—stripped him of his clothes, which they burned—tarred and feathered him—burned him on several parts of the body with a heated iron—and dismissed him naked, wounded, and otherwise in a suffering condition.* They tarred and feathered other persons. And they seized and carried off witnesses, in order to prevent their giving testimony of the outrages.†

They likewise burned the barns, with their contents, of persons who had given information against the insurgents; and not satisfied with this outrage, they perpetrated the same even on those who had merely complied with the law.‡

The marshal and inspector of the revenue were beset on the road by from thirty to forty armed men, and finally fired upon.§

A meeting was held at Pittsburg, of a large number of inhabitants of the western counties of Pennsylvania, which passed a number of inflammatory and seditious resolutions,—among the rest they declared “that they would in future regard those who held offices for the collection of the duty *as unworthy of their friendship*; that they would have no intercourse nor dealings with them; that they would withdraw from them every assistance; *withhold all the comforts of life which as men and fellow citizens they owed each other*; and on all occasions treat them with contempt; earnestly recommending to their fellow-citizens at large, to follow the same line of conduct towards them.||

Every attempt was made to appease them, but in vain. They proceeded, step by step, to the last extremity. On the 17th of July, 1794, an armed party of insurgents, amounting to about 500 men, attacked the house of the inspector in Pittsburg, in which was a small but gallant band of soldiers, amounting to about a dozen men, under Major Kirkpatrick. A brisk firing took place, which continued for an hour—and at length, the insurgents having set fire to the adjacent buildings, eight in number, the intenseness of the heat obliged the major and his small party to surrender; when the assailants burned the inspector's house and all its furniture. They took the marshal and inspector prisoners, and only released them on a solemn pledge, that they would serve no other process west of the mountains.¶

They likewise stopped the mail, cut it open, and took out all the letters, except those contained in one packet.**

* Proceedings of the executive of the United States, respecting the insurgents. Anno 1794. p. 104.

† Idem, 105.

‡ Idem, 108.

§ Idem, 115, 116.

¶ Idem, 121.

§ Idem, 119.

** Idem, 123.

Here ended their short-lived triumphs. The president, as stated, sagaciously embodied a force that rendered further opposition hopeless.

The leaders of the insurrection fled in various directions—and of course escaped danger. Numbers of their deluded followers were unresistingly seized—thrown into prison—tried—found guilty—and all experienced the lenity of the government.

This unsuccessful insurrection operated, as all others of this description have ever done. It wonderfully strengthened the hands of the government. It paralyzed thousands of the democrats, who had been terrifying themselves with the apprehensions of the Scylla of despotism—and found themselves on the verge of a shipwreck on the Charybdis of anarchy. Vast numbers of them abandoned the ranks of democracy—and enrolled themselves beneath the banners of federalism, under which they have kept the field ever since.

New views of the war.

The late war may be regarded under a variety of views, furnishing ample subjects for exultation, astonishment, and gratitude. I submit two, by no means the least remarkable.

It continued for about two years and a half. For nearly two years of that time Great Britain was engaged in a desperate and doubtful war with France and her dependencies; and, of course, her attention was distracted from our war to more pressing affairs nearer home.

During this time, we met with a long series of disasters on land, which, in rapid succession, trod on the heels of each other. But from the period of the subjugation of France and the final triumph of Great Britain, when we had to engage this mighty power single-handed, we were almost unceasingly prosperous, with the exception of the disgraceful and never-enough-to-be-regretted disaster at Washington.

The other view of the war is as interesting. It was, with few exceptions, conducted by the ministry of Great Britain with great imbecility. Yet where the means were least proportioned to the ends, they succeeded best. Of this their success at Washington affords a most complete illustration. With the force the British had on that occasion, it was a most extravagant and wild undertaking, to venture so far from their shipping in such a country. But where they planned with the most prudence and sagacity, there they were most signally defeated. The ablest statesman that ever lived, could hardly have made more judicious arrangements—or better proportioned the means to the object in view, than was done at Plattsburg and New Orleans: and never was there a more complete prospect of suc-

cess. But never were arrangements more completely baffled—never were defeats more signal—than in those two cases. The disproportion of forces was immensely great; but the disproportion of destruction was far greater. There is probably no example of the kind in history equal to that of New Orleans.

These two cases afford the most complete corroboration of the scripture maxim—"the race is not always to the swift—nor the battle to the strong."

John Henry.

The employment of this British agent by sir John Craig, to sound the views of the leaders of the federal party in the eastern states, and to ascertain how far they would "exert their influence to bring about a separation from the general union;" and "how far, in such an event, they would look to England for assistance, or be disposed to enter into a connexion" with her, has been stated in the 27th chapter, in which the correspondence between the employer and the agent has been given.

He was not only ungenerously but unjustly treated by the British government. He had been employed by one of their highest public functionaries on an important service, attended with considerable trouble, difficulty, and expense—and requiring a respectable grade of talents. In the performance of this service, he displayed ability and industry. He fairly earned a handsome reward: and it was discreditable to Great Britain not to compensate him.

Irritated to revenge by this treatment—and probably pressed by want, he came to this country to sell his secret to the best advantage. Our administration gave him the enormous and most extravagant bonus of 50,000 dollars for his discoveries and his breach of faith to his original employers.*

It was most immoderately beyond the value of the communication. The administration doubtless calculated that it would excite a general resentment against the British nation and the partizans of that nation, which would produce a great degree of unanimity in favour of the war. And had Alexander Hamilton been at the head of the government, and possessed such an instrument against his political opponents, he would have crushed them, as the forked lightning crushes whatever stands in its way. But, at it was managed, it became a mere pop gun, wholly inoperative as to the end proposed. Indeed, it may be fairly doubted whether it did not actually recoil upon and injure the administration.

* Never was money more wretchedly bestowed. One half the interest of it, employed in publications, to defend the measures of the government from the gross misrepresentations which they underwent, would probably have prevented the war, and saved millions of dollars and thousands of valuable lives.

CHAPTER LXXX.

Blue Lights. Congress.

AT an early period of the war, Captain Decatur, in the United States, accompanied by the Macedonian and Hornet, sailed from New-York, into the Sound, hoping to elude the vigilance of the enemy's squadron cruising off that harbour. He was disappointed in this calculation, and obliged to take refuge in the port of New London, where he was blockaded by a superior force.

The weather, on two occasions, appeared to afford him a fair chance of escape, of which he was anxiously desirous to avail himself. But in both instances he was defeated by traitors, who, by means of *blue lights*, announced his intentions to the enemy, so as to render the attempt a certain prelude to destruction.

This is a most melancholy consideration. It evinces the awful extent to which disaffection and the treasonable spirit was carried, and affords a most admonitory warning against the courses with which faction is pregnant.

Attempts were made to destroy the belief of this atrocious fact. It was flatly contradicted in various newspapers in the eastern states. The following is the form in which the contradiction appeared in the Rhode Island American :

"In our paper of Friday last [December 17, 1813] we republished from the New London Gazette, an account respecting the exhibition of *blue lights*, on the heights near that place, designed as signals to the enemy's fleet. We were unwilling to believe that any of our citizens could be guilty of so gross an outrage on the laws of their country ; and are happy now to have it in our power to state, on the authority of a respectable paper published at Norwich, that the statement was totally incorrect. It appears, that on the night of Sunday the 12th inst. *blue lights* from the enemy's ships were discernible from our guard boats. But none were seen proceeding from the land."

It would be highly grateful, for the honour of our country, to find these confident assertions coincide with the fact. Unfortunately they are in direct hostility with it, as will appear from the following

Extract of a letter from Commodore Decatur to the Secretary of the Navy.

New London, Dec. 20, 1813.

"Some few nights since, the weather promised an opportunity for this squadron to get to sea : and it was said on shore, that we intended to make the attempt. In the course of the evening, two *blue lights* were burned on both the points at the harbour's mouth, as signals to the enemy. And there is not a doubt, but that they have, by signals and otherwise, instantaneous information of our movements. Great, but unsuccessful exertions have been made to detect those who communicate with the enemy by signal. The editor of the New London Gazette, to alarm them, and in the hope to prevent the repetition of these signals, stated in that newspaper, that they had been observed, and ventured to denounce those who had made them, in the most indignant terms. The consequence is, that he has incurred the express censure of some of his neighbours. Notwithstanding these signals have been repeated, and

have been seen by twenty persons at least in this squadron, there are men in New London who have the hardihood to affect to disbelieve it, and the effrontery to avow their disbelief. I am, &c. STEPHEN DECATUR."

Hon. Wm. Jones, Sec. of the Navy.

It may not be unsatisfactory to the reader, to see the statement from the New London Gazette to which Commodore Decatur refers, and which, alas! excited the indignation of the printer's patriotic neighbours!

New London, Dec. 15.

"It will astonish every American who has one spark to kindle into a flame the love of his country, when we state as a fact, for which we vouch, that on Sunday evening last, when the report was current, that our squadron would put to sea before the next morning, in the course of the night, *blue lights* were raised on the heights both at Groton and on this side of the entrance of our harbour; evidently designed as signals to the British fleet. This has excited the highest indignation: and the most decisive measures have been taken to detect and to bring to condign punishment the traitorous wretches who dare thus to give the enemy every advantage over those great and gallant men, who, in the war with Tripoli, and in the present contest, have honoured the American stars with a lustre which cannot be eclipsed."

Congress.

It is impossible for any man who has the honour or interest of this country at heart, to view some of the proceedings of congress, without mixed emotions of astonishment, and deep regret.

The mind eagerly searches in those proceedings for symptoms of that public spirit, those enlarged views, that regard for the permanent honour or interest of the nation, which their country has a right to demand. The search is too frequently in vain. There are not many traces of them to be found.

Congress have been steadily years behind the mass of the nation, whose voice has loudly, but ineffectually called for a variety of measures of great public utility, becoming a nation which has started into independent existence with advantages hardly ever equalled, never surpassed. What blessings would they have deserved, had they enacted a comprehensive and judicious bankrupt law, to stem the tide of fraud which is invited by the want of a suitable legal provision on the subject—a noble and enlightened scheme of militia defence—a general plan for extending the intercourse between the states by magnificent canals and roads, on a scale commensurate with the magnitude of the country—a sound and effectual tariff for the protection of domestic industry—and had they made that provision for the brave defenders of their country,* which public gratitude demanded! And how great and how just is the condemnation they richly deserve, and will indubitably receive from history, for their utter neglect of these grand and magnificent objects!

To the loud call of the nation, for these and various other great measures, has been added the strong recommendation, often re-

* Written 1817

peated, of the various executives. But the call and the recommendation have been equally unavailing.

The nation must suffer, in the eyes of the world, by its representatives. Almost wholly unaided by those representatives, and, in some respects, in spite of them, it breasted the storm of foreign warfare; emerged through all its difficulties; and ascended the highest pinnacle of glory.

It was fondly hoped that the odious imbecility of the majority, and the factious violence of the minority, which, during the war, menaced the country with destruction, would have been offered up as a sacrifice at the restoration of peace, on the altar of patriotism, and that the future contest would be, who should labour most for the public prosperity. The hope was perfectly natural. Would to heaven it had been realized! Such conduct might, in a great degree, have expiated the sins, manifold and heavy as they were, of the period of warfare. The nation would have buried them in oblivion; as the return to virtue, entitles a repentant sinner to a reception in the fold. But the fatigued eye seeks in vain among the barren pages of what are pompously styled the journals of congress, for any thing that assumes the form of atonement. Every page exhibits the same miserable waste of time in speechifying—the same utter neglect of those mighty objects that are so loudly called for by patriotism, the unanimous voice of all the good and the wise of the nation, and the strong and unequivocal dictates of duty.

CAUCUS.

This subject presents itself to the mind in a point of view, highly interesting, and almost entirely novel.

Throughout the United States, too much importance is attached to the men who are to administer our state and general governments. It would appear, when we are called upon to elect a president or governor, that we believe there is but one man in the country fit for the presidency, and but one in a state suitable for governor; and that if we fail of electing them, our affairs are doomed to destruction. This is an absurdity disgraceful to the nation. Heaven has not been so parsimonious of its endowments as to furnish but one or two men fit for the reins of government, as president, in a population of 8,000,000—or, as governor, in a population of 500,000, 700,000, or 1,000,000.

Let us boldly examine the subject, and ascertain the real state of it, regardless of the censure of those to whom every thing is wrong that militates against ancient usage.

We will take a retrospect of a few years; as the mind's eye can view objects at a moderate distance, in point of time, more

correctly, than those of a similar description that are passing around us.

When Mr. Jefferson retired from public life, three citizens of high standing were contemplated by different portions of the nation to fill the vacant seat: George Clinton, venerable for his undeviating patriotism and his valuable revolutionary services—James Madison, an able defender of the federal constitution, distinguished as an enlightened and independent representative in congress, and as secretary of state, which stations he filled with great credit—and James Monroe, who had long served in a diplomatic capacity in France and England, in periods of considerable difficulty and embarrassment. No others were brought forward or contemplated by the democratic party. — Yet it is not improbable that there might have been found in that party twenty, perhaps one hundred, other citizens, in the United States, with high claims on public favour, and with talents and merits equal to any of these. To the mass of the nation it was a matter of supreme indifference, which of the three was chosen—as they were all men suitable for the station, possessed of pure characters, great experience, and of sound republican principles.

To the particular friends of each candidate, indeed, the choice was a matter of immense importance. On the issue of that question depended, whether they were to continue in private life, or to fill the high public stations in the presidential gift. It is not wonderful, therefore, that they struggled hard to effect the nomination of their friends respectively. This affords a complete clue to the factious violence generated by our elections, whereby neighbours, friends, and relations are embittered against each other—and whereby, at a future day, the peace and liberty of the country may be sacrificed.

Had the unbiassed voice of the nation prevailed, it is almost certain that Mr. Clinton would have been the successful candidate. His career, as a politician, had been undeviatingly pure and unsullied. His reputation was deservedly very high. He filled a large space in the history of the revolution: and in canvassing the claims of candidates for honours or emoluments in the gift of the people, or that of the governments, either state or federal, revolutionary services are entitled to great and decisive weight.

The congressional caucus, a manifest and most flagrant violation of the constitution, prevailed. Mr. Madison, nominated by that caucus, was elected by the democratic party. His administration affords much food for censure—much for praise. He was an excellent peace president, except on one point. This respects the insurrectional proceedings in the eastern states. The hydra of faction and insurrection ought to have been

strangled in the cradle. Had the strong arm of government been employed, as it ought to have been, the struggle would have been short and decisive. Incipient treason would have expired in agonies. During the war, none but a sorry parasite can deny, that Mr. Madison committed errors, and was guilty of omissions, some of them of great magnitude. Yet on a fair review of his whole administration—taking into consideration the immense difficulties and embarrassments, internal and external, with which he had to contend, the impartial voice of history, when he and his cotemporaneous eulogists and calumniators are consigned to the peaceful grave, will pronounce a favourable sentence on his presidency. His communications to congress were just, luminous, profound, and contained full details of the soundest policy: and a large proportion of his appointments were eminently wise and judicious. These are the principal points on which a president of the United States has to act. And of those who have lavished so much abuse on the late president, for his errors, may we not ask—Do not all human affairs exhibit a mixture of good and ill, of wisdom and folly? And what peculiar merit in the eye of heaven has America, that her rulers are to be invested with infallibility?

But is it possible for a rational man to believe, that, had either governor Clinton or Mr. Monroe, or any one of a dozen or perhaps twenty citizens, who might be named, filled the station, its duties would not have been as well performed as they have been by Mr. Madison, in peace or in war? Surely not.

I may be arrested here with the question, on the subject of these discussions—*Cui bono?* The answer is plain. If these views be correct, the inference is clear, that the factious violence with which men of the same principles, who merely differ on the question of the comparative merits of two citizens, either of whom is perfectly adequate and worthy to fill an office about to be vacated, engage in hostility, is absurd, improper, and unjust.

Since the chapter on caucuses, page 439, was written, an important event has occurred in the state of Pennsylvania, which forms an era in the political history of this country. The public attention had been directed to the subject of legislative caucuses, of which the gross and manifest impropriety had forced itself on the mind of the community. That they were pregnant with corruption, that they subjected the president or governor, as the case might be, who might be anxious for a re-election, to the caprice of influential men in the legislature of the United States or of the individual states, was so plain and palpable as to force conviction on the most superficial observer. Prescription, however, was in their favour. They had been sanctioned by early and uniform custom, in which the nation had acquiesced—and, though offering violence to the fundamental principles of liberty, it was thought impracticable to apply any remedy.

At length the good sense of the state aroused itself. And a determination was formed, to apply a remedy to the evil. This remedy was suggested by the Board of Electors of president, which met at Harrisburg on the 5th of December, 1815. They published a recommendation to the citizens of the state, to appoint delegates to attend a convention to be held at the same place on the 4th of the then ensuing March, for the sole purpose of nominating a candidate for the office of governor.

To the honour of the state, this plan was, without any difficulty, generally adopted, and carried into effect, although proposed only three months before the time of its operation, and although in opposition to an inveterate practice.

All the counties in the state were represented, except two or three of the most remote ones. Several of the counties authorised their representatives in the state legislature to act for them on the occasion—the others elected delegates for this express object.

The whole number of members in the convention was 113, of whom 44 were senators and representatives, and 69 delegates, specially chosen for this particular purpose.

Thus is a great object attained. It cuts off a fertile source of intrigue and management. And it cannot be doubted, that it will be found advisable on future occasions to exclude from nominating conventions the members of legislatures universally.

The objections to the congress caucuses are infinitely more powerful than against those of state legislatures. Besides the vile spirit of domestic faction, intrigue, management, and corruption, which they engender in common, the former have the additional disadvantage, that they open a door to foreign intrigue and corruption, far more deleterious. The voice of the nation ought to be elevated in one common concert, to consign them to oblivion.

The present period is auspicious to such a determination. Three years and upwards will elapse before another presidential election takes place, an interval amply adequate to devise a plan calculated to obviate all the plausible reasons in favour of congressional caucuses, and all the objections that may be made to an innovation upon the usurped power of congress.

Almost the only reason that has ever been assigned in favour of this usurpation is, that in any other mode it is impossible to concentrate the force of the party, or to secure the election of their candidate.

Were this objection founded in truth, which is not the case, it has not sufficient weight to influence the minds of men of understanding. The evils arising from congressional caucuses are far greater than those of any substitute that can be devised.

CHAPTER LXXXI.

Faction. A most tremendous scourge. Corrupts the heart and bewilders the head.

OF all the curses disgorged on mankind from Pandora's Box, there is hardly any worse in its consequences, than "faction." It is the fruitful parent of "*legions*" of calamities. Civil war, with all its horrors, marches in its train, and is its lineal and legitimate descendant.

Faction is vitally destructive to purity of heart—to benevolence—to beneficence—to integrity—to human happiness. And the most lamentable feature in its character, is, that there are few, alas! very few, who in times of fermentation are capable of withstanding its allurements. During the prevalence of faction, men in other points of sound minds and good hearts, become, in this respect, as stupid, as blind, as infatuated, and as sottish—as the tenants of bedlam—and likewise, frequently as hard-hearted and unfeeling as tigers. They yield themselves up as pliant and submissive victims to the will and pleasure of violent and wicked leaders.

Its effects on the head are as deleterious as on the heart. A faction, headed by a few turbulent demagogues, although composed generally of men of integrity in private life, will frequently perpetrate wickedness in company, which they would individually shudder at with horror, and fly from with affright.

It requires a slight knowledge of history, to produce numerous and striking cases in point. Short as is that of our nation, it affords us strong and admonitory examples. I shall therefore not travel from home, but shall sketch a few instances wherein both of the parties, federal and democratic, have been unduly influenced by the force of faction—that complication of folly and wickedness—that canker-worm, destructive equally to human virtue and human happiness.

The cause of France, in her late contest, was assuredly at the commencement one of the most noble that ever attracted the attention, or excited the sympathy of mankind. Heaven never smiled on a more glorious struggle. It was the cause of a mighty nation, ground to the earth by a most complicated and vexatious tyranny—a nation wherein 25,000,000 of human beings, were literally "hewers of wood and drawers of water," to 1, or 200,000 of the privileged orders.

It were to compare the ravages of an otter or a fox with the desolation of a ruthless lion, or tiger, or panther—the southern breeze with the West India hurricane—or the agitations of the Delaware with the overwhelming violence of the Mahlstrom—to compare the grievances of England in 1688, when she expelled the Stuart Race, and called in the House of Brunswick—

or the oppression of the American Provinces in 1775-6, when they threw off the yoke of Great Britain—to compare, I say, either of these with the awful state of France in 1789.

Not to feel a deep, a lively interest in such a glorious cause, were to be grossly stupid, or greatly depraved. Well might Gen. Washington say with solemnity, when he received the French standard, from the minister of that nation, M. Adet, in the year 1796 :—

“Born, sir, in a land of liberty; having early learned its value; having engaged in a perilous conflict to defend it; having, in a word, devoted the best years of my life to secure its permanent establishment in our own country—my anxious recollections, my sympathetic feelings, and my best wishes, are irresistibly excited, whensoever, in any country, I see an oppressed nation unfurl the banners of freedom. But, *above all, the events of the French revolution have produced the deepest solicitude, as well as the highest admiration.* To call your nation *brave*, were to pronounce but common praise—*Wonderful people!* Ages to come will read with astonishment the history of your brilliant exploits.

“I rejoice that the period of your toils and of your immense sacrifices is approaching; I rejoice that *the interesting revolutionary movements* of so many years have issued in the formation of a constitution designed to give permanency to the great object for which you have contended; I rejoice that liberty, which you have so long embraced with enthusiasm; liberty, of which you have been the *invincible defenders*, now finds an asylum in the bosom of a regularly organized government—a government, which, being formed to secure the happiness of the French people, corresponds with the ardent wishes of my heart, whilst it gratifies the pride of every citizen of the United States, by its resemblance to their own. On these glorious events, accept, sir, my sincere congratulations.

“In delivering to you these sentiments, I express *not my own feelings only, but those of my fellow citizens, in relation to the commencement, the progress, and the issue of the French revolution*; and they will cordially join with me in purest wishes to the *Supreme Being*, that the citizens of our sister republic, our *magnanimous allies*, may soon enjoy in peace, that liberty which they have purchased at so great a price, and all the happiness which liberty can bestow.

“I receive, sir, with lively sensibility, the *symbol of the triumphs* and of the *emancipation of your nation, the colours of France*, which you have now presented to the United States.—The transaction will be announced to Congress; and the colours will be deposited with those of the United States, which are at once the evidences and the memorials of their freedom and independence: May these be perpetual, and may the friendship of the two republics be commensurate with their existence.”

With few exceptions, the American nation felt a profound interest in the holy struggle. She had freed herself from manacles. And she rejoiced that France was following the example, and shaking off her ponderous and galling fetters. Our hopes and our fears were as highly excited as if our own battles were fighting—as if our fate was about to be decided. This was perfectly natural. It was highly honourable.

But soon the prospect changed. The horizon was darkened. And over the fair scene which angels and archangels must have regarded with complaisance, were spread all the horrors that the furies and gorgons themselves could engender. To Fayette, Claviere, Roland, Vergniaud, Brissot, Condorcet, and Gensonnet,

succeeded Legendre, Danton, St. Just, Couthon, Marat, and finally Robespierre, demons incarnate, who appear to have had no delight but in human misery, and to have ravenously thirsted after blood and slaughter.

The goddess of liberty when she first appeared on the shores of France, was pure and immaculate as an angel. She was then fairly entitled to the utmost veneration we bestowed on her. But her hands were early stained with blood. We overlooked her guilt in the magnitude of the object in view. Soon, however, she literally swam in blood. We nevertheless extenuated or defended these atrocious crimes—and almost appear to have believed in the vile maxim, that “*the end sanctifies the means.*”

While the succession of monsters preserved the name of “French republic, one and indivisible,” the democrats clung to the cause most stedfastly. Faction blinded us to the mass of wretchedness that overspread the face of France. We palliated the noyades, the unprecedented fusillades, the slaughters at Lyons and elsewhere. It was a republic in name. That single word was enough to lull us asleep—to render us blind, and deaf, and dumb to the mountains of misery endured under the pretended republic—which “exceeded in one year all that France had endured under the Bourbons in twenty.” We lauded, and toasted, and belauded the murderous leaders, whose deeds spoke more of the hyæna, the panther, or the tiger, than of the human being. Our attachment remained, when the cause of the rulers of France—it was no longer the cause of the nation—had become “*a stench in the nostrils of heaven.*” And every man who dared to doubt the justice and propriety of the murderous scenes exhibited in France, was denounced as a tory, or a monarchist.

To these monsters succeeded Bonaparte. Ambitious, and unfeeling, and delighting in war, he was nevertheless not blood-thirsty. He did not slaughter his fellow men wantonly and for sport, as many of his predecessors had done. Compared with Danton, Marat, or Robespierre, he was an angel of light. But as he scorned to deceive the world by pretending to the form of a republic—as he assumed the style of a sovereign, we generally abandoned his cause.

Again. When Jay’s treaty was presented for ratification to General Washington, he was greatly embarrassed as to the course to be pursued. It was by no means perfectly satisfactory to him. He had weighty objections to many of its clauses. But an apprehension of war and its horrors, induced him, after the most solemn consideration, to adopt the measure of ratification.

All the long and disinterested services of this patriotic and illustrious citizen were, with the mass of the democrats, effaced

by this act, which, even if incorrect, could not, without gross and manifest injustice, be ascribed to sinister motives—but must have arisen from error in judgment. The thunderbolts of the press were hurled at his fame: and all the merits of a seven years warfare—were obliterated. Many of the democrats have not recovered from the delusion to this day.

The federalists have no reason to triumph over us for this folly and madness. They have displayed insanity, equal in degree, and still more pernicious in its consequences.

While the ministers of Great Britain, with an odious mixture of injustice and folly, were harassing our commerce, and enslaving our seafaring citizens, with every aggravation of violence and outrage, faction blinded and deluded a large portion of the federalists, as I have already fully detailed, to embarrass and cripple their own government, struggling not merely for the national rights, but for the most vital interests of those very federalists themselves. They scouted the idea of resisting the most abominable practice of impressment—the greatest degradation and the most detestable outrage ever perpetrated by any civilized nation.

Again. During the pressure of the late war, waged in defence of the most sacred rights of the nation, faction predominated over a great body of the federalists, particularly in the eastern states, to such a degree, that they were, as I have already stated, incomparably more formidable to the government than the embattled legions of the enemy. I could mention individuals in Boston, who were more serviceable to Great Britain, than General Ross, General Pakenham, General Prevost, Admiral Warren, or Admiral Cockburn. Were I called upon to pronounce their names, I should unhesitatingly place in the foremost ranks, some of the apostles whose pulpits resounded with loud invocations of “Moses and Aaron”—and who violated every sentiment of Jesus Christ and his apostles, on the subject of government, to be found in the New Testament, in which there is not a single sentence, line, or word, to warrant the course they steered.

The evils of faction are numberless. I shall, for the present, confine myself to one.

It circumscribes the range of selection of candidates for public life to one portion of the community—and of course excludes all the rest, however meritorious and useful they may be. Within the pale of the dominant party they must be selected. No degree of virtue or talents can afford the least chance of success out of that pale. Were a choir of angels and archangels to have assumed human form, and settled in Connecticut, they would not have been able, a few years since, to procure seats in congress, if they believed in democracy. Candidates profess-

ing "the pure principles of federalism," with very moderate endowments of head and heart, would triumph over them in an election contest.

This folly is not peculiar to Connecticut or to federalism. Pennsylvania and democracy are subject to the same censure. In parts of this state, angels or archangels, professing, or suspected of federalism, would be equally proscribed from all chance of public employment.

The evil is not confined to candidates for public employment. As the number of these bears a small proportion to the mass of the community, if the influence of faction were limited to them, the evil would be of much less importance than it is at present. But it pervades every ramification of society, and sheds its blasting poison on most of the comforts and enjoyments of life. And it too frequently happens that a conformity to the creed of the dominant party in any particular place, not virtue, nor honour, nor talents, decides the standing or influence of individuals. There are numberless instances of men of weak heads and bad hearts, as well as tarnished reputations, who are caressed and idolized by parties and factions, merely on the ground of their political opinions, while men as superior to them as Aristides was to Cleon, are put into Coventry.

Libels against General Washington.

During the effervescence of the public mind in the United States, on the subject of Jay's treaty, great importance was attached to the circumstance of its having received the sanction of general Washington, then president of the United States. This was regarded by vast numbers as a decisive reason for public acquiescence; for such was their boundless confidence in the soundness of his judgment and in his political integrity, that they were satisfied he would not ratify any measure either unjust or pernicious.

Under these circumstances a small club of ardent democrats in the city of Philadelphia, after a long debate on the subject, determined, to canvass the conduct and attack the character of the general, in order to destroy, or at least to impair the effect of his support of that instrument. On this decision they steadily acted. Unceasing abuse was heaped on him. All his merits and services—all his disinterestedness—were entirely buried in oblivion.

This ill-advised measure was highly pernicious, and for a time ruinous to the party, and incalculably advantageous to their political opponents.

The most violent and malignant enemy of the democrats could not have done them a more serious injury. It disgusted

and alienated from them vast numbers of their most zealous friends ; who duly appreciated the distinguished merits of general Washington. In a certain degree it threw him into the arms of the federalists—and completely identified him with them. It operated as fatally on the democratic party, as the Hartford convention has recently done on the federalists.

On the 5th of March, 1797, the day after the inauguration of Mr. Adams as president, in consequence of General Washington declining to be a candidate, Benjamin Franklin Bache, editor of the *Aurora*, published the following shameful and impolitic attack on the president, which fairly capped the climax of the long tissue of abusive publications against that great and good man. Dearly did the unfortunate editor pay for his folly. The patronage of his paper was reduced within narrow limits. His subscribers withdrew by dozens—and he closed his career in considerable embarrassment—a career commenced under the most favourable auspices. On few men of his age did the sun ever rise more benignantly—but the setting, alas ! was overcast with deep gloom.

Having said thus much, it would be extreme injustice did I not add, that few natives of Philadelphia ever excelled this amiable young man in all the qualities of head or heart that can excite or repay esteem or regard. It was impossible to know him without admiring and esteeming him. He was a member of the club above mentioned, among whom were some men of excessive violence. I am convinced, they overruled Mr. Bache, whose native mildness and urbanity, had they been allowed free scope, would have shut the *Aurora* against such rancorous and unfounded abuse.

FROM A CORRESPONDENT.

“Lord, now lettest thou thy servant depart in peace,” was the pious ejaculation of a man who beheld a flood of happiness rushing in upon mankind. If ever there was a time that would license the reiteration of the exclamation, that time is now arrived ; for the man who is the source of all the misfortunes of our country, is this day reduced to a level with his fellow-citizens, and is no longer possessed of power to multiply evils upon the United States. If ever there was a period for rejoicing, this is the moment. Every heart in unison with the freedom and happiness of the people, ought to beat high with exultation, that the name of Washington ceases to give currency to political iniquity, and legalize corruption. A new era is now opening upon us, an era which promises much to the people ; for public measures must now stand upon their own merits, and nefarious projects can no longer be supported by a name. When a retrospect is taken of the Washington administration for eight years, it is a subject of the greatest astonishment, that a single individual should have cankered the principles of republicanism in an enlightened people, just emerged from the gulph of despotism, and should have carried his designs against the public liberty so far as to have put in jeopardy its very existence. Such, however, are the facts : and with these staring us in the face, this day ought to be a jubilee in the United States.”

March 5, 1797.

CHAPTER LXXXII.

Rejection of the Treaty negotiated by Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney. Bankruptcy of the Banks.

There is no part of this work that has been so much censured by the democratic party, as the unqualified disapprobation of Mr. Jefferson's rejection, without consulting the senate, of the treaty negotiated by Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney with the British government. Many enlightened men among them regard this denunciation as highly improper and unjust. I have received from Mr. Jefferson a letter on the subject, in which he endeavours to convince me of my error. And it is but justice to this illustrious, estimable, and much-abused citizen, to communicate his view of the subject to the public, that if I be wrong, he may have an opportunity of vindicating himself.

Poplar Forest, near Lynchburg, Nov. 11, 1816.

Dear Sir,—I received here (where I pass a good deal of my time) your favour of Oct. 22, covering a Prospectus of a new edition of your Olive Branch: I subscribe to it with pleasure, because I believe it has done and will do much good, in holding up the mirror to both parties, and exhibiting to both their political errors. That I have had my share of them, I am not vain enough to doubt: and some indeed I have recognised. There is one, however, which I do not, although charged to my account in your book: and as that is the subject of this letter, and I have my pen in my hand, I will say a very few words on it. It is my rejection of a British treaty without laying it before the Senate. It has never, I believe, been denied that the president may reject a treaty *after* its ratification has been advised by the senate. Then certainly he may before that advice: and if he has made up his mind to reject it, it is more respectful to the senate to do it without, than against their advice. It must not be said that their advice may cast new light on it. Their advice is a bald resolution of yea, or nay, without assigning a single reason or motive.

“You ask if I mean to publish any thing on the subject of a letter of mine to my friend Charles Thompson? Certainly not. I write nothing for publication: and least of all things, should it be on the subject of religion. On the dogmas of religion, as distinguished from moral principles, all mankind, from the beginning of the world to this day, have been quarrelling, fighting, burning and torturing one another, for abstractions unintelligible to themselves and to all others, and absolutely beyond the comprehension of the human mind. Were I to enter on that arena, I should only add an unit to the number of Bedlamites. Accept the assurance of my great esteem and respect,

MR. MATHEW CAREY.

TH: JEFFERSON.

I have given this letter that due degree of consideration to which every thing emanating from so respectable a source is entitled. To whatever cause it may be owing; whether to my perversity or to the want of cogency in its arguments, it has not altered my opinion. I still believe that the rejection of the treaty, without submitting it to the co-ordinate branch of the treaty making power, was manifestly wrong.

It was treating Mr. Jefferson's own ministers very cavalierly, to use no stronger language. But this was by no means the most exceptionable feature of the transaction. It was treating with slight—perhaps I might add, with contempt, the govern-

ment of a mighty nation, entitled, from its high rank among the European powers, to respect and attention. But the worst feature remains. It indubitably quadrupled the chances of war, which ought to be studiously avoided by every fair and honourable means—of which the issue is at all times precarious—and pre-eminently so between two nations, so unequally matched in point of resources, as the United States and England.

But, Mr. Jefferson says, if a president “has made up his mind to reject [a treaty] it is more respectful to the senate, to do it without than against their advice.”

This does not appear to touch the real merits of the question. If a president, indeed, be determined to reject a good treaty, then perhaps it would “be more respectful to the senate, to do it without than against their advice.” But if the treaty be really so absolutely bad as to require rejection, it is not to be supposed, that the senate would advise its ratification.

We therefore put entirely out of the question, as not supposable, the case of a treaty wholly or principally pernicious to the public interest; and ask, What course ought a president to adopt, who disapproves part of a treaty, of which the residue is satisfactory? The path is plain. It has been distinctly delineated in the case of Jay’s treaty. Ratify the part which is satisfactory—and submit the residue to further negotiation.

I cannot doubt that this will be the sentence pronounced by history on this injudicious procedure. Were all the rest of my Book as correct as this, I should unhesitatingly dare the utmost malignity of criticism.

Bankruptcy of the Banks.

About the close of the month of August, 1814, the banks in Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York, and universally throughout the middle, southern, and western states, were imperiously driven to adopt a resolution to suspend the payment of specie. This measure, a virtual bankruptcy, had become indispensibly necessary by the constant and enormous drains of specie to Boston.

In the 53d chapter of this work, I have charged this calamitous event, which has produced such ruinous consequences, to a factious, perhaps a treasonable combination, “to stop the wheels of government.” A reconsideration of the subject has convinced me that I took a too confined view of it; and that the ascription of this bankruptcy exclusively to the Boston conspiracy, is the greatest error in the work.

Let me not be understood to say, that no such conspiracy existed, or that it was not highly influential in producing the bankruptcy of the banks. This would be a still greater error than the former. A formidable conspiracy did exist in Boston and

elsewhere. This, I trust, is fully established, beyond the power of doubt or controversy, in the 53d chapter. Those who engaged in this conspiracy were powerful, influential, daring and energetic. They were guilty of a heinous offence, which in many countries would have subjected them to the severest sanctions of the criminal code. But the lenity of our constitution and our laws, and the imbecility of the administration, secured them from molestation. The extent of the conspiracy, and the audacity with which it was carried on, may be conceived from the strong circumstance, that those who lent money to the government were obliged to do it clandestinely. (See page 289.)

But the imprudence of the banks in New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, the district of Columbia, and elsewhere, in subscribing so immoderately to the government loans, was the grand source of an evil which has produced so much distress and ruin. It required the most transcendent folly for a bank to subscribe to nearly the whole amount of its capital stock, and thus increase its specie responsibility, so as to subject itself to the danger, and indeed almost to the absolute certainty, of bankruptcy, and to be at the mercy of any four or five very wealthy men, who might be disposed to make a run on it, and to drain it of its specie.

I shall single out three of the banks established in Philadelphia, and give a slight glance at the operation of the measure of speculating in government stock, on the great scale to which it was extended by those institutions :

	<i>Capital.</i>	<i>Government Stock owned in Dec. 1815.</i>
Bank of Pennsylvania,	\$ 2,500,000	\$ 1,811,028
Bank of Philadelphia,	1,800,000	275,000
Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank,	1,250,000	844,892
	<hr/> \$ 5,550,000	<hr/> \$ 2,930,920

A friend in Baltimore has furnished me with a statement of the extent to which the speculation in the government stock was carried by some of the banks in that city, which I annex. But I wish the reader to observe that it is not official, and may not be as correct as the preceding one, which is taken from official documents. The error, if any, I have reason to believe to be trivial.

	<i>Capital.</i>	<i>Government Stock.</i>
Bank of Baltimore,	\$ 1,200,000	\$ 1,000,000
Union Bank,	2,200,000	900,000
Commercial and Farmers' Bank,	750,000	450,000
Mechanics' Bank,	750,000	500,000
Marine Bank,	150,000	100,000
	<hr/> \$ 5,050,000	<hr/> \$ 2,950,000

For every dollar of which they were liable to be called on for their notes, and of course subject to a demand of specie. Could

such a thoughtless conduct lead to any other goal than bankruptcy? It may be fairly averred, that, considering the respectable character, and the sober, orderly demeanor of the majority of the directors of those institutions, there probably never occurred in any monied incorporation, a more extraordinary or inconsistent procedure.

Suppose a merchant, who conducts a business in which there is a due proportion between his engagements and his ways and means, at once to purchase or subscribe for government stock, to the full amount of one half, or two-thirds of his capital, which is principally invested in such a way that it cannot be withdrawn in season. Suppose him to issue notes for the amount of this purchase, for which payment may be demanded at the pleasure of the holder. Is there a possibility of his escaping bankruptcy?

Such was the conduct and the situation of some of the banks in Philadelphia. Those in Baltimore, the district of Columbia, and New York, pursued the same system, and were involved in the same difficulties. It may therefore be averred, that though the conduct of the persons in Boston hostile to the government, who accelerated the bankruptcy of the banks, was highly criminal, the culpability of the directors of those institutions was thereby nowise diminished. They sowed the seeds of bankruptcy in their institutions, which germinated rapidly, and produced a copious harvest of ruin, which will be long deplored by the numerous victims who have fallen sacrifices to this misguided policy.

It can hardly be doubted, that even without the conspiracy in Boston, the banks must have ultimately been obliged to stop the payment of specie. Such superabundant issues of paper have never failed to produce this effect.

It has been said, in defence of the banks, that the loans they made the government were absolutely necessary to save the country from ruin. This is an inadmissible plea. These loans encouraged congress to continue the pernicious system of postponing the imposition of taxes, which alone could support the credit of the government, or save the country. If, therefore, we could admit, that patriotic motives wholly influenced the banks to pursue this ruinous course of overtrading in those loans, which is inadmissible, we are reduced to the necessity of paying a tribute to the hearts of the directors, at the expense of their heads.

CHAPTER LXXXIII.

Hartford Convention.

THE grand ostensible object of this convention was, to devise some effectual means of protecting trade and commerce against the deadly hostility displayed towards them by the anti-commercial *i. e.* the southern and western states.

The mass of the people of the eastern states had been led, as is stated in a former part of this work, by a series of the most inflammatory and deceptive publications, to believe, that they were almost exclusively interested in commerce; and that a systematical plan had been pursued by the southern and western majorities in congress, to destroy it, for the purpose of impoverishing them: and thus the most violent animosity had been excited in the eastern states against their southern and western brethren, by the unfounded and often repeated accusation, that the latter were hostile to the former.

That these contemptible opinions should have ever gained ground among a people so intelligent and enlightened as the yeomanry of the eastern states, who are inferior to those of no nation in the world, was, even contemporaneously, a matter of astonishment to every man of the most superficial observation. But the astonishment must be increased a thousand fold, by a reflexion on the relative state of the commerce of the United States, as recently developed by the public documents.

The object, I repeat, was, to protect commerce from southern and western hostility. Virginia was regarded as a species of political anti-commercial planet, round which the other anti-commercial states revolved as satellites, and by which their movements were regulated.

Maryland, South Carolina, and Georgia, were among those anti-commercial states. New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island, and Connecticut, were four of the five "great commercial states," forming component parts of "the Nation of New-England," to use the inflated, bombastic, and gasconading phraseology of the day.

Let us calmly examine the ground on which this sublime, this profound idea rested. Let us compare the exports of those commercial and anti-commercial states.

No. 1.

Exports, foreign and domestic, 1816.

New Hampshire	-	-	-	-	\$ 140,293
Vermont	-	-	-	-	892,594
Massachusetts	-	-	-	-	10,136,439
Rhode Island	-	-	-	-	612,794
Connecticut	-	-	-	-	593,806
					<hr/> 12,375,926

Maryland	-	-	-	-	-	7,338,767
Virginia	-	-	-	-	-	8,212,860
District of Columbia	-	-	-	-	-	1,680,811
North Carolina	-	-	-	-	-	1,328,735
South Carolina	-	-	-	-	-	10,849,409
Georgia	-	-	-	-	-	7,511,929
Louisiana	-	-	-	-	-	5,602,948
						<hr/> 42,525,459

It is impossible to regard this table without the most profound amazement at the folly, to call it by no harsher name, of those who could for a moment be blinded by such absurd and frivolous pretences. History presents no instance of more miserable insanity—insanity on which measures were predicated, pregnant with perdition to our union, to our peace, to our happiness—insanity which had nearly bestowed on us, and bequeathed to our posterity, the tremendous gift of Peloponnesian, Social, Red-and-white-rose, and Guelph-and-Ghibelin wars.

Rhode Island, with a population of 76,931, and an export of \$ 600,000, sitting in grand convention, to guard the interests of commerce against the machinations of Virginia, with a population of 974,622, and an export of \$8,000,000, must be an object of attention to an admiring world! She has really acquired immortal honour by this grand exploit. It would not be more absurd or irrational for a skipper of Boston or Philadelphia to petition for the protection of commerce, the former against the machinations of William Gray, the latter against those of Stephen Girard.

Cicero is reported to have said that it was wonderful how the Roman augurs could regard each other in the face without downright laughter at the deception of the trade they carried on.—And it is difficult to conceive how a Rhode Island delegate could look in the face of his colleague, or of the New Hampshire delegate, without producing a similar effect. The worthy delegate from New Hampshire, which state exported \$140,000 in 1816, must cast a retrospective eye on this portion of his political career, with feelings very far from comfortable. He would surely wish the memorable event of the meeting of this convention, were buried in eternal oblivion. If he form a fair estimate of political character, he would purchase, at an immense price, were it possible, the erasure from the tablets of history, of the part he has acted in this political drama.

In the preceding table of exports I have given the whole amount of foreign as well as domestic articles. This does not place the argument in the strongest point of light. It must be obvious, that the substantial interests of a country are more promoted by the exportation of twenty millions, of native productions, than by that of thirty millions of foreign articles. The former may be said to be almost all clear gain to the exporting nation: whereas from the latter it derives merely the freight and profit—of which the second item is frequently very slight.

In order, therefore, to evince more completely the transcendent folly and arrogance of the pretensions of the eastern states—and their comparative commercial insignificance, I submit a few tables, confined wholly to domestic articles:—

Domestic Exports, 1816.

No. 2.

New Hampshire,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	\$ 119,486
Vermont,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	892,594
Massachusetts,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,008,974
Rhode Island,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	418,996
Connecticut,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	587,007
								<hr/>
								\$ 7,027,057
								<hr/>
Georgia,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	\$ 7,436,692
								<hr/>

Thus it appears, that of domestic productions, which are the bone and marrow of the commerce of a nation, the single state of Georgia exported more than the whole of “the nation of New England”—notwithstanding that this “nation,” in its exports, included a large amount of cotton, rice, and other southern productions.

No. 3.

“The nation of New England,” (see No. 2)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	\$ 7,027,057
Maryland,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	\$ 4,834,490
Virginia,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8,115,890
District of Columbia,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,555,572
North Carolina,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,328,271
South Carolina,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10,446,213
Georgia,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7,436,692
Louisiana,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,251,833
								<hr/>
								38,968,961

No. 4.

The single port of New Orleans has exported fifty times as much as New Hampshire; nearly six times as much as Vermont; twelve times as much as Rhode Island; above eight times as much as Connecticut; and somewhat more than Massachusetts.

New Orleans,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	\$ 5,251,833
New Hampshire,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	\$ 119,486
Vermont,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	892,594
Massachusetts,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,008,974
Rhode Island,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	418,996
Connecticut,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	587,007
								<hr/>
								-7,027,057

No. 5.

The district of Columbia, of ten miles square, exported forty per cent. more than New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Connecticut.

Thus, the wonderful fact appears incontestible, that Georgia and Louisiana exported, in the year 1816, more domestic productions, than "the nation of New England" exported within the same period, of every description, foreign and domestic !!!

Reader, ponder well on these strong facts—and then answer this simple question—Has the world ever witnessed more transcendent folly than the eastern states have displayed in assembling a convention at Hartford, to guard the interests of commerce against the hostility of the southern states, at the risque of civil war and all its horrors?

Import Duties.

On the subject of the import duties paid by the different states, there was a great clamour excited, and the mass of the people of the eastern states were thoroughly satisfied, that they bore almost the whole expense of the government, their southern brethren contributing but little towards it. I annex two tables of the duties on imports for the year 1815.

Georgia paid more duties than the four minor eastern states.

Georgia,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	\$ 882,453
New Hampshire	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	92,316
Vermont	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	228,957
Rhode Island	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	233,024
Connecticut	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	233,683
<hr/>								787,980

The southern states paid twenty-five per cent. more than the eastern, exclusive of the duties really paid by them on foreign goods bonded to the eastward, and consumed to the southward.

Maryland,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	\$ 4,050,504
Virginia,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,226,404
Columbia,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	482,426
North Carolina,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	345,204
South Carolina,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,429,498
Georgia,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	882,453
Louisiana,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	984,909
<hr/>								9,401,398
Four minor eastern states, as above,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	\$ 787,980
Massachusetts,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,771,667
<hr/>								7,559,647

CHAPTER LXXXIV.

Freedom of the seas. Prophets. Sedition. Opposition to the war. Jury Trial.

The hallucinations of minds of respectable grade, are in many cases wholly inexplicable, and excite astonishment. C. C. Brown, a writer of very considerable celebrity, published "an address to congress," in Philadelphia, anno 1803, in which he openly avowed the monstrous and absurd theory, that England had just the same right to exclude us from, as we had to navigate, the ocean; that our conduct to Great Britain and France, flowed from the

O. B. 62

same source as theirs towards us; that vessels unemployed were worse than vessels captured or shipwrecked; and that the real law of nations is, that each must enrich and aggrandize itself by all the means in its power. These crude and absurd ideas were delivered with as much solemnity as so many responses of the Delphic Oracle. They form the sum and substance—the pith and marrow, of a prolix pamphlet of above ninety pages.

Prophets.

In all ages, prophets have been highly gratified to have their predictions fulfilled—and, so far as lay in their power, have generally spared no pains to effect their accomplishment. Of this propensity the United States have exhibited several instances. I cite one.

Some of the high-toned federalists, about the time of the formation of the federal constitution, ridiculed, as the quintessence of political absurdity—as transcendently Utopian—the idea of its being practicable to give permanency to the republican form of government in so extensive a country as the United States. They pitied the folly, or detested the wickedness of the attempt. Some of these gentlemen in Boston and elsewhere have made great exertions, to secure the verification of their predictions.—Thank heaven they have been disappointed.

Sedition.

Although I have given numerous instances of the seditious spirit that prevailed in the eastern states, during and subsequent to the embargo, yet it can hardly be unacceptable to the reader to put a few more on record, in order more fully to evince the dangerous nature of the precipice from which we have escaped.

A memorial to the legislature of Massachusetts, presented by the citizens of the town of Hadley, contains the following very significant paragraph.

“Resolved, that in our opinion, a perseverance in that deadly hostility to commerce, which, we believe, derives its origin and its vigour from a deep rooted jealousy of the eastern states, will inevitably lead to a **DISSOLUTION OF THE UNION**. And though we most sincerely deprecate such an event, yet we cannot suppress our fears, that the time is at hand, when **A SEPARATION OF THESE STATES** will be enforced by the most irresistible of all motives—**SELF-PRESERVATION!!**”

The citizens of Boston at the same period, passed the following among other resolves.

“Resolved, that we will not voluntarily aid or assist in the execution of the act passed on the ninth of this month, for enforcing the several embargo laws: and that all those who shall assist in enforcing upon others the arbitrary and unconstitutional provisions of this act, ought to be considered as enemies to the Constitution of the United States, and hostile to the liberties of this people!!”

At a meeting of the inhabitants of the County of Hampshire in Massachusetts, a number of inflammatory resolutions were passed, of which the tenor may be calculated from the following.

“Resolved, that causes are continually occurring, which tend to produce a most calamitous event—*a dissolution of the union.*”

On the 5th of August, 1812, a meeting was held in Castine, at which the following resolutions among others were passed:—

“Resolved, that we do not hold ourselves bound in honour or patriotism, voluntarily to enlist in the army destined for foreign conquest: but that we will not lag behind any of our fellow-citizens in resisting and repelling invasion of our rights, our liberty, or our country.

“Resolved, that we contemplate with pleasure the patriotic spirit which animates the friends of peace throughout the United States; and that we hail it as kindred to the spirit of 1775.”

How far the pompous pledge given in the first resolution, was redeemed, the unresisted invasion and conquest of Castine, afforded a handsome illustration.

Opposition to the War.

Although the late war declared against Great Britain was as just as any war ever waged, yet those who opposed the declaration to the very last stage, can offer very strong arguments in their defence. The issues of wars are so totally uncertain—so many nations have been utterly ruined by them—and the divisions of our citizens were so inveterate and deep rooted—that men of the purest hearts and clearest heads, might well hesitate before they would consent to pass the **Rubicon**, even though they might be well satisfied that the accumulation of injury heaped on this country, had warranted a recourse to the *ultima ratio* at a much earlier stage of aggression.

But what justification can be offered for those who, after war was declared by a respectable majority—after it had become the law of the land—while the nation was in jeopardy of its existence—while deep perdition stared their country in the face, continued to embarrass and enfeeble, and endeavoured to strangle that government which was the sole barrier between them and anarchy, and civil war, on the one hand—and subjugation by a foreign foe on the other! When they cast a retrospective eye on their infatuation and delusion, they must be preyed on by the deepest regret and remorse.

Jury Trial.

James Ross, an eminent lawyer of Pittsburg, was, many years since, the federal candidate for governor of the state of Pennsylvania. Some of his opponents circulated a malicious and lying report, to ruin his character, that he had administered the sacrament to a dog. This excited a deadly hostility against him, among the sober and religious part of his fellow citizens—lost him many friends—and increased the ardour and the energy of his enemies.

The report was traced to some individual whose name I do not recollect. Mr. Ross sued him for damages. After all the vexatious and irritating delay that chicane can contrive, the case finally came before a jury. A verdict was given against the defendant—with damages. And how much damages, reader, would you suppose? You might guess for a dozen years, before you could guess the exact sum. It was, to the best of my recollection, six cents. I write from memory, having mislaid the account of the trial: but I am confident it was below a dollar!

So much for our boasted trial by jury.

CHAPTER LXXXV.

Self-created Societies. Merit unrewarded. Compensation Law.

The proceedings of parties and factions, however different their principles, views, and professions, bear a wonderful analogy to each other, when placed in similar circumstances. Those who possess power, strain every nerve, too often regardless of right or wrong, to preserve it. Those who are divested of it, too generally use every possible means to acquire it, equally regardless of justice.

During the inflammation of the public mind, excited by the then recent French revolution, and the art and address of M. Genet, the democratic party, then in a minority, established democratic societies, which, by their affiliations in every ramification of the United States, were intended, and expected, by co-operation, to overawe the administration, to dismount their antagonists, and to enable the leaders to vault into the vacant saddles. This effect they would indubitably have produced, but that they were denounced by General Washington, and both houses of congress, as having been implicated in encouraging the opposition to the general government, which, finally, led to the western insurrection. This was a mortal stroke to them, and totally enfeebled them thenceforward.

General Washington, after detailing the various steps that led to the final explosion, states, in his address to congress, anno 1794—

“From a belief that by a more formal concert, the operation of the excise laws might be defeated, *certain self-created Societies* assumed the tone of condemnation. Hence, while the greater part of Pennsylvania were conforming themselves to the acts of excise, a few counties were resolved to prostrate them.”

To this the senate replied—

“Our anxiety, arising from the licentious and open resistance to the laws, in the western counties of Pennsylvania, has been increased by the proceedings of *certain self-created Societies*, relative to the laws and administration of the government; proceedings, in our apprehension, founded in political error, calculated, if not intended, to disorganize our government, and which, by inspiring delusive hopes of support, have been influential in misleading our fellow citizens in the scene of insurrection.”

The denunciation of the house of representatives, was not quite so unequivocal. It excited an ardent debate, and was greatly softened down :

" We learn, with the greatest concern, that any misrepresentations whatever, of the government and its proceedings, either by individuals, *or combinations of men*, should have been made, and so far credited, as to foment the flagrant outrage which has been committed on the laws."

General Washington expressed his utter disapprobation of those societies much more pointedly in his letters to his friends :

" The real people," he says, " occasionally assembled, in order to express their sentiments on political subjects, ought never to be confounded with *permanent, self-appointed Societies*, usurping the right to controul the constituted authorities, and to dictate to public opinion. While the former was entitled to respect, the latter was incompatible with all government, and must either sink into general disesteem, or finally overturn the established order of things."

To Mr. Jay, then negotiating in London, he wrote as follows :

" That the *self-created Societies*, who have spread themselves over this country, have been labouring incessantly to sow the seeds of distrust, jealousy, and, of course, discontent, hoping thereby to effect some revolution in the government, is not unknown to you. That they have been the fomenters of the western disturbances, admits of no doubt in the mind of any one who will examine their conduct. But, fortunately, they have precipitated a crisis, for which they were not prepared; and thereby have unfolded views which will, I trust, effect their annihilation much sooner than it might have happened. An occasion has also been afforded for the people of this country to show their abhorrence of the result, and their attachment to the constitution and the laws; for I believe, that five times the number of militia that were required, would have come forward in support of them, had it been necessary."†

The Washington Benevolent Societies owe their origin to the same lust of power that engendered the Democratic Societies. They were intended, like those democratic societies, to give an undue influence to the members beyond what their numerical force entitled them to. And the advantages of concert and co-operation are so great, that wherever they are established, they cannot fail to produce this effect.

The time and place of their birth are considerably against them. They originated in Boston, at a period when that town was the grand focus of disaffection and sedition—when "*Moses and Aaron*" were invoked to lead "*the oppressed Israelites*" under the standard of rebellion, to a "new region," to "Mount Carmel." And the prime agents in all these rebellious movements were among the leaders of the Washington Benevolent Societies—leaders whose views and proceedings were as diametrically opposite to the holy admonitions of Washington, as light is opposite to darkness.

That among the Washington Benevolent Societies are to be found thousands of the best citizens in the United States—

* Marshall's Life of Washington, vol. v. page 592

† Idem, page 592

that the objects of those citizens are perfectly pure—that they would shudder with horror at the idea of any illegal act, I most unhesitatingly admit.—But there cannot be a doubt, that whenever the views of such societies embrace political operations, as they almost universally do, they are to be regarded with great watchfulness and jealousy. They are liable to every possible objection ever made against the Democratic Societies.

Merit unrewarded.

That congress, the proper organ of the gratitude and liberality of the nation, has not discharged the debt due to many illustrious individuals, whose talents and patriotism powerfully aided in saving this country, is a truth which, however it may be regretted, cannot be controverted. The instances are unfortunately but too numerous.

The defence of Baltimore, and the defeat of the British there, were among the most fortunate circumstances of the war. Had the enemy succeeded, Philadelphia would probably have fallen the next victim—and the war might have been prolonged for another year, with the most calamitous results at home and abroad. To the success there, major Armistead, who commanded Fort M^cHenry, and lieutenant Webster, who commanded a six gun battery, mainly contributed. The best judges of the state of the case, are of opinion, that but for the noble efforts of skill and bravery displayed by lieutenant Webster, the British would very probably have succeeded. With his six guns, and about forty men, he kept up such a destructive fire upon them, as finally induced them to abandon the enterprize.

It is painful to state, that neither of these citizens has received from the government of the United States any remuneration for their brilliant and most useful services, of which it has hardly taken any notice whatever.

A few public spirited individuals in Baltimore subscribed toward the purchase of a handsome piece of plate for major Armistead, and a sword for lieutenant Webster—and thus ends the sorry tale of gratitude for such important services!!

Lieutenant Webster was induced, by the advice of some of his friends, to establish a grocery store in the centre of Baltimore, and calculated upon the patronage of a city to which he had rendered such substantial services. He has been disappointed even in those moderate expectations, and a few weeks since was closing his concerns after the much-to-be-regretted failure of his experiment.

Compensation Law.

Few circumstances have occurred of late years more creditable to the nation, as well as to its representatives, than the proceedings respecting the compensation law.

The wages of congress were fixed, on the organization of the government, at six dollars per day. They remained stationary, so far as respects the house of representatives, from that period till the operation of the law which forms the subject of this discussion.

A factious clamour was raised by the democrats against the extravagance of the compensation, with a view of rendering unpopular the federalists who had passed the six dollar law. The clamour was nearly as great as that raised against the recent compensation law. But as it was founded in sordid and sinister motives, it gradually subsided. The public acquiesced in the propriety of the wages.

Twenty-eight years have since elapsed. Money has greatly depreciated in value. Some articles advanced 20, 30, 40, and 50 per cent in price. And some might be pointed out, of which the price is doubled. Superfine cloths are among the number.

It would be waste of time, and indeed an insult to the reader, to undertake to prove the necessity, under these circumstances, of increasing the compensation of the members of congress. It is self evident.

This being assumed, the only real question on the subject is, whether the increase were too great, or otherwise.

In forming a fair estimate of the proper amount of compensation for any species of service, public or private, it requires to be regulated by a compound ratio of the value of the time bestowed—the situation of the parties—the sacrifices they make—the compensation for similar or other services—and the expense of living.

Applying all these tests to the law in question, it can be unanswerably defended.

There are large and important classes of citizens, embracing no small proportion of the persons suitable for the situation of members of congress, whom the amount of the compensation which has afforded ground for so much factious clamour, or even double that amount, would not adequately pay for the sacrifices they would make, by accepting seats as members of congress. I mean first-rate lawyers, doctors, and merchants. What compensation, for instance, would 1500 dollars per annum be to Mr. Wirt, Mr. Pinkney, or Mr. Emmet; to Dr. Wistar, Dr. Physick, or Dr. Monges; or to Wm. Gray, Mr. Willing, Mr. Ralston, or Mr. Girard.*

* There is frequently a considerable difficulty in prevailing on suitable persons to stand candidates for congress in our capital cities. I was, some years since, a member of a committee appointed to wait on sundry gentlemen who were contemplated as candidates. We consulted four in succession, who declined. This was the year in which Mr. Clay was first elected. He was the fifth gentleman applied to; agreed to become a candidate; and was successful. He was at the time a clerk in the bank of North America.

In order to enable the reader to form a correct idea on the execrated compensation of the members of congress, I annex a statement of the compensations given to sundry officers, some under the general government, and some in a few other situations.

<i>Secretary of State's office.</i>			Third and fourth, each	\$ 1300
Secretary	\$ 5000		Seven others, each	1000
Chief clerk	2000		<i>Paymaster's office.</i>	
Second	1500		Paymaster general	\$ 2500
Third	1350		Chief clerk	1840
Four others, each	1150		Second	1495
<i>Treasury department.</i>			Third	1250
Secretary	\$ 5000		Fourth	1200
Chief clerk	2000		Fifth	1150
Second	1650		Three others, each	1100
Two others, each	1500		Five others, each	1009
Fifth	1400		<i>Accountant's office.</i>	
Sixth	1300		Two accountants, each	\$ 2000
<i>Comptroller's office.</i>			Two clerks, each	1600
Comptroller	\$ 3500		Four others, each	1300
Chief and second clerk, each	1500		Seventh	1200
Third and fourth, each	1300		Four others, each	1150
Fifth	1100		Twelfth	1050
Sixth and seventh, each	1088		Three others	1009
Eighth and ninth, each	1000		<i>Superintendent's office.</i>	
<i>Auditor's office.</i>			Superintendent	\$ 3000
Auditor	\$ 3000		Chief clerk	1600
Principal clerk	1600		Second	1200
Second	1300		Third	1000
Four others, each	1150		<i>Secretary of Navy's office.</i>	
Three others, each	1100		Secretary	\$ 4500
One	1000		Chief clerk	2000
<i>Register's office.</i>			Second	1300
Register	\$ 3000		Third and fourth, each	1200
Chief clerk	1766		<i>Navy Commissioners' office.</i>	
Second	1516		Three commissioners, each	\$ 3500
Third and fourth, each	1450		Secretary	2000
Fifth	1400		Three clerks, each	1000
Sixth	1066		<i>Accountant of Navy's office.</i>	
Three others, each	1000		Accountant	\$ 2300
<i>Treasurer's office.</i>			First clerk	1600
Treasurer	\$ 3000		Second	1320
First clerk	1700		Third	1280
Second	1300		Fourth	1120
Third	1240		Three others, each	1060
<i>General Land office.</i>			Five others, each	1000
Commissioner	\$ 3000		<i>General Post office.</i>	
First clerk	1600		Postmaster general	\$ 3000
Second	1100		First assistant	1700
Three others, each	1050		Second do.	1600
<i>War department.</i>			Book-keeper	1300
Secretary	\$ 4500		Assistant	1100
Chief clerk	1600		Six clerks, each	1200
Second	1430		Three others, each	1000
Mayor of the City of Philadelphia				\$ 3000
President of the Bank of Pennsylvania				4000
Cashier of do.				4000
Governor of the State				5333
Secretary				1333
Speaker of the Senate, should he exercise the office of Governor				3333 33
Chief Justice Supreme Court (and \$ 4 per day while on circuit)				2666 67

Assistant Judges - - -	1600	Secretary of the Land office	1333 33
and \$4 per day, while on circuit.		Receiver general of Land Office	} 1333 33
Treasurer - - -	1333 33	Comptroller General -	2133 33
Surveyor General - -	1333 33	Register General - -	1333 33

Let it be observed that the salaries of the above officers of the state of Pennsylvania were fixed anno 1791, when money was from 17 to 20 per cent. more valuable than at present.

A careful examination of the above cannot fail to satisfy any man whose mind is open to conviction, that the obnoxious compensation was no more than reasonable; and that the outcry against it was, as I have stated, factious, or the result of a beggarly spirit of economy, discreditable to the nation, of which every man who has its honour at heart, must feel deeply ashamed.

The most injurious of the consequences of the miserable clamour against this law, was, that some of the most valuable members of congress fell into such discredit with their constituents, as to be superseded by rival candidates. Among the members who shared this fate, there is probably none who ought to be more regretted than Mr. Hurlbut, a federalist, of Massachusetts, a gentleman of considerable talents, and remarkable for fairness and candour, qualities of inestimable value in a public character.

It may seem extraordinary, at the first glance, that while the people of the United States are regarded as deserving severe censure for the factious outcry excited against this law, the proceedings of congress on this subject, at its last session, are deemed equally deserving of reprobation. Nothing has occurred in the variegated annals of that body much more reprehensible. Never was time more wretchedly spent—never talents more misemployed. It is not improbable that a third or a fourth part of the session was prostituted to, I had nearly said, never-ending debates on the repeal of this act. Almost every member capable of making a speech, filled two, three, four, or five columns of the newspapers, until the public was disgusted not more with the act than with its defenders and opposers. The subject might have been compressed within the compass of a nutshell. Any man of tolerable talents might have exhausted all that was worth hearing on either side of the question in three hours. And, had congress possessed the firmness that becomes such a body, it would have scouted the idea of a repeal—and, had it a due sense of its own dignity, it would have decided the question in two or three days.

When regard is had to the number of all-important laws which might have been enacted in the time thrown away on this paltry subject, the folly displayed on it must be a subject of deep and lasting regret.

There are some of the salaries paid by the United States' government, that are still more striking cases in point than any of those I have given :

<i>Senate.</i>		<i>House of Representatives.</i>	
Secretary	\$3000	Clerk	\$3000
Principal clerk	1800	Second clerk	1800
Two engrossing clerks (each)	1500	Four other clerks (each)	1500
Serjeant at arms	1500	Serjeant at arms	1500
Deputy Door-keeper	1450	Doorkeeper	1500
		Assistant doorkeeper	1450

What a triumph will it afford in Europe to those who hate and affect to despise this country, to be able to state, that the whole nation has for two years been kept in a state of commotion and ferment, because the members of the legislature of the union dared to fix their own salaries at the same rate as those of clerks, serjeants at arms, and doorkeepers ! It is really inexpressibly mortifying to reflect on the subject.

It is not worth while to offer any argument derived from the heavy expense of living at Washington, where board and lodging are probably twice as high as at the seat of government in any of the eastern or middle states. A rational man need not take this point into consideration to enable him to decide the question.

Seamen.

The clamour made by the British government on the subject of the seduction of their seamen, has hardly ever been exceeded in point of inconsistency. To a superficial observer it might appear that Great Britain was guiltless of enticing or receiving the seamen of any other nation—and that her fleets were wholly manned with her own subjects. This inference would be perfectly natural—because on no other ground could she be warranted in the remonstrances she made against the admission of her seamen on board our vessels. But the astonishing fact is, that in war, she has generally more foreigners than natives in her service. The following is a statement of the relative proportions of each, for three years.

	<i>Natives.</i>	<i>Foreigners.</i>
1807	42,000	43,000
1808	29,000	43,000
1810	34,000	58,000

CHAPTER LXXXVI.

American magnanimity, generosity, and public spirit.

A large portion of this work cannot be perused without exciting mixed sensations of surprise and pity at the transcendent folly, and indignation at the political sins, of both the parties by which the country is divided. As a relief to the gloom this

view of the subject naturally inspires, I had determined to devote a long chapter to record various traits of honour, generosity, magnanimity and justice, which elevate the national character; place it on a level in some cases with that of Greece or Rome; and hold out glorious examples to posterity. I regret to state, that most of the materials of which it was to have been composed, have been irrecoverably mislaid. It is therefore necessarily circumscribed within much narrower limits than I had proposed.

The British sloop of war, *Sylph*, was wrecked off the east end of Long Island, and nearly the whole of her crew perished. The few survivors were destitute of almost every thing: and in many countries would have been thrown into prison, as if they had been captured in battle. But to the honour of our government, as soon as the intelligence reached Washington, orders were issued not merely for their liberation, without exchange, if previously confined, but that they should be provided with whatever was "necessary for their subsistence and comfort." It was likewise ordered that "they should be either sent in a cartel to Halifax, or conveyed by a flag to one of the ships off New York harbour."

The captain of an American privateer, the *Midas*, having landed some of his men, on Royal Island, at the plantation of a Mr. Barnett, gave them orders "to set fire to the buildings." Accordingly, "four handsome dwelling houses, and fourteen negro huts," were consumed.

Intelligence of this outrage being conveyed to the seat of government, by the collector of the customs at Wilmington, N. C. the president of the United States immediately sent orders to that officer to revoke the commission of the captain of the *Midas*, for "the wilful deviation from his instructions, which enjoined the strictest regard to the usages of civilized nations."

The merit of this order is greatly enhanced by the time of its occurrence. It is dated the 25th of November, 1814, when the feelings of the nation were festering under the then recent Vandalic destruction of the public buildings at Washington—and the abominable atrocities perpetrated at Hampton and elsewhere—and when the strict laws of war might, perhaps, in retaliation, have justified the infliction of a desolating vengeance on the defenceless shores of the West Indies. The conclusion of the order is so just and pointed, that I most cheerfully present it to the reader:

"In communicating this determination of the president, it is proper to remark, that by whatsoever acts of flagrant outrage upon defenceless towns and property of unarmed and unresisting individuals, the British naval and military officers on our maritime and inland frontiers may have provoked, or may hereafter provoke, severe measures of retaliation, it is for the government alone to prescribe the manner and the means of retaliation."

That the conduct of our naval heroes towards their conquered enemies has displayed a high degree of magnanimity, kindness, and liberality, there is not the shadow of a doubt. "Proofs rise on proofs, and still the last the strongest." It is delightful to find the most decisive testimony borne on the subject, even by the British officers themselves, who must be most indisputable evidence.

Captain Dacres, to his honour be it said, expresses himself in the most unequivocal terms on this subject, in the official letter containing an account of his capture :

"I feel it my duty to state, that the conduct of Captain Hull and his officers to our men, has been that of a brave enemy ; the greatest care being taken to prevent our men losing the smallest trifle, and the greatest attention being paid to the wounded."

Of the conduct of the amiable and universally-lamented Captain Lawrence, the following decisive testimonial was given by the officers of the Peacock :

New-York, 27th March, 1813.

"SIR—We, the surviving officers of his Britannic majesty's late brig Peacock, beg leave to return you our grateful acknowledgments for the kind attention and hospitality we experienced during the time we remained on board the United States sloop Hornet. So much was done to alleviate the distressing and uncomfortable situation in which we were placed when received on board the sloop you command, that we cannot better express our feelings than by saying, "We ceased to consider ourselves prisoners;" and every thing that friendship could dictate, was adopted by you, and the officers of the Hornet, to remedy the inconvenience we would otherwise have experienced, from the unavoidable loss of the whole of our property and clothes, by the sudden sinking of the Peacock.

"Permit us, then, sir, impressed as we are, with a grateful sense of your kindness, for ourselves and the other officers and ship's company, to return you and the officers of the Hornet our sincere thanks, which we shall feel obliged if you will communicate in our name ; and believe us to remain, with a high sense of the kind offices you have rendered us, your humble servants,

"F. A. WRIGHT, 1st lieutenant.

C. LAMURET, 2d lieutenant.

EDWARD LOTT, master.

J. WHITTAKER, surgeon.

F. D. UNWIN, purser.

James Lawrence, esq. commander U. S. sloop Hornet."

Captain Carden bore the most unequivocal testimony to the chivalric liberality of Commodore Decatur and his officers. All the private property of the officers and men on board the Macedonian was given up to the owners—and for some wine, and other articles, which nine officers out of ten, similarly circumstanced, would have seized, without any "compunctious visitings of conscience," the commodore paid the captain eight hundred dollars.

To the humanity, kindness, and liberality of commodore Bainbridge towards the prisoners, captured in the Java, General Hislop bore the most honourable testimony. Next to the gratifica-

tion which a liberal mind feels in the contemplation of the conduct of the victor, is that felt in reading the candid acknowledgments of the vanquished.

Gen Hislop to Commodore Bainbridge.

Dear Sir,

St. Salvador, January 3d, 1813.

I am justly penetrated with the fullest sense of your very handsome and kind treatment, ever since the fate of war placed me in your power: and I beg once more to renew to you my sincerest acknowledgments for the same.

Your acquiescence with my request in granting me my parole, with the officers of my staff, added to the obligation I had previously experienced, claims from me this additional tribute of my thanks. May I now finally flatter myself, that in the further extension of your generous and humane feelings, in the alleviation of the misfortunes of war, you will have the goodness to fulfil the only wish and request I am now most anxious to see completed, by enlarging on their parole, (on the same conditions you have acceded to with respect to myself) all the officers of the Java, still on board your ship—a favour I shall never cease duly to appreciate, by your acquiescence thereto.

I have the honour to subscribe myself, dear sir, your much obliged and very humble servant,

(Signed)

T. HISLOP.

Commodore Bainbridge.

Answer of Commodore Bainbridge.

United States' Frigate Constitution, St. Salvador, 3d Jan. 1813.

Dear Sir,

I have received your letter of this date, conveying sentiments of your feelings for my treatment towards you since the fate of war placed you in my power. The kind expressions which you have been pleased to use, are justly appreciated by me, and far overbalance those common civilities shewn by me, and which are always due to prisoners. I regret that the lumbered state of my ship prevented me from making you as comfortable on board, as I sincerely wished to have done. I have complied with your last request, respecting paroling all the officers of the Java. In doing so, your desire, in addition to my disposition to ameliorate, as much as possible, the situation of those officers, considerably influenced me.

Permit me to tender you (notwithstanding our respective countries are at war) assurances of sincere esteem and high respect, and to assure you that I shall feel at all times highly gratified in hearing from you. With fervent wishes for the recovery of the gallant Captain Lambert,

I have the honour to subscribe myself, very respectfully, &c.

(Signed)

Wm. BAINBRIDGE.

Lieut. Gen. Hislop, of the British army.

General Hislop to Commodore Bainbridge.

Dear Sir,

St. Salvador, 4th January, 1813.

Allow me once more to express my sincerest acknowledgments for this last instance of your kind attention to my wishes, by having complied with my request in behalf of the officers of the Java.

Lieutenant Chads delivered to me your very polite and obliging letter: and be assured, that I shall feel no less gratification at all times to hear from you, than that which you are so good as to express you will derive in receiving information respecting myself.

May I request now that you will be so good as to cause to be looked for, a small chest,* containing articles of plate, more valuable to me on account of

* The chest was merely mislaid. It had been restored by orders of Commodore Bainbridge, prior to the receipt of this letter.

having been presented to me by the colony of Demarara, where I commanded for several years. I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed)

T. HISLOP

Commodore Bainbridge.

CHAPTER LXXXVII.

Miscellaneous articles.

THE people of the eastern states, thank heaven, are recovering fast from the paroxysms of the malignant political fever, whereby they were, during the war, driven to the utmost excess of insanity and idiocy. With aching hearts, they look back on their wild career. There is no point of view in which it can be placed, to produce this effect more forcibly, than by a contrast with the heroism, patriotism, and liberality of the western states, which have elevated the national character to a level with those of Greece and Rome, in their proudest days of glory.

The following instance of devotion to country, and of alacrity in preparation for her defence, has perhaps hardly ever been exceeded.

Governor Meigs, at Chilicothe, received an express, requiring aid, to support General Hull against the enemy, on Saturday the 18th of July, 1812. On Sunday the ladies of the place (heaven reward them for "*doing good on the Sabbath*") worked all day to equip their fathers, husbands, brothers, and lovers, for the service. On Monday the drums beat to arms—and before noon of that day, a new and complete company of sixty men paraded and marched, fully equipped and uniformed. Several of the most respectable citizens of the place were among the volunteers. It has been affirmed that empire and science are travelling to the westward. And certain it is, that glory and public spirit follow in their train—or, to speak more correctly, lead them forward on their route.

The legislature of Tennessee passed an act the 25th of September, 1813, for raising 3500 men, to march against the Creeks, and authorising the banks of the state to lend, and the governor to borrow, any sum of money not exceeding \$300,000, for arming and equipping them.

The act contained a clause directing, in the event of the general government refusing to pay the debts thus contracted, "that at the next session of the legislature of that state, a tax should be laid upon the taxable property within the same, sufficient to raise the sum and the interest thereon, which might be borrowed by the governor."

Contrast this act, in the enactment of which presided exalted liberality and the purest patriotism, with the following miserable act passed in Massachusetts, about four months afterwards—an

act displaying as much toothless malignity as ever entered into any public document.

Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

An act declaratory of the true intent and meaning of an act entitled, "An act to provide for the safe keeping of all prisoners committed under the authority of the United States, in the several gaols within this commonwealth."

Sec. 1. Be it enacted by the senate and house of representatives in general court assembled, and by the authority of the same, That nothing contained in an act entitled, "An act to provide for the safe keeping of all prisoners committed under the authority of the United States, in the several gaols of this commonwealth," shall be so construed as to authorise the keepers of said gaols to take custody of, and keep within said gaols, any prisoners committed by any other authority than the judicial authority of the United States.

And whereas, several prisoners of war have been committed to gaols within this commonwealth, under the executive authority of the United States:

Sec. 2. Be it further enacted, That the keepers of the said gaols are hereby authorised and required to discharge from said gaols all such prisoners of war, after the expiration of thirty days from the passing of this act, unless they shall be sooner discharged by the authority of the United States. *Feb. 1814.*

The same toothless malignity that the house of representatives, senate, and governor of the very respectable and enlightened state of Massachusetts exhibited in the above act, actuated the citizens of New Bedford, in their attempt to prevent, as far as lay in their power, the destruction of the enemy's commerce by our privateers, by the following resolutions:

Voted, unanimously, As expressive of the sense of the inhabitants of this town, that inasmuch as we have uniformly disapproved of the impolitic, unnecessary, and ruinous war in which the United States are engaged, we have considered it to be our duty to abstain, and have scrupulously abstained from all interest and concern in sending out *private armed vessels*, to harass the commerce of the enemy, and from all voluntary acts which appeared to us to have a tendency to prolong the duration, encourage the prosecution, or increase the ravages of the "unprofitable contest;" that we have seen with disapprobation several *private armed vessels* belonging to other ports, taking shelter in our peaceful waters; and regret that we have not authority, by law, wholly to exclude them from our harbour, where they serve to increase our dangers, and to excite tumult, disorder, riot, and confusion.

Voted, unanimously, As expressive of the sense of the inhabitants of this town, that *private armed vessels*, while cruising in various climates, and visiting ships and vessels from every country, are extremely liable to contract and receive on board infectious diseases; and that in such cases there is every reason to suspect that such vessels, and the persons, baggage, and clothing, on board, may be infected with some contagious distemper—

Voted, unanimously, As expressive of the sense of the inhabitants of this town, that the safety of the inhabitants thereof requires that any *private armed vessel* or vessels, which shall arrive or be bound to the harbour of New Bedford, from any port or place, shall be required to perform quarantine during a term of not less than forty days; and that the select men and health committee of the town be requested to cause all such vessels to perform quarantine at such place as they shall appoint, and under such restrictions and regulations as they may judge expedient. *New Bedford, July 21, 1814.*

By these insidious resolves, a privateer, direct from New York, Philadelphia, or Baltimore, would be obliged to perform quarantine of "not less than forty days." Thus, so far as depend-

ed on the "patriotic citizens" of New Bedford, while the numberless government vessels and privateers of the enemy, were preying on our exposed commerce, they would cut up our privateering by the roots!

To these striking examples of insatiation, I shall add one more—and then close the scene. But the reader may rest assured, that there are enough on record to fill a handsome pocket volume, and that not printed on very large type.

Some of the disaffected citizens of the state of New York were in the habit of seizing British deserters, and conveying them across the lines, to receive punishment for the abandonment of their sovereign. To deter from a continuance of this foul crime, the legislature of that state passed the following act:

Be it enacted by the people of the state of New York, represented in senate and assembly, That if any person or persons within this state shall apprehend, arrest, or detain, or assist, or aid or abet, in the apprehension, arrest, or detention, of any British deserter or deserters, knowing him or them to be such, and with intent to return him or them to the enemy, such person or persons, on being thereof convicted, shall be deemed guilty of felony, and shall be sentenced to imprisonment, in the state prison, for the term of ten years. Passed October 11, 1814.

The spirit of disaffection that existed during the war, appears in no way more disgusting, than in the elaborate attempt made in certain newspapers to depreciate the merits and the glory of the defenders of their country. In this they ran a race with the most envenomed of the ministerial papers in London.

After the defeat and capture of the army of general Proctor, which, treading on the heels of the illustrious Perry's glorious exploit, excited a general burst of joy among all the friends of this country, the following comments on the subject were published in two influential eastern papers:—

"At length, the handful of British troops, which, for more than a year, had baffled the numerous armies of the United States, in the invasion of Canada, deprived of the genius of the *immortal Brock*, have been obliged to yield to superior power and numbers." *Salem Gazette*, Oct. 22, 1814.

"We shall surrender all our conquests at a peace. It is indeed a hopeful exploit for Harrison, with five thousand troops, who have been assembling and preparing ever since July, 1812, to fight and conquer four hundred and fifty worn-out, exhausted British regulars, whom the Indians had previously deserted." *Boston Daily Advertiser*, Oct. 23, 1814.

Extract of a letter from Albany. Nov. 24, 1813.

"Every hour is fraught with doleful tidings from the north. Humanity groans from the frontiers. Hampton's army is reduced to about 2000; Wilkinson's cut up and furnishing. Crimination and recrimination are the order of the day. Democracy has rolled herself up in weeds, and lain down for her last wallowing in the slough of disgrace. Armstrong, the cold-blooded director of all this military anarchy, is still here, but chop-fallen. No profane allusion, but

Now lift, ye saints, your heads on high,
And shout—for your redemption's night."

Boston Gazette.

Public Spirit.

Shortly after the declaration of war, a company of aged citizens was formed in Rowan County, North Carolina, of which the members were from 45 to 80 years of age. They were embodied under the title of "The Company of Silver Locks." The following is the preamble to their articles of association.

"The undersigned soldiers, having many of us fought for our liberty in the revolution, and now from our advanced age are unable to undergo the same hardships in the field as formerly; yet our bosoms swell with indignation, when we hear of our honour and independence being insulted by foreign enemies, who have not only begun the awful work of death themselves, but encouraged the savage tribes to spill the blood of our innocent brethren on our frontiers, regarding neither sex or age:

"We, therefore, are willing to aid our beloved country, in opposing the enemy and suppressing the influence of dangerous and ill-designing men (as we fear may exist among us) in every instance, so far as we may be justified by the laws of our country."

In the city of Richmond, shortly after the declaration of war, a subscription was opened for raising a sum of money for the benefit of such poor persons and their families, as might leave Virginia in the service of the United States; and on the spur of the occasion, the sum of 5,282 dollars was collected.*

The following resolution was agreed to by both houses of the legislature of New York, on the 22d of October, 1814, without a dissenting voice, notwithstanding that a considerable portion of the members were high-toned federalists, and, of course, hostile to the administration.

"Resolved unanimously, That the house of assembly of the state of New-York, view with mingled emotions of surprise and indignation, the extravagant and disgraceful terms proposed by the British commissioners at Ghent—and however ardently they may desire the restoration of peace to their country, they can never consent to receive it, at the sacrifice of national honour and dignity—that they therefore strongly recommend to the national legislature the adoption of the most vigorous and efficacious measures in the prosecution of the war, as the best means of bringing the contest to an honourable termination, and of transmitting unimpaired to their posterity their rights, liberty, and independence."

Theories of Government.

We have lived through a most eventful period, a period in which as many strong and important facts have been compressed into the space of a year, as in former times would have afforded ample materials for the history of half a century.

It is difficult for the mind to grasp these mighty events—to trace effects to their causes—and to deduce lessons of instruction from the whole for ourselves and our posterity.

One consequence resulting from a deep contemplation on the subject—is, that it staggers our faith in some of the generally

* Compare this liberality with the paltry conduct of Philadelphia in similar circumstances, as stated, page 316. What an awful contrast!

received maxims of the most celebrated writers on political economy.

In this superficial sketch, I confine myself to the affairs of this country only. The French revolution is one of those political phenomena, that bid defiance to all the ordinary powers of calculation.

That the people of the United States, taken in mass, are more generally well informed than those of any other country with which we are acquainted, can hardly be denied. And it appears equally true, that there is no part of this country, in which information is more generally spread, than among the people of the eastern states. This is the result of the most admirable system of education which has prevailed among them for so long a period.

While this claim of superior mental cultivation is unhesitatingly advanced for the mass of our citizens, it would be the extreme of arrogance to pretend to compare our higher orders with those of France, England, and Germany, among whom will be found numbers of illustrious men who far excel the most highly cultivated among our citizens. Compared with Europe, on the ground of intellect, we stand nearly as we do with respect to wealth. There, both are in extremes:—a small number immensely wealthy, and the mass of the community in penury. Here we have hardly any in penury—and as few immensely rich. Thus it is with endowments of mind. We have no Landais, nor La Places, nor Buffons, nor Robertsons, nor Scotts, nor Opies. But we have none buried in such deplorable ignorance as prevails in various parts of Europe.

Every theory of government that has met with the approbation of the friends of mankind, has presumed, that a people circumstanced as we are, enjoying all the advantages of a mild and rational government, would duly appreciate its value, cling to it in all its difficulties, and risk, or, if necessary, sacrifice fortune and life in its defence.

Is not this the fact, reader? Is it not a beautiful and enchanting theory? Who, among us, has not hung delighted on the pages of Locke, Sydney, Harrington, Price, and Junius, in which this captivating view is given of human nature?

But what have we had the misfortune to witness?

A most awful and till now a most incredible reverse. We have seen, that a most enlightened portion of our common country was in a state of delusion and insanity that could not be exceeded by the most ignorant and oppressed populace in the worst-governed part of Europe—that they were proceeding, step by step, to anarchy and civil war—that they were on the point of selling their sacred their holy birthright for a mess of pottage—and, finally, that the wealthy and the higher orders of society were zealously tearing down the pillars of government,

while the middle and lower classes were as zealously guarding them from destruction!!!!

CHAPTER LXXXVIII.

Conscription. Impressment.

IT is a curious subject of investigation, to trace the influence and effects of faction, in different countries and in different periods. And it will be found, that the most violent bodily disorders in different parts of the world, and at different eras, are not more uniform in their symptoms and operations than are those of the mind.

The lamentable and disgraceful defeat of the noble plans of defence suggested by the secretary of state, and by Mr. Giles, has been fully detailed in a preceding part of this book. They were falsely asserted to be of French origin:—and to this falsehood, it is not improbable at least one half of the factious and senseless violence with which they were opposed, may be traced.

The history of England affords a case of the most perfect analogy, that can be conceived.

The atrocious practice of impressment had been long a subject of the loudest and most unqualified complaint and disapprobation. The nation was to the last degree tenacious of its liberties: and yet an entire class of a most useful description was put out of the protection of the law, and subjected to the most enormous violence and outrage—as well as to what may be justly termed a most galling slavery.

The British ministry in 1748, attempted to apply a remedy to this crying evil. A bill was submitted to parliament, whereby the mariners throughout the kingdom were to be registered—a certain portion of them to receive some small amount of pay—and to be liable, in cases of emergency, to serve in the royal navy for a limited time.

It requires but a very superficial consideration of the subject, to be convinced, that the interests of humanity, as well as of the seamen, would be promoted by such a bill, the provisions of which were as guarded as could be conceived.

But faction defeated this wise plan. It was run down by the same senseless clamour as our conscription. It was branded with the foul charge of being “Frenchified.” This was enough. The ministry were compelled to abandon it.

“The members in the opposition, affecting to represent this measure in an odious light, as an imitation of the French method of registering seamen, without their consent, Mr. Pelham dropped it as an unpopular project.”*

The intrinsic merit of this plan induced an attempt to revive it in 1758, with considerable improvements, one of which was, that

* Smollet’s England. Philadelphia edition, 1810, vol. iii. p. 68.

where any number of seamen were required by the government, they should be drawn by lot. The same success attended this attempt as had done the former.† It was run down by the same absurd outcry.

Another effort was made in 1759, to rescue the seamen from the horrors of impressment, by improvements on the bill of the preceding year. A still greater clamour was excited—and the bill was rejected.

In order to shew the excessive absurdity of the objections made to the plan of Mr. Pelham, on the ground of its being of French original, I annex a statement of the regulations of the French seamen, so far as respects compulsory service. They are as far superior to those of the British navy, as the British government is superior to that of Turkey. For this statement I acknowledge myself indebted to P. S. Duponceau, Esq. an eminent French barrister of this city.

“The French law for the classification, or, as it might perhaps be called, for the *conscription*, of seamen, was enacted by Lewis XIVth, in the year 1668, under the ministry of the great Colbert. Before the enactment of that law, the French government had no resource left, when they wanted seamen, but to lay a general embargo on merchant vessels in all their ports; by which means mariners were left without employment, and compelled by necessity to enlist on board the king’s ships. But the classification system having been suggested by Colbert in the year 1667, was put in force, by way of experiment, in the governments of *La Rochelle*, *Brouage*, and the Isles of Re, Oleron, and Aix, where it operated so successfully, that the next year its provisions were extended to the whole kingdom.

“This Ordonnance, which bears date the 22d of September, 1668, provides in substance: That all persons who have been employed two years in maritime service on board of a merchantman, shall be considered as *seamen by profession*, and as such shall be enrolled or registered in a public office established within each maritime district or department. In time of war, the seamen so registered are divided into three classes: and each class is bound alternately to serve for *one year* on board the king’s ships when required. After having thus served one twelvemonth, they are discharged and free to engage again in the merchants’ service; the next class in order takes their place; and so on in rotation, until the end of the war.

“Seamen who are constantly employed on board of *fishing vessels*, are exempt altogether from the operation of this law. In order to encourage the fisheries, the edict declares that

† Idem, page 521.

“those who are regularly employed in that line, shall not be classed like other mariners; and shall not be compelled to serve on board the ships of the royal navy.

“The seamen who are classed as abovementioned, enjoy many important privileges, to make them amends for this compulsive service. They are exempt at all times from serving in the militia. Soldiers cannot be quartered or billeted in their houses. They are exempt from all the burdensome offices of the state, such as with us that of constable, guardian of the poor, and the like : and while in actual service, no legal process can be served upon them, and all suits actually depending, are superseded.”

For further details, see 1st Valin, page 509, and following.

The Pulpit.

Chapter 56 exhibits an awful view of the deplorable infatuation which led to the prostitution of the pulpit, in Boston, to excite to anarchy, rebellion, and civil war. It is delightful to contemplate its application in New-York, to the sacred, I had almost said the divine, purpose, of defending our fathers, our mothers, our sisters, our brothers, our wives, our children, our homes and our altars. The rev. Mr. M'Leod, a gentleman of powerful talents, preached a set of sermons, entitled, “A Scriptural View of the Character, Causes, and Ends of the Present War;” in which are displayed a holy zeal—a glowing spirit of patriotism, a profound knowledge of scripture, and an eloquence not unworthy of a Massillon or a Bourdaloue. I intended to have given copious extracts from them, but my limits forbid the indulgence of that intention, and confine me to a few paragraphs—enough, however, I trust, to induce readers of taste to possess themselves of the whole work.

“I affirm the *justice of the war from its commencement*. Our neutral trade was violently opposed, and almost totally destroyed; our property was captured; our fellow-citizens were enslaved, while peaceably pursuing their proper employment; and negociation failed, after the exertions of years, to procure redress for the past, or immunity for the future. To recover and preserve property, to redeem and to defend men, these are lawful causes of war. These are the causes of the present war. The argument requires neither art nor eloquence. It is obvious to every capacity. It is irresistible. It may be evaded, but it cannot be refuted. If it fail in extorting confession, it cannot fail in producing conviction.

“American property has been seized and destroyed: American citizens have been impressed and enslaved. These are the facts.

“War, in defence of property, of liberty, and of life, is lawful. This is the principle.

“Apply the principle to the facts. The United States have declared war, in order to vindicate the rights of property, of liberty, and of life. Therefore is the present war, from its origin, a defensive and a just war. This is the argument.

“You may speak about it, and write about it; you may close your eyes upon it: you may go round about, and fly from it: but you will in vain offer resist-

ance to its truth. The facts are notorious. The principle is confessed. The application is necessary.

"I would urge the support of the war, because I earnestly long for a permanent peace. You know the enemy. His claims will rise by his successes; and fall, in proportion to his defeats. The more he suffers, the more will he be disposed to relinquish the contest. The greater his danger, the sooner will he come to an accommodation. By consistency and unanimity, America might have finished this war as soon as it had commenced. It is only by affecting the fears of the foe, that he can be made to listen to the voice of equity.

"I would recommend the support of this war, because it is just. The United States ask for nothing but what they ought to have; what it is lawful for the enemy to give; what is, in its very nature, moral—the protection of property, and personal liberty. I pray for success to these righteous claims. I pray for courage to the warrior, and for success to the armaments by which the plea is urged, because the cause is just—because it is necessary to the repose of the world—because God has promised that this cause shall universally prevail.

"When your country is at war, in defence of her rights, it is your duty to encourage, by all lawful means, her exertions in the strife. It is criminal to diminish her strength, or impede her progress. To this principle I would call your notice from the pulpit, while our friends, and our brethren from the adjacent country are assembled round our city, to defend it from attack. While those among our fellow-worshippers in this house, who are fit to bear arms, are practising in the field, the arts of defensive warfare; while all ranks and classes of our fellow-citizens are employing their hands and their money in raising bulwarks on every assailable point, to protect our homes and our places of public worship, let us accompany them with our wishes and our prayers, lest we become an enslaved people.

"Those, who withhold their support from the war in which their country is engaged, do what tends to prolong the evil.

"When appeal is once made to the law of force, the parties, if they do not cease to reason, employ discussion only as an auxiliary to the sword. It then becomes a contest for victory. The aggressor, influenced originally by principles of injustice, is not likely to be corrected by his own success. The history of nations affords no instance of claims which occasioned war, being relinquished by the offending party merely because the resistance of the other was feeble. When a people are divided, they offer themselves an easy prey to the aggressor; and even if they should ultimately succeed in redressing the evil, their weakness and discord certainly prolong the contest. A protracted warfare, although ultimately successful, is a present evil; and the friends of a speedy peace will always, in war, be desirous to employ the energy which alone can deserve and secure a peace. With the work of death none should trifle. It is ruinous—it is cruel, to prolong, unnecessarily, even a war of defence. In so far as any member of the community, in public or in private, distracts the councils, or impedes the progress of those who conduct the war, he evidently prolongs the contest, and does what he can to prevent the return of peace. So far the guilt of a protracted warfare is chargeable upon him. It is, indeed, an evidence of the displeasure of the Deity, when a people, instead of unanimously co-operating for punishing the aggressor, are so divided and enfeebled, as to prolong, for years, a contest which might be brought to a successful issue almost immediately after its commencement. The man who withholds his support in such a case, is the enemy of peace: he loves his party more than he does his country, more than he does honour and justice; more even than humanity or his own interest, connected with the return of peace, who strives, for the sake of party, to enfeeble the arm of authority, to withhold the necessary resources, and to discourage the soldier.

"The Deity is a God of justice and of truth. He will have us to judge righteous judgment. He commands us to love the truth and the peace; and to promote the knowledge and practice of equity. Therefore he reproves those who do not support an equitable war, as the cause of God, the Supreme Judge. Judges, v. 23. "*Curse ye Meroz,*" (said the angel of the Lord,) "*curse ye bitterly the inhabitants thereof; because they came not to the help of the Lord, to the help of the Lord against the mighty.*"

THE END.

INDEX.

Achilles's tender heel,	438
Adams's Defence of the American Constitutions, tribute to,	39
Administration of Mr. Jefferson, weakness of,	56, 57
Admiralty address to the British navy,	65
Alexander, emperor, his opinion of the justice of the war,	240
Alien law, extract from,	51
Alien and sedition laws, 83, opposition to,	50
American revolution, barbarities perpetrated in,	44
American merchants, true policy of,	105
Americans vindicating the outrages of Great Britain,	124
American impressed sailors scourged for trying to procure redress,	187
American slaves on board British men of war,	210
American magnanimity, generosity and public spirit,	486
Appointment of Mr. Gallatin, as minister, impolitic,	63
Armistice, proposed by admiral Warren, 59—rejected by Mr. Madison, 60—impolicy of the rejection,	63
Armistice proposed by Mr. Madison, 61—rejected by Lord Castlereagh	61
Arnold, Benedict, treason of,	317
Associations to prevent the success of the loans,	285
Attack on the Chesapeake, statement of the, 108—Remarks on,	173
Baltimore Mercantile Memorial, extracts from,	93
Bank of the United States, non-renewal of the character of the,	58
Banks, bankruptcy of the,	470
Bankruptcies, numerous, in middle and southern states,	295
Baring, Sir Francis, purchased 2200 shares in the Bank U. States,	59
Baron, commodore, letter from,	114
Bayard, James A. his opinion of the orders in council,	242
Baring's inquiry into the effects of the orders in council,	123
Berlin Decree, <i>November 21, 1806,</i>	115
Berlin decree not enforced against American vessels, for 12 months,	117
Blake, Francis, remarks on,	313
Blind leading the blind,	304
Blockade of the coast from the Elbe to Brest,	115
Blockade, British definition of,	342
Blue lights,	457
Bonaparte complains of being libelled by Peletier,	435
Boston Mercantile Memorial, extracts from,	88
Boston banks, abstract of the state of the,	296
Boston has 44 members in the H. of R. of Massachusetts,	388
Boston, turbulence of,	253
Bourbons and Guises, deadly animosity between,	430

Boyle's (captain) blockade of the British dominions,	116
British depredations brought on the tapis in the senate of the U. S.	106
British importations, law limiting,	107
British proclamation, ordering the impressment of British subjects on board American vessels,	114
British government bills, advertisement for the sale of,	297
British prizes sent into Boston,	294
British depredations, calculation of the amount of,	239
British depredations, governor Plumer's opinion on,	240
British ministry deceived by their friends,	223
British government bills openly advertised for sale in Boston,	297
British depredations, mercantile meetings against,	87
British privateers, horrible picture of the rapacity of,	125
British system towards United States, impolicy of,	330
British ministers, indefensible conduct of,	339
Brougham, Henry, extract from speech of,	332
Caning, Mr. George, instruction of, to Mr. Erskine,	174
Caucuses, observations on,	459
Catlet, Dr. report of,	77
Certificate of Lieutenant B. Van Hoffman,	201
Chesapeake, proceedings respecting the attack upon the,	110, 111, 112
Chesapeake, murderous attack on the, 108, 173—Indignation excited by the,	110, 112, 113
Change in the prospects of the country,	40
Church is in danger, magical effects of the deceptive cry,	166
Civil war, danger of, 39, endeavours to produce,	41
Civil wars of France and England,	421, 422
Classification system, excellence of, 356, 357, 358—a measure of the American revolution,	378, 379
Cobbett, W. reflections of, on the impressment of American seamen,	182
Colonial trade, report of King's advocate upon,	86
Combination to paralyze the government, 295, ruinous consequences of, 288, particulars of,	300
Combination, treasonable, to bankrupt the government,	285
Commerce of America, all-important to England, 330—extent of	329
Commerce of different parts of the United States,	260
Commercial intercourse with Great Britain and France, act to interdict,	158
Committee of Congress, report of,	77
Compensation Law,	482
Conflagration at Washington, effects of,	73
Congress, lamentable imbecility of,	67, 68
Congress, imbecile proceedings of,	458
Congressional caucus, unconstitutional and illegal,	440, 441, 442
Conscription of Militia, Pennsylvania law respecting,	378
Conscription,	495
Consular certificates of origin, a cause of capture,	126
Constitutions of various states, extracts from,	358
Congress empowered to call out the militia in case of invasion,	363, 364
Copenhagen, destruction of, Mr. Roscoe's account of the,	344
Craig, Sir James, his instructions to John Henry,	144
Credentials from Sir James Craig, to John Henry,	145
Credulity, wonderful, of faction,	131
Critical situation of the United States,	39
Dacres, captain, address of, to the court martial,	202
Dardin's (Amy) horse, proceedings respecting,	70
Danes, Portuguese and Swedes, impressed in American vessels,	207
Davila's history of French civil wars, reference to,	39
Deane, Silas, treason of,	317
Debts of the United States, diminution of the,	401
Declaration of war against France, motion for, rejected,	248
Decatur, letter of, respecting blue lights,	457

Democrats threatened with vengeance as friends of Bonaparte,	392
Democrats rail at the appointment of Judge Jay to negotiate with England,	63
Democratic Societies,	480
Democrats, errors of, respecting government,	47
Deposition of Isaac Clark,	200
Deposition of Richard Thompson,	201
Direct taxes repealed under Mr. Jefferson's administration,	402
Discord, attempts to produce, between eastern and southern states,	255
Documents on the subject of impressment, annexed to the report of the committee of the legislature of Massachusetts, 211; Deposition of J. Eldridge, 211; of William Parsons, <i>ibid</i> ; of Caleb Loring, <i>ibid</i> ; of An- drew Haraden, 212; of Josiah Orne, 214; of Nathaniel Hooper, <i>ibid</i> ; of B. T. Reed, <i>ibid</i> .	
Domestic improvements and industry, progress of,	398
Duties paid by the different states, from 1791 to 1812,	276
Dyson, captain, unjust treatment of,	78
Eastern states, pretensions of, to superiority over the southern,	257
Eastern states, character of, at various periods,	258
Eastern states, greatly dependent upon the southern,	283
Eastern states, deeply interested in manufactures,	354
Eaton, Gen.	47
Eight per cent. loan, opposition to,	52
Embargo, act to enforce the	136
Embargo, flagrantly violated, 136—repealed,	158
Embargo, recommended to congress by merchants of New York,	160
Embargo, not duly enforced by Mr. Jefferson,	57
Embargo, factious clamour against,	132
Embargo, a wise, prudent, and necessary measure,	129, 130, 132, 133
Embargo, British proclamation invites to violation of,	135
Embargo, Philadelphia resolutions against,	137
Enforcing law, extracts from,	137
English outrages, details of,	342
English canaille detest foreigners of all descriptions,	315
England, magnanimous example of,	315
England struggling for her existence, a mere delusion,	341
England more ably defended in America than in London,	123
England, elaborate defences of,	177, 178
England carries on with France the trade interdicted to the U. States,	239
England makes war without any declaration,	436
Error, egregious, committed by the author of the Olive Branch,	217
Errors of the democratic party,	46
Erskine arrangement, liberal and magnanimous,	162
Erskine arrangement, loudly and universally applauded,	166
Erskine arrangement, newspaper extracts respecting,	168, 169, 170
Erskine arrangement, analysis of,	171
Erskine arrangement, cause of its rejection,	172
Erskine, Hon. David M. letters to the secretary of state,	163, 164
Erskine, Mr. George Canning's instructions to,	174
Exports of the United States,	473
Exports of the United States, statements of the	399
Exports of the United States, increase of,	86
Exports of the United States, foreign and domestic, 260—foreign, 262, domestic, 264—various comparisons of the	261, 262
Extract from the proceedings of the legislature of Massachusetts,	236
Extract from the report of the committee recommending a declaration of war,	237
Extract from the memorial of the merchants of Salem,	96
Extract from New York memorial,	89, 198
Extract from the memorial of the merchants of Baltimore,	93, 199
Extract from the memorial of the merchants of Newhaven,	95, 199
Faction, a tremendous scourge,	463

Faction, consequences of,	39
Faction, deleterious effects of, respecting impressment,	207
Federal convention, proceedings in,	81
Federal party, division among,	81
Federal constitution, formed with great difficulty,	83
Federal party, their unavailing struggles for power,	409
Federal constitution, happy consequences of,	405
Federalists, errors of,	81
Federalists, address of the author to,	321
Federalists pursued the policy they reprobated in the democrats,	46
Federalists in 1793, 4 and 5, friends of order and good government,	312
Foreigners, illiberality of prejudices against,	314
Foreigners, list of, who supported the cause of America,	319
Foreign commerce, progress of,	399
Fort Washington, capture of,	78
Foster, Augustus, Esq. extract of a letter from,	249
Fox's (Charles James) blockade from the Elbe to Brest,	115
France, American injustice to,	103
France, urbanity of,—hideous change in its manners,	43
Freedom of the seas,	477
French influence, utter want of foundation of the charge of,	113, 166
Gardiner, Rev. J. S. J. extracts from his political sermons,	307
General government, wonderful pusillanimity of the,	391
General tickets, extremely partial and unjust,	386
Gerrymanderism, definition and injustice of,	383
Generosity of nations, a nonentity,	38
Gilman, governor, extract from his speech,	394
Gottenburg, negociation at, impolitic,	64
Government, theories of,	493
Governor of Massachusetts, his praise of Mr. Madison,	169
Great Britain egregiously deceived by her friends,	223
Great Britain vulnerable in her commerce,	436
Griswold, governor, extract from an address of,	243
Griswold, governor, his opinion of the conduct of France and England,	243
Guerriere, particulars of the capture of the,	202
Guerriere, extracts from the logbook of the,	202
Guises and Bourbons, deadly animosity between,	430
Hamilton's views of the Federal Constitution,	82
Hartford Convention,	473
Hartford convention censures the repeal of direct taxes,	402
Hartford convention, extract from an address to,	424
Henry, John, ill requited by the British,	456
Henry, John, extravagant bonus given to,	456
Henry, John, statement of the mission of,	143
Henry, John, letters from,	144, 145
Hillhouse, Mr. invites to insurrection,	143
Horizon, atrocious case of the,	117, 130
Horizon, letter respecting the capture of the,	117
Imbecility of the government, reproaches of the,	220
Import duties,	477
Impressment,	495
Impressment, resolution of the senate of the United States, against,	106
Impressment on board the Baltimore, vessel of the U. S.	412
Impressment of American seamen, reflections on,	181, 2, 3, 4
Impressment of American seamen, various views of,	180—199
Ingratitude of the United States,	49
Insurrection and civil war, easily excited, difficult to suppress,	327
Instructions of Mr. Madison to Mr. Monroe,	181
Instructions from Timothy Pickering, Esq. to Rufus King, Esq.	185, 186
Ireland and Irishmen, strong federal tribute to,	320
Ireland and Irishmen, elegant defence of,	320
Irish and Frenchmen, objects of jealousy,	315

Irishmen in Pennsylvania line, sufferings and hardships of,	316
Irishmen, zealous in their support of the government,	319
Izard, departure of from Plattsburg, highly injudicious,	79
Jackson, Francis James, Esq. extract of a letter from,	248
Jackson, General, exploits of,	48
Jacobin and Jacobinism, definition of,	312
Jay's Treaty, factious opposition to,	52
Jefferson, Thomas, malignant abuse of,	167
Jews, deplorable and factious state of the,	13
Jury Trial, fact respecting,	479
King, Rufus, Esq. vote of thanks to him on the classification bill,	382
King, Cyrus, speech of, on the classification bill,	364
King, Rufus, conduct of, respecting impressment,	206
Knox, General, his plan for classification of the Militia,	380
Ladd, Eliphalet, deposition of,	195
Legislature of Ohio, their declaration respecting the war,	241
Letter from the Secretary of State to Admiral Warren,	61
Letter from Mr. Russel, to Lord Castlereagh,	61
Letter of John Quincy Adams, Esq. to Harrison G. Otis, Esq.	182
Letter from Thos. Jefferson, secretary of state, to Rufus King, Esq.	184
Letter from Rufus King, Esq. to Timothy Pickering,	186, 188
Letter from Silas Talbot, to Timothy Pickering, Esq.	187
Letter from Timothy Pickering, secretary of state, to Silas Talbot,	188
Letter from John Marshall, secretary of state, to Rufus King,	191
Letter from T. Pickering, secretary of state, to president Adams,	193
Letter from Benjamin Stoddart, Esq. secretary of the navy, to do.	193
Letter from Oliver Wolcott, Esq. to do.	193
Letter from James M'Henry, Esq. secretary at war, to do.	194
Letter from Commodore Rodgers,	201
Letter from Commodore Porter to the author of the Olive Branch,	201
Letter from John Nichols,	202
Letter from John Davis, of Abel,	203
Letter from Commodore Decatur to the secretary of the navy,	204
Letter from Captain Capel to Commodore Decatur,	204
Letter from Commodore Decatur to Captain Capel,	205
Liberality and forbearance of the United States,	107
Licentiousness of the Press, instances of,	431
Liston's, Mr. projet of a convention respecting deserters,	193
Liverpool, Lord, letter of, respecting John Henry,	156, 157
Lloyd, James, Esq. extract from a speech of,	242
Lloyd, James, Esq. extract of a letter from,	250
Lloyd, James, his opinion of the Orders in Council,	242
Loans, ruinous dependence upon,	80
Loans to government, treasonable efforts to prevent the success of,	285
Loans, advertisements of Boston brokers, respecting,	291
Lyon, Matthew, severe case of,	51
Machiavelian advice of John Henry,	150
Madison, James, administration of,	460
Maryland representation, unequal, unjust, and oppressive,	388
Massachusetts degraded by faction, 302—compared with Tennessee,	
303—invaded without resistance,	503
Massachusetts has a representative of her black population,	350
Massachusetts, factious and turbulent spirit of,	284
Massachusetts, representation in, very ill arranged,	387
Members of the house of representatives of the United States,	353
Merchants, character of, by Edmund Burke,	101
Merchants utterly fail to redeem their pledge,	102
Merchants miserably mistake their true policy and interests,	104
Mercantile meetings to remonstrate against British depredation,	87
Merit unrewarded,	482
Milan Decree, December 17, 1807	120
Milan decree, atrocious wickedness of the,	151

Miller, Mr. Speech of on the classification bill,	-	-	364
Militia, extracts from state constitutions respecting the,	-	-	358
Militia, extracts from state laws respecting the,	-	-	360
Militia, extracts from the letters of Gen. Washington on the subject of,	-	-	369
Militia defence, examination of its efficiency,	-	-	367
Militia service, right of society to coerce,	-	-	358
Militia laws of various states, extracts from,	-	-	360, 361
Militia drafts, oppressive, unequal, and unjust,	-	-	366
Militia defence, inefficiency of, 368—Gen. Washington's denuncia-	-	-	369, 370
tions of,	-	-	76
Minor, col. report of,	-	-	224
Minority, inexplicable conduct of the,	-	-	285
Money, the sinews of war,	-	-	469
Monroe's Treaty, rejection of,	-	-	87
Monroe and Pinkney, extract of letter from,	-	-	53, 469
Monroe and Pinkney's treaty rejected by Mr. Jefferson,	-	-	293
Morals, horrible depravation of,	-	-	393
Morse, Rev. Jedidiah, extracts from a political sermon of,	-	-	201
Muster books of Moselle and Sappho,	-	-	432
National reflections, highly unjust,	-	-	47
Navy, democratic opposition to,	-	-	401
National debt of the United States, tables of the,	-	-	222
Newspaper statements, erroneous,	-	-	70
Neglect of public opinion, ruinous consequences of,	-	-	95
Newhaven Mercantile Memorial, extracts from,	-	-	220, 221
Newspaper misrepresentation, ruinous consequences of,	-	-	96
Newburyport Mercantile Memorial, extracts from,	-	-	100
Newburyport threatens to resist the government "even unto blood,"	-	-	231
New Orleans, remarks on the occlusion of,	-	-	289
Newspaper denunciations of subscribers to government loans,	-	-	89
New York Mercantile Memorial, extracts from,	-	-	401
New York Memorial, recommending an embargo	-	-	461
Nominations, improvement in,	-	-	161
Non-intercourse reprobated by democrats, 57—and by federalists	-	-	107
Non-importation law, tenor of,	-	-	160
Non-intercourse law, view of the,	-	-	41, 42
Northern Grievances, extracts from,	-	-	54
Note of the British Commissioners, appended to Monroe's treaty,	-	-	204
O'Brien, Barnard, impressed seaman, certificate respecting,	-	-	311
Opposition to the government, ruinous consequences of the,	-	-	246
Orders in Council, and Decrees, resolution respecting the	-	-	334, 335
Orders in Council, evidence respecting the operation of the	-	-	117
Order in Council, Nov. 1793, 85—Nov. 11, 1807,	-	-	245
Orders in Council, denunciation of, by James Lloyd, 242—by James	-	-	85
A. Bayard, 243—by H. G. Otis,	-	-	122
Orders in Council, 1793, ruinous consequences of,	-	-	329
Orders in Council, Nov. 11, 1807, 117—Nov. 25, 1807, 120—defended	-	-	334
by Americans,	-	-	393
Orders in Council required to be resisted,	-	-	245
Orders in Council, inquiry into the effects of the, 333—testimony against,	-	-	330
Osgood, Rev. David, extracts from the political sermons of,	-	-	309, 392
Otis, Harrison Gray, Esq. extract of a letter from,	-	-	68
Outrages, succession of, perpetrated on this country by the British,	-	-	37
Pacific measures defeated by mercantile opposition,	-	-	45
Parish, Rev. Elijah, extracts from his political sermons,	-	-	13
Parliamentary proceedings in England,	-	-	311
Party and faction the bane of republics,	-	-	141
Party writers, deceptive conduct of,	-	-	312
Party men, thorough-going, rarely honest politicians,	-	-	
Parties change names and principles,	-	-	
Patrotic proceedings, statement of,	-	-	
Peace party, ruinous consequences of their exertions,	-	-	

Peace party, composed of warlike materials,	230
Peletier, prosecuted for a libel on Bonaparte,	435
Pelham's Essays, extracts from,	255
Pennsylvania line, sufferings and heroism of,	316
Perceval, Spencer, assassination of,	339
Perry, consequences of his victory,	48
Philadelphia Mercantile Memorial, extracts from,	91
Philadelphia, citizens of, as religious as those of Boston,	259
Philadelphia, ingratitude of,	316
Pickering, Mr. Timothy, vote of, against British depredations, 106— against impressment,	106
Pickering, T. wonderful contrast of the opinions of,	133
Pinkney, Wm. character of,	339
Political writers, partiality of,	45
Political sermons, extracts from,	307, 308
Popular delusion, influence of,	37
Popular delusion, extraordinary instance of,	287
Population of the United States, progress of the,	404
Plumer, governor, extract from his speech 1812,	240
Proclamation inviting to a violation of the embargo,	135
President's proclamation restoring intercourse with Great Britain,	165
Population of the United States, tables of the progress of the,	404
Pickering, Mr. Timothy, letters of, respecting impressment,	188, 190
Pittsburg, Insurrection at,	453
Proclamation, interdicting our ports to British vessels of war,	108
Power of congress over the militia, inquiry into the,	363
Preparations, neglect of,	64
Preparations for war,	217, 218, 219
“President Madison to Elba,” a favourite idea with many,	11
Pretensions of Great Britain exposed by Boston merchants,	88
Pretensions of England, extravagant,	174
Printer at Reading scourged by a band of Philadelphia volunteers,	223
Proceedings of congress, imbecility and folly of,	67, 68
Prosperity of the United States, view of,	396, 398, 407
Prophets,	478
Pulpit politics, a hideous abomination,	41, 305, to 310
Quincey, Josiah, inexplicable and inconsistent conduct of,	227
Quincey, Josiah, seditious speech of,	348
Randolph, John, resolutions of, in favour of Mr. Madison,	169
Repeal of orders in council, extract from the,	62
Repeal of orders in council, very equivocal,	62
Report of Timothy Pickering, Esq. secretary of state, to congress,	195
Reproaches by the minority of Congress against the majority,	220
Republics, history of, not duly studied by the democrats,	47
Resolution of the senate U. States against the rule of 1756,	106
Resolutions of the Federal Republicans of New York,	199
Resolution of the town of Gloucester respecting the embargo, 141—of Bath, <i>ibid</i> ; of the town of Boston, <i>ibid</i> ; of the town of Topsfield, 142—of the town of Augusta,	142
Resolutions of the revolutionary congress, respecting intercourse with the enemy,	297
Retaliation, a mere pretence on the part of England,	242, 243
Revenues of the United States, increase of the,	400, 401
Richard Carter, deposition of,	195
Road to Ruin, delusion and misrepresentation of,	304
Rule of 1756, utterly abandoned by the British government, 86—a mere pretext to cover predatory seizures,	95
Russian mediation, misrepresentation respecting,	72
Ryland, H. W. his letters to John Henry,	144, 154, 157
Salem Mercantile Memorial, extracts from,	96
Secretary of state's letters to Hon. D. M. Erskine,	163, 164

Sedition law, extract from,	50
Sedition,	478
Senate of New Hampshire, extract from the reply of,	394
Senate of Massachusetts, their declaration respecting the war,	240
Senate of Maryland, their declaration respecting the war,	241
Senate and house of representatives of Massachusetts, their praise of Mr. Madison,	170
Senatorial representation, iniquitous arrangement of,	384, 385
Separation of the states, project for a, in 1796,	255, 256, 257
Separation of the states, steadily advocated in Boston,	56
Septembrization perpetrated by a small portion of the mob of Paris,	433
Smuggling carried to great excess in Boston,	292, 293
Sober character of the Americans no security against civil war,	43
Southern states, unfavourable anticipations respecting, belied by events,	411
Southern states, shameful libel against the,	255
Specie, accumulation of in Boston,	294
Specie, oppressive drafts for, on middle and southern states,	295
Speech of Henry Brougham, Esq. extract from a,	332
Stansbury, general, report of,	76
Statement of applications on the subject of impressment, to the British government,	215, 251
Thayer, Hiram, hard case of	204
Thompson Richard, impressed seaman, sufferings of,	201
Tonnage of the United States, view of,	274, 403
Transit duties, tariff of, payable by American vessels,	121
Transit duties, 121—F. J. Jackson's view of the payment of,	248
United States, glorious prospects of, 40—remarks upon,	41
United States, not sufficiently munificent towards great merit,	48
United States, view of the prosperity of,	14, 396
Van Ness, gen. report of, to a committee of congress,	75
Virginia representation, unequal, unjust, and oppressive,	389
War, constant cause of with England,	53
War, violently opposed by the minority,	228, 229, 230
War proceedings in congress, details of the,	224
War with England inevitable but by sacrifice of national character,	229
War, repeated clamour for,	230, 231
War, inquiry into the justice of,	236
War proceedings in congress—yeas and nays,	224
War, view of the,	455
War, opposition to the,	479
Washington, general, his great merits and services,	405
Washington, capture of, documents respecting,	75, 76, 77
Washington Benevolent Societies,	481
Washington, libels against,	467
Wealthy men lending their aid to overturn the government,	12
Wellington, lord, immensely rewarded,	49
Western Insurrection,	453
Whitby, captain, honourably acquitted for the murder of Captain Pearce,	200
Wilkinson and Hampton, violent enemies,	67
Winder's orders to destroy Fort Washington,	78
Wolcott, O. objections to Mr. Liston's projet respecting deserters	193
Yeas and Nays on various questions regarding war,	224



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